

FEEDING THE GERMAN EAGLE

*Soviet Economic Aid to
Nazi Germany, 1933–1941*

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Preface

“Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong,” states Murphy’s Law. And this proved to be the case with the economic foreign policy that the ruthless leader of the Soviet Union, Josef Stalin, attempted to follow from 1939 to 1941 in regard to Germany. According to his logical and cautious plan, trade with the Nazis would simultaneously keep war away from Soviet borders, prolong a debilitating struggle between communism’s capitalist enemies, and significantly strengthen the Soviet military and war economy. It all made perfect sense, except for the appearance of Mr. Murphy, this time in the guise of the equally brutal, but often incautious and illogical, Adolf Hitler. While contemporary military wisdom assumed that Germany would become enmeshed in World War I–style, drawn-out conflicts, Hitler won a series of rapid military victories at the longest of odds against Poland, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece. And while contemporary military wisdom also assumed that Germany would have to deal with the growing Anglo-Saxon alliance first before a struggle with the USSR would be at all possible, Hitler did the unthinkable and launched his invasion of the Soviet Union, codenamed Operation Barbarossa, on June 22, 1941. In short, Stalin’s rational plans fell victim to Murphy’s Law.

Mr. Murphy has also made an occasional appearance in the course of researching and writing this project. On the whole, however, I have been continually amazed by the incredible support I have received. I would like to acknowledge first of all the guidance and sound advice of James Diehl of Indiana University-Bloomington and of my father, Edward Ericson, Jr., of Calvin College. I also want to thank the following senior colleagues for their advice and the insights of their works: William Cohen, Hiroaki Kuromiya, Charles Jelavich, and the late Barbara Jelavich, all of Indiana University; John Dodge of Indiana

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Abbreviations

AA	Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office)
AG	Aktiengesellschaft (Incorporated)
AGK	Ausfuhrgemeinschaft für Kriegsgerät (Export Association for War Materials)
Akt.	Akten (Document)
APA	Außenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP (Foreign Policy Office of the Nazi Party)
ArWI	Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut (Institute for Industrial Sciences)
BA	Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (Federal Archives in Koblenz)
BAAP	Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Potsdam (Federal Archives in Potsdam)
BAMA	Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg (Federal-Military Archives in Freiburg)
Bd.	Band (Volume)
BdRAM	Büro des Reichsaussenministers (Foreign Ministry Bureau)
BdSts	Büro des Staatssekretärs (State Secretary's Bureau)
BfVP	Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan (Representative for the Four-Year Plan)
BM	Botschaft Moskau (German Embassy in Moscow)
cif	Cost, insurance, freight (all costs paid for by the supplier)
DAD	Der Aussenhandel Deutschlands (German Foreign Trade)
DAF	Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Worker's Front)
DBFP	Documents on British Foreign Policy
DDfWiO	Deutsche Delegation für Wirtschaftsverhandlungen in

	Ostasien (German Delegation for Economic Talks in East Asia)
Dego	German Gold Discount Bank
DGFP	Documents on German Foreign Policy
doc.	Document
DR	Dienststelle Ribbentrop (Special Office Ribbentrop)
EfA	Einrichtungen für den Aussenhandel (Institutions for Foreign Trade)
FAH	Familienarchiv Hügel (Hügel Family Archives)
fob	Free on board (receiver pays for costs after placed on ship)
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GHH	Gutehoffnungshütte AG
GmbH	Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (Limited)
GPO	Government Printing Office
HA Krupp	Historisches Archiv der Friedrich Krupp GmbH, Essen (Krupp Archives in Essen)
HaPol	Handelspolitische Abteilung (Economic Policy Section)
HWK	Sonderstab für Handelskrieg und wirtschaftliche Kampfmassnahmen (Special Staff Office for Economic Warfare)
IfW	Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel (Institute for World Economics in Kiel)
IG	I. G. Farben
IMT	International Military Tribunal
kg	Kilogram
MA	Mannesmann Archiv, Düsseldorf
M.E.	Mineralöl-Einfuhr GmbH (Oil Import, Ltd.)
MGFA	Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Military History Research Office)
n.	Footnote
NC&A	Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression
NE-Metalle	Nichteisenmetalle (Nonferrous Metals)
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National-Socialist German Worker's Party)
NSR	Nazi-Soviet Relations
OKH	Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command)
OKW	Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High Command)
PA	Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn (Foreign Office Archives)
Pol.	Politische Abteilung (Political Section)
PrA	Pressearchive (Press Archive)
RA	Rußlandausschuß der Deutschen Wirtschaft (Russia Committee of German Industry)

RAM	Reichsaussenminister (Foreign Minister)
RfEuL	Reichsstellen für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (Offices for Food and Agriculture)
RfF	Reichsstelle für Fette (Office for Fats)
RfG	Reichsstelle für Getreide (Office for Grains)
RfM	Reichsfinanzministerium (Finance Ministry)
RfW	Reichsamt für Wirtschaftsausbau (Office for Economic Development)
RfWP	Reichsamt für wehrwirtschaftliche Planung (Office of War Economy Planning)
RK	Reichskanzlei (Chancellery)
RL	Reichsministerium der Luftfahrt (Air Transport Ministry)
RM	Reichsmark
Ro	Rohstoff Abteilung (Raw Material Section)
RSt	Reichsstelle (Imperial Office)
RWK	Reichswirtschaftskammer (Chamber of Commerce)
RWM	Reichswirtschaftsministerium (Economics Ministry)
RWW	Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, Köln (Rhenish-Westphalian Economic Archives in Cologne)
Skl.	Seekriegsleitung (Head of Naval Warfare)
SR	Statistisches Reichsamt (Bureau of Statistics)
Stb	Stabsabteilung (Staff Section)
t	Tons (Metric)
v.	Von (German Title of Nobility)
VO	Verbindungsoffizier (Liaison Officer)
Vowi	Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung (Political Economy Section)
WA	Werksarchiv (Company Archives)
WFSt	Wehrmachtsführungsstab (Armed Forces Command Staff)
WG	Wirtschaftsgruppen (Economic Group)
Wi	Wehrwirtschaftliche Abteilung (War Economy Section)
Wifo	Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft m.b.H. (Economic Research Corporation)
WiRüAmt	Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt (War Economy and Armaments Office)
ZAV	Zusatz-Ausgleichs-Verfahren (German Export Subsidy)

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Introduction

In the late afternoon of September 27, 1939, Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and his entourage were winging their way to Moscow to solidify the tentative partnership worked out in the economic treaty of August 19 and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23. But Ribbentrop's Condor had been delayed in Königsberg for lunch, refueling, and more passengers, and the slower JU-52 escort plane carrying second-level officials arrived first. It was, therefore, the economic negotiators, in particular Dr. Karl Schnurre, the head of the German Foreign Ministry's Eastern European Economic Section, who initially received the red-carpet treatment.¹

This confusion at the Khodynka airfield was emblematic of the wider developments in the Nazi-Soviet relationship from 1936 to 1941. For in many ways it was Schnurre and not Ribbentrop who was the key figure in the evolution of the Nazi-Soviet partnership because the economic ties were often more central to whatever friendship existed between the two states than their political or military cooperation. And for good reason. With a major war approaching, Germany increasingly needed Russia's raw materials, and the USSR needed German machines and technology.

THE PROBLEM

The central problem facing Hitler was lack of raw materials: how could Germany, a relatively small country with few natural resources, fight a major war against continent- or globe-spanning empires? By the late thirties the *Führer* had three options: solidify the autarkic economy before going to war (the Four-Year Plan approach), conquer and plunder the needed resources (the Austria-Czechoslovakia strategy), or reach agreements with one or more major powers (the

Nazi-Soviet Pact proposal). Although Hitler and the Nazi leadership appeared to prefer building up a self-sufficient economy (the autarky approach), the necessary infrastructure was expensive and would not be in place until 1942 at the earliest. The loot-and-plunder strategy ran the risk of escalating into the big war that Hitler was trying to avoid (as exemplified by what happened in Poland). Hitler had looked to an understanding with England in the mid-1930s, but by the summer of 1938 he had intensified his naval program (always a key indicator of his intentions towards Great Britain) and had declared that we “must reckon England permanently among [our] enemies.”²

With his other options closed, Hitler, reluctantly to be sure, had to consider closer relations with the Soviet Union for economic reasons alone. As a number of German studies produced on the eve of the war argued, only the USSR could plug some of the major gaps in the German war economy, particularly in oil, manganese, rubber, and perhaps even grain.³

Without oil, of course, the German military would be unable to carry out any of the tasks Hitler had assigned for it. Unfortunately for the *Führer*, the Greater Reich could only supply 25 percent of its own oil needs,⁴ leaving Germany 2 million tons short a year⁵ and an eye-popping 10 million tons below planned mobilization totals.⁶ With Germany cut off from its (and the world’s) main supplier, the United States, Hitler would have to look to potential European sources for his oil, namely to Rumania and Russia.

The problem was similar with regard to metals and metal ores such as chrome, wolfram, nickel, molybdenum, and manganese, all necessary to produce the hardened steel used in tanks, ships, and other weapons of war. But Germany relied entirely on imports for many of these raw materials, imports that would end once the war began. Although the manganese situation was somewhat better, with the Greater Reich producing 40 percent of its own needs,⁷ the British blockade would cut Germany’s link to South Africa, its main supplier. Again, the 165,000-tons-a-year shortfall could only be made good by the Soviet Union.⁸ Furthermore, Hitler would need Stalin’s permission if he wanted to ship wolfram and molybdenum from China and chrome from Turkey along Russian rail lines.

Hitler would also need Soviet help procuring and shipping another crucial resource from the Far East—rubber. As the Second Reich had discovered in World War I, shortages of rubber meant fewer tires and fewer shoes, among other things. The German military, in other words, had to have rubber as much as it did oil and steel. Although by 1939 Germany’s developing synthetic materials plants could handle about 50 percent of the Reich’s rubber needs,⁹ even these plants still required huge amounts of natural rubber to mix with the synthetic product. But the rubber production of Malaysia and the East Indies was dominated by the British and the Dutch. With stockpiles sufficient for only two months,¹⁰ Hitler had to find some way to get more rubber to the Reich.

In comparison to these raw material shortages in oil, metals, and rubber, Germany’s food supply was fairly secure. Imports made up only 11 percent of the Reich’s overall food requirements. On the other hand, imports of fats and oils

accounted for 40 percent of Germany's needs.¹¹ Here, also, Soviet imports of Ukrainian grains or Soviet transshipments of Manchurian soybeans could make up the shortfall, a shortfall that would only grow if Germany conquered more territories (such as France and the Benelux countries) with an overall food deficit and if the Greater Reich's food production decreased as a result of the war (which it did).

Of course, the Soviets would clearly want something substantial in return for supplying raw materials they themselves needed for their own expanding war economy. In the short term, the Soviet Union needed military equipment and weapons designs to strengthen the purge-weakened Red Army and Red Navy. For example, the Soviets would ultimately ask for, among other things, gun turrets, cruisers, mines, battleship blueprints, and the latest German aircraft. In the long term, the Soviets also required machine tools and new technology to help them develop their own industrial base. German construction of synthetic materials plants, for instance, would initially loom very large in German-Soviet economic negotiations.¹² Such demands, however, would prove difficult for a Germany already engaged against the West. How could the Reich afford to sell guns to the Soviets that the *Wehrmacht* or the *Kriegsmarine* might need to fight the English and French?

Even if the two sides could agree on the amounts and types of items to be traded, a major stumbling block would simply be transporting the goods to the other party. The Soviet transportation network was woefully underdeveloped. Roads were nonexistent, and the rail lines could barely handle their current loads, especially the Trans-Siberian route to the Far East. Soviet trains also ran on a broader gauge than those of the rest of Europe, creating tremendous complications for exchanging goods between the two countries (a problem that became even worse with the redrawing of boundary lines in late 1939 and 1940). Water transport might be able to take up some of the slack, but the overall situation was problematic, to say the least.¹³ In short, getting Germany and the USSR together might be a difficult match to make.

OF POLITICS AND WAR ECONOMIES

Nevertheless, both sides, and Germany in particular, desperately wanted the other's economic help. If these economic relations were so important, however, why are they still so poorly understood? The answer is two-fold. First, the key documents for the economic negotiations are either missing or scattered throughout various archives. As the editors of *Documents on German Foreign Policy* explain, "the basic secret and open files of the Economic Policy Department on the Soviet Union are missing for the period covered by this volume, as are the economic files of the Embassy in Moscow."¹⁴ Published collections that might at least bring together the remaining documents have followed the pattern of the secondary literature and skipped over the "long and bulky" economic negotiations in order to concentrate on the political negotiations.¹⁵ Consequently, one must turn

to unpublished sources in various German archives to find the real story of how valuable Soviet economic aid was for Germany during World War II.¹⁶

Second, and probably more important, the political and military events appear flashier and more dramatic—economics as the dull science versus Ribbentrop swooping into Moscow to sign last-minute treaties that reshape the face of Europe. As a result, even those works that one might expect to cover the economic relations and their importance for Germany in some detail, such as histories of the German-Soviet relationship or studies of the German war economy, have largely relegated this issue to the sidelines in favor of other questions.

What are those other issues? In the case of the general histories of the war in Europe, the focus has usually been on the ease or difficulty of the German advance. Historians divide into two camps. Much of the early writing was based on the memoirs and autobiographies of German military leaders¹⁷ and consequently provided an often distorted version of events in which Hitler's mistakes, real and otherwise, were analyzed in excruciating detail while the mistakes of various subordinates were glossed over. In other words, Hitler, or Stalin in the case of the Soviet Union,¹⁸ became the scapegoat for practically every German misstep made during the war. Without the *Führer*, supposedly, the *Wehrmacht* would have easily won the war.

Much of the professional historical writing over the past three or four decades has tried to puncture the myth of an invincible German military machine hamstrung by Hitler.¹⁹ Instead, it was Hitler's willingness to risk adventurous campaign strategies and try innovative tactics that proved a key factor in Germany's success during the first two years of the war. Those failures that Germany did encounter were due in much greater measure to various supporting players (particularly in the military) than had been previously realized. Even the more popular-level histories have caught on, noting that Germany's early conquests were, in the case of the German lightning success in France, for example, "almost a miracle."²⁰ And close-run victories might easily have become defeats without Soviet economic and political support.

As for the German war economy, the discussion has centered on the extent of the Reich's mobilization efforts. Here again we find two major arguments. The early works contended that the Germans never really mobilized until 1942 or later.²¹ The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, for instance, reached "the [inescapable] conclusion . . . that Germany's war production was not limited by its war potential—by the resources at its disposal—but by demand; in other words, by the notions of the German war leaders of what was required to win. The Germans did not plan, nor were they prepared for, a long war."²² According to Alan Milward, this delayed mobilization was part of Hitler's explicit design for a *Blitzkrieg* economy that "allowed Germany to play the part of a great power," and avoid "the total economic commitment of 'total war'" by fighting a series of campaigns in short bursts.²³

More recent scholarship, however, has concluded that the Germans were mobilizing for total war from 1939 at the latest, and probably from 1936.²⁴ The

plan was to construct the military-industrial complex first and then build the ships, tanks, and planes. But when the big war they were expecting in 1943 arrived in 1939 instead, the Germans were forced into a “total war of improvisation” in which they tried to do both simultaneously. Far from having excess industrial capacity in the first two years of the war, “all the figures show conclusively that the German economy had converted the great bulk of its labour and capacity to war work by the end of 1941.”²⁵ Any economic aid, therefore, would have been important to the straining German economy.

In regard to the general German-Soviet relationship, most historians have skipped the economic negotiations and concentrated on the lead-up to the Nazi-Soviet Pact in the summer of 1939²⁶ and the development and implementation of Operation Barbarossa in the summer of 1941.²⁷ The primary issue has been which of these two powers was the aggressor—who initiated talks in 1939, for example, and who started planning to attack whom in 1940 and 1941? Furthermore, since their ideological differences were supposedly so great, why did both powers decide to work together from 1939 to 1941?

Again we find two primary arguments—Stalin as reluctant appeaser or as cautious expansionist. Although there have been some extremely pro-Soviet works (Stalin as far-sighted anti-Nazi)²⁸ or pro-German works (Hitler waging a preventive war against Bolshevism),²⁹ most historians fall into either of these two less extreme camps. The “appeasers” argue that Stalin preferred to work with France and Britain but was forced by the West’s dilatoriness into a last-minute agreement with Hitler. And as Germany’s power continued to grow, Stalin had no choice but to appease Hitler even further in order to avoid Nazi aggression or possibly even the nightmare vision of complete capitalist encirclement.³⁰ The “expansionists” contend that Stalin preferred an alliance with Hitler from the very beginning, because it offered him security, territory, technology, and more possibilities to further his world revolutionary goals.³¹ Any delays were designed primarily to raise Stalin’s asking price.

MURPHY’S LAW

Almost sixty years after World War II began, these debates about the general course of the war, German economic mobilization, and Nazi-Soviet relations continue. The opening of the Soviet archives was supposed to answer some of these questions, but the two recent books based on these documents have come to opposite conclusions.³² Since German-Soviet economic relations profoundly influenced all these aspects of the war, this study can shed some light on these historiographical debates. If Germany was barely mobilized and still easily winning the war, for instance, then closer political and economic relations with the Soviet Union would have meant relatively little to the Reich, and the documents would probably show the Soviets initiating contacts and appeasing the growing German colossus. In fact, a close study of German-Soviet trade supports the more recent version of events in which a resource-poor Reich was barely

winning its “total war of improvisation” and therefore had to approach the USSR first and accede to most of Stalin’s demands. The “expansionists,” in other words, are right, though perhaps more because of Stalin’s emphasis on *realpolitik* than the ideological or personal motivations some have attributed to Stalin.³³ Stalin’s early and frequent approaches to the Germans and his tough bargaining throughout show him not to be appeasing Hitler but to be eager for closer relations with the Reich and also to be taking advantage of an increasingly desperate German economic situation to expand the USSR’s power.

Among those few historians who have focused on German-Soviet economic relations, however, not all have agreed with this interpretation.³⁴ In fact, the only other substantive piece on the trade negotiations, Heinrich Schwendemann’s revised dissertation, supports the “appeasers” position.³⁵ Schwendemann is thorough, analytical, and provocative. Unfortunately, he is also too often misleading. The problem is twofold: Schwendemann’s desire to be completely original—his “pride,” if you will; and his bias or “prejudice” against the often superior German source material in favor of other evidence. The result is an intriguing but ultimately flawed work.³⁶

So what do the extensive but little-used German files tell us about the economic relationship and its significance? This study makes possible at least five major conclusions which will serve as the building blocks for the detailed narrative to follow:

- (1) The German war economy suffered from continuing raw material shortages in a series of key areas that, if Hitler were to continue his expansionist policies, could only be dealt with by economic cooperation with or domination of the Soviet Union. Hitler preferred the latter policy (as did many in the military), but was willing to follow the former course for as long as he thought necessary.
- (2) Stalin appeared to prefer an agreement with Germany over one with the Allies in part because these German economic needs gave him a superior bargaining position that he exploited logically, and often separately from the political situation, to extract economic concessions from the Germans throughout the entire course of the relationship. Although Stalin did occasionally use some elements of economic blackmail for political purposes, especially in the earlier phases of the relationship, and less frequently a sort of economic appeasement, particularly at the very end of the partnership, the Soviet *Vozhd* concentrated on hard-nosed economic bargaining to get the best trade arrangements he could and expand Russia’s power.
- (3) Hitler’s new focus in July 1940 on attacking Russia instead of England was made primarily for ideological reasons but also because of increasing concerns that the Soviet Union could not be trusted as an ally and that the Soviet trade relationship would not aid Germany enough to see it through a possible long-term struggle with the Anglo-Saxon powers. That these concerns were shared by many in the military and elsewhere goes far toward

explaining the support that planning for Operation Barbarossa received among Germany's ruling elite.

- (4) Despite the tough Soviet bargaining and the German concerns about the extent of Soviet aid, Russian shipments and trans-shipments of raw materials made a crucial contribution to the German war-making capability in the first two years of the war. Gerhard Weinberg's initial questioning of "whether without Soviet aid . . . the German attack in the West in 1940 would have been as successful as it was and the attack on the Soviet Union would have been possible at all"³⁷ turns out to have been substantially correct.
- (5) Finally, that Stalin's hard-won concessions proved of such little value does not mean that Stalin's basic policy of neutrality and tough bargaining with Germany was misguided, rather that the war took a series of very unexpected turns. Given Hitler's illogical predilections and his success in pulling off long-odds military campaigns, Stalin's strategy was rational to a fault. Stalin was, in short, the victim of Murphy's Law.

NOTES

1. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA)/Nachlässe/Dr. Karl Schnurre, *Aus einem bewegten Leben. Heiteres und Ernstes* (Bad Godesberg, 1986), 91. See also Anthony Read and David Fisher, *The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin, and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939–1941* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1988), 349–50.
2. Donald C. Watt, *How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939* (New York: Pantheon, 1989), 40–41.
3. For more information on Germany's raw material shortages on as war approached, see OKW/WiRüAmt/Wi, "Die Möglichkeiten der Versorgung Deutschlands und Italiens aus dem neutralen Raum im Fall einer Kriege gegen England und Frankreich (und Rußland) (12.5.39)," *RW 19/3110*.
4. BA/SR/RfW, "Rohstoffversorgung: Möglichkeiten einer Großraumwirtschaft unter deutscher Führung, Teil I (August 1939)," *R 25/53*, 4.
5. BA/SR/RfWp, "Der deutsche Außenhandel im Kriegsfall (Mai 1939)," *R 24/82*, 3–5.
6. BA/SR/RfWp, "Die Einfuhrabhängigkeit der Achse an kriegs- und lebenswichtigen Roh- und Halbstoffen und ihre mögliche Sicherstellung im Kriegsfall (August 1939)," *R 24/21*, 1.
7. BA, *R 25/53*, 4.
8. BA, *R 24/82*, 3–5.
9. BA, *R 25/53*, 4.
10. "Overall Report," in *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), 45.
11. "Effects of Strategic Bombing," in *USSBS*, 1945 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1947), 132.
12. See Appendix B for more details about Soviet economic demands.
13. For more information, see IG/Vowi, "Das Transportproblem in der UdSSR im Hinblick auf den deutsch-russischen Handelsverkehr (6.10.39)," *80 IG 1/A 3725*.
14. *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, Series D (Washington D.C.: Dept. of State, 1950–), 8: 7, doc. 10, n. 1.

15. *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941*, ed. R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie (New York: Didier, 1948), 7.

16. Among these archival sources, the following four document groups are the most important: the *Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt* (War Economy and Armaments Office) files at the military archives in Freiburg; the *Handakten* (personal files) of Emil Wiehl and Carl Clodius and the *Nachlässe* (memoirs) of Karl Schnurre at the Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry in Bonn; the reports of the *Rußlandausschuß der deutschen Industrie* (Russia Committee of German Industry) available at a variety of places, including the *Bundesarchiv* (Federal Archives) in Koblenz and the *Institut für Weltwirtschaft* (Institute for World Economics) in Kiel; and the statistical material found in *Der Außenhandel Deutschlands* (German Foreign Trade), available in Kiel and elsewhere.

17. Starting with B. H. Liddell-Hart, *The German Generals Talk*, 1948 (New York: Quill, 1979), this memoir-driven history still pervades many works such as the discouragingly popular R. H. S. Stolfi, *Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1991).

18. See Aleksandr Nekrich, "June 22, 1941": *Soviet Historians and the German Invasion*, edited by Vladimir Petrov (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1968), for the beginnings of the Soviet debate.

19. See, for example, Gerhard Weinberg, *A World at Arms* (New York: Cambridge University, 1994), and Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, 10 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979–).

20. Robert A. Doughty, "Almost a Miracle," *Military History Quarterly* 2, no. 3 (Spring 1990): 43.

21. For examples, see *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, edited by David MacIsaac, vol. 1 (New York: Garland, 1976); Burton Klein, *Germany's Economic Preparations for War* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1959); Rolf Wagenführ, *Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939–1945*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1963); and Alan Milward, *The German Economy at War* (London: Athlone, 1965).

22. "Overall Report," in *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), 31.

23. Milward, *German Economy*, 8.

24. These recent works include Richard Overy, "Mobilization for Total War in Germany, 1939–41," *English Historical Review* (July 1988): 613–39; Hans-Erich Volkmann, "Die NS-Wirtschaft in Vorbereitung des Krieges," in *Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik*, Vol. 1 of *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979), 117–370; and Ludolf Herbst, *Der totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda 1939–1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982). For a recent survey of this debate, see J. P. Harris, "The Myth of Blitzkrieg," *War in History* 2, no. 3 (November 1995), 348–52.

25. Overy, *Mobilization*, 627.

26. See, for instance, Reinhold W. Weber, *Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Hitler-Stalin-Paktes 1939* (Frankfurt: P. D. Lang, 1980), or Ingeborg Fleischhauer, *Der Pakt. Hitler, Stalin und die Initiative der deutschen Diplomatie 1938–1939* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1990).

27. Two examples are Barry A. Leach, *German Strategy Against Russia, 1939–1941* (London: Oxford University, 1973), and Robert Cecil, *Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941* (New York: David McKay, 1975).

28. For instance, see the appropriately entitled book by Anna Strong, *The Soviets Expected It* (New York: Dial, 1941).

29. The most recent and famous of these books is by Victor Suvorov, *Ice-Breaker: Who Started the Second World War?*, trans. Thomas B. Beattie (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990).

30. See Bianka Pietrow, *Stalinismus, Sicherheit, Offensive: Das Dritte Reich in der Konzeption der sowjetischen Aussenpolitik 1933–1941* (Melsungen: Schwartz, 1983); Ingeborg Fleischhauer, *Diplomatische Widerstand gegen "Unternehmen Barbarossa."* *Die Friedensbemühungen der Deutschen Botschaft in Moskau 1939–1941* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1991); and Geoffrey Roberts, *The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's Pact with Hitler* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1989).

31. For the first two points, see Donald C. Watt, *How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939* (New York: Pantheon, 1989); Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929–1941*, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University, 1947–49); and Gerhard L. Weinberg, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany, 1937–39* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984). For the third motivation, see Tucker's contribution to Robert C. Tucker, et al., "Discussion: The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy," *Slavic Review* 36, no. 4 (December 1977): 563–607; and R.C. Raack, "Stalin's Plans for World War II," *Journal of Contemporary History* 26 (1991): 215–27.

32. R.C. Raack, *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1995), and Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933–1941* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), both restate their earlier positions.

33. For a more focused discussion of this point, see Edward E. Ericson III, "Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1936–1941," *German Studies Review* 21, no. 2 (May 1998): 263–84.

34. The few pieces that focus on the economic partnership from 1939 to 1941 include Ferdinand Friedensburg, "Die sowjetischen Kriegslieferungen an das Hitlerreich," *Vierteljahrshäfte zur Wirtschaftsforschung* (1962): 331–38; Gerhard Eichler, *Die deutsch-sowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen vom August 1939 bis zum faschistischen Überfall im Juni 1941* (Ph.D. diss., Halle, 1965); Wolfgang Birkenfeld, "Stalin als Wirtschaftspartner Hitlers (1939–1941)," *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 53 (1966): 477–510; Hartmut Schustereit, "Die Mineralöillieferungen der Sowjetunion an das Deutsche Reich 1940/41," *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 67 (1980): 334–53; and Manfred Zeidler, "Deutsch-sowjetische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen im Zeichen des Hitler-Stalin-Paktes," in *Zwei Wege nach Moskau*, ed. Bernd Wegner (München: Piper, 1991), 93–110.

35. Heinrich Schwendemann, *Die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Sowjetunion von 1939 bis 1941. Alternative zu Hitlers Ostprogramm?* (Berlin: Akademie, 1993).

36. For a more thorough analysis of Schwendemann's work, see Edward E. Ericson III, *Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941* (Ph.D. diss., Indiana, 1996), 30–38.

37. Gerhard Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939–1941* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954), 75.

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Chapter 1

Traditional Interdependence

Our story begins long before Stalin or Hitler had come to power. As those Germans who supported the policy of economic cooperation with the USSR repeatedly noted, Germany and Russia were natural economic allies, the one possessing first-class industry and the other abundant natural resources. While their compatibility politically and ideologically has frequently been debated,¹ there is no questioning their economic importance to each other. In 1912, for example, Germany imported 1.5 billion Reichsmarks (RM) worth of goods from Russia and exported 680 million RM to that country, an astounding 14.3 percent of total German imports and 7.6 percent of total German exports.²

Since the late nineteenth century, the issue for the Germans had been one of means and not ends. Germany clearly needed Russia and its resources. But were Germany's status and prosperity best insured by trade or conquest? Before World War I, German leaders such as Bethmann-Hollweg appear to have been of two minds on the Russian question. However, once war started, direct control of Russian grain, metals, and oil inevitably became a vital goal of German military planning.³

WORLD WAR I

Even before the guns of August 1914 had roared to life, Great Britain had begun to cut off Germany's lifeline to the world's markets when Winston Churchill mobilized the British navy in the early morning hours of August 2. As Liddell-Hart explains, "the blockade [was] . . . the decisive agency in the struggle," demoralizing the German people and making them feel helpless.⁴ He goes on to say, "Helplessness induces hopelessness, and history attests that loss of

hope and not loss of lives is what decides the issue of war.”⁵

When the Von Schlieffen Plan came up short and the armies on the Western Front had become mired in bloody trench warfare, the only real German hope of victory was the defeat of Russia. Success here could secure Germany from the effects of the blockade and perhaps even enable her to gather enough strength to break the siege in the West. Unfortunately for the Central Powers, this plan was too long in the making and too poorly executed. Although Russia did eventually collapse, Germany proved incapable of quickly harnessing the needed resources. England’s “Empire Jack” managed to torch the Rumanian oil fields in mid-October 1916 ahead of the invading Central Power armies, while the British beat the Germans to the Baku oil fields in August of 1918.⁶ Efforts to feed Germany from the Ukrainian breadbasket proved equally ineffectual. From an area that had previously exported an average of five million tons of grain a year, Germany was able to secure less than one million tons in 1918.⁷ With its economy in shambles and the Allied armies approaching, Germany gave up the fight in November 1918.

THE “HAVE-NOTS” HAVE EACH OTHER, 1919–27

This first disastrous attempt to dominate instead of trade with the Russian colossus should have chastened those who had harbored expansionist aims in the east. Such, however, was not the case. German military leaders were successfully able to sidestep the issue of their responsibility for losing the war and to put much of the blame on the new political leadership. Consequently, many nationalist-conservative leaders continued to nourish the belief that German national security required eventual control of the now-Soviet economy. Rolf-Dieter Müller and other historians, therefore, have asked the logical question: “Were there not in the economic and armament policies of the Weimar Republic such extensive, genuine power-political aims to make it necessary to describe the economic revisionism and military policy of the Twenties as a preliminary step to the aggressive-expansionist course of the Nazi leadership?”⁸

Although this argument can be all too easily exaggerated, Hitler’s anti-Bolshevik rhetoric did trumpet many of the same concerns voiced by these nationalist elites, despite their frequent distaste for Hitler’s racist and anti-semitic propaganda. Hitler, too, believed that Germany’s national security and potential world-power status required it to have a secure resource base. Or, as he put it in *Mein Kampf*, “Germany will either be a world power or there will be no Germany.”⁹

To achieve this aim, there were, from Hitler’s perspective, two possible courses: control of sea lanes to a colonial empire (as in the British case) or control of a land empire (as in the case of the United States or the USSR), which, for Germany, could only be found to the east. The cardinal German error in World War I, therefore, had been to lose simultaneously both of these raw material bases.

For Hitler the future choice was clear. Russia must become German *Lebensraum*. And so he wrote in 1925, “At long last we break off the colonial and

commercial policy of the pre-War period and shift to the soil policy of the future." However, "if we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only *Russia* and her vassal border states." Consequently, "if before the War we could have choked down every possible sentiment and gone with *Russia*, today it is no longer possible," because "*the conclusion of an alliance with Russia embodies a plan for the next war.* Its outcome would be the end of Germany."¹⁰

There has, of course, been endless debate about how to interpret these professed goals of eastern *Lebensraum*. A. J. P. Taylor claimed that they were just "day dreams." Others have seen them as practically a lock-step plan.¹¹ However, most historians have accepted Alan Bullock's explanation that "Hitler's foreign policy . . . combined consistency of aim with complete opportunism in method and tactics."¹² In other words, the conquest of *Russia* as the basis for world power would remain Hitler's constant aim, but the tactic of rejecting any alliance with the Soviet Union, no matter how temporary, could be modified depending on circumstances.

These plans for domination of *Russia*, however, were not official German policy during the 1920s. In fact, the Weimar government preferred to reestablish its trade relationship with the Soviet Union as a way of bolstering its economy and also gaining some political leverage over the victorious Allies. Even this policy, however, did not develop overnight. At first, German views of the USSR were mixed at best, and German-Soviet contacts were limited. Edward Carr offers this prescient British assessment of the situation in the summer of 1919:

All classes in Germany are looking towards *Russia* for one reason or another. The extremists of the Left look upon her as the realization of their own political ideals; the pan-Germans look upon her as providing the only possible outlet for surplus population and compensation for the loss of colonies. Officers think that she may provide employment, which is no longer possible in their own country. Industrialists think that she will provide employment for capital and ultimately be the means of paying off the war indemnity. The realization of these ideas, however, lies in the far future, and, for the present, communication is much too difficult to make any practical steps possible.¹³

But this confused situation began to clarify itself as the governments in both Germany and the USSR solidified their internal positions. Their mutual political opposition to the Treaty of Versailles and their natural economic compatibility combined to draw the two sides closer together, as evidenced by the commercial treaty of May 1921 and the Rapallo Agreements of April 1922.

This new relationship, however, "did not bring with it a definite swing of German foreign policy away from the West and toward a firm alliance with Soviet *Russia*."¹⁴ In fact, both sides continued their diplomatic and economic contacts with other powers, "constantly asking themselves who would be the first to sell the partner down the river by making a deal with Poland, England, or France."¹⁵

The negotiations leading up to the signing of a cluster of economic treaties on October 12, 1925, were a good indication of the fragility of this relationship. Both sides needed to have a successful resolution of the talks, but "the Germans were

mainly interested in material results, whereas the Russians had their eye principally on the tactical advantages that might be gained.”¹⁶ Consequently, the negotiations were long and difficult, and neither side was very happy with the final 100 million RM in short-term credits offered to the USSR. To rectify this problem, a novel formula was agreed to in February 1926 that provided 300 million RM in longer-term credits backed by the German government to 35 percent.¹⁷ This new system became the model for future credit arrangements with ever-increasing percentages guaranteed by the German government.

These economic agreements were also intended, in conjunction with the April 2, 1926, Treaty of Berlin, to allay Soviet concerns about the October 16, 1925, Locarno Treaty and to allow Stresemann, Germany’s Foreign Minister, to continue his policy of playing the USSR and the West against each other to German benefit. Nevertheless, these economic arrangements did foster a growing trade relationship that saw imports from the USSR reach 433 million RM and exports reach 330 million RM in 1927, both post-war highs.¹⁸

THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN, 1928–32

During the next four years, the political relationship began to deteriorate as the more isolationist Stalinist regime asserted its power in the USSR, and as “the Allied decision to abandon military control . . . [made] Germany less dependent on Russia and to this extent strengthen[ed] the hand of German foreign policy.”¹⁹ The economic relationship, on the other hand, continued to grow. The *Schicksalgemeinschaft* (Community of Fate) had become a “marriage of convenience.”²⁰ But increased trade was, coincidentally, just such a convenience, due in part to the new treaty structure that made trade easier. Ironically, the Great Depression also fostered improved German-Soviet economic relations because German firms were increasingly desperate to find customers anywhere, even in markets such as the USSR, which, “during the years of prosperity, German business had tended to regard . . . as a risky undertaking made difficult by petty formalism, tiresome bargaining, and an annoying fear of responsibility on the part of the Soviet negotiators.”²¹

Even more important than German export requirements was increased Soviet demand resulting from the implementation of the first Soviet Five-Year Plan. This demand pushed overall Soviet imports from almost 2.5 billion Rubles in 1926–27 to 3.85 billion Rubles in 1931 and imports from Germany from 563 million Rubles to 1431 million Rubles during the same period. In fact, by 1932, 46.5 percent of all Soviet imports came from Germany!²²

New economic treaties merely tried to keep pace with this surging Soviet demand: the Arbitration Treaty of January 25, 1929, which set up a bipartisan arbitration board; the Pyatakov Agreement of April 14, 1931, which provided for another 300 million RM credit to the USSR; the May 28, 1932, Tariff and Toll Treaty, which allowed easier Soviet access to the German market; and another

credit treaty on June 15, 1932, this time with 60 percent government backing (up from 30 percent in 1926).

Despite this expanded trade and new economic arrangements, “the impression remains of a slow deterioration of relations punctuated by rather frenzied attempts to pretend that all was well.”²³ The Soviets had needed industrial goods for the Five-Year Plan, and German firms had needed markets, especially the small- and medium-sized German companies for which “the Russian contracts [had] often meant their last salvation.”²⁴ That these German firms could survive the Depression to later produce weapons and machines for the Nazi invasion of the USSR was a completely unforeseen consequence. Conversely, these German industrial shipments would later help the USSR produce weapons to repel this very attack.

PAYING FOR THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN, 1933–34

Contrary to the common wisdom that “trade is a natural barometer of relations between countries, and the figures for trade between the Soviet Union and Germany are particularly revealing,”²⁵ trade and politics often went their separate ways from 1928 to 1932. The same holds true for much of the Nazi era. Looking only at the German-Soviet trade numbers, one would initially assume that the Nazi entry into power in January 1933 had completely altered the economic relationship. Imports from Germany plummeted from 1142 million Rubles in 1932 to 100 million Rubles in 1934!²⁶ Coupled with the ongoing “long-range oratorical bombardment” emanating mostly from Germany,²⁷ many historians have concluded that “the ideological strife had first of all liquidated the economic relationship.”²⁸

Upon closer examination, however, the picture becomes less clear. The political relationship certainly did decline, from the German side in particular, but neither power was particularly eager to sever all ties in the first two years of Hitler’s regime as evidenced by the renewal of the Berlin treaty in May 1933, a step the Weimar government had been unable to take in the two preceding years. Hitler’s motivation in following this noncommittal policy seems fairly straightforward: “Until German military power had been restored, he had no reason or wish to bring about an open rupture with Russia—or, on the other hand, to let relations become too close.”²⁹

Stalin’s thinking at this time has been the subject of more debate.³⁰ Was he mainly being defensive, as Geoffrey Roberts argues?³¹ Was he instead following a dual policy with “a foot in each camp,” hoping to continue the earlier successful military and economic relationship with Germany while disregarding the political shadings of the German government just as he disregarded the Fascist label in Italy?³² Or did Stalin have more revolutionary, ideological motivations when his Moscow-led German Communist Party helped destroy the Weimar Republic and when Stalin then allowed the German Communist Party to be liquidated by the Nazis?³³ In any case, Stalin felt the need for more freedom of maneuver in this more volatile era.

But there were also other pressures on the Soviet system. The Soviets had extended their credits as far as they could, and now “pay-back” time had arrived. Consequently, the Soviet Union would spend the next two and a half years digging itself out of the financial debt it had incurred over the previous four. And with no other state was the Soviet deficit as high as the 1.2 billion RM that the USSR owed to Germany in 1933.³⁴ This meant that no matter what political course Stalin may have wanted to follow in regard to the Third Reich, diminished trade (and diminished imports from Germany in particular) would be inevitable.

From the German side also, the trade relationship was changing, due primarily to nonpolitical factors. As the German economy began to improve and as the Nazis began their rearmament programs, German businesses had more opportunity to sell at home and less incentive to send industrial goods to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, German demand for raw materials was increasing as various autarky measures were initiated. For example, Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht introduced a pure nickel currency whose only real purpose could be stockpiling in case of a prolonged conflict. John Perkins asserts that “Clearly, by the early 1930s some German leaders were planning for a major war.”³⁵ Other examples of raw materials that would be in short supply in such a struggle were manganese, oil, and rubber,³⁶ exactly the resources that the Soviets either had large reserves of or could buy for the Germans from third parties.

So both Germany and especially the Soviet Union had overriding economic reasons quite apart from their political relationship for reducing shipments from Germany while maintaining deliveries to Germany.³⁷ Consequently, while a number of new economic agreements were concluded (such as the February 25, 1933, bridge credit and an even larger bridge credit on March 20, 1934, at 70 percent government backing), Soviet imports from Germany continued to drop even faster than the general decline in Soviet imports.³⁸ At the same time, Soviet exports and gold payments to the Reich remained at relatively high levels from 1933 to 1935,³⁹ so that by the beginning of 1936, the USSR had paid off almost its entire debt to Germany.

While recognizing the true causes of the new trading pattern, a number of German officials were increasingly concerned that the entire German position in the USSR might become mired in inaction. During his short-lived ambassadorship to Moscow, for example, Nadolny noted on December 11, 1933, that “the decisive reasons why the volume of orders to German industry declined this year to a minimum of a few million marks a month must be sought . . . in the general economic situation of the USSR.”⁴⁰ However, he also warned that “the sooner we realize the fact that the Soviet market can no longer be kept and re-captured solely with merchandise credits and Reich guarantees against loss, the better for us.”⁴¹

Such a change in attitude, however, was not forthcoming. Instead, Germany left its Soviet economic policy on hold and continued its rearmament measures, albeit in the form of “a great, sprawling machinery . . . without any driver.”⁴² By early 1934 Schacht was already facing a critical shortage of foreign credits, without which Germany could not purchase crucial raw materials.⁴³ Schacht’s September 1934 currency plan to increase barter trade through clearing accounts

could be no more than a temporary solution.

At the same time that Germany was moving further away from Russia with the signing of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of January 26, 1934, and was losing its claims to Soviet resources as the USSR paid off its debt, its demands for Soviet raw materials were increasing. Clearly, the economic balance of power between the two countries was changing. Hitler seems to have sensed his increasing need for Soviet political and economic support when he lamented in the spring of 1934, "Perhaps I shall not be able to avoid an alliance with Russia."⁴⁴

THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER, APRIL 9, 1935

Despite the concerns expressed by Nadolny and even Hitler himself, the pattern of German-Soviet relations in the second year of the Thousand-Year Reich continued along much the same lines as they had in the first year. The Soviets made repeated efforts to reestablish closer contacts with Germany, which, according to some observers, became more energetic after Hitler tightened his grip on power with the Night of the Long Knives (June 20, 1934) and displayed the sort of ruthlessness that impressed even the man who had already starved to death millions in the Ukraine. Stalin's interpreter, Valentin Berezhkov, for instance, quotes the *Vozhd* as having exclaimed shortly after the June purge, "Have you heard the news from Germany? About what happened, how Hitler got rid of Röhm? Good chap that Hitler! He showed how to deal with political opponents!"⁴⁵ Whether such stories are true or not, Hitler pretended not to notice these Soviet approaches, and the political relationship continued its downward slide, with the Soviet Union signing a series of nonaggression and mutual assistance pacts with neighboring states, as well as joining the League of Nations in September 1934.

The economic relationship continued its parallel but mostly independent path, dominated by the Soviet desire to repay its old debt and the German plans to rearm. Gustav Hilger explains that "the political enmity of the two countries was so much taken for granted that trade relations were now removed from the realm of controversy and could be discussed with an amount of detachment that made for far greater efficiency." With Hitler's four-year plans creating shortages of various items that the USSR was particularly well situated to supply, however, it was now "Germany [that] was quite dependent on Russian business."⁴⁶ So, while the Soviets were the ones pursuing better political relations, the combination of Soviet repayment and German rearmament was giving the USSR the upper hand in the economic negotiations.

The discussions leading up to the April 9, 1935, credit treaty make this point very clear. The two sides had been haggling over a new 200 million RM credit for months, with the primary sticking point being the duration of the credit. Four years was the maximum that the German Ministry of Economics was willing to go, whereas the Soviets demanded no less than five and a half. By August 18, 1934, the Germans said they were "willing to compromise," but the Soviets refused to budge,⁴⁷ and by November 27 the Germans were complaining to the Soviets "that the negotiations concerning the two hundred million [Mark] project

were not making any progress and that there had been no one in charge of the Trade Delegation for a number of months now.”⁴⁸

By this time, however, Hjalmar Schacht, now the Acting Minister of Economics, had entered the fray and by February 12 had informed David Kandelaki, the head of the Soviet trade delegation in Germany and rumored close personal friend of Stalin, “that the list of requirements which he [Kandelaki] had handed to the Reich Ministry of Economics in January could not form part of an inter-State treaty, . . . that the Germans reserved the right to delete certain items of special equipment from the list, [and] that imports from the Soviet Union would in the future be subject to the German import control system.” The Soviets became “indignant” at Schacht’s demands (whose result would be much higher Soviet gold shipments than previously planned), and Kandelaki promptly headed back to Moscow.⁴⁹ On February 14, Schacht then informed Deputy Head of the Soviet Trade Delegation Friedrichson that “it was no longer acceptable that the Soviet Union should have a special position with regard to the importation of its goods into Germany. Under the ‘New Plan,’ Soviet imports, too, must be controlled by the supervisory authorities.” Friedrichson replied “that the President’s statement meant a severe blow for the Soviet Union,” to which Minister Schacht merely declared that “he had full confidence in the Soviet Union’s solvency and desire to pay.”⁵⁰

While these new German demands were primarily just another part of Schacht’s currency system, they bore little relationship to the developing trade situation with the USSR. As Otto Bräutigam, an official in the Economic Policy Office of the Foreign Ministry, already noted in the February 14 report, “These statements by President Schacht are in contradiction to the negotiations which Ministerialdirektor Heintze of the Ministry of Economics has been conducting with the Soviet Trade Delegation for the last nine months. . . . This means a completely new basis for negotiation.”⁵¹ A February 22 meeting between Schacht and the just-returned Kandelaki failed to resolve the differences,⁵² and over the following weeks the Soviets continued to complain that they “cannot understand the severe action which President Schacht is taking against them.”⁵³

In Bräutigam’s opinion, the all-but-signed 200 million RM credit agreement and Russo-German economic relations in general were being “completely paralysed simply in order to uphold a principle.”⁵⁴ On the other hand, “even if the Russians do accept the arrangements made by President Schacht,” Bräutigam warned, “it stands to reason that under the ‘New Plan’ the Russians will keep back those goods which are of primary economic importance to Germany, on the assumption that they will receive payment for these goods in free Reichsmark.”⁵⁵

With Hitler renouncing the Treaty of Versailles and beginning official rearmament on March 16, 1935, the President of the Reichsbank had few other options to supply the expanding German war economy except to convert German trade to more of a barter system. If the Soviets stayed out, then other countries would pull back and the whole plan might fail. So Schacht wanted to press forward regardless of Bräutigam’s and others’ warnings that his demands could disrupt the vital German-Soviet economic relationship and that the “New Plan”

could even backfire if applied to the USSR.

Interestingly, the subsequent economic agreements followed Soviet proposals more than those of the Germans. The sixteen-page *Allgemeine Lieferbedingungen für Lieferungen aus Deutschland nach der UdSSR* (General Supply Terms for Shipments from Germany to the USSR) was finally signed on March 20, 1935, after four years of difficult negotiations. The Germans, under the leadership of the Russia Committee for German Industry, had been the main proponents of the treaty as a means of promoting German exports to the USSR and were frustrated by the incredibly long time it took to reach an agreement. Furthermore, in the opinion of many German businessmen, the treaty's arbitration procedures were unusually harsh and immediately became the subject of long-running discussions that finally resulted in somewhat easier terms in December 1939. Instead of fostering more German exports to the USSR, therefore, the treaty had something of the opposite effect, scaring off German business afraid of becoming entangled in legal wranglings with Soviet officials.⁵⁶

The 200 million RM credit treaty that was finally signed on April 9, 1935, after continuing difficulties, did resolve a series of outstanding questions but also kept Soviet gold shipments at 100 million RM for 1935,⁵⁷ left the question of future Soviet raw material shipments open, and only required 60 million RM in "current business" orders in 1935.⁵⁸ In reference to these results, a Foreign Ministry circular of April 10, 1935, lamented the poor performance of the "New Plan" and specifically mentioned the USSR as a country which had been able to force through economic agreements on its own terms because it possessed raw materials that Germany desperately needed.⁵⁹

NOTES

1. See, for example, Edward H. Carr, *German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919–1939*, 1951 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), for the argument that the two countries were natural allies and Walter Laqueur, *Russia and Germany: A Century of Conflict* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), for the view that the two were traditional enemies.

2. See Appendix A, Tables 1.1 and 1.2.

3. For a general overview of Germany's evolving expansionist ideology, see Woodruff Smith, *The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism* (New York: Oxford University, 1986).

4. Liddell-Hart, *The Real War, 1914–1918*, 1930 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), 471.

5. Liddell-Hart, *The Real War*, 472.

6. For Germany's oil needs in World War I, see Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 172–83.

7. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Stb/Varain, "Die landwirtschaftliche Produktion der Ukraine vor und im Weltkrieg 1914/18 (13.2.41)," *Wi/ID*.38, 3, 7, & 21.

8. Rolf-Dieter Müller, *Das Tor zur Weltmacht: Die Bedeutung der Sowjetunion für die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Rüstungspolitik zwischen den Weltkriegen* (Boppard: Boldt, 1984), 8.

9. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 1925, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 654. Emphasis is in original.
10. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 654, 660, & 663.
11. See, for instance, the documents and discussion in Jeremy Noakes & Geoffrey Pridham, eds., *Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination*, vol. 2 of *Nazism, 1919–1945: A Documentary Reader* (New York: Schocken, 1988), 750–54.
12. Alan Bullock, "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War," in *European Diplomacy Between the Two Wars, 1919–1939*, ed. Hans Gatzke (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972), 224.
13. As quoted in Carr, *German-Soviet Relations*, 12–13.
14. Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations, 1918–1941* (New York: MacMillan, 1953), 80.
15. Hilger and Meyer, 152.
16. Hilger and Meyer, 182.
17. For the economic relations in the mid-1920s, see Robert H. Haigh, et al., *German-Soviet Relations in the Weimar Era* (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1985), 132–36.
18. See Appendix A, Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
19. Carr, *German-Soviet Relations*, 96.
20. This is the word Rantzaus, the German Ambassador to Moscow in the mid-1930s, coined to describe the Rapallo relationship.
21. Hilger and Meyer, 236.
22. See Appendix A, Table 1.3.
23. Carr, *German-Soviet Relations*, 101.
24. Manfred Pohl, *Die Finanzierung der Russengeschäfte zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen. Die Entwicklung der 12 großen Rußlandkonsortien* (Frankfurt: Fritz Knapp, 1975), 48.
25. Read and Fisher, 47.
26. See Appendix A, Table 1.3.
27. Beloff, 1: 94.
28. Birkenfeld, *Wirtschaftspartner*, 479.
29. Alan Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives* (New York: Knopf, 1991), 520.
30. For a short summary of the differing arguments, see Paul Raymond, "Witness and Chronicler of Nazi-Soviet Relations: The Testimony of Evgeny Gnedin (Parvus)," *The Russian Review* 44 (1985): 379–80.
31. Roberts, *The Unholy Alliance*, 43.
32. James McSherry, *Stalin, Hitler and Europe*, 2 vols. (New York: New World, 1968–70), 1: 55.
33. George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston: Mentor, 1960), 274–75. See also Tucker, 582–84.
34. Dean Scott McMurtry, *Deutschland und Sowjetunion 1933–1936* (Köln: Böhlau, 1979), 424.
35. John Perkins, "Coins for Conflict: Nickel and the Axis, 1933–45," *The Historian* 55, no. 1 (Autumn 1992): 100.
36. Klein, 28–34.
37. For further analysis of this argument, see McMurtry, 425–26; Karl Helmer, "Der Handelsverkehr zwischen Deutschland und der UdSSR in den Jahren 1933–1941," in vol. 13 of *Berichte des Osteuropa-Instituts* (Berlin, 1954), 2–5; and Werner Beitel and Jürgen Nötzold, *Deutsch-sowjetische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1979), 198.

38. See Appendix A, Table 1.3.
39. See Appendix A, Table 1.4.
40. *DGFP*, C, 2: 203–4, doc. 119.
41. *DGFP*, C, 2: 206, doc. 119.
42. Berenice Carroll, *A Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), 86.
43. Carroll, 87.
44. Quoted in David Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939–1942*, trans. Leon Dennen (New Haven: Yale University, 1942), 21.
45. As quoted in Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 234.
46. Hilger and Meyer, 283.
47. *DGFP*, C, 3: 366–67, doc. 181.
48. *DGFP*, C, 3: 683–84, doc. 359.
49. *DGFP*, C, 3: 960, doc. 505.
50. *DGFP*, C, 3: 935, doc. 494.
51. *DGFP*, C, 3: 935–36, doc. 494.
52. *DGFP*, C, 3: 960–61, doc. 505.
53. *DGFP*, C, 3: 1002, doc. 529.
54. *DGFP*, C, 3: 1002, doc. 529.
55. *DGFP*, C, 3: 1000–1, doc. 529.
56. For more details about this treaty and its legal implications, see F. Krahe, *Allgemeine Lieferbedingungen für Lieferungen aus Deutschland nach der UdSSR* (Berlin: Heymann, 1935).
57. This 100 million RM was half of the remaining 200 million RM debt from the original 1.2 billion RM total in 1933.
58. *DGFP*, C, 4: 28–29, doc. 20.
59. *DGFP*, C, 4: 41, doc. 22.

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Chapter 2

Failed Economic Partnership

Despite the potential problems in the two recent economic treaties and the growing Soviet economic leverage over the Reich, German officials remained hopeful about the prospects for a renewed German-Soviet economic partnership. The new agreements had been successfully concluded, the Soviet Union still seemed interested in closer political ties, and Hjalmar Schacht had finally been converted to the view that expanded credits to the USSR were necessary if Germany wanted to receive more of the increasingly vital Soviet raw materials. These hopes, however, were continually dashed on the twin rocks of Hitler's hesitancy and the superior Soviet economic bargaining position.

FIRST FAILURE: SCHACHT'S PLAN, APRIL 29, 1936

The first to try his hand at establishing a new German-Soviet economic partnership was President of the Reichsbank and Acting Minister of Economics Hjalmar Schacht. Having thrown so many wrenches into the earlier credit negotiations, Schacht now changed course and decided that Germany's growing shortages in raw materials and the Reich's dwindling foreign-currency reserves required concessions to the Soviet Union as the one state that could supply the needed goods and might not demand hard currency but actually prefer to barter. Consequently, Schacht sounded out Kandelaki about the possibility of the Germans providing 500 million RM in credits.¹ The counterdeliveries for these extensive credits would have solved many of Germany's resource difficulties without overly burdening the Reich's hard-currency stocks.

Such obvious economic support for Germany also implied some sort of political reconciliation in which the Nazis would tone down their anti-Communist

rhetoric, publicly accept the Soviet Union as a legitimate state, resolve various diplomatic disputes, and so forth. Kandelaki was quick to make this point upon his return from consultations in Moscow. The Soviets were certainly willing to accept the credits, but “after some embarrassment” explained that they wanted to wait until after the earlier 200 million RM agreement had been completed in 1936 or later. In the meantime, they suggested that German-Soviet political relations could be improved. Schacht replied “that we had indeed already previously agreed that a brisk exchange of goods would be a good starting point for the improvement of general relations, but that I was not able to enter into political negotiations.”²

And there the matter lay. The Germans wanted access to Soviet resources without using hard currency. The Soviets wanted to use this leverage to gain political concessions in addition to good economic terms, a price Hitler was unwilling to pay.³ So while the Soviets continued their occasional contacts to improve political relations, the Germans kept their distance.

These Soviet soundings intensified in October as the French-Soviet Pact encountered some problems. Assuming, in good Marxist-Leninist fashion perhaps, that the head capitalist in Germany would probably also be the real person in charge, Kandelaki brought up the issue of closer political and diplomatic relations again with Schacht during the resumed economic discussions. In their October 30 meeting, Schacht returned to the 500 million RM credit idea for much the same reasons as he had before.⁴ And the Soviets once again highlighted the political implications of such an arrangement as they probed the issue with German officials at various levels over the next month. They also asked to buy weapons and high-technology items under the new credit plan, goods that the Germans were hesitant to supply. As Gerhard Weinberg explains, “The Russian requests for military equipment within the trade agreement framework as well as the long-term character of the trade credit both—perhaps intentionally—gave the trade negotiations a political aspect that Hitler, it soon became evident, did not want. The negotiations, therefore, were allowed to continue indecisively.”⁵

Eventually, Molotov’s indiscrete mentioning of the negotiations during a public speech in January was used as an excuse to scale back the credit discussions, much to the surprise and dismay of the Soviets.⁶ After some difficult negotiations and Soviet stoppages of oil shipments, the two sides reached a much-reduced, status-quo agreement on April 29, 1936, which provided only for short-term clearing accounts to circumvent the strict currency regulations that were discouraging foreign trade.⁷

SECOND FAILURE: GÖRING’S PLAN, DECEMBER 24, 1936

Only two weeks after Schacht’s efforts to solve Germany’s growing economic problems had reached their disappointing conclusion, another German leader was eyeing the Soviet market—Hermann Göring. The reasons for Göring’s increasing interest in the matter were many: the German raw-material and currency situation had continued to worsen as rearmament intensified;⁸ the April 29, 1936, treaty had

given the Soviets even less incentive to export vital goods to Germany;⁹ the international situation had deteriorated, especially with Hitler's reclaiming of the Rhineland in March;¹⁰ and the coming Four-Year Plan would soon put Göring at the head of all efforts to solve Germany's resource crisis.

On May 13, 1936, Göring made his first move by meeting with Soviet trade delegates Kandelaki and Friedrichson. In attendance was Göring's cousin Herbert, the official in the Reich Ministry of Economics who had promoted the meeting and who would serve for the next eight months as the main coordinator for German economic approaches to the USSR. Herbert Göring described the meeting to Count Schulenburg, German Ambassador to the Soviet Union, as follows:

Their visit to the Colonel General passed off in a very pleasant and almost friendly way, and Kandelaki and Friedrichson were in every respect delighted by the Colonel General's charming manner. . . . It seems to me particularly important that, as I myself was witness, [Hermann] Göring suggested to the Russians that if ever they had any wishes with which they were making no headway they should apply to him direct; he was prepared at all times to assist by word and deed. This naturally constituted a considerable success for the Russian gentlemen. . . . After this very friendly conversation the ice did seem to me to have been to some extent broken.¹¹

The future Reichsmarschall continued his promotion of an economic arrangement with the USSR when he met with German industrialists a few days after the Kandelaki conversation and promised them that he would bring up the subject with Hitler.¹² Whether he actually kept this promise is unclear. The summer dragged along with no real action on either side of the economic-relations issue. The Soviets had no particular reason to give away their superior economic bargaining position, and Hitler seems to have looked to the stop-gap measures of the Four-Year Plan to deal with Germany's raw material needs until such time as Germany could actually conquer the required territory.¹³

But the Four-Year Plan would take time to implement and would actually make Germany even more dependent in the short term on obtaining resources from a reluctant Soviet Union.¹⁴ A September 12 memorandum from Karl Schnurre, an ambitious, up-and-coming diplomat who would later be the primary German negotiator in economic relations with the USSR, laid out the German thinking. Since the April 26, 1936, treaty contained "no obligation whatsoever for the Russians to supply us with raw materials in the quantities desired by us," and since "no concrete programme has been laid down for current orders to be placed by the Russians in Germany either, . . . the exchange of goods under the Agreement . . . [has] been extremely meagre." Schnurre wanted the 1937 agreement to remedy these defects, but admitted that "the prospects of success in both matters are extremely poor."¹⁵

The problems were the same as before. The Germans desperately needed the resources, but Hitler was unwilling to pay the high Soviet price of political reconciliation and military shipments, especially when the Soviet economic negotiators were likely to haggle over every detail and drag out the discussions to

such an extent that whatever Russian shipments did arrive would come too late to help solve the immediate raw material crisis. Of course, continuing the old agreement was still better than no treaty structure at all, since the Russians had other potential customers for their goods, such as the United States and Great Britain, and the Germans could ill afford to lose even the reduced amounts they were currently receiving.¹⁶ But these limited shipments would be small comfort to the new Head of the Four-Year Plan as he tried to find a way around the expanding bottlenecks.

When the Soviets made one of their usual soundings in the fall of 1936, the Görings took the opportunity in the October discussions to press the German economic case regarding renewal of the 1936 treaty. By October 3, Hermann Göring was telling German businessmen that he wanted “to do business with the Russians at all costs,” and by October 12, Kandelaki was hinting that a deal was in the works that would allow the Germans to import manganese in return for exporting armor plate and aircraft catapults.¹⁷ In a meeting with Schnurre, Herbert Göring explained his plan as follows:

It was recognized in authoritative quarters that the raw materials situation and the progress of German rearmament were such as to make us dependent on procuring Russian raw materials. It was therefore necessary to get German-Russian economic relations out of their present deadlock. The precondition for this was that business with Russia should be rendered completely non-political. This was the task which Colonel General Göring had assigned to him [Herbert]. The purpose of this assignment was to centralize German-Russian economic questions in his hands, in order to avoid the Russians approaching every possible authority, as they have done hitherto, and then playing them off one against the other.¹⁸

In the course of this meeting, however, Schnurre noted that Herbert had left out the key question of the contractual relations for 1937. It was fine for both sides to make vague promises of bartering various goods, but these had to be fit into an overall framework.

While Herbert Göring agreed that he needed to work further with Schnurre and others in bringing such an agreement about, the course of the negotiations over the next two months was disappointing. Whether or not Stalin had decided to reach a deal with Hitler at this point, as some have argued,¹⁹ Hitler was still unwilling to commit himself and lose his anti-Soviet propaganda card. Consequently, the larger goals were once again dropped, and a simple extension of the April 29, 1936, treaty for the year 1937 was agreed to on December 24, 1936.²⁰

THIRD FAILURE: THE PURGES, MARCH 1, 1938

Although in his January 6 memorandum on the treaty German Ambassador on Special Assignment Karl Ritter had emphasized the value of having this framework agreement in place before the previous one ran out, he nevertheless

argued that this increasingly important German-Soviet trade would probably continue to shrink unless German-Soviet political relations were improved first. While doubtful that such a change would occur, Ritter was even less enthusiastic about the alternatives. Herbert Göring's policy of trying to put the economic relationship on a completely nonpolitical basis was sputtering to a fruitless conclusion, and the old standby of offering new credits would now probably take away what little incentive the Soviets currently had to send raw materials to Germany in the short term.²¹

Russia Committee Business Manager Tschunke argued similarly in a March 18 circular that "for the time being, imports of vital Russian raw materials are of substantial importance." However, because "the entire world was scrambling for these Soviet goods," they would be very difficult to get without significant concessions, especially in the form of new credits.²² The Russia Committee, in fact, was so convinced of Germany's desperate need to assure access to Soviet resources that they proposed offering the USSR the ludicrously large and politically suicidal sum of one billion RM in new credits!²³

These already questionable hopes for increased trade were further undermined by the shifting sands of Soviet internal policy. Starting with the Kirov murder in 1934, Stalin's purges had spread to the military by the beginning of 1937. What role Stalin's views of Germany or the machinations of Heydrich and the *Sicherheitsdienst* played in this bloodbath is still unclear. However, the effect that decapitating the Red Army had on Soviet international prestige was obvious. Hitler, in particular, saw these actions as confirmation that the USSR was a weak power that could be dealt with at his leisure.²⁴

The purges in the military and throughout Soviet society had important ramifications for German-Soviet economic relations as well. In the long term, they may have made a closer relationship more likely. Soviet economic production slumped as the purges intensified,²⁵ increasing Soviet desires for industrial imports to supplement their own domestic supplies. Furthermore, Stalin's need for time and goods to rearm and rebuild the Soviet military machine made him more amenable to an economic arrangement with Germany and certainly became "a major factor in his . . . opting for the Nazi-Soviet Pact."²⁶

But in the short term, the purges disrupted the already confused and cumbersome Soviet administrative structure, leaving the reins of power in the hands of "the politically safe but intellectually retarded."²⁷ This made a new economic settlement almost impossible. As Ritter had expected, the initial soundings during 1937 followed the old pattern of the Soviets trying to discuss toning down the press war and other political questions via economic representatives such as Schacht, while the Germans tried to focus on expanding trade links without having to send military equipment as part of the economic package.²⁸

These continuing problems worsened during the summer of 1937 and into 1938 as various key Soviet economic players were recalled and replaced: Soviet Trade Commissar Rosengolz by Mikoyan, Soviet Ambassador to Germany Suritz

with Yurenev, Head of the Soviet Trade Delegation Kandelaki with Smolensky, Voznesensky as the new head of *Gosplan*, and so forth. Although not as drastic, some changes in personnel occurred on the German side also. For example, Schacht, who had become increasingly critical of Hitler's policies, was replaced in July 1937²⁹ by Walther Funk, "a servile party hack . . . [and] 'a greasy, shift-eyed, paunchy little man' whose face reminded him [the American journalist William Shirer] of a frog."³⁰ Many of the German business representatives in the USSR were also recalled because of the danger that the purges in the Soviet Union might spill over to German nationals.³¹

This dearth of competent or seasoned trade representatives, especially on the Soviet side, sabotaged German plans to renew the basic economic arrangements and destroyed the already waning hopes for expanded trade ties. Hilger explains that "on the German side nothing stood in the way of another renewal. But the last months of 1937 went by without the Soviet government designating a negotiator empowered to sign the agreement." With no new clearing or credit treaties,³² "our trade relations came to a general halt in the first months of 1938."³³

New negotiations finally got under way on January 5, 1938.³⁴ However, the usual ensuing rounds of difficult negotiations were made even worse this time by purge-inspired fears and delays. As Schnurre argued in his January 10 memorandum, "it is a disadvantage that the present Chief of the Trade Mission, Smolensky, hardly dares to express his own opinion and depends upon his Moscow superiors in everything. In Moscow itself the personnel relations in the Commissariat for Foreign Trade are completely unsettled."³⁵ Nevertheless, the previous year's clearing agreement was renewed on March 1, 1938, but again without any of the major changes that the Germans had wanted.

FOURTH FAILURE: SCHULENBURG'S PLAN, DECEMBER 19, 1938

While the economic treaty structure remained relatively the same and German-Soviet trade continued to decline (from 182 million RM in bilateral trade in 1937 to 87 million RM in 1938),³⁶ the German need for Soviet raw materials became ever more acute. As Schacht and other German economists had repeatedly warned, German "armaments production had reached the limit of peacetime expansion possibilities."³⁷ Combined with Hitler's concerns about illness and age, his belief that the West was too decadent to hinder his moves, and his race against the newly begun crash armaments programs of the other powers, Hitler decided to take a series of foreign policy gambles in 1938.³⁸

As with the Four-Year Plan, the soon-to-follow Austrian *Anschluss* in March and the increasing pressure on Czechoslovakia were in some measure attempts to pull Germany out of the economic mire into which Hitler's poorly executed armaments program had drawn the Third Reich.³⁹ In his secret February 8 lecture to high-ranking military and industrial officials, Hermann Göring maintained that "the situation was coming perilously close to disaster, . . . [and that] the only way out of the difficulties . . . was the immediate annexation of Austria and the

conquering of Czechoslovakia”⁴⁰ in order to capture their hard currency and gold reserves and to harness their resources and factories. Similar concerns among many leading German businessmen made them “more or less unhesitatingly ready to go along with the Nazi regime’s general, aggressive course of action.”⁴¹

A second major option for dealing with Germany’s raw material and currency crises remained, however, a closer trade relationship with the one major power that could supply most of the needed goods without demanding hard currency—Russia. Despite the previous failures, therefore, Russia Committee President Dr. Reyss made an appeal to German businesses on May 18 “to become even more strongly interested in exports to Russia” in order to elicit Soviet raw materials in return.⁴²

Such appeals, however, were falling on increasingly deaf ears, as German business declined to spend the time and effort on the risky, purge-racked Soviet market when the German armaments program was offering them plenty of lucrative and safe opportunities. Despite the unsubstantiated but frequent rumors of a new arrangement that were floating around Moscow at this time,⁴³ Hitler still hesitated to deal with the USSR. Furthermore, the ever-changing cast of Soviet negotiators—Merekalov replaced Yurenov as Soviet Ambassador to Germany and Skossyrev and then Astakhov replaced Smolensky as Head of the Soviet Trade Delegation—remained unwilling to make any concessions to German economic wishes without direct approval from the top.⁴⁴ Even a tentative economic reconciliation, therefore, became nearly impossible during the politically tense summer of 1938.

Nevertheless, there were changes underway that were laying the groundwork for a possible economic and maybe even political *rapprochement*. First, by the summer of 1938, Hitler’s main opponent was becoming more and more England instead of the USSR. On May 24, for instance, Hitler pushed for a major expansion of the German naval program, always a key indicator of his intentions toward Great Britain, by arguing that we “must reckon England permanently among [our] enemies.”⁴⁵ Hitler could afford to change his target because the USSR appeared much less of a danger to German plans in the wake of the purges. In fact, “Schulenburg’s reports during the first nine months of 1938 could only reassure Hitler that he need have no immediate fears of Russia as long as he made no direct assault upon her.”⁴⁶ With England seen as more of a threat and the USSR as less of a problem, some of Hitler’s opposition to reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union began to erode.

A second factor in making an economic arrangement more likely was the fallout of the Munich crisis of September 1938. Although there are numerous competing interpretations concerning the Soviet reaction to the dismantling of Czechoslovakia, one major school of thought has argued that Soviet statements of support for the Czechs, if not in military terms, then at least in diplomatic terms, were on the whole legitimate.⁴⁷ Consequently, “Munich, to the Soviets, was a flat rejection of their plea for Western assistance in stemming the Nazi tide. . . . Thus it was that Munich gave birth to the Nazi-Soviet agreement.”⁴⁸ Or, as Vice-

Commissar for Foreign Affairs Potemkin bemoaned to French Ambassador Coulondre upon receipt of the French decision regarding the Munich Accords, "My poor fellow, what have you done? For us, I see no other consequence but a fourth partition of Poland."⁴⁹

A second major group of historians has seen these Soviet statements as mostly show, and "if the Soviet Government never intended to support France and Czechoslovakia in 1938, then distrust of the West instilled at this time can hardly have led to Stalin's pact with Hitler a year later."⁵⁰ Despite the widespread acceptance of the first position in general surveys, most of the academic literature has downplayed the importance of Munich for Soviet foreign policy.

In fact, Munich seems to have had more of an influence in changing German strategy than in changing the Soviet Union's traditional policy of security through independent strength. Hitler seems to have become more convinced not only that he could risk war with impunity but that "the enemy was Britain, not the Soviet Union."⁵¹ Of course, to avoid a two-front war, Poland would have to be dealt with, but Hitler and Ribbentrop hoped to seduce the Poles into an alliance with the lure of future territorial gains in the Ukraine. When Polish Foreign Minister Beck later rejected that idea, Hitler started considering an invasion of Poland to protect his eastern front.⁵² According to this scenario, Soviet neutrality and economic support were both more feasible and more important in German eyes now that a full-scale war with the West was becoming a greater possibility.

Furthermore, despite the bloodless successes in Austria and Czechoslovakia, Germany's economic situation continued to deteriorate, and expanded trade with the USSR appeared increasingly vital for Germany.⁵³ As a result of Germany's growing needs and the hope that Soviet desires to rebuild their military would mean an increased demand for German weapons and machines, the Germans returned in October once again to the idea of expanding economic ties between the two powers. This time the initiative came primarily from German Ambassador to the USSR Friedrich von Schulenburg, the old-world gentleman whom Carl Schorske describes as having been a "patient, impersonal, and disengaged spectator of the passing show."⁵⁴ As explained by Moscow Counselor of Embassy Tippleskirch in his October 3 memorandum, Schulenburg now believed that "the present circumstances offer favorable opportunities for a new and wider German economic agreement with the Soviet Union."⁵⁵

During these first weeks of October, the Germans made a series of moves that the Soviets were quick to follow up. Schulenburg and Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov agreed to reduce the usual rhetorical bombardments, and Schnurre's negotiations with the Head of the Soviet Trade Delegation, Skossyrev, concerning a German offer of a 200 million RM credit intensified.⁵⁶ Furthermore, Soviet inquiries for German goods picked up, much to the pleasure of Funk and Ribbentrop.⁵⁷ These various trends coalesced with Schulenburg's October 26 proposals to clear away the major problems facing German-Soviet relations and offer a new 300 million RM credit to the Soviet Union.⁵⁸

As everyone recognized, "there [were] obvious economic reasons for bringing

[these two powers] together.”⁵⁹ The question was whether the political situation would permit such economic collaboration. The British thought that “Soviet Russia . . . can scarcely become the ally of Germany so long as Hitler lives.”⁶⁰ German diplomats and businessmen hoped otherwise since, according to Schnurre’s November 4 memorandum, “Germany’s raw materials situation . . . is such that the emphatic demand has been raised by Field Marshall Göring’s office and other interested agencies at least to try to reactivate our Russian trade, especially insofar as imports of Russian raw materials are concerned.”⁶¹

The truth, however, remained, as it had since April 1935, somewhere in between these two assessments. Hitler needed Soviet raw materials but would not permit large shipments of increasingly short supplies of weapons and machines to his ideological enemy and would not countenance the closer political relations that such trade would imply. The Soviets needed at least the possibility of a German alliance to make the West take more notice of Soviet interests and wanted German machines and weapons to rebuild the Soviet military and war economy as part of the next Five-Year Plan.⁶² On the other hand, Stalin was not willing to sell his increasingly strong economic bargaining position for the minimal price that Hitler was then willing to offer.

Consequently, Schulenburg’s proposals made little immediate headway in the ensuing two months; and, for the time being, the Germans had to settle for a simple renewal of the clearing agreements. Even this limited goal seemed tenuous at times. By December 1, Schnurre was already complaining that the main Soviet economic negotiator, Davydov, had yet to depart Moscow and that further delays would jeopardize timely reissuance of the previous treaties.⁶³ On December 13, Davydov was still in the Soviet capital, though planning to travel to Berlin soon.⁶⁴ Despite these initial delays, the renewal was finally approved on December 19, 1938, in an almost routine manner. This end result was really very limited, but “the German and Soviet presses played it up, and it created quite a stir in the West because it had generally been taken for granted that the two countries had separated so far as to preclude agreements of any sort.”⁶⁵

FIFTH FAILURE: SCHNURRE’S ABORTED VISIT, JANUARY 28, 1939

Although Schulenburg’s hopes for a quick expansion of German-Soviet trade via a new credit deal had proved premature, the German side continued to hope that such an arrangement could be worked out in the near future. The man who was increasingly becoming the center of such efforts was forty-year-old Karl Schnurre. Since Schnurre came to play *the* pivotal role in the ensuing German-Soviet trade relationship and since his reports and memoirs are the key pieces of evidence for any study of the economic collaboration, it is worthwhile to take a quick look at exactly who this man was and what he wanted to accomplish.

A veteran of four years of fighting in World War I and a diligent student, Schnurre had become a rising star in the German Foreign Office in the 1920s and 1930s, serving in London, Tehran, and Budapest. In 1936 he had become Head of

the Eastern European Economic Section where he was responsible, among other things, for economic relations with the Soviet Union.⁶⁶ According to his colleague and long-time Russia expert Gustav Hilger, "He was extremely capable and efficient, and very ambitious. Moreover, he had great zeal, perseverance, and a real understanding for economic problems and the whole complex economic system."⁶⁷

He, along with other Foreign Office and Russia Committee officials such as Hilger, Köstring, Ritter, Schulenburg, Wiehl, Tschunke, and Ter-Nedden, was also a great believer in closer relations with the USSR. The fact that such collaboration would also advance his career probably made this ambitious man an even more avid proponent of the Soviet tie. Consequently, when reporting to their superiors, Schnurre and his compatriots frequently presented the Soviet Union in the best light possible (and correspondingly criticized the German approach) in order to convince an otherwise skeptical Hitler or Ribbentrop, for example, to strengthen German-Soviet contacts.

Herein, of course, lies a danger for the historian. Because document collections have limited space and have therefore concentrated on these reports to or meetings with superiors, a false picture of the economic relationship has sometimes emerged: a completely intransigent, deceptive Germany and a compromising, even appeasing Soviet Union. The distortion in Schnurre's and his cohorts' reports became greater the closer they got to Barbarossa. They presented increasingly rosy scenarios of potential German-Soviet collaboration in order to convince Hitler not to attack the USSR.⁶⁸ After the war, of course, Schnurre and others emphasized these same reports to prove their innocence of promoting aggressive action in the East.

What Schnurre reported to or heard from his peers, however, often sheds a much different light on the subject of German-Soviet economic relations. Here Germany is usually the suitor in constant need of Soviet raw materials and willing to make burdensome political and economic concessions. The Soviet Union becomes the intransigent, tough negotiating partner, ready to use its superior bargaining position to get the best deal possible. Although both sides played the negotiating game to the best of their ability, the Soviets clearly had the upper hand throughout almost the entire relationship. They were neither the blackmailers one finds in the works of Phillip Fabry⁶⁹ nor the appeasers one finds in Schwendemann. They were instead just very tough bargainers looking to expand Soviet power at the margins.

By December 1, 1938, Schnurre had laid out the basic plan that would later be accepted, with slight modification, on August 19, 1939: a 200 million RM credit over six years at 5 percent interest with a Reich guarantee of 100 percent in return for 100 million RM of raw material imports from the Soviet Union during each of the next two years in addition to the normal 50 million RM in "current business." The Germans would, therefore, receive 150 million RM worth of mostly raw materials from the USSR in 1939 and 1940 in return for which the Soviet

Union would be able to place 500 million RM in mostly industrial orders over the next two to three years.⁷⁰

These credit terms were even better for the Soviets than those of 1935, but a skeptical Schnurre nonetheless concluded, "The prospects of success for the German proposal must not be overestimated."⁷¹ As before, the political situation was still tense, and Hitler and the military were reluctant to make room in their armaments program for Soviet shipments. On the other hand, the Soviets did not want to play their winning hand too quickly, especially with Soviet internal demand claiming more and more of the various resources that the Germans coveted. But the terms were generous, and the Soviets wanted at the very least to use these negotiations as a counterweight to lure the West; so when Schnurre raised the credit idea on December 22, the Soviets agreed to consider the matter.⁷²

As Schnurre expected, however, problems had begun to appear even before the December 22 sounding. In a December 6 meeting of German officials, in which Schnurre and fellow-diplomat Ter-Nedden pushed for a 100 percent Reich guarantee of the Russian credit, the Reich Finance Ministry representatives rejected the idea and offered 75 percent as the maximum possible given current obligations.⁷³ Schnurre argued that the credit deal would fail without the full 100 percent guarantee, but finance officials remained adamant.⁷⁴

While the Germans waited for the Soviet reply and haggled over funding, rumors again began floating around Moscow of a new Nazi-Soviet arrangement. Some of these rumors were probably started by the Soviets to test German resolve and were fueled by enthusiastic Soviet press reports about the successful signing of the December 19, 1938, clearing agreement.⁷⁵ The Germans also seemed optimistic about the chances of success. American Chargé Alexander Kirk, who was well informed about these discussions by the German Second Secretary in the Moscow Embassy, "Johnnie" von Herwarth, reported on January 6, for example, "that as a result of negotiations which have been proceeding in Berlin, a commercial arrangement will shortly be concluded between the German and Soviet Governments for the expansion of German-Soviet trade."⁷⁶

Unfortunately for the Germans, the USSR's January 11 response threatened to undermine these optimistic timetables. Although the Soviets gladly accepted the German offer to discuss a new economic arrangement, they demanded that Moscow be the site of these talks. Furthermore, they failed to mention what for the Germans had been the main item, a Soviet guarantee to send additional raw materials over the next two years. Unsure that they would get the goods that they wanted and wary of the political spectacle that would result from moving the negotiations to the Russian capital, the Germans claimed that it would be impossible to send a whole delegation, and Schnurre in particular, to Moscow because of the current heavy demand on the time of the various German economic negotiators. The Soviets, however, refused to budge, and the Germans were left with little choice.⁷⁷ As Wiehl explained in a January 12 memorandum, "because of the raw materials, our interest in the achievement of a favorable credit agreement is so great that it does not appear expedient to frustrate the negotiations

in any way, or even to delay them or render them essentially more difficult by a refusal of the Russian request. I would therefore propose to send to Moscow, not of course the whole German delegation, but the chairman, Counselor of Legation Schnurre.”⁷⁸

As before, the Soviets expected that closer economic relations would entail closer political relations as well—not a full-fledged alliance of course, but a significant change in previous German policy nonetheless. The fact that Hitler had a long and very public chat with the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin at a New Year’s reception on January 12 probably convinced the Soviets that the Germans had finally decided to pay the Soviet asking price of a truce in the press war and closer political relations in return for expanded bilateral trade.⁷⁹ On January 20, the Germans informed the Soviets of their plan to send Schnurre on January 30 for ten days of talks at the end of which an agreement would be signed. Soviet Ambassador Merekalov, a servile *apparatchik* who acted only under Stalin’s orders, readily agreed.⁸⁰

If Stalin thought the Germans were now strongly committed to paying his high price for more raw materials, his belief proved unfounded. While Göring and many others in the German government deemed this approach necessary, Hitler and Ribbentrop were still unsure. In fact, Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, the vain and arrogant ex-champagne salesman whom Hilger described as “a man who occupied a responsible position for which he had neither talent, knowledge, nor experience,”⁸¹ had developed his own diplomatic strategy, one in sharp contrast, as always, to Göring’s.⁸² Ribbentrop hoped that he could lure the Poles closer into the German orbit and join with the Japanese and Italians in a united front against France and England. Consequently, Ribbentrop had reluctantly agreed to the Schnurre trip only as long as the political ramifications could be kept to a minimum, hence Schnurre’s roundabout path via Warsaw in the company of Schulenburg.⁸³

The Poles had no intention of either becoming Ribbentrop’s lackey or promoting German-Soviet friendship and apparently leaked the story of Schnurre’s planned trip.⁸⁴ Exaggerated reports of a thirty-member German delegation headed for Moscow began to appear in various newspapers, starting in the *Krackauer Kurier* on January 25.⁸⁵ Schnurre’s cover blown and his Polish plans ruined, a furious Ribbentrop cancelled the trip to Moscow on January 28 with the excuse that Schnurre had urgent business in Berlin.⁸⁶

SIXTH FAILURE: SCHULENBURG IN MOSCOW, MARCH 11, 1939

Although Schnurre’s mission had been scuttled by the still-intense diplomatic winds, this latest plan had progressed further than its recent predecessors. Moreover, the German need for Soviet raw materials or goods that could be transported via the USSR in case of war with England continued to grow as the overall German export situation worsened.⁸⁷ Despite the efforts of the Four-Year Plan, Germany was still dependent on foreign supplies for 10 to 20 percent of her

foodstuffs, two thirds of her oil, and 80 percent of her rubber.⁸⁸ The Germans did have hopes that the introduction of the Soviet Five-Year Plan would reverse the previous pattern of declining Soviet exports and would increase Soviet interest in German industrial goods.⁸⁹

But the already limited odds for success had become even slimmer after the Schnurre debacle. The Soviets were justifiably upset and very suspicious of German actions. In fact, by February 6, Emil Wiehl, Head of the Commercial Policy Section in the German Foreign Office, was warning his superiors that a complete economic rupture with the USSR was possible and that this would have dire consequences for the German economy.⁹⁰

Both sides did agree on further economic talks in Moscow, but the Germans would not commit themselves to giving full negotiating power to Schulenburg or to promising a future visit by Schnurre.⁹¹ Consequently, despite the successful conclusion of Soviet-Italian economic negotiations on February 7, the German-Soviet talks that took place over the next five weeks in Moscow ultimately made little progress.⁹²

Schulenburg's main negotiating opponent and the man who would continue to represent the USSR throughout the following discussions was the gifted, powerful, and engaging Trade Commissar, Anastas Mikoyan. Despite his frequent role as "bad cop" to Stalin's "good cop," he was nonetheless well liked by his German negotiating partners.⁹³ He was also a survivor, as illustrated by a favorite joke among his fellow party members. According to authors Read and Fisher, the story has Mikoyan "caught at a friend's house when it starts raining heavily outside. Ignoring it, and without coat or umbrella, he prepares to leave. 'But you can't walk,' his friends tell him. 'It's pouring down!' 'Don't worry,' he replies cheerfully, 'I can dodge between the raindrops.'"⁹⁴

Schulenburg and Mikoyan had their first meeting on February 10, at which point Mikoyan stated that the USSR could not offer more than 50 million RM of additional raw material shipments per year. Schulenburg replied "that for such a small return our credit offer would lose much of its interest for us."⁹⁵ By the next day Mikoyan had upped the Soviet offer to 70 million RM for the first year and 75 million RM for the second year.⁹⁶

Despite the continuing swirl of rumors in Moscow about imminent German-Soviet economic and political agreements, the Americans, who were kept fairly well informed by "Johnnie" von Herwarth, had figured correctly on February 15 that such a close arrangement was unlikely.⁹⁷ The British, who were not privy to Herwarth's intelligence information, thought the chances of a close partnership greater, but also concluded on February 20 that the Soviets had only manganese and oil "available for export in dangerous quantities."⁹⁸

In fact, the Moscow talks were making surprising progress. By February 20, the Americans had changed their minds and now believed that "within the last few days a virtual agreement with a few unimportant exceptions has been reached."⁹⁹ This was, however, still somewhat premature, and a substantial gap remained between the two sides. On February 27 the Soviets had offered to send 160 million

RM in raw materials over the next two years, instead of the 200 million RM the Germans had asked for, unless the Germans raised their credit offer from 200 million RM over one and a half years to 300 million RM over two years. Either way, the Soviets demanded seven-year loans at 4.5 percent interest with a 100 percent Reich guarantee instead of the six years at 5 percent interest with a 75 percent guarantee offered by Germany.¹⁰⁰

By March 1 the sides had come closer to agreement with Mikoyan's offer to consider the full German request for 200 million RM in raw material deliveries. As a result, Schulenburg's previously pessimistic reports became somewhat more upbeat. On the other hand, in response to Japanese Ambassador to the USSR Togo's request to support Japan in its fishing-rights discussions, Schulenburg "repeatedly emphasized that it was not really necessary to slow up the negotiations with the Soviet Union—Moscow would take care of that on its own!"¹⁰¹

It was, however, not delays from Moscow, but once again decisions in Berlin that ended this latest attempt to patch up the German-Soviet economic relationship. Hitler still showed himself unwilling to force a reluctant military and industry to divert armaments production to Soviet export as long as the West seemed ready to appease him with more easy victories like those in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Until this strategy had reached a dead end, Hitler apparently would rather use the USSR as a bogeyman to scare the West than pay the high Soviet economic and political price for their raw materials. Wiehl, therefore, told Schulenburg on March 8 to put the negotiations on hold indefinitely,¹⁰² and on March 11 ordered him to bring them "to a standstill in a suitable way . . . [and to] continue [them] in a dilatory fashion."¹⁰³

NOTES

1. Gerhard Weinberg, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany, 1933–1936*, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970), 221.
2. See Hjalmar Schacht's July 15 memorandum in *DGFP*, C, 4: 453, doc. 211.
3. Weinberg, *Foreign Policy, 1933–1936*, 221.
4. *DGFP*, C, 4: 783, doc. 386.
5. Weinberg, *Foreign Policy, 1933–1936*, 222. For the course of the November and December negotiations, see Dittmann's memorandum in *DGFP*, C, 4: 967–72, doc. 483.
6. See *DGFP*, C, 4: 1009–10, doc. 502; and 1033, doc. 518.
7. For details of this treaty, see *DGFP*, C, 5: 488–94, doc. 302.
8. Hans-Erich Volkmann, "Außenhandel und Aufrüstung in Deutschland 1933 bis 1939," in *Wirtschaft und Rüstung am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges*, eds. Friedrich Forstmeier and Hans-Erich Volkmann (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1975), 104.
9. Robert Gibbons, *Soviet Industry and the German War Effort, 1939–1945* (Ph.D. diss., Yale, 1972), 21.
10. Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence, 1917–1973*, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974), 234.
11. *DGFP*, C, 5: 571, doc. 341.
12. *DGFP*, C, 5: 572, doc. 341.

13. Carroll, 128–29.
14. Carroll, 139, and Hans-Jürgen Perrey, *Der Rußlandausschuß der deutschen Wirtschaft. Die deutsch-sowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen der Zwischenkriegszeit. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Ost-West-Handels* (München: R. Oldenburg, 1985), 276.
15. *DGFP*, C, 5: 965–66, doc. 535.
16. *DGFP*, C, 5: 965–66, doc. 535.
17. *DGFP*, C, 5: 1068–70, doc. 591.
18. *DGFP*, C, 5: 1115, doc. 615.
19. See in particular the interesting, but sometimes questionable, account by Walter Krivitsky, *I Was Stalin's Agent* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1939), 37–38. Here he argues that Stalin had ordered Kandelaki “to go outside the ordinary diplomatic channels and at whatever cost arrive at a deal with Hitler.”
20. BA/APA, “Sowjetunion, Wirtschaftliche Angelegenheiten: Rußlandausschuß der deutschen Wirtschaft 1935–36,” *NS 43/39*, 319.
21. *DGFP*, C, 6: 252–53, doc. 129.
22. BA/RFM/RA, “Rundschreiben (18.3.37),” *R 2/17281*, 1.
23. Perrey, 285.
24. For a short overview of the origins and effects of the Soviet military purges, see Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin*, 490–95.
25. Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR* (New York: Penguin, 1969), 227.
26. Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin*, 555.
27. This is Paul Kennedy’s characterization of the new Soviet military leadership as quoted in Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin*, 555.
28. See, for example, Schacht’s February 6, 1937, report in *DGFP*, C, 6: 379–80, doc. 183; Neurath’s April 17 memorandum in *DGFP*, C, 6: 665, doc. 323; and Karl Ritter’s April 30 minute in *DGFP*, C, 6: 693, doc. 339.
29. Carroll, 146–47.
30. This is William Shirer’s description as quoted in Read and Fisher, 20.
31. See State Secretary Mackensen’s August 16 warning to the Moscow Embassy in *DGFP*, C, 6: 1013–14, doc. 517.
32. The 1935 credit terms ended June 30, 1937, with the Soviets only requesting 183 million RM of their possible 200 million RM total. See *DGFP*, D, 1: 912, doc. 619.
33. Hilger and Meyer, 284.
34. *DGFP*, D, 1: 913–14, doc. 619.
35. *DGFP*, D, 1: 903, doc. 613.
36. See Appendix A, Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
37. Volkmann, *Außenhandel*, 100.
38. Noakes and Pridham, 2: 753–54.
39. For an example of the debate between Tim Mason and some of his critics, such as Richard Overy, about the extent of these internal, economic motivations for Nazi aggression in 1938 and 1939, see David Kaiser, Tim Mason, and Richard Overy, “Debate: Germany, ‘Domestic Crisis’ and War in 1939,” *Past and Present* (February 1989): 200–40.
40. Read and Fisher, 47–48.
41. Volkmann, *Außenhandel*, 112.
42. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Wi, “Vortrag von Dr. Reyss in der Vorstandssitzung des Russland-Ausschusses der Deutschen Wirtschaft (18.5.38),” *Wi/ID.11*, 1.
43. *DGFP*, D, 1: 920–21, doc. 626.

44. See *DGFP*, D, 1: 927–28, doc. 629, for German complaints in June about the slow progress of negotiations with the Soviets.
45. Watt, *How War Came*, 40–41.
46. Carl Schorske, “Two German Ambassadors: Dirksen and Schulenburg,” in *The Diplomats, 1919–1939*, eds. Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 490.
47. Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin*, 584.
48. See Thomas Bennet, *The Soviets and Europe, 1938–1941* (Geneva: Universite de Geneve, 1951), 107.
49. As quoted in Franklin Ford and Carl Schorske, “The Voice in the Wilderness: Robert Coulondre,” in *The Diplomats, 1919–1939*, eds. Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 568.
50. McSherry, 1: 96.
51. Donald C. Watt, “Setting the Scene,” in *1939: A Retrospect Forty Years After*, ed. Roy Douglas (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1983), 19.
52. Watt, *Setting the Scene*, 19.
53. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Stb, “Stand der wirtschaftlichen Lage (Okt. 1938),” *RW 19/93*, 88–97; and BAMA, *RW 19/93*, 121–23.
54. Schorske, 488.
55. *DGFP*, D, 4: 603–4, doc. 476.
56. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 67.
57. BA/RK, “Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Sowjetunion (17.10.38),” *R 43/1489a*, 1.
58. *DGFP*, D, 4: 607, doc. 478.
59. *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 3rd Series, vol. 3 (London: HMSO, 1947–), 253.
60. *DBFP*, 3: 253.
61. *DGFP*, D, 4: 608, doc. 479.
62. See German Military Attaché Köstring’s analysis in BAMA/OKH, “Schriftwechsel: O Qu IV - Mil.Att. Moskau (18.11.38),” *RH 2/2932*, 71.
63. PA/HaPol/Wiehl, “Russland (1.12.38),” *R 106230*, E041378.
64. PA, *R 106230*, E041377.
65. Hilger and Meyer, 284.
66. For more information on Schnurre’s personal background, see the first eight chapters in his unpublished memoirs (PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 1–49).
67. Hilger and Meyer, 285.
68. See Chapter 13 and Chapter 14 for more details.
69. See, for example, Phillip W. Fabry, *Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt 1939–1941* (Darmstadt: Fundus, 1962), 427–29.
70. *DGFP*, D, 4: 614, doc. 481.
71. *DGFP*, D, 4: 615, doc. 481.
72. *DGFP*, D, 4: 615–18, doc. 482. See also PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Russland (22.12.38),” *R 105998*, H000957.
73. PA, *R 106230*, 452584.
74. PA, *R 106230*, E041379.
75. PA/BM, “Presse- und Propagandawesen (2.1.39),” *Fach 68*, 1.
76. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1939, vol. 1 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1958–59), 312.

77. *DGFP*, D, 4: 618–20, doc. 483.
78. *DGFP*, D, 4: 620–21, doc. 484.
79. Watt, *How War Came*, 122.
80. *DGFP*, D, 4: 621–22, doc. 485.
81. Hilger and Meyer, 293.
82. For the personal rivalry that caused Ribbentrop and Göring almost inevitably to take opposing views on German diplomatic policy, see Watt, *How War Came*, 618.
83. Schorske, 498.
84. For a description of Polish foreign policy in 1939 and how the Poles chose the best of their bad options, see Józef Garliński, “The Polish View,” in *1939: A Retrospect Forty Years After*, ed. Roy Douglas (Hamden CT: Archon, 1976), 66.
85. PA/BdStS, “Russland,” *R 29712*, 111281, fiche 925.
86. *DGFP*, D, 4: 622, doc. 486.
87. See BAMA, *RW 19/94*, 63 & 68, and David Kaiser’s contribution in Kaiser, Mason, and Overy, 205.
88. Carroll, 177.
89. Fritz Tschunke, “Rückblick und Ausblick auf das Rußlandgeschäft,” *Ost-Europa-Markt*, January 1939, 9.
90. *DGFP*, D, 4: 624–25, doc. 488.
91. *DGFP*, D, 4: 625, doc. 489.
92. *Ost-Europa-Markt*, February 1939, 100.
93. See Hilger and Meyer, 285, n. 11, and PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 60.
94. Read and Fisher, 436.
95. *DGFP*, D, 4: 626, doc. 490.
96. *DGFP*, D, 4: 626–27, doc. 491.
97. *FRUS*, 1939, 1: 315–16.
98. *DBFP*, 4: 614.
99. *FRUS*, 1939, 1: 316.
100. PA, *R 106230*, E041389.
101. *DGFP*, D, 4: 628–29, doc. 493.
102. *DGFP*, D, 4: 630, doc. 494.
103. *DGFP*, D, 4: 631, doc. 495.

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Chapter 3

Talking About Talking

By March 11, 1939, the intermittent, long-running German-Soviet economic discussions had reached a dead end, a situation many German officials found “extremely regrettable in view of Germany’s raw-materials position.”¹ Regardless of these resource needs, Hitler had been and was still unwilling to pay the price that Stalin had been asking for since 1935. If a deal was to be worked out, therefore, either Stalin would have to lower his demands, or Hitler would have to raise his offer, neither of which seemed very likely. Contrary to expectations, a series of events in the ensuing five months did make it possible for the two sides to begin talking seriously again.

FIRST SOUNDINGS, APRIL 17

The first big event, or really nonevent, was Stalin’s famous March 10 speech in which he explained, “The tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy are: (1) To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries; (2) To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflict by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them.”² While a few writers, such as Angelo Rossi, have seen these statements as a clear signal of Stalin’s fervent desire for closer relations with Nazi Germany,³ most historians have argued that Stalin was probably just continuing his traditional policy of neutrality or at most casting a line into the troubled diplomatic waters to see if either big fish would take his bait.⁴ The speech certainly was not seen by anyone at the time, except for a few low-ranking German officials, as a significant pro-German move. In fact, by May 10, when Schnurre met with Germany’s major diplomatic and military leaders to inform them of the situation

in the Soviet Union, none of them had had any inkling of the possible importance of Stalin's pronouncements.⁵

Still nothing happened. But in the second half of March, the Soviet situation changed dramatically. Pressed by continuing economic constraints and his desire to wash away the bad taste Munich had left him with,⁶ Hitler sent the *Wehrmacht* into Prague on March 15 and then Memel on March 23. A stunned Polish Foreign Minister Beck turned to the now-infuriated British, who offered on March 31 to guarantee Polish territorial integrity against German encroachments. With war in Poland suddenly looming on the horizon, the Soviet Union became *the* vital player in the European balance of power. As Adam Ulam argues, "A few words spoken by Mr. Chamberlain transformed the U.S.S.R. from being in a hopeless diplomatic situation to being the arbiter of Europe's fate."⁷

Not only had the political situation been radically transformed, but so too had the economic situation. While Hitler probably thought the British support for Poland a bluff all the way up until September and Stalin appears to have had real doubts about British resolve as well, both men had to take into account the possibility that war in Poland and even war in Europe could occur in the near future. As a result, both Germany and the Soviet Union intensified their military building plans, often to the point of hysteria. Hitler, for example, called for a navy the size of Great Britain's and an air force so large that it would have taken 85 percent of the world's annual gasoline production just to fuel it!⁸ Stalin, for his part, pushed for a fifteen battleship, fifteen heavy cruiser navy to rival that of the United States.⁹

In order to build these huge arsenals, both sides required what the other power had—raw materials from the USSR in return for technology and machines from the Reich. A new series of German reports reinforced the long-standing point that Germany could not continue its rearmament drive without access to Soviet resources. War Economy and Armaments Office (*WiRüAmt*) officials complained on April 1 that the occupation of Bohemia had solved none of the economic dilemmas facing the Reich, but had instead merely added to Germany's raw material needs. As a result, the export situation was going from bad to worse.¹⁰ Similarly, an April 9 report on Germany's oil situation argued that if a long-term war developed against both the West and the USSR, Germany would have to secure at least Rumania and probably also the Caucasus to achieve victory, because current oil stocks were only sufficient for three to four months of war.¹¹

Historians Müller and Schwendemann have used this and similar economic warfare reports to show widespread, anti-Soviet aggressive intentions in the German military. In fact, all the aggressive measures hinged on the contingency that the Soviet Union would be in the enemy camp. Soviet belligerency was merely a logical assumption and not a clear indication that the *WiRüAmt* desired an invasion of the Soviet Union. Alternatively, because the report's demand that Germany have access to Baku's oil was so obviously improbable, one might also see much of this document as a warning that Germany was not ready for a major war, especially not one that would involve the USSR as an enemy.

In any case, the Soviet Union also needed German economic aid to build up its own military-industrial complex. In a March 15 circular from the Russia Committee of German Industry, Fritz Tschunke, editor of *Die Ostwirtschaft*, sharpened his traditional argument in favor of expanded Russo-German trade. He argued that the Soviet Union's upcoming Third Five-Year Plan would require massive new infusions of technology and industrial equipment. Germany could, he explained, take advantage of this new potential market to acquire more raw materials.¹² Combined with increasing demand for the rearmament program, the Soviets too supposedly had new-found economic incentive to reach a deal with Germany.

Nevertheless, Stalin still held the upper hand in any potential economic negotiations. If war came, Germany had nowhere else to turn for certain raw materials such as manganese. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, still had possible connections to England or the United States to acquire manufactured goods, as demonstrated by the trading patterns of the previous two decades¹³ and also somewhat by lend-lease after 1941. As if to prove this point, the Soviets slowed their exports to Germany to a trickle. In a March 29 meeting, for instance, officials of the Four-Year Plan complained that the Soviets had cut back their shipments to the bare minimum required by earlier treaties. But the Germans felt they could do little to change the situation given Hitler's current policy.¹⁴

This policy, however, was beginning to change, if ever so slightly. The Germans, and Hermann Göring in particular, carried out some tentative soundings in early April,¹⁵ which culminated in the April 17 meeting of Soviet Ambassador Merekalov and State Secretary Weizsäcker. Here Merekalov brought up the unresolved question of Soviet contracts with the Skoda arms factory in the former Czechoslovakia, the broken-down commercial negotiations, and even the possibility of closer political relations, explaining that "there exists for Russia no reason why she should not live with us on a normal footing. And from normal, the relations might become better and better."¹⁶

At the same time that the Soviets were drawing the Germans into new conversations, Stalin was also offering the West the possibility of a Triple Alliance, backed by a military convention. In effect, the Soviets had again cast their line into the sea as they had done on March 10. Only this time, the Soviets had more attractive lures and were trawling for bigger catch.¹⁷

The Soviets also had at least one major advantage over the "fish" they were casting for—spies. Through the likes of John Herbert King in London and Richard Sorge in Tokyo, the Soviets were able to feed stolen information to the Germans and then find out their reactions. As Donald Watt explains, "whoever conducted the Soviet side of the negotiations with Britain and Germany was able to play on their partners like a poker player with marked cards."¹⁸

MOLOTOV'S MAYBE, MAY 20

Despite Stalin's seemingly superior position as fisherman to the German and British fish, there were still precious few tugs on the line. The Soviets were

probably dangling bait just too big for the British to bite on, the West having already committed itself to the Poles. The English leaders delayed in answering the extensive April 17 proposal, finally responding with their own plans on May 8 and May 27. The Soviets rejected both proposals. The Germans had, in theory, much more to offer Russia, and Stalin therefore apparently still preferred an agreement with Hitler unless the West was willing to accede to his more extensive demands.¹⁹

Unfortunately for the Soviets, Hitler was still unwilling to accept the possible Soviet price, and Ribbentrop had other ideas about how to resolve the looming Polish crisis—a closer alliance with Italy and Japan. Consequently, the Germans spent the rest of April ignoring the Soviet bait, having apparently decided that they were unwilling to swallow the whole lure in order to get the food they wanted.

By early May, however, the Germans had changed their minds and were now beginning to circle the Soviet lines. First of all, Ribbentrop's deal with the Japanese was going up in smoke as the fires of the Russo-Japanese conflict in the Far East began to flare. On the one hand, Germany began eyeing Moscow to make up for the loss of Tokyo. On the other hand, this Far Eastern struggle put pressure on the USSR to insure its security in the West, and only Germany could really offer that security.²⁰ Not surprisingly, therefore, the day after Japan rejected Ribbentrop's proposal for a military alliance, Hitler gave a speech that was notable for its omission of the usual diatribe against the Soviet Union.²¹

In addition to the problems with Japan, Germany continued to struggle with its lack of raw materials, making an economic arrangement with the Soviet Union ever more enticing. An April 20 article in *Der Vierjahresplan*, for example, complained of dwindling rubber stocks, as motorization of the economy and of the military continued, and warned that there was little Germany could do about the situation because rubber was "practically a British-Dutch monopoly."²² A May report from the Office of War Economy Planning warned that if Russia were hostile in an upcoming war, Germany would need to find substitutes for about 165,000 tons of manganese and almost 2 million tons of oil a year. Germany might also be cut off from Sweden's vital iron ore supplies.²³ Finally, on May 8, the *WiRüAmt* estimated Germany's oil stocks in case of war at a mere 3.1 months.²⁴

Even though these economic and diplomatic problems were gradually pressuring Germany toward renewed talks with the Soviets, Hitler still refused to bite. Fed up with waiting, Stalin brought in a new fisherman on May 3, hoping that Vyacheslav Molotov, the man whose demeanor Donald Watt has described as that of "a salesman of encyclopedias down on his luck,"²⁵ could reel in the catch that had eluded Litvinov. Although Molotov's appointment was probably not meant as the strong pro-German move that Churchill and others believed,²⁶ it was Berlin that finally started to pull on the line. Within a couple days, Hitler had ended German press attacks on the USSR and recalled for consultations Schulenburg and Ernst Köstring, the German military attaché in Moscow.

At the same time, flickers of life began to appear in the economic

negotiations, the most important remaining link through which the two sides could still communicate directly. On May 5, Schnurre invited his occasional card-playing companion Soviet Counselor of Embassy Astakhov, "a tall, thin young Don Cossack with a sparse goatee beard,"²⁷ to a meeting during which Schnurre approved the Soviet requests on the unresolved contracts that the USSR had previously scheduled with the Skoda Arms Works in Czechoslovakia. According to Schnurre, "Counselor of Embassy Astakhov was visibly gratified at this declaration and stressed the fact that for the Soviet Government the material side of the question was not of as great importance as the question of principle. He inquired whether we would not soon resume the negotiations which had been broken off in February."²⁸ Although Schnurre was unable to answer Astakhov affirmatively at that moment, the encounter certainly boded well for the future.

Hitler had obviously become more interested in the Soviet option. On the tenth of May, for instance, he met with Schnurre and Counselor of Embassy Hilger, "a walking encyclopedia" of Russian and Soviet history²⁹ who "even spoke German with a slight Russian accent,"³⁰ to discuss the developing situation. According to Schnurre, Hitler sat quietly, listened attentively, and asked pertinent questions,³¹ all rarities for a meeting with the *Führer*. Hitler's meeting less than a week later with Köstring was similar in nature,³² indicating that he was studying an agreement with the Soviet Union very seriously during the middle of May. And his interest appears to have been reinforced on May 17 when Astakhov called on Schnurre again to restate "in detail that there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germany and Soviet Russia, and that therefore there was no reason for any enmity between the two countries."³³

Interestingly, Roberts notes that Astakhov's report to Moscow portrayed this meeting somewhat differently. Here the Germans are the ones pushing for closer relations and the Soviets are the ones making "general noises."³⁴ It appears that Astakhov as well as Schnurre was attempting to entice his superiors into further negotiations by presenting the other side as being very interested in closer relations.

Neither Hitler nor Stalin appeared convinced, however. The general German consensus was that the Allies still had the jump on reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union. Schnurre's proposal to restart economic negotiations was accepted, therefore, in part simply to forestall a possible Allied-Soviet deal.³⁵ Moscow also seemed hesitant. After the repeated hints from Astakhov and Merekalov, Molotov appeared surprisingly reserved on May 20 when he met with Schulenburg. In reply to Schnurre's proposed journey to Moscow to restart the economic negotiations, "Herr Molotov replied that the course of our last economic negotiations had given the Soviet Government the impression that we had not been in earnest in the matter and we had only played at negotiating for political reasons. . . . The Soviet government could only agree to a resumption of the negotiations if the necessary 'political bases' for them had been constructed."³⁶ Although Hilger and others saw this statement as a repetition of long-standing Soviet demands and an "implicit invitation," "In Berlin the ambassador's report created the impression that

Molotov had given a veiled rebuff to the German advances.”³⁷ It was the same old story. The Germans had nibbled, but had refused to bite.

MORE SOUNDINGS, JUNE 17

Within a week, however, they were circling the Soviet lines once again. First, the Pact of Steel was signed on May 22, signaling the end of a possible alliance with Japan and raising the importance of the Soviet Union for Germany. Second, Hitler’s May 23 meeting to discuss war plans against Poland had shown the military’s reluctance even to contemplate a war against both the West and the Soviet Union.

These already growing concerns were heightened by the negotiations leading up to the May 27 Western proposals to the Soviets. On May 26 the Nazi leadership considered but then apparently rejected sending an order to Schulenburg that had argued, “Since the latest reports indicated that the Anglo-Russian pact negotiations may shortly lead to a positive result in one form or another, it seems appropriate that in further conversations with the Russians we should emerge from our reserve more markedly than has been contemplated hitherto.”³⁸

Although the German fears proved unfounded and the Soviets quickly rejected the Western proposals, the Germans decided it was finally time to get back in the game, and on May 30 Weizsäcker notified Schulenburg, “Contrary to the policy previously planned, we have now decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union.”³⁹ The ensuing discussions were channeled through the economic negotiations, in part because the economic needs of the two sides were so great but also in part because close military and diplomatic connections had been severed in the mid-1930s and this was the only means of communication left open. But if the past failures from 1935 to 1939 were to be any indication, these negotiations were going to be long and very difficult. In fact, much of June was spent continuing the elaborate display of signal and countersignal as Hitler explored alternative ways to resolve the Polish crisis.⁴⁰

The Soviets certainly seemed interested in a deal, assuming their conditions were met. During his May 30 meeting with Weizsäcker, Astakhov asserted that the barrier to any agreement had been raised by the Germans. Logically, therefore, the way was open to a closer relationship if the Germans changed their policy.⁴¹ Schulenburg also reported that Molotov’s May 31 speech “avoided sallies against Germany, and showed readiness to continue the talks begun in Berlin and Moscow.”⁴²

At the same time that they were offering these hints of availability, however, the Soviets were also putting stumbling blocks in the path toward a closer economic relationship. During a June 2 meeting with Hilger, Mikoyan argued that Moscow “had lost all interest in these [economic] negotiations” as a result of earlier German procrastination.⁴³ And on June 6, American Chargé Alexander Kirk reported that “Johnnie” von Herwarth “did not anticipate that any important results would follow” from the soon-to-be-renewed economic negotiations, because

neither side was willing to give up enough of the resources or machine tools that the other power wanted.⁴⁴

The mixed Soviet signals and mixed German response continued over the next couple of weeks. Although the Soviets did agree in principle by June 8 that Schnurre could come to Moscow to continue economic negotiations, the Russians stipulated that the Germans first accept the Soviet February proposals as the basis for discussions.⁴⁵ These demands set off another series of “pow-wows” as first Schulenburg, then Hilger, and then Köstring trekked to Berlin to meet with Hitler.⁴⁶ More positively, Astakhov paid an unusual visit to the Bulgarian Ambassador in Berlin on June 14 to inform him (and apparently the Germans as well) that the USSR “was vacillating between three possibilities, namely the conclusion of the pact with England and France, a further dilatory treatment of the pact negotiations, and a rapprochement with Germany. This last possibility, with which ideological considerations would not have to become involved, was closest to the desires of the Soviet Union.”⁴⁷

Even before this hint, the Germans appeared ready to commit themselves by June 12. They tentatively agreed to most of the Soviet terms for Schnurre’s departure⁴⁸ and relayed this message via Hilger to Mikoyan on June 17.⁴⁹ Such a move on the economic front had profound implications for the general state of the relationship as Karl Schnurre detailed in a June 15 memorandum. Elaborating on the possible goals of his mission, Schnurre outlined the recent history of the economic negotiations and explained that the crucial turning point had arrived. If he did go to Moscow, Schnurre argued that “we shall still, for economic and political reasons, have to reach agreement with the Russians even if a substantial increase in the Russian offer of last February should not be obtained.” If the Germans did not give in to Soviet demands and allowed the economic negotiations to break down yet again, any chance for expanded German-Soviet trade and closer political relations would be ruined.⁵⁰ In short, the moment of decision was at hand, and since the Soviets held the better cards, the Germans really had no choice but to play Stalin’s game.

TALKS REOPENED, JULY 21

Having received for two months, and actually for more than two years, these suggestions of Soviet desire for closer relations and having finally, it appeared to them, acceded to most of the Soviet demands, the Germans seemed confident they could reach an economic agreement in fairly short order. They were soon disappointed.

If Schnurre could see that the Soviets were the ones in control of the agenda, so could Stalin, in part because he had access to German diplomatic strategy thanks to Rudolf von Scheliha, a Soviet mole operating in the German Embassy in Warsaw.⁵¹ The next couple of weeks saw the Soviets play out their lines a bit in order to make sure that the Germans really were on the hook and then to tire them out before they were reeled in. A quick deal would give the Germans their

resources and split the Soviets from the West. A longer lead-up, on the other hand, would allow the USSR to continue the bidding war and ensure that the Germans did not reap their political benefits without first providing a commensurate treaty guaranteeing Soviet security.

Signs of Stalin's tactics of delay were soon forthcoming. Hilger's June 25 meeting with Mikoyan went nowhere when the Soviet Trade Commissar suddenly rejected Schnurre's mission as too risky.⁵² Schnurre interpreted Mikoyan's actions as follows: "While, on the Soviet side, everything is being done to delay a decision on the resumption of negotiations, on the other hand the Soviets are unmistakably endeavouring not to break off all ties, and to keep open the possibility of resuming negotiations with us at a time tactically more favourable to them."⁵³ Undaunted, Schulenburg proposed to dispel Mikoyan's distrust by having the Soviets send their own special delegates to Berlin;⁵⁴ and, after a relatively successful meeting with Molotov on June 28, Schulenburg concluded "that the Soviet Government is greatly interested in knowing our political views and in maintaining contact with us."⁵⁵

Some in Berlin were not so confident about the direction these proposed talks were taking. While generally approving of Schulenburg's strategy, Schnurre, for example, harshly criticized the proposal to move the talks to Berlin, arguing that without Mikoyan, "it would be better to postpone the question of the negotiations entirely, since any other way will neither produce the political advantage expected by us nor bring us the clarity necessary for a decision on the economic possibilities existing *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union."⁵⁶ Hitler also appears once again to have cooled to the whole idea, and on June 29 he canceled further discussions with the Soviets.⁵⁷

This decision to cut off all talks appears not to have been enforced too rigorously, however. Although Herwarth and others remained "skeptical . . . of any real results issuing from the trade talks now in progress,"⁵⁸ the Germans were soon pressing forward again, with Schulenburg and Molotov holding yet another friendly meeting in Moscow on July 3.⁵⁹

The Germans could only be encouraged by the continuing difficulties in Anglo-Soviet negotiations. By July 1, Molotov had brought up the intractable issue of "indirect aggression" that would plague the talks for the next two months. In fact, the West seems increasingly to have viewed the negotiations with the Soviets as important primarily in keeping the totalitarian powers apart.⁶⁰ So by mid-July, the roles had been reversed, and it was the Western Powers who now felt themselves on the defensive in the bidding war with the Soviets. Nevertheless, it was still up to the Soviets to set the final price for their support and up to the Germans to decide whether they could afford to pay that price. In the meantime, the negotiations with the West had to be continued to inflate the value of Soviet friendship and to provide a backup in case talks with the Germans failed to yield the desired results.

For their part, the Germans seemed resolved to meet at least some of the Soviet economic demands for German military equipment and better credit terms.

On July 7, Weizsäcker notified the Moscow Embassy of Berlin's specific plans for economic talks.⁶¹ The German embassy then passed along the message to Mikoyan on July 10.⁶² Despite some disagreements over details and despite the continuing request (*contra* Schulenburg) that Schnurre carry out the negotiations in Moscow, the Germans had finally made a real strike for the Soviet bait.

But they were still not yet securely on the line. On July 12, Werner Tippilskirch, a high-ranking minister in the Moscow Embassy who was then back in Berlin, noted that Weizsäcker had talked merely about slow progress in the economic realm.⁶³ He went on to explain, "According to my impressions the problem of the Soviet Union is still of the greatest interest here. The opinions, however, fluctuate and are undecided. The formation of a definite political opinion has not yet materialized."⁶⁴ In any case, the Germans would go no further without a definite response from the Soviet Union.

Stalin must have realized what was at stake. Ever since 1935, the Germans had backed away from a closer economic relationship because it would cut into German armaments production and imply a certain level of political toleration. Now the Germans were making serious proposals. Although there were still potential pitfalls, no other nation could offer the Soviet Union the combination of technology and security that Germany could.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the Soviets responded to the German offer on July 17 when Evgeny Babarin, the middle height, middle-aged middle-man who served as Deputy Head of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin, paid a call on Schnurre to offer the USSR's counterproposals. Although clearly not agreeing with everything in the earlier German offer, the Soviets had obviously come out from behind their veil of hints and suggestions.⁶⁵

The most important outstanding issue was the location of the negotiations. The Germans still wanted the negotiations held in Moscow, because the chances of a quick and public success were greater. Germany could get the raw materials she wanted and drive a permanent wedge between the Soviets and the Allies without having to offer a formal political agreement. Negotiations held in Berlin would be lower profile, allowing the bidding war with the Allies to continue, and more easily controlled by the Soviets, who could constantly claim the need to refer questions back to Moscow, since the Soviet negotiators were always held on a tighter rein than the more independent German officials like Schnurre. Stalin would then be able to drag out the negotiations until he had gotten both his economic and his political "pound of flesh."⁶⁶

The Germans quickly caved in to the Soviet demand, and official economic talks were reopened in Berlin between Babarin and Schnurre on July 21 and announced in the papers on July 22.⁶⁷ Hitler, via Weizsäcker, even promised to the Moscow Embassy that "we will here act in a markedly forthcoming manner, since a conclusion, and this at the earliest possible date, is desired for general reasons."⁶⁸ That it would be the Soviets who again got their way on this, the crucial question, highlights the fact that the Soviets were still holding a winning hand now that the

two sides were finished “talking about talking” and could move on to restoring the economic partnership that had crumbled almost five years before.

NOTES

1. DGFP, D, 4: 631, doc. 495.
2. As quoted in Arnold Toynbee, ed., *Documents on International Affairs*, vol. 1 (London: Oxford University, 1951), 370.
3. Angelo Rossi, *The Russo-German Alliance* (Boston: Beacon, 1951), 9–10.
4. Carr, *German-Soviet Relations*, 127.
5. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 74.
6. Watt, *How War Came*, 142.
7. Ulam, 267.
8. Williamson Murray, *The Luftwaffe, 1933–1945*, 1983 (Washington D.C.: Brassey's, 1996), 11.
9. Tobias Philbin, *The Lure of Neptune. German-Soviet Naval Cooperation and Ambitions, 1919–1941* (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1994), 144.
10. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Stb, “Stand der wirtschaftlichen Lage (1.4.39),” *RW* 19/94, 103 & 110.
11. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Ro, “Die Mineralöl Versorgung Deutschlands im Kriege,” *Wi/I.37*, 1–2, 5, & 30.
12. BA/RFM/RA, “Rundschreiben: Investitionsprogramm des 3. Fünfjahresplanes der UdSSR,” *R* 2/16467, 1.
13. See Appendix A, Tables 1.3 and 1.4.
14. BA/BfVP, “Allgemeine Wirtschafts- und Versorgungsfragen 1939–1942,” *R* 26/IV/51, 5–6.
15. See Donald C. Watt, “The Initiation of Talks Leading to the Nazi-Soviet Pact: A Historical Problem,” in *Essays in Honour of E. H. Carr*, eds. C. Abramsky and Beryl J. Williams (London: Macmillan, 1974), 161–64, for a more complete discussion of these early feelers.
16. *NSR*, 2.
17. See Roberts, *Unholy Alliance*, 124–27, for the opposing argument that the Soviets had no real desire in April to improve relations with Germany.
18. Watt, *How War Came*, 231.
19. Weber, 144–47.
20. See Dallin, *Foreign Policy*, 223, and Carr, *German-Soviet Relations*, 133, for more details.
21. Read and Fisher, 74.
22. “Weltrohstoffmärkte und Aufrüstung, Kautschuk,” *Der Vierjahresplan*, 20 April 1939, 528–29.
23. BA, *R* 24/82, 3–5.
24. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Ro, “Anlagen zum Kriegstagebuch der Gruppe V (Mineralölversorgung) 1935–1940,” *RW* 19/347, 138.
25. Watt, *How War Came*, 113.
26. See Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, vol. 1 of *The Second World War* (New York: Bantam, 1948), 327–28, for the argument that the dismissal was a clear pro-German signal and Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 24, for the view that this was instead a move toward neutrality and an invitation to both sides.
27. Read and Fisher, 71.

28. NSR, 3.
29. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 59.
30. Read and Fisher, 75.
31. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 73–75.
32. Ernst Köstring, *Der militärische Mittler zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Sowjetunion 1921–1941*, ed. Hermann Teske (Frankfurt a. M.: E. S. Mittler u. Sohn, 1966), 135–36.
33. NSR, 5.
34. Roberts, *Soviet Union*, 75–76.
35. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 75–76.
36. NSR, 6.
37. Hilger and Meyer, 297.
38. DGFP, D, 6: 589, doc. 441.
39. NSR, 15.
40. Weber, 200.
41. NSR, 14–15.
42. DGFP, D, 6: 626, doc. 463. See Alexander Werth, *Russia at War, 1941–1945*, 1964 (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1984), 23, for the opposing argument that this speech was actually an attack against Germany.
43. DGFP, D, 6: 628, doc. 465.
44. FRUS, 1939, 1: 322–23.
45. DGFP, D, 6: 687, doc. 499.
46. See DGFP, D, 6: 687, doc. 499, n. 3 & 4, for Schulenburg and Hilger. For Köstring, see Weinberg, *Foreign Policy, 1937–1939*, 603, and Köstring, 136–37.
47. NSR, 21.
48. DGFP, D, 6: 711, doc. 514.
49. NSR, 22–23.
50. DGFP, D, 6: 731, doc. 530.
51. Weinberg, *Foreign Policy, 1937–1939*, 604.
52. DGFP, D, 6: 788, doc. 568.
53. DGFP, D, 6: 821, doc. 596.
54. NSR, 24–25.
55. NSR, 27.
56. DGFP, D, 6: 802, doc. 576.
57. NSR, 25.
58. FRUS, 1939, 1: 329.
59. NSR, 28–30.
60. Watt, *How War Came*, 379.
61. DGFP, D, 6: 870–71, doc. 628.
62. DGFP, D, 6: 889, doc. 642.
63. NSR, 31.
64. NSR, 32.
65. DGFP, D, 6: 936–38, doc. 685.
66. Carl Schorske has argued that the change in locations for the economic negotiations from Moscow to Berlin was a concession by the Soviets because Schulenburg originated the idea (Schorske, 505). But Schulenburg had suggested and Schnurre and others had rejected Berlin as the negotiating site because they all saw it as a concession to the Soviets.

67. *NSR*, 32.

68. *DGFP*, D, 6: 955, doc. 700.

Chapter 4

Restored Economic Partnership

Although the two sides were finally talking again, the Soviets continued to hold some of their distance during the next few weeks. The longer Stalin could keep the Allies in the game, the higher the stakes he could play for with the Germans. Who knew? Perhaps he might actually receive a better deal from the West after all. For his part, Hitler was running short of time and short of options, and by late July the German efforts to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union were becoming more and more intense.

DINING OUT, JULY 26

The reasons for the German sense of urgency were fairly obvious. First, the war in Poland was scheduled to begin on August 25, leaving only one month to clarify relations with the USSR. With Japan lost as a close ally, Italy shaky, and the fortifications in the west far from complete,¹ Germany needed a political agreement with the USSR in order to intimidate the West into submission if possible or to fight the West if necessary.

At the very least, Germany needed some sort of understanding with the Soviet Union in order to head off an unlikely but still potential Anglo-Soviet agreement. With the new English proposals of July 23 and secret new information from July 25 that the West was about to send a mission to the Soviet Union to carry out military talks,² Germany could not afford to wait it out on the sidelines.

Germany's economic situation also continued to dictate a much closer relationship with the huge empire to the east. For example, an August report from the Office for War Economy Planning argued that in the case of a war that included the USSR as hostile, Germany and Italy would fall short of their

mobilization requirements by 9.9 million tons of oil and 260,000 tons of manganese.³ Furthermore, Germany was, among other things, still importing 20 percent of her foodstuffs, 66 percent of her oil, and 80 percent of her rubber.⁴ At the same time, Germany possessed stocks of rubber sufficient only for two to three months of war and oil sufficient for only three to six months.⁵ Since the English blockade would cut off most of the sources of these materials and since the Soviet Union was practically the only potential supplier for many of these items, an August report from the Office for Economic Development concluded that “*making our greater economic sphere blockade-proof can only be achieved through close economic cooperation with Russia.*”⁶

These military, political, and economic concerns all meant that Hitler had to strike a deal with Stalin, and quickly! As the point man for the economic negotiations around which everything else revolved, Schnurre was literally “on call” twenty-four hours a day and was bombarded by question after question from Ribbentrop and the *Führer*. One time, Ribbentrop even tracked him down at a Charlottenburg restaurant where Schnurre was having dinner with his mother and brothers.⁷

This German desire for speed resulted in a series of meetings over the next two weeks to finalize the economic arrangements and to lay the groundwork for a political and military understanding. Throughout, the Germans were the pursuers, despite some continuing hesitations, and the Soviets were the pursued. Both realized that it was still the USSR that was in control of the situation.

The first few encounters were relatively minor. On July 24, for example, Astakhov invited Weizsäcker and the Germans to send delegates to an agricultural exhibition in Moscow,⁸ which the Germans did in the second week of August.⁹ Schnurre’s July 25 memorandum indicated that the economic negotiations were focusing on technical questions and were making steady progress on the remaining problems. For example, the two sides had already agreed on a seven-year credit, currency arrangements, and 60 percent of the goods being shipped by German vessels; but they were still a half percent apart on interest rates and twenty million RM apart on Soviet raw material shipments.¹⁰

With a few days of relatively successful bargaining under their belts, the Germans decided to begin a “full-court press.” On July 26, Schnurre and his last-minute partner, the young Foreign Office official Walther Schmid, met Astakhov and Babarin at Ewest’s, a Berlin restaurant, for dinner. Schmid, who had been told nothing of the nature of the upcoming conversation, was stunned when Schnurre proposed the following three-stage plan¹¹:

Stage One: The reestablishment of collaboration in economic affairs through the credit and commercial treaty which is to be concluded. Stage Two: The normalization and improvement of political relations. . . . Stage Three would be the reestablishment of good political relations, either a return to what had been in existence before (i.e. the Berlin Treaty) or a new arrangement which took account of the vital political interests of both parties. This stage three appeared to me within reach.¹²

The Soviets readily accepted the agenda. On the other hand, they also “emphasized that the tempo must probably be very slow and gradual.”¹³

Over the next week the Soviets seemed remarkably agreeable. Astakhov met again with Schnurre on August 1 and laid down two Soviet conditions before political talks could begin: the cessation of all anti-Soviet attacks by the German media and the signing of a new economic treaty. Schnurre agreed without hesitation.¹⁴ On the same day, Babarin, Moscow’s “postman,” dropped off the latest Soviet economic proposals, after which Schnurre wrote, “I think we shall now manage to conclude an agreement.”¹⁵ Herr “Brickendrop” (as the English privately called Foreign Minister Ribbentrop) did cause some consternation to negotiators on both sides when he held a somewhat cool meeting with Astakhov on August 2, but Astakhov’s August 3 discussions with Schnurre were conducted “on very positive lines.”¹⁶ Finally, during Schulenburg’s August 4 meeting in Moscow, “Molotov abandoned his usual reserve and appeared unusually open.”¹⁷ With the economic treaty practically finished, a political agreement seemed right around the corner.

ECONOMIC END GAME, AUGUST 12

Unhappily for the Germans, they would have to wait an agonizing two more weeks for the economic settlement to be approved and then a frantic four additional days to reach a political agreement. Even after his successful meeting with Molotov, Schulenburg argued that “it will nevertheless take considerable effort on our part to cause the Soviet Government to swing about.”¹⁸ Stalin surely realized that Germany could ill afford any delays; and the more desperate Hitler became, the more likely he would be to pay not only Stalin’s economic price but also his political price. In addition, the Soviets had to make absolutely sure that a war between the capitalist powers would break out; otherwise, “If another Munich were to take place, the German-Soviet treaty would immediately become a meaningless piece of paper—or worse.”¹⁹

Although diplomatic contacts were being reestablished between the two powers, most of the negotiations continued to be channeled through the economic discussions. On August 5, for example, Astakhov and Schnurre met once again, this time to feel out the other side’s response to the previous day’s Molotov-Schulenburg encounter. According to Schnurre, “Astakhov . . . inform[ed] me of Molotov’s answer to the questions which I put to him the day before yesterday. (1) The Soviet Government were ready, and desirous of continuing the conversations with us on the improvement and development of our relations. (2) The Soviet Government regarded the conclusion of the credit agreement as the first important stage in this direction.”²⁰

The negotiations over the next week were carried out in a similar vein—the Soviets agreeing in principle to closer relations, but delaying on final closure until they were sure the Germans would meet the asking price. On August 7, for instance, Schulenburg reported that in the Soviet negotiations with the West, “we

hear that throughout Herr Molotov sat like a bump on a log." In contrast, Schulenburg noted in the margin that Molotov "has been very different toward Hilger and me of late; very communicative and amiable."²¹

In response to these tentatively favorable developments, Ribbentrop called Schnurre and Köstring to Fuschl (where the Reich Foreign Minister stayed whenever Hitler was at the Berghof) to discuss the next German move. After extensive talks that were frequently interrupted by telephone calls to the *Führer*, the Germans apparently decided to make a final push for a settlement.²²

The Soviets also did their part to lure the Germans forward. During the August 10 Schnurre-Astakhov meeting, for example, the Soviet representative "mentioned that he had *once again* received express instructions from Moscow to emphasize that the Soviet Government desired an improvement in their relations with Germany."²³ In addition, the two hashed out a series of relatively minor technical questions that all but made final the economic arrangement.²⁴

Of course, the Soviets still refused to commit themselves completely. With the Western military mission about to arrive in Russia, the Soviets had every reason to keep the bidding war going, even if the West appeared unlikely to meet the Soviet demands. Consequently, the Soviets would delay the signing of the now-completed economic treaty for almost ten days until they were sure that they had a political agreement as well. So when Astakhov met with Schnurre once again on August 12, he emphasized the Soviet desire to execute a far-reaching settlement, but explained, "Such a discussion, however, could be undertaken only *by degrees*."²⁵

The Soviet delaying tactics were having their desired effect. Although some German studies were raising questions about how much oil, manganese, and so forth the Soviets really could send in the short term,²⁶ German businesses were already compiling lists of raw materials they wanted from the Soviet Union and of goods they had available to export to the USSR.²⁷ Regardless of his continuing anti-Soviet sentiments,²⁸ Hitler could not afford to lose Soviet political and economic support in case of a war with the West. Every military and economic study had argued that Germany was doomed to defeat without at least Soviet neutrality. Therefore, Ribbentrop cabled Schulenburg on August 12 with detailed instructions for the political negotiations.²⁹

THE FINAL GO-AHEAD, AUGUST 19

While the Soviets had temporarily put the economic talks on hold, the political talks now entered a period of furious activity as the Germans tried to reach an agreement before the Polish crisis came to a head. Although the always-cautious Schulenburg was still advising against "any hasty measure" on August 14,³⁰ Hitler had already made up his mind for a quick settlement. That same day, Ribbentrop proposed a short visit to Moscow "to set forth the *Führer's* views to M. Stalin."³¹

Even though the Germans had obviously put all their cards on the table, the

Soviets still left the Germans guessing for a few more days. On August 15, Schulenburg and Molotov met to discuss Ribbentrop's proposed visit. Although Schulenburg reported that "the conversation took a very friendly course and Molotov was more candid than before,"³² Molotov still delayed, arguing that "such a trip required adequate preparation in order that the exchange of opinions might lead to results."³³ Ribbentrop responded with an even more specific request to visit Moscow and, "if the occasion arises, to sign the appropriate treaties."³⁴

With war imminent, the German cards on the table, and the Allies still apparently reluctant, the Soviets finally revealed their own hand and accepted Ribbentrop's offer. During his August 17 meeting with Schulenburg, Molotov offered a three-stage process for establishing closer relations: (1) signing the economic agreement, (2) negotiating the terms of a nonaggression pact, and (3) having Ribbentrop visit Moscow to sign the final deal.³⁵ The same day, Voroshilov adjourned the military negotiations with the West. Still in question was the speed with which Molotov's three steps would be handled, but the die had clearly been cast.

Schulenburg's report of his meeting with Molotov arrived on the morning of August 18, shifting the economic negotiations back into high gear as the Germans raced to complete the first part of the process as quickly as possible. The final treaty appears to have been ready by noon on August 19. But suddenly the Soviets went back into their "stall defense." The Soviets called at 4:00 P.M. to say that they could not sign that day, much to Schnurre's consternation.³⁶

At the same time, Molotov was telling Schulenburg that Ribbentrop could not visit Moscow until at least a week after the economic treaty was signed.³⁷ The Soviets appear to have been giving the West one final chance to match the German bid.³⁸ As in the past, however, the Poles were unwilling under almost any circumstances to permit Soviet troops to enter Poland, and the West was equally unwilling to make the Poles change their position. Without a compromise on this issue, any possible arrangement between the USSR and the West became mute.³⁹ Therefore, at 2:00 A.M. on August 20, the Germans' agony of waiting ended, and the economic agreement was signed by Schnurre and Babarin in Berlin.⁴⁰

The terms were as follows. Over the next two years, the Germans would accept 200 million RM in new orders⁴¹ and would export about 60 million RM in "current business" (trade covered by the earlier clearing agreements) and 180 million RM in "new business" (expanded trade resulting from the new treaty). For their part, over the next two years, the Soviets would export 60 million RM in "current business," 180 million RM in "new business," and another 200 to 300 million RM in repayment for old and new credits. Schnurre estimated that over the next few years the total trade might jump to almost 1 billion RM!⁴² As usual, the Soviets would supply raw materials in return for German manufactured goods.

Contemporaries and historians have had mixed opinions about the significance of this new economic partnership. One school of interpretation has asserted that the German war economy would have quickly collapsed without Soviet aid.⁴³ Now, however, "the threat of the blockade . . . had been overcome"

by the August treaties.⁴⁴ Preventive-war theorists have gone even further with this theory. Stalin now had almost complete control of the German war economy and could effectively blackmail and manipulate Hitler: "By skillfully apportioning Soviet aid Stalin had it in his power to save Germany from defeat, but also to prevent them from achieving victory and so make the war drag on till both parties were exhausted, while the Soviet Union carried on rearming in safe neutrality in order to have the last word."⁴⁵

On the other hand, the terms of the understanding were still relatively limited, which has led a third group of historians to claim that the agreement was mostly superficial. Since Hitler did not envision a long-term war of attrition, he intended these early economic accords to serve primarily as political ammunition to overawe the Allies and not to make Germany blockade-proof.⁴⁶

While correct about Hitler's goals, this last argument is still only a half-truth. Schwendemann, for example, is surely right that the Soviet Union could never replace all the raw materials that Germany would lose if war with England broke out. But the USSR could still offer crucial amounts of vital resources such as oil, manganese, and (as a third-party supplier) rubber. Furthermore, as Schnurre explained, "The framework now set up represents a minimum," and both sides expected that trade would increase dramatically.⁴⁷

Since the expanding German war economy had an endless appetite that could not be satisfied elsewhere, the new Soviet market would play an important role regardless of whether a major war developed. Not surprisingly, therefore, Hitler and his cohorts tried to bolster German morale by repeatedly emphasizing, and often overemphasizing, the importance of this economic agreement to Germany's war-fighting capability. During Hitler's August 22 meeting with his military leaders to discuss the upcoming invasion of Poland, for instance, Hitler downplayed the danger from the West, "because we have sources of supply in Eastern Europe. . . . The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc."⁴⁸ Similarly, Hitler could now allay German fears that a new war might see a repetition of the past war's "turnip winters."⁴⁹

Although clearly not "the last salvation"⁵⁰ that some were now claiming, the new commercial treaty would end up playing an important role in Germany's ability to weather the first two years of the world war. More immediately, however, the agreement also provided the key link to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23.

NOTES

1. Read and Fisher, 139.
2. McSherry maintains that this information was "leaked" to Germany by the Soviet Union itself (McSherry, 1: 200–201).
3. BA, R 24/21, 1–2.
4. Georg Thomas, *Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft 1918–1943/45*, ed. Wolfgang Birkenfeld (Boppard: Harald Boldt, 1966), 146.
5. Klein, 57–58.
6. BA, R 25/53, 11.

7. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 79–80. This image of Hitler pestering Schnurre about details in the economic negotiations contrasts sharply with Schwendemann's picture of a distant and reserved Hitler who knew and cared little about the economic relationship with the Soviet Union (Schwendemann, 69).

8. *DGFP*, D, 6: 975–76, doc. 714.

9. *DGFP*, D, 7: 21, doc. 20.

10. PA, *R 106230*, 452641–42.

11. Read and Fisher, 124–25.

12. *NSR*, 33.

13. *NSR*, 33.

14. Read and Fisher, 134–35.

15. *DGFP*, D, 6: 1047, doc. 757.

16. *DGFP*, D, 6: 1052, doc. 761.

17. *NSR*, 39.

18. *NSR*, 41.

19. Ulam, 273.

20. *DGFP*, D, 6: 1067, doc. 772.

21. *NSR*, 42.

22. PA/Schnurre, *Die hektischen Tage vom 3. bis 22./23. August 1939* (Bad Godesberg, 1987), 3. Schnurre lost his notes for this meeting, so there is, apparently, no documentary record of what was specifically discussed.

23. *DGFP*, D, 7: 18, doc. 18.

24. PA, *R 106230*, 452654.

25. *DGFP*, D, 7: 59, doc. 50. The emphasis is in the original. Schnurre's report stressed the point that the Soviets were willing to negotiate only gradually.

26. PA/HaPol/Schnurre, "Russland-Aussenhandel der UdSSR 1936–1940," *R 105314*, 14–30.

27. MA, Presseauschnitt, "Zusammenarbeit mit Rußland 1939–1940," *M 35.025*, 1–2. The Soviets had already shown interest in construction of high-tech German factories. See RWW/Otto Wolff/Rußland, "Ruhrchemie (9.8, 15.8, u. 23.8.39)," 72–41–5, for more information on some of these early negotiations.

28. See Hitler's famous August 11 talk with Carl Burkhardt in which the *Führer* asserted, "Everything I undertake is directed against the Russians; if the West is too stupid and blind to grasp this, then I shall be compelled to come to an agreement with the Russians, beat the West, and then after their defeat turn against the Soviet Union with all my forces. I need the Ukraine so they can't starve us out like in the last war" (Noakes & Pridham, 2: 739).

29. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 40.

30. *NSR*, 46–47.

31. *DGFP*, D, 7: 64, doc. 56. The Germans had planned to send Reich Minister Frank and Schnurre (*DGFP*, D, 7: 68–69, doc. 62), but Hitler's desire for a rapid resolution to the political talks made it imperative that a central figure like Ribbentrop lead the mission to Moscow.

32. *DGFP*, D, 7: 87, doc. 79.

33. *NSR*, 52.

34. *DGFP*, D, 7: 84, doc. 75.

35. *NSR*, 60–61.

36. *DGFP*, D, 7: 132–33, doc. 123.

37. NSR, 63.

38. See Ingeborg Fleischhauer, "Die sowjetische Außenpolitik und die Genese des Hitler-Stalin-Paktes," in *Zwei Wege nach Moskau*, ed. Bernd Wegner (München: Piper, 1991), 32, for the opposing explanation that Stalin still preferred an understanding with the West and only now switched course toward striking a deal with Hitler.

39. Read and Fisher, 213–14.

40. The treaty was backdated to August 19, released to radio agencies late on the twentieth, and announced in the newspapers on the morning of the twenty-first (*DGFP*, D, 7: 152, doc. 135).

41. Schwendemann and others have sometimes misinterpreted this 200 million RM in new *orders* to mean 200 million RM worth of additional *exports* and have then criticized the Germans for not fulfilling this obligation in a timely fashion. Because of the long lead-times for some of the items purchased (ships and factories, for example), these orders might not actually be due to be shipped until 1942 or later.

42. NSR, 84–85. See Appendix B for the complete terms of the August 19 treaty. "Current business" totals are based on later German estimates.

43. For an example of this argument, see Hildebrand, 92.

44. Perrey, 289.

45. Topitsch, 42.

46. See Schwendemann, 65, and Bianka Pietrow-Ennker, "Deutschland im 1941-Ein Opfer sowjetischer Aggression? Zur Kontroverse über die Präventivkriegthese," in *Der Zweite Weltkrieg*, ed. Wolfgang Michalka (München: Piper, 1989), 592–93.

47. NSR, 84.

48. As quoted in Noakes and Pridham, 2: 742.

49. Raack, *Stalin's Plans*, 217.

50. This is General Quartermaster Eduard Wagner's statement as quoted in Müller, *Tor zur Weltmacht*, 333.

Chapter 5

Toward an Economic Alliance

After more than four years of negotiations, the economic and military pressures of a potential war in Poland had finally forced Hitler to reach a settlement with the Soviets and largely on their terms. The Germans had wanted a large credit (500 million RM or more), short terms (five years at the most), high interest rates (5 percent or more), lower government guarantees (already at 70 percent), specific lists of goods, and a quick signing in Moscow. What they got were a low credit (200 million RM), long terms (seven years), higher government guarantees (80 percent), somewhat vague lists of goods (which the Soviets would later use to their advantage), and a late signing in Berlin. Stalin could be and apparently was quite happy with the new economic arrangement.¹ For his part, Molotov argued in his August 31 speech that “this agreement differs favourably not only from that concluded in 1935, but also from all previous agreements, not to mention the fact that we have never had any equally advantageous economic agreement with Great Britain, France, or any other country.”²

The Germans still got some of the vital raw materials that they wanted, but they really needed an economic alliance and not just an economic partnership. The next six weeks, therefore, saw the Germans push for an even closer economic understanding, especially after the war in Poland had begun. For their part, the Soviets continued to take advantage of the German predicament to reap economic and political benefits at little material cost.

POLITICAL END GAME, AUGUST 23

For four years the Soviets had been the ones pursuing a political agreement in order to avoid “capitalist encirclement.” Since the end of March, however, it

had been the Germans seeking the political agreement in order to escape a different kind of encirclement. Now that the commercial treaty had been signed, a political treaty was almost inevitable, though the question of timing still remained. On the same evening that the Soviets agreed to the economic arrangement, Molotov also informed Schulenburg that Ribbentrop could come to Moscow, but only on August 26 or 27.³ This was still too slow for Hitler, who decided to break the logjam by writing directly to Stalin and requesting that Ribbentrop visit on the twenty-second or twenty-third.⁴ Stalin apparently appreciated the *Führer's* direct approach and also realized that a political understanding with Germany was now or never.⁵ According to Albert Speer, Hitler received Stalin's affirmative reply at supper on the twenty-first: "He scanned it, stared into space for a moment, flushed deeply, then banged on the table so hard that the glasses rattled, and exclaimed in a voice breaking with excitement: 'I have them! I have them!'"⁶

The deal was now all but completed, and Ribbentrop flew to Moscow on the twenty-second. He almost never arrived. Anti-aircraft units near Velikie Luki mistakenly fired at the German Condors but missed.⁷ It would not be the last time that confusion between the two powers nearly "shot down" the relationship, nor would it be the last time that the Germans were thankful for the poor training of the Soviet military. Once in Moscow, Ribbentrop negotiated some last-minute changes to the documents that had been prepared over the preceding weeks (to which Hitler cabled back his one-word response: "Agreed!")⁸ and signed the final accord (along with the secret protocols dividing up Eastern Europe) late the next night.⁹ Afterwards, Stalin, Ribbentrop, and company exchanged toasts to their new-found friendship. At one point, Stalin even took the Reich Foreign Minister aside and earnestly whispered, "The Soviet Government takes the new Pact very seriously."¹⁰

One can question, however, the sincerity of both sides' commitment to the new political arrangement. On repeated occasions, Hitler would refer to August 23 as "the saddest day" of his life.¹¹ Similarly, Hitler explained to his generals on August 22, "My pact was meant only to stall for time." Eventually, "we will crush the Soviet Union."¹² Stalin revealed his own secret intentions to Khrushchev: "Hitler thinks he's outsmarted me, but actually it's I who have tricked him!"¹³

Historians have used these conflicting statements to engage in an endless debate over the meaning of the new arrangement. In fact, the political accord bears striking similarities to the recent commercial treaty. The Soviets had largely controlled the negotiating process and ended up with a limited partnership (with possibilities for a closer relationship in the future) in which the Germans would do most of the real work in return for seemingly small benefits. Combining the two agreements, the Germans had to provide credits up front from which they would see no real return for seven years, had to fight a hot war with Poland and probably the West, had to give up substantial territory to the USSR, and had to undermine their alliances with other Fascist countries. In return, the Soviet Union had to export limited raw materials and stay neutral (their preferred strategy

anyway) in a war that they could be reasonably sure would turn into a long struggle between the capitalist powers. This probably seemed a relatively small price to Stalin for such a potentially huge payoff.

WAR BEGINS, SEPTEMBER 1

But for Stalin to cash in on his prize tickets, he needed to make sure that “the capitalist war” actually began. Although probably fairly certain of this outcome, given what he knew from his secret sources about German and Allied intransigence, Stalin’s signing of the new political arrangement made inevitable an already likely struggle.¹⁴ Apparently confident that the war was about to start, Stalin ended the now-meaningless military talks with the West. The Western officers were quickly hustled out of Moscow and seen off by two Soviet generals, who related their version of the departure: “The locomotive whistle blew; the train began to move slowly. We turned to each other and without saying a word burst into laughter.”¹⁵

Laughter was not the reaction of the rest of the world to the two Nazi-Soviet agreements. While those in Germany and the Soviet Union seemed either resigned or even approving of the new venture, everyone else reeled in stunned amazement that the two ideological enemies could so quickly become economic and political partners. Some Western officials refused to believe that the Pact would have any serious effect.¹⁶ Communists around the world did not even know what to believe. The Soviets left their movement temporarily without orders. And when new orders finally arrived, they called for a direct reversal of previous policy. It was all too much for many, especially those few Communists left in Austria and Germany, most of whom quit the Party in protest.¹⁷

Hitler had hoped that this confusion would cause the West to back down from its Polish guarantees.¹⁸ Instead, England and Poland signed a military alliance on August 25. After that a major war became a foregone conclusion, despite the diplomatic flurry of the last week of August and despite Hitler’s continuing illusions that the Allies would give in yet again. By September 1, Hitler launched Operation White; and the West responded, somewhat reluctantly, by September 3. The war was on.

That Hitler did not expect a major war to develop out of the Polish crisis was readily apparent from the state of the German economy. Although historians have disagreed about Germany’s level of preparedness and its economic strategy in September 1939,¹⁹ most recent analyses have maintained that the Germans had been gradually gearing up for a total war in 1942 or 1943. Therefore, “the war in Europe began three to four years prematurely. This unexpectedly imposed a ‘total war of improvisations’ on the Third Reich.”²⁰ Germany still had room to intensify mobilization of certain areas of the economy where they had surpluses, such as machine tools,²¹ but on the whole the Reich was by no means ready for a long war.

One major weakness in the German war economy was its lack of raw materials now that access to overseas markets had been cut off. To deal with these

resource problems, the Germans had a series of possible options to choose from: (1) rationing, (2) expansion of domestic production in key sectors, (3) drawing from stocks, and (4) expansion of supplies from European markets.²² Unfortunately for the Germans, since the Reich had already been moving gradually toward a total-war economy and since Hitler was always very conscious of German public opinion,²³ rationing could accomplish only so much. The second option, expanding domestic production, required enormous expenditures. Opening up old mines or producing synthetics was very inefficient, created a drag on the rest of the war effort, and would take years to have a major effect. Germany also could not rely on withdrawing from stockpiles, because there were few stocks to begin with. That left the fourth option as Germany's major hope for economic success in a long war—trading for or conquering vital resources.

Oil and rubber provide two good examples of the dilemma facing Germany. Before the war Germany had imported 66 percent of its oil products and 80 percent of its rubber.²⁴ How were they to make up the difference, especially if military needs began to escalate? The Germans tried to conserve at home. Civilian oil consumption was throttled back from about 200,000 tons a month to 71,000 tons a month by the beginning of 1940.²⁵ And by May of 1940, military consumption of liquid fuels had already reached 68 percent. Military consumption of rubber went from 10 to 52 percent during the first month of the war.²⁶ The rest of the economy would take more than two years to catch up to the percentages of oil and rubber being mobilized for the war effort by early 1940.²⁷ In other words, Germany was already squeezing out about as much of these resources as it could afford, and military consumption percentages could only inch upward during the rest of the war. Nevertheless, Germany was still losing ground.

Option two, expanded domestic production, also failed to solve the problem. Although the Germans built a number of plants for synthetic production of liquid fuels and rubber, these facilities were very expensive, were very vulnerable to air attacks (as raids in 1944 would prove), and took a very long time to construct. Synthetic oil production could never keep pace with increasing military demand, and large-scale synthetic rubber production did not begin until 1942. Synthetic rubber also had some serious disadvantages (poor elasticity, for instance) and had to be blended with pure rubber.²⁸ In short, Germany had to have *natural* rubber and oil, especially during the next three years.

Option three, withdrawing from stockpiles, was even less promising. Hitler had been reluctant to allow a massive effort so early in his plans, and the exporting nations had "kept their German customers on a hand-to-mouth basis."²⁹ As a result, oil stockpiles at the beginning of the war were sufficient only for up to three months.³⁰ Rubber stocks were even worse, at a mere two months.³¹ No answer here.

The first three options still left a large gap to be filled by expanding supplies from other European states. Rumania and Hungary could supply most, but certainly not all, of Germany's minimum oil requirements.³² In the short term, Holland might be able to supply Germany's natural rubber needs; but by the summer of 1940 and the German invasion of the Lowlands, that route too had

been closed. The only other state capable of supplying Germany with substantial quantities of oil and rubber (along with other increasingly vital resources such as grain, fats, manganese, and platinum) was the USSR.

Even before the war had begun, German officials were taking an increasingly close look at the extent to which the Soviets could supply Germany with crucial raw materials. Reactions were mixed. By August 24, interested German firms had already sent numerous letters of congratulations on the recent commercial treaty to the Soviet trade representatives and seemed eager to reestablish old trading links.³³ And by August 25, a euphoric Walther Funk had reported to Hitler that the German war economy could now survive the blockade for up to two years (double the previous estimates of one year) thanks to the new agreements with the Soviet Union.³⁴ An August 26 study on the history of German-Soviet trade relations pointed to the complementary nature of the two economies and argued that “the new agreement represents only the beginning of a new stage in trade between Germany and Russia.”³⁵ Another August 26 study asserted that the commercial treaty would “provide a powerful new impulse” to German-Soviet trade and place the USSR back at the top of the list of Germany’s trading partners.³⁶ On the other hand, an August 25 newsletter on the Soviet war economy warned that transportation difficulties and increasing Soviet internal demand would significantly reduce the Soviet export potential in grain, oil, and nonferrous metals.³⁷

The economic relations in the last week before the war also saw generally positive signals mixed with occasional signs of impending problems. On August 26, Babarin and Schnurre signed a confidential protocol to deal with one of the many issues (in this case some currency arrangements) left unresolved in the rush to complete the first treaty.³⁸ Only a few days later, however, Schulenburg was reminding Molotov that the Soviets still needed to appoint an ambassador to replace Merekalov,³⁹ a trade representative to replace Astakhov,⁴⁰ and a military attaché to fill a long-vacant position.⁴¹

DIVIDING POLAND, SEPTEMBER 17

With the war now officially begun, Germany’s reliance on Russia became less hypothetical and more real. The British blockade left the German economy increasingly desperate for a whole host of raw materials from oil to grain to various metals. These increasingly practical needs highlighted increasingly practical concerns about the details of this new trade relationship. Consequently, the early optimism of the Foreign Ministry and German business circles⁴² was more and more balanced by the pessimism of some *WiRüAmt* reports.

The Institute for World Economics submitted one such mixed report to General Georg Thomas’s *WiRüAmt* agency in September.⁴³ This extensive analysis argued that Germany could easily meet Soviet demands for machine tools by simply switching exports previously scheduled for Britain and the United States to the USSR.⁴⁴ Increasing imports from the Soviet Union would be more difficult

because of its rising internal demand, its inelastic economy, and its backwards transportation network. As the institute's report concluded, "In general, the complementary nature [of the two economies] should not be overestimated."⁴⁵ On the other hand, the Soviets at relatively little cost to themselves could help Germany with oil, manganese, wood, and perhaps even grain in the short term, and might be able to provide enormous aid after a year or two if they were willing to cut into their domestic consumption and build up their transport system.⁴⁶

But why would the Soviets make such sacrifices? As the members of the Russia Committee had been pointing out for some time, the Third Five-Year Plan and new rearmament efforts were creating greater Soviet demand for manufactured goods. At the same time, the prospect of a European war was pushing England and the United States to scale back their exports of exactly the items that the USSR wanted.⁴⁷ The new friendship with Nazi Germany also alienated Western governments, as did Stalin's later invasion of Finland.⁴⁸ For example, more than 50 percent of Soviet exports had gone to countries that ceased trade relations with the USSR in September.⁴⁹ If Germany increasingly needed Soviet resources, the USSR also increasingly needed German machines.⁵⁰

A word of caution is in order in interpreting these German reports on the prospects for improved economic relations with the USSR. Officials on both sides of the issue may have had ulterior motives in presenting the issue the way that they did. The careers of the officials in the Foreign Ministry and Russia Committee, for example, could depend on closer relations with the USSR, perhaps contributing to their sometimes rosy scenarios for German-Soviet trade. The *WiRuAmt* officials, on the other hand, wanted more emphasis on creating a "total-war" system under their own auspices. Easy access to Soviet raw materials would undermine their plan to ratchet up the war economy.

The truth, therefore, probably lies somewhere in the middle of these estimations. If the Soviets refused to make any changes in their current foreign trade and internal demand, there would be limited surpluses available to the Germans, except in a few vital areas such as oil or manganese. If, on the other hand, the Soviets were willing to transfer their current trade with England and the United States and also cut into their domestic supplies, then Germany would have access to substantial and perhaps even decisive quantities of raw materials. It all depended on how eager Stalin was to cooperate with Germany and at what price. And that depended not only on the Soviet economic situation but also on what happened in the war.

Stalin, along with most European military analysts, seems to have assumed that the "capitalist war" would develop into a World War I-style slugfest and drag on for awhile.⁵¹ As long as the fighting in Poland raged, Stalin saw no real reason to side too closely with his new partner and preferred continuing his role as the outside arbiter. Herwarth, for example, "ventured the opinion that the Soviet Government would endeavor to fulfill its commercial agreements with both Germany and Poland."⁵²

Unfortunately for Stalin's plans, the Germans proved the vastly superior force

during the fighting in Poland.⁵³ Although the Poles fought hard, they really “never had a chance.”⁵⁴ As the noted military historian Liddell-Hart explains, “The military issue in 1939 can be summed up in two sentences. In the East a hopelessly out-of-date army was quickly disintegrated by a small tank force, in combination with a superior air force, which put into practice a novel technique. At the same time, in the West, a slow-motion army could not develop any effective pressure before it was too late.”⁵⁵

Even this relatively easy victory, however, was putting severe pressure on the German system. In addition to raw-material shortages, Germany had entered the war with a munitions supply of only six weeks⁵⁶ and no considerable manpower reserve.⁵⁷ Consequently, Germany increasingly faced major munitions, personnel, and resource crises.

The Germans were soon looking to their new-found friends in the east for both economic and military aid. Schnurre's September 2 memorandum describing Germany's working program for its economic relations with the USSR laid out a four-part plan. First, resolve questions left open by the Commercial Agreement, such as the still unsatisfactory (from the German perspective) arbitration and delivery terms. Second, expand industrial production so that Germany could explore ways to increase the volume of cash transactions. Third, advance the date and raise the amount of Soviet raw-material deliveries. Fourth, send Schnurre to Moscow to negotiate further terms with Mikoyan.⁵⁸

Various German agencies held a series of meetings over the next two weeks to discuss aspects of this plan. A long list of Ph.D.s and government officials, for example, filed through the *WiRuAmt*'s doors to review Soviet raw-material production and transportation capabilities.⁵⁹ I. G. Farben's Political Economy Section issued its own brief report on transportation routes to Soviet resources and pointed out that the Baltic, as the main trade link between the two countries, had handled in the early 1930s up to seven times the current tonnage.⁶⁰ Mannesmann (and presumably other major firms as well) expanded its August list of goods it could sell to the Soviets and declared its willingness “to push forward trade with Russia with all means possible.”⁶¹ The Foreign Office, among other discussions, focused on the possibilities for transit trade from the Far and Near East, and soybeans from Manchuria in particular, during a September 6 meeting.⁶²

With its typically optimistic tone about the potential of German-Soviet trade, the Russia Committee's September 8 issue of *Ostexpress* argued that the Soviets could free up vast quantities of manganese for export if they expanded their mining operations in the Urals and Siberia.⁶³ A September 12 Russia Committee meeting proposed raising Soviet imports from 180 million RM in the first year to 500 million RM.⁶⁴ The committee's sometimes blind enthusiasm even bubbled over into proposals that the Soviets allow transit shipments of German machines to foreign buyers and that the Soviets hold a trade show in Moscow where German merchants would show off the latest consumer goods that the Soviet people had been deprived of!⁶⁵

As the point-man for German-Soviet trade, Karl Schnurre was particularly

busy during this period. Out drumming up support for his Soviet project, Schnurre met with Thomas and State Secretary Neumann on September 6 to review the availability of Soviet raw materials and the possibilities for expanding cash transactions.⁶⁶ The next day Schnurre met with German firms Ruhr-Chemie and Otto Wolff, who were already deep in discussions with the Soviets,⁶⁷ and agreed to propose concentrating negotiations for synthetic fuel plants in their hands.⁶⁸

While all these fact-finding discussions were going on, a September 4 meeting of the Reich Defense Council, chaired by Göring, debated Schnurre's proposed plans and came up with some preliminary decisions. The council members agreed "that further expansion of our economic relations with Russia should be undertaken as quickly as possible." They also agreed to set up a committee of various state secretaries responsible for overseeing proposals to widen trade with the USSR. Finally, they took up Schnurre's idea to go to Moscow to negotiate further economic arrangements.⁶⁹ There appears to have been some hesitation on who should lead this mission; but Schnurre eventually got his wish to head the delegation, and a proposal was sent to the Soviets on September 7.⁷⁰

Based on Stalin's actions so far, however, plans for rapid expansion of German-Soviet trade seemed unrealizable. During the first week of the war, the Soviets appeared unwilling to move beyond the formal requirements of their new relationship. On September 2, for example, Babarin was promoted to Head of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin to replace the recalled Astakhov.⁷¹ At the same time, Voroshilov was reassuring Poland that "the Soviet Union was prepared to continue to provide commercial supplies."⁷² Similarly, the new Soviet military mission did finally arrive in Berlin on September 2, but Molotov requested that the German media play down the event.⁷³

After a week of German victories in Poland, however, Stalin had changed his mind and began edging closer to Hitler by September 9. If the *Vozhd* wanted to get his slice of the Eastern European pie, he could no longer sit on the fence. In addition to being cooperative on such issues as German merchant ships seeking refuge in Murmansk⁷⁴ and promising to intervene militarily in Poland,⁷⁵ Stalin now agreed to receive Schnurre's delegation by September 15.⁷⁶

Although it now appeared that negotiations for more complete economic cooperation would soon get under way, some in Germany continued to advise caution. A September 9 report from I. G. Farben's Political Economy Section reinforced the points made in the Institute for World Economics analysis. While reemphasizing the complementary nature of the two economies and the possibility for huge raw material imports in the long run, this report also explained that transportation problems and rising Soviet internal demand would make it "almost impossible in the short term to raise considerably [Soviet] exports of raw materials important to us."⁷⁷ However, if the Soviets thought they could get weapons and machines in return, they could easily diminish their internal use of certain key items, such as oil, manganese, and chrome, in order to make them available for export to Germany.⁷⁸ A September 18 meeting of the Reichsbank concluded even

more pessimistically that the current commercial treaty “comes close to the maximum capacity of both sides.”⁷⁹

These words of caution proved largely correct as even the earliest negotiations quickly became mired in practical problems raised by the USSR. A September 13 meeting of the Import Committee (a special department of the Russia Committee that became a semi-official section of the Reich Economics Ministry on October 10) highlighted some of the general problems in negotiating with the Soviets: difficult payment procedures, drawn-out negotiations, lack of government guarantees for cash transactions, transportation questions, and suddenly high Soviet prices (an average of 50 percent above previous demands).⁸⁰ The USSR also quickly tried to pit German firms against one another, a problem that the German government would attempt to counter by limiting the number of firms that could send representatives to Moscow.⁸¹ For example, Schnurre had tentatively agreed to allow Otto Wolff to handle all negotiations concerning synthetic oil plants, but a rivalry quickly developed with *Gutehoffnungshütte AG* (GHH). Even though both firms wanted the contract, both found the early going extremely difficult, with the Soviets demanding completion of the two-to-three year project in one year.⁸²

For their part, the Germans decided to postpone Schnurre’s trip until after the political fallout from the Polish situation had settled. Schnurre met with Ribbentrop on September 14 and 15 to discuss plans for a “large-scale program for raw material deliveries, exceeding many times the figures of the Agreement of August 19.” Although both realized the transportation problems such an increase in trade might cause, Ribbentrop (probably under pressure from political and military officials) raised yet another hurdle when he ruled that “compensation in the form of additional machine tool deliveries is out of the question.”⁸³

The Germans did not have to wait long for the political crisis to come to a head. Having edged toward Hitler’s camp on September 9, Stalin finally stepped decisively over the line on September 17 when the Soviet Union entered Poland in order “to protect its Ukrainian and White Russian brothers and make it possible for these unfortunate people to work in peace.”⁸⁴ It took awhile, however, for everyone in Germany to get the news that the Soviets were now on the German side. For instance, having received the first news of the Soviet intervention in Poland, Major-General Jodl, Chief of the German Armed Forces Operations Staff, replied, “Against whom?”⁸⁵

COLLUSION IN THE KREMLIN, SEPTEMBER 28

With the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact now sealed by Polish blood, the way appeared open to forming not just an economic partnership but an economic alliance. As the first German studies had already shown, however, both sides would have to undertake major sacrifices to achieve such a close working relationship. The Soviets would have to cut into domestic consumption of various raw materials, and jealous German political and military officials would have to

give up some of their machines and weapons. So far, neither side seemed willing to make the necessary concessions.

But it was the Germans who were blockaded and at war, and therefore it was still Hitler who needed Stalin more than Stalin needed Hitler. Consequently, the Germans continued their intensive investigation of the possibilities for expanded trade between the two powers. More experts reviewed the general transportation problems for the *WiRuAmt*,⁸⁶ while other agencies focused on the vital transportation link to Rumania (which might now go through Soviet territory)⁸⁷ and a possible connection to the Far East.⁸⁸ Numerous businesses began sending (or trying to send) representatives to Moscow⁸⁹ to negotiate deals on everything from stranded ships in Murmansk,⁹⁰ to oil,⁹¹ to synthetic fuel plants,⁹² to war materials.⁹³ And general reports continued to emphasize the enormous Russian raw-material potential⁹⁴ but also to caution that “the Soviet Union has probably reached nearly the limit of its capacity in promising us raw material deliveries to a value of 180 million RM within 2 years.”⁹⁵

Given its potential importance to the German war economy, Soviet oil became the focus of an extensive Army High Command (*OKH*) report from Dr. Erwin Haudan of the National Defense Institute at the University of Berlin. This study estimated that the Soviets, despite increasing internal demand, could send up to two million tons of oil to Germany in the first year alone and much more in later years.⁹⁶ Although there were problems with each of the four possible routes (Baltic, Poland, Black Sea–Rumania, Black Sea–Mediterranean) by which this oil could be shipped to Germany from its main source in the Caucasus, the report concluded that the combination of all four should be adequate to handle the estimated load.⁹⁷

Despite these still cautiously optimistic analyses, the reaction of the German business negotiators “on the ground” was increasingly negative. Although the German representatives for one of the first completed contracts (2.5 million RM for 700,000 sheepskins and goatskins) described the Soviets as “extraordinarily accommodating,”⁹⁸ this was more the exception than the rule. Typically, German business representatives were quickly complaining of stalled negotiations, difficult terms, and outrageous prices. As early as September 13, the Russia Committee was already pleading with German firms to be flexible with these high Soviet demands because of the long-term possibilities in German-Russian trade.⁹⁹

A couple of major meetings were held to sort out these various bits of information and arrive at some further policy decisions. On September 21, for example, Göring, Thomas, Schnurre, and others debated negotiating strategy. In order to improve his bargaining position, Schnurre wanted German war-material deliveries to begin as soon as possible “so that the Soviets can see that we are serious.”¹⁰⁰ As usual, the military and political officials were reluctant to endorse Schnurre’s proposal. Instead of looking to sell weapons to the Russians, Admiral Raeder (among other things on his wish list from the Soviets) had already raised the issue with the *Führer* of buying submarines from the USSR.¹⁰¹

With the war in Poland over and Hitler already pressing for a clash with the West,¹⁰² the time had come to resolve the economic and other issues left open by

the August treaties. To arrange the Boundary and Friendship Treaty, Ribbentrop, with Schnurre and other economic negotiators in tow, made a second trip to Moscow. Other than Schnurre accidentally receiving the initial red-carpet treatment at the airport instead of Ribbentrop,¹⁰³ the proceedings went exactly as Stalin had planned.¹⁰⁴

The resulting agreement, signed at 5:00 A.M. on September 29 but backdated to September 28, contained four important sections pertaining to future economic negotiations. First, a confidential protocol stated that "the U.S.S.R. shall place no obstacles in the way of Reich nationals and other persons of German descent residing in the territories under its jurisdiction, if they desire to migrate to Germany or to the territories under German jurisdiction."¹⁰⁵ Left unclear was whether "no obstacles" meant that these estimated 400,000 people could leave with all of their roughly one billion RM in assets or not.¹⁰⁶

Also unclear were the statements in an exchange of public letters between Ribbentrop and Molotov about the future of German-Soviet economic collaboration. The Soviet Union vowed to "supply raw materials to Germany, for which Germany, in turn, will make compensation through delivery of manufactured goods over an extended period. Both parties shall frame this economic program in such a manner that the German-Soviet exchange of goods will again reach the highest volume attained in the past."¹⁰⁷ But what did "an extended period" mean? Manufactured goods from Germany would obviously take years to produce and ship, compared to the weeks or months for Soviet raw materials. But how long should the Soviet Union have to wait to balance the books?

In a second exchange of letters, this time a confidential one, Molotov also promised "that German transit traffic to and from Rumania by way of the Upper Silesia-Lemberg-Kolomea railroad line shall be facilitated in every respect. . . . The same will apply to the German transit traffic to and from Iran, to and from Afghanistan, as well as to and from the countries of the Far East."¹⁰⁸ Again, what did "in every respect" mean? Even in this confidential letter, nothing had been clearly spelled out.

More concretely, Stalin agreed to supply Germany with an additional amount of oil equal to that produced by the disputed but now Soviet-occupied Polish fields of Drohobycz and Boryslav in return for hard coal and steel tubing.¹⁰⁹ Since the Soviets had captured seventy percent of Polish oil production,¹¹⁰ this was really no concession on Stalin's part and made the Germans just that much more dependent on Soviet economic support.

Stalin had gotten the territorial settlement he wanted (compatible population, oil regions, and the direct route from Germany to Rumania) at the price of minimal military effort and vague promises of economic (and political) support.¹¹¹ It had all been so very easy. In fact, Stalin apparently suspected (and suspected correctly) that the deal had been too easy, that Hitler had given in so quickly because he intended to take it all back as soon as possible.¹¹² As the American reporter William Shirer concluded at the time, however, "Russia is the winner in

this war so far and Hitler is entirely dependent upon the good graces of Stalin, who undoubtedly has no good graces for anyone but himself and Russia.”¹¹³

NOTES

1. According to Valentin Berezhev, the future First Secretary in the Berlin Embassy, “Stalin believed that the trade treaty was more important to Moscow than a nonaggression pact” (as paraphrased in Philbin, 43). See also PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 84.
2. As quoted in Jane Degras, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University, 1953), 3: 367.
3. *NSR*, 63.
4. *NSR*, 66–67.
5. *NSR*, 68–69. See also Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 45.
6. Speer, 223.
7. Dmitri Volkogonov, *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*, trans. Harold Shukman (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 386.
8. *NSR*, 72.
9. For the full terms of the agreement, see *NSR*, 76–78.
10. *NSR*, 76.
11. As quoted in Dallin, *Foreign Policy*, 39.
12. As quoted in Alan Clark, *Barbarossa*, 1965 (New York: Quill, 1985), 25.
13. Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. & ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 132.
14. See B. H. Liddell-Hart, *History of the Second World War* (New York: Putnam, 1971), 13, for the argument that the Pact was the “green light” for World War II. For the less-widely held counterview that the Pact had relatively little influence in unleashing the war, see John Lukacs’s argument in David Pike, *The Opening of the Second World War* (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 56–57.
15. As quoted in Dallin, *Foreign Policy*, 53.
16. *FRUS*, 1939, 1: 343–44, and Dallin, *Foreign Policy*, 63.
17. Read and Fisher, 294. For the effect of the Pact on individual members of the Party, see the various vignettes in Wolfgang Leonhard, *Betrayal: The Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1989).
18. McSherry, 1: 232–33.
19. See the Introduction for more information on this historiographical debate.
20. Jürgen Förster, “The Dynamics of *Volksgemeinschaft*: The Effectiveness of the German Military Establishment in the Second World War,” in *The Second World War*, vol. 3 of *Military Effectiveness*, eds. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen Unwin, 1988), 182. See also Rolf-Dieter Müller, “Die Mobilisierung der deutschen Wirtschaft für Hitlers Kriegsführung,” in *Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs*, vol. 5a of *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, by Bernhard Kroener et al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1988), 349–50.
21. “Machine Tools and Machinery as Capital Equipment,” in *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, 1945 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1947), 24–25.
22. *USSBS, Effects*, 70.
23. See Thomas, 160, for his complaints about the Party’s “psychological” barriers to total war.
24. Thomas, 146.

25. "Oil Division, Final Report," in *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, 1945 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1947), 25.
26. "Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry," in *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, 1945 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1947), 14.
27. See Appendix A, Table 3.6, for more information on military consumption percentages.
28. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Ro/Hedler, "Kautschuk und die Versorgungslage im Kriege (1941)," *RW 19/1467*, 12–13 & 22–23.
29. USSBS, *Oil, Final Report*, 17.
30. USSBS, *Oil, Final Report*, 17. See Appendix A, Table 3.2. for figures on German oil stocks.
31. BAMA, *RW 19/1467*, 27. See Appendix A, Table 3.2. for more information on German rubber stocks.
32. USSBS, *Oil, Final Report*, 25.
33. PA/BM, "Politische Beziehungen der Sowjetunion zu Deutschland 1939–1940," *Fach 65*, 2: 6971.
34. Müller, *Mobilisierung der deutschen Wirtschaft*, 363.
35. PA/HaPol/Schnurre/Institut für Konjunkturforschung, "Trade Relations between Germany and Russia (26.8.39)," *R 105314*, 3.
36. BA/EfA/Lehman, "Allgemeine Angelegenheiten (26.8.39)," *R 9/I/634*, 2: 149.
37. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Wi, "Nachrichtenblatt: Wehrwirtschaft UdSSR Nr. 1 (25.8.39)," *Wi/ID.19*, 1.
38. *DGFP*, D, 7: 345–46, doc. 340.
39. Merekalov had been recalled on April 19, survived an eighteen-year stint in the psychiatric wards from 1940 to 1958, and died peacefully in 1983 (Roberts, *Unholy Alliance*, 126).
40. Astakhov had been recalled in August and later died in a Soviet prison camp in late 1941 (Read and Fisher, xviii).
41. *DGFP*, D, 7: 419–20, doc. 425.
42. For yet another glowing assessment of the future of German-Soviet economic relations, see "Grundlagen und Möglichkeiten des Wirtschaftverkehrs mit Sowjetrußland," *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, 1 September 1939, 932–34.
43. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Geheim/Institut für Weltwirtschaft, "Das russische Wirtschaftspotential und die Möglichkeit einer Intensivierung der deutsch-russischen Handelsbeziehungen (Sept. 1939)," *RW 19/Anhang I/700 u. 702*. For a similar analysis, see also BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Wi/Dr. Tomberg, "Der Außenhandel in den wehrwirtschaftlichen Vorbereitungen Deutschlands vor den gegenwärtigen Krieg," *RW 19/1496*, 34–35.
44. BAMA, *RW 19/Anhang I/702*, 32–34. This contemporary evaluation is reinforced by a similar USSBS analysis after the war (USSBS, *Machine Tools*, 24–25).
45. BAMA, *RW 19/Anhang I/702*, 35.
46. BAMA, *RW 19/Anhang I/702*, 31 & 47.
47. Perrey, 292–93.
48. Zeidler, 99.
49. Dallin, *Foreign Policy*, 419.
50. See Appendix A, Tables 1.3 and 1.4, for a comparison of Soviet trade with England, Germany, and the United States from 1913 to 1940.
51. McSherry, 1: 251, and Ulam, 280–82.

52. *FRUS*, 1939, 1: 345.

53. For a brief analysis of Soviet thinking during these first two weeks of the war, see Jonathan Haslam, "Soviet Foreign Policy 1939-41: Isolation and Expansion," *Soviet Union/Union Soviétique* 18, no. 1-3 (1991): 106-7.

54. Michael Lyons, *World War II: A Short History* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 77.

55. Liddell-Hart, *Second World War*, 32.

56. Carroll, 177-78.

57. Förster, *Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft*, 188.

58. *DGFP*, D, 7: 526-27, doc. 557.

59. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Wi, "Wochenberichte," *RW 19/240*, 6-8.

60. PA/HaPol/Schnurre/IG/Vowi, "Der Deutsche Rohstoffbezug aus der UdSSR und Südosteuropa (4.9.39)," *R 105314*, 1-3.

61. MA/Presseauschnitt, "Zusammenarbeit mit Rußland 1939-1940 (5.9.39)," *M 35.025*, 1.

62. PA, *R 106230*, 452678.

63. PA/HaPol/Schnurre/RA/Ostexpress, "Die Manganerzgewinnung und -ausfuhr der Sowjetunion (8.9.39)," *R 105315*.

64. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/VO, "Berichte (14.9.39)," *RW 45/13b*, 3. The Russia Committee had already noted, by the way, that the Soviets appeared particularly interested in acquiring German weapons, a point that would cause many problems later in the negotiations.

65. BAMA, *RW 45/13b*, 3c.

66. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Stb, "Kriegstagebuch (6.9.39)," *RW 19/163*, 12, and BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Ro, "Wochenberichte (6.9.39)," *RW 19/335*, 6.

67. RWW/Otto Wolff/Rußland, "Letter from Gasper (7.9.39)," *72-41-5*, 1-3.

68. RWW/Otto Wolff/Rußland, "Aktennotiz über Besprechungen wegen des Russland-Geschäfts (7.9.39)," *72-41-5*.

69. *DGFP*, D, 8: 7, doc. 10. See also BAMA, *RW 19/163*, 11-12.

70. *DGFP*, D, 8: 21, doc. 21.

71. According to a notice in *Die Ostwirtschaft*, Oct/Nov 1939, 135, J. S. Kormilizin was named to fill Babarin's old position as Deputy Trade Representative at the beginning of October.

72. *FRUS*, 1939, 1: 348.

73. *DGFP*, D, 7: 509, doc. 534.

74. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schulenburg Telegram (8.9.39)," *R 105999*.

75. By September 10, however, Molotov had to backpedal slightly on when the Soviets would move into Poland, probably because the speed of the German advance had caught the Soviets by surprise (*NSR*, 91).

76. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schulenburg Telegram (9.9.39)," *R 105999*.

77. BAAP/IG/Vowi, "Der Außenhandel Deutschlands mit der Sowjetunion (9.9.39)," *80 IG 1/A 3746*, 3. Schnurre's *Handakten* at the Foreign Ministry Archives in Bonn also contain a copy of this report (PA, *R 105314*).

78. BAAP, *80 IG 1/A 3746*, 4.

79. BAMA, *RW 45/13b*, 5.

80. BA/RK/RA, "Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (21.9.39)," *R 43/II/1489a*, 149-53. For the Foreign Office copy of this report, see PA/HaPol/Schnurre, "Russland-Ostwirtschaft (22.9.39)," *R 105315*, 1-12.

81. BA, *R 43/II/1489a*, 153.
82. RWW/Otto Wolff/Rußland/Schroeder, "Aktennotiz über eine Besprechung bei der Handelsvertretung der U.d.S.S.R. (15.9.39)," *72-41-5*, 1-3.
83. *DGFP*, D, 7: 82, doc. 82.
84. *NSR*, 95.
85. Read and Fisher, 334.
86. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Wi, "Wochenberichte," *RW 19/243*, 4-6.
87. *DGFP*, D, 7: 103-4, doc. 102.
88. PA, *R 106230*, E041461, and BAMA, *RW 19/243*, 15-16.
89. By September 20, the Americans had already noted the increasing number of German industrialists and engineers in the Soviet capital (*FRUS*, 1939, 1: 478-79); and by September 29, the Russia Committee was again pleading that interested firms work through established channels and not send new (and probably unqualified) representatives to Moscow (BA, *R 9/I/634*, 2: 82). For a list of all the businesses who sent representatives to the USSR over the next months and what their interests were, see Eichler, 98-100. See also the lists of treaties and businesses involved in making them in Appendix A, Table 5.2.
90. BAMA, *RW 19/243*, 9, and BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Stb, "Aktenvermerk über eine Besprechung bei General Thomas mit Generaldirektor Hoffmann und Direktor Hecking von der Hapag am 20.9.1939," *RW 19/171*, 122-23.
91. BAMA, *RW 19/243*, 7.
92. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Stb, "Aktenvermerk über eine Besprechung im RWiMin am 21.9.1939," *RW 19/560*, 1-2.
93. BAMA, *RW 19/560*, 2-4. The Germans assumed the Soviets would ask only for the 50 million RM in war goods stipulated under the 8/19 agreement. Furthermore, they believed the Soviets wanted only licenses and technology, not the actual weapons. Both assumptions proved incorrect.
94. BA/RFM/RA, "Die Rohstofflage der UdSSR," *R 2/16467*, 1-16.
95. Schulenburg, cautious as usual, offered this assessment on September 20 (*DGFP*, D, 8: 108-9, doc. 108).
96. BAMA/OKH, "Die Treibstoffversorgung Deutschlands aus Rußland," *RH 2/2371*, 23-24.
97. BAMA, *RH 2/2371*, 11-22.
98. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Stb, "Zusammenfassender Überblick über die Wirtschaftsberichte der Wirtschaftsinspektionen (20.9.39)," *RW 19/69*, 56-57.
99. PA, *R 105315*, 12.
100. BAMA, *RW 19/560*, 3.
101. *Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945* (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1990), 43. The German Naval Attaché in Moscow, Captain von Baumbach, thought such a deal very possible, but Hitler vetoed the idea on October 10. See *Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939-1945* (Bonn: E. S. Mittler u. Sohn, 1988), 1: 185, and *FCNA*, 47.
102. For Hitler's September 27 military conference in which he laid out his plans for an early attack in the west, see Martin Kitchen, *A Military History of Germany from the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1975), 308-9.
103. See the Introduction.
104. Read and Fisher, 351.
105. *NSR*, 106.
106. Dallin, *Foreign Policy*, 94-95 & 98.
107. *NSR*, 108-9.

108. *NSR*, 109.

109. *NSR*, 109. Read and Fisher state that this production totalled 30,000 tons a year, but was supposed to increase to 500,000 tons a year according to Soviet plans (Read and Fisher, 352).

110. Robert Goralski and Russell Freeburg, *Oil and War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat* (New York: William Morrow, 1987), 31. A German report in October 1939 claimed that the Soviets now controlled 228,000 tons a year of Polish oil production versus 75,000 tons a year for Germany (PA, *R 106231*, E041513–14).

111. Pike, 111–13. For an opposing opinion, see Ulam, 284–86, where he describes the treaty as “a profound humiliation” for the USSR in which “there were no loopholes left for future evasions or double-dealing.”

112. Read and Fisher, 355.

113. William Shirer, *Berlin Diary, 1939–41*, 1941 (New York: Popular Library, 1961), 173–74.

Chapter 6

The German Plan

With these suspicions in mind, Stalin approached the upcoming round of economic negotiations somewhat cautiously. Far from being the “honeymoon” historians sometimes describe, the Soviet Union showed itself still reluctant to make concrete promises, and Germany showed itself still overly optimistic about what the USSR would or could provide in the short term. The Germans spent much of the month in a futile attempt to push through swiftly an extensive economic agreement on the basis of the terms they thought had been laid down in the September agreements. They were quickly disappointed, and it would end up taking more than four months to negotiate a final economic settlement instead of the four weeks that the Germans had hoped for.

RITTER AND SCHNURRE FLY TO MOSCOW, OCTOBER 7

If the Germans needed any further incentive to seek a more substantial economic agreement with the Soviet Union, Thomas’s depressing September 29 report to Army Chief of Staff Franz Halder on the state of the German war economy confirmed fears that the German military lacked the oil and some other raw material stockpiles necessary for a western offensive.¹ Natural rubber stocks were particularly short, with synthetic “buna” rubber unable to make up the difference.²

The Soviet solution to Germany’s economic woes continued to receive intensive study as the Germans began putting their initial proposal together. The Russia Committee’s newspaper *Die Ostwirtschaft*, for example, concluded that the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states should not endanger German trade with these countries because the Soviets had no manufactured goods to sell.³ I. G. Farben

issued reports on Soviet platinum exports⁴ and on problems in the transportation system, arguing that some increases in trade were possible, especially via the Black Sea, but that transit trade to the Far East was almost out of the question.⁵ The *WiRüAmt* reported the completion of studies on the Soviet transportation system,⁶ their raw material production, and their food production, while Thomas held meetings with Schnurre, Göring, Ter-Nedden, and a number of German businessmen to discuss various aspects of the new trade relationship.⁷

German firms also continued to send representatives over to Moscow to negotiate,⁸ despite continuing Russia Committee warnings that this expanding number might actually delay overall progress.⁹ During the run-up to the September 28 treaties, however, business negotiations seemed to be going rather well. The Soviets had shown themselves to be "very accommodating" and had scaled back many of their earlier high price demands.¹⁰ Similarly, the Soviets soon agreed to the construction of a small naval repair base at Teriberka (near Murmansk).¹¹ Although militarily meaningless in the long run, *Basis Nord* was "significant as a political symbol."¹²

But cracks had begun reappearing already by early October, as Schnurre complained to the Soviet government about the lack of visas for German negotiators, men the Soviets themselves had wanted sent to Moscow.¹³ Furthermore, the Soviets appeared increasingly likely to renail the Czernowitz rail line (the direct route from Rumania's oil to Germany) with their wider spur,¹⁴ a move that "would make German transit traffic to Rumania practically impossible."¹⁵

Despite these renewed signs of difficulty and the continuing reservations about Soviet trade potential, the new program cobbled together by October 6 called for some joint German-Soviet economic planning and a dramatic increase in Soviet shipments during the first year from 180 million RM to 1.3 billion RM! The Germans wanted 530 million RM in industrial materials (iron ore, phosphates, platinum, etc.), 330 million RM in foodstuffs, 120 million RM in lumber, 100 million RM in materials bought from third parties (tin, rubber, etc.), and 200 million RM in crude oil. In return, the Germans were willing to offer 810 million RM in the first year¹⁶ and the rest in capital goods over the next few years.¹⁷

Schnurre, however, had a number of reservations about this program that he was supposed to push forward. Although describing the German requests as "relatively modest," he nonetheless contended, "Within the framework of purely economic negotiations, the difficulties actually existing in Russia cannot be overcome, especially as we demand of the Russians performance in advance. A positive achievement can really only be expected, if an appropriate directive is issued by the highest Russian authorities, in the spirit of the political attitude toward us."¹⁸ Ter-Nedden seconded Schnurre's sentiments, describing the proposals as "utopian."¹⁹ In other words, the terms of the treaty were uneven and would only be accepted if the Soviets felt politically in debt to the Germans.

While Schnurre may have thought the terms merely unequal, some historians

have labelled them “imperialistic”²⁰ and part of the German “*Drang nach Osten*.”²¹ This argument appears hard to accept, especially given the even more extreme Soviet terms offered in November. The Germans seem simply to have been setting out a high opening bid within the framework of what they thought had been arranged in Moscow—early Soviet shipments in return for long-term German capital goods. The individually requested amounts had already been scaled back on the basis of some thorough studies and were now (barely) within Soviet capabilities. And the overall total was still less than what it had been in the late 1920s. Of course, the terms were still totally unacceptable to the Soviets, but then Ribbentrop and Schnurre both seem to have calculated that the Soviets had received the better end of the political settlement and should compensate the Reich economically.²²

So far, political relations did appear quite friendly, with Stalin supporting Hitler’s October 6 call for peace.²³ But this backing still meant very little in practical terms and could not automatically be counted on to counterbalance the German economic demands. So Schnurre departed for Moscow with a plan, a twelve-member delegation,²⁴ and a new chief negotiator (Ambassador Karl Ritter),²⁵ but also lots of doubts and questions.

THE SOVIET SLOW AND STEADY, OCTOBER 22

Unfortunately for the Germans, their hopes for a quick economic settlement based on Soviet repayment of political debts soon foundered on the hard rock of the Soviets’ patient and detailed negotiating style. Stalin had waited more than four years to get an economic and political settlement to his liking, and he still held the better cards. If the Germans wanted increasingly scarce Soviet resources, they were going to have to pay dearly for them. Stalin was not going to give them away just because he had gotten the better part of the territorial division resulting from this “Fourth Partition of Poland.” And until the Germans were thoroughly engaged with the Western powers, instead of just fighting the “phony war,” Stalin would remain reluctant to send raw materials to the Nazis that might easily be used against the USSR. But for the moment, he appeared willing to haggle. Negotiations cost him nothing.

The German trade delegation arrived in Moscow on October 8 to begin discussing the new economic arrangement. From the outset a number of things went wrong for the Germans. First, the Soviet news agencies reported the arrival of only one chief economic negotiator, an “Ambassador Ritter von Schnurre.” Perhaps because the mistake fairly accurately described the “tag-team” negotiations that Schnurre and Ritter carried on with their counterpart Mikoyan, it took a long time to get the Soviet media to correct the error.²⁶

More important, Mikoyan, State Secretary Krutikov, and People’s Commissar Tevossyan (with Molotov and Stalin intervening frequently)²⁷ refused to follow the German script for the negotiations (as Schnurre had feared). Although the Soviets appeared initially willing to meet many of the German requests, they rejected the

overall German numbers.²⁸ They also declined to follow the German negotiating pattern and preferred instead to “carefully study among themselves section after section and then negotiate with us point by point.” Although Ritter found this process “rather tiresome,” he nonetheless argued, “By acceding to the other side’s working method of building the contractual structure piece by piece from the bottom up, we shall achieve speedier and better results than by the reverse method of working from the top down.”²⁹

Despite these general problems, some aspects of the negotiations were showing progress as the Soviets agreed to a series of individual contracts. By the middle of October, a regular exchange of goods by rail lines through Poland had begun.³⁰ A potentially troublesome Anglo-Soviet economic arrangement was smoothed over when the Soviets promised to resell to Germany some of the tin and rubber they had gotten in exchange for lumber exports to England.³¹ The Soviets also agreed to ship soybeans from Manchuria and not to rerail the line to Rumania to meet the broader Soviet rail gauge requirements.³² In addition, the Soviets assented to a series of individual contracts, the most important of which were agreements to sell 900,000 tons of oil and 1 million tons of grain.

Herwarth summarized for the Americans the general pattern of economic negotiations to this point: “A month ago German economic authorities appeared to be skeptical concerning the possibility of any immediate and substantial imports from Russia, but now it appears that they are beginning to believe that Russia will really make an effective effort to furnish raw materials to Germany.”³³

These successes continued to pump air into German hopes that the Soviet Union would substantially aid the Nazi war economy. When the Soviets began inquiring into buying some German ships, the Naval High Command argued that “Russian economic help is of decisive importance for us. . . . Accordingly, generous reciprocation [is] required from the German side as well.”³⁴ Fritz Tschunke asserted in *Die Ostwirtschaft* that “in a short period we can reckon with a very large German-Soviet exchange of goods.”³⁵ The Reich Defense Council’s October 16 evaluation of the German food situation also emphasized the burgeoning connection to the USSR with its grain and its rail link to Manchuria.³⁶ Even General Thomas seemed increasingly optimistic about the German raw-material situation, thanks in large part to the negotiations going on in Moscow.³⁷

But major problems were soon looming on the horizon. Nervous about Soviet actions in the Baltics, *Volksdeutsche* began “flooding” across the borders. Dismayed, the Soviets started pressuring the Germans to stem the tide.³⁸ Despite Schnurre’s protests, the Soviets also began hedging on the new oil arrangements, with 200,000 of the scheduled 900,000 tons being merely diverted from Italy to the Reich.³⁹ In essence, they were robbing Peter to pay Paul.

Even worse were the complicated developments in the grain negotiations. Before October 18, the Soviets had promised to deliver the 1 million tons of grain within one to two months.⁴⁰ But by October 21, the Soviets were now promising only to deliver 200,000 tons a month.⁴¹ On October 22, even that promise was put on hold indefinitely by Mikoyan. Unfortunately, the lead grain negotiator, a Herr

Dassler, apparently had already rushed to the press with the news of a successful treaty.⁴² Dassler, however, later claimed he had never authorized nor even known about the press report.⁴³ A treaty for 1 million tons was apparently signed on October 26, but at only 150,000 tons a month.⁴⁴ Even these shipments had yet to begin in December, and later documents have the October 26 treaty being scaled back to a mere 170,000 tons total.⁴⁵ A new grain treaty would have to wait until after the February agreements.

The turning point for all of these early endeavors came on October 22. The already slow economic negotiations came almost to full stop when Mikoyan explained that all the specific delivery contracts could not be carried out until the Germans had agreed to fulfill Soviet import wishes. According to Mikoyan's oral account, these demands included large increases in war materials, 378 million RM in assorted machines and ships, chemical processes, and synthetic fuel plants. A trade commission led by Ivan Tevosyan would soon depart for Berlin to tour German production facilities for a couple of weeks. Final terms could be reached back in Moscow shortly thereafter.⁴⁶

BITTER RETURNS, OCTOBER 26

Mikoyan's bombshell meant the end of any German hopes for a rapid resolution to the talks. But the negotiators had apparently concluded even earlier that final agreement was still some time off because of the languid Soviet negotiating style. By October 20, for example, Ribbentrop had agreed to Ritter's October 18 request to return to Berlin to report on the state of the negotiations and help prepare for the soon-to-arrive Soviet trade mission.⁴⁷ So a few days later, Ritter and a number of other delegates left the Moscow negotiations in Schnurre's capable hands and headed home.⁴⁸

In the meantime, German military and economic officials had begun analyzing the tentative Soviet wishlist and preparing the way for the Soviet delegation. Concerns were quickly raised about the estimated seventy thousand tons a month of iron and steel that would be required to construct the items the Soviets wanted.⁴⁹ Ritter noted on October 25 that this difficult issue would have to be referred to the *Führer*.⁵⁰ Some in the *WiRuAmt* also believed that the Soviets should turn over a sizeable percentage of their captured Polish locomotives and freightcars.⁵¹ In addition, the size of the proposed Soviet mission, forty-five members coming over in the first wave and sixteen later, initially unnerved the Germans.⁵²

But on the whole, despite the fact that Mikoyan's demands were substantially above what the Germans had offered earlier, the German military officials saw "no insurmountable difficulties" in fulfilling the proposed Soviet terms.⁵³ By October 26, Ritter reported "complete understanding for the fact that we must now make a great effort with regard to the German deliveries." Although Hitler's assent would be required for final approval, Ritter also felt confident that "from the military standpoint the deliveries of arms would probably not encounter any

difficulties.”⁵⁴ In general, therefore, the Germans still hoped that they could accommodate the Soviet requests and reach a final treaty within the three weeks that Mikoyan had hinted at.

As usual, however, new problems had already begun to appear even before the first Soviet delegate had stepped onto the tarmac. At the last minute, Mikoyan informed Schnurre that the Soviet mission would have no authority to make actual commitments. That meant that the economic negotiations might be substantially delayed while the military mission finished all its work and returned to Moscow. In frustration, Schnurre suggested to the Foreign Ministry that the main negotiations be moved back to Berlin.⁵⁵ From the German perspective, this was not an auspicious beginning to what they hoped would be the final stage of the new treaty talks.

NOTES

1. General Franz Halder, *War Diary, 1939–42*, eds. C. Burdick and H. A. Jacobson (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988), 66–67.
2. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Stb, “Interne Monatsbericht zur deutschen Rüstungswirtschaft (Okt. 1939),” *RW 19/204*, 36.
3. “Die Rußlandhandel der baltischen Staaten,” *Die Ostwirtschaft*, Oct/Nov 1939, 139.
4. PA/Schnurre/IG/VoWi, “Die Edelmetalle in der Sowjetunion (2.10.39),” *R 105314*, 1–2.
5. PA/HaPol/Schnurre, “Das Russische Verkehrsproblem (30.9.39),” *R 105314*, 1–12. See also BAAP, *80 IG I/A 3725*, 1–15.
6. PA/HaPol/Schnurre/Wi, “Das Verkehrswesen der UdSSR für Rohstofflieferungen an das Deutsche Reich und für den Transitverkehr aus anderen Ländern (6.10.39),” *R 105314*, D527936–43. This report came to almost the same conclusions that the I. G. Farben study had—the Soviet system could handle the required increases in western Russia and the Ukraine, but could not handle any additional traffic to the Far East.
7. BAMA, *RW 19/243*, 28–33, and BAMA, *RW 19/335*, 88.
8. MA/Presseauschnitt, “Bericht Groote (30.9.39),” *M 35.025*.
9. Perrey, 302–3.
10. BA, *R 43/II/1489a*, 163.
11. *DGFP*, D, 8: 213, doc. 195.
12. Philbin, 117.
13. PA, *R 106231*, E041493.
14. *DGFP*, D, 8: 265, doc. 237, n. 4.
15. PA, *R 106230*, E041490.
16. The German list included 330 million RM in industrial goods, a 150 million RM hydrogenation plant, 50 million RM in tubing and hard coal, 180 million RM in liquidated 1935 credits, 30 million RM in gold, 50 million RM in armaments, and 20 million RM in Czech bonds.
17. *DGFP*, D, 8: 233–34, doc. 208.
18. *NSR*, 120.
19. BAMA, *RW 45/13b*, 22a.

20. Eichler, 91.
21. Müller, *Wirtschaftsallianz*, 102.
22. Hitler, on the other hand, apparently expected no political “debt of gratitude” from the USSR, which made him all the more eager to attack the West quickly (Liddell-Hart, *Second World War*, 34, and Noakes & Pridham, 2: 760).
23. See Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 62, for a discussion of the peace offensive and Stalin’s role in it.
24. According to PA/Ritter, “Moskau (17.10.39),” *R* 27804, 357054, this total had increased to thirty-seven by mid-month.
25. *DGFP*, D, 8: 263, doc. 237, n. 1.
26. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 96.
27. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 99.
28. *DGFP*, D, 8: 263, doc. 237.
29. *DGFP*, D, 8: 312, doc. 272.
30. BAMA/OKW/WFSt, “Abschrift: Chef des Transportwesens,” *RW* 4/v.328, 1.
31. *NC&A*, 6: 979, and *DGFP*, D, 7: 314, doc. 273, n. 2.
32. *DGFP*, D, 8: 265, doc. 237.
33. *FRUS*, 1939, 1: 488.
34. *NC&A*, 6: 979. For the complete text, see BAMA/Skl, “Kriegstagebuch. Abt. C VIII: Völkerrechtliche Kriegführung, Propaganda und Politik,” *RM* 7/198, 83–86.
35. Fritz Tschunke, “Große deutsch-sowjetrussische Wirtschaftsplanung,” *Die Ostwirtschaft*, Oct/Nov 1939, 126.
36. “Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Ministerrats für die Reichsverteidigung (16.10.39),” *Trial of the Major War Criminals* (Nuremberg: IMT, 1947–49), 31: 233.
37. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Stb, “Anlagen zum Kriegstagebuch,” *RW* 19/171, 39. For the *WiRüAmt*’s continuing discussions on German-Soviet trade, especially on the transit trade to the far east, see BAMA, *RW* 19/171, 23, and BAMA, *RW* 19/243, 47–48.
38. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Wi, “Kriegstagebuch,” *RW* 19/230, 12.
39. PA, *R* 106231, 452718.
40. *DGFP*, D, 8: 311, doc. 272.
41. PA, *R* 106231, E041543.
42. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 98.
43. BA/RfEuL/RfG, “Besprechung im Reichsernährungsministerium (5.12.39),” *R* 15/VII/46.
44. BA/RfEuL/RfF, “Russland 1939–1941 (26.10.39),” *R* 15/V/43.
45. Appendix A, Table 5.3.
46. PA, *R* 106231, 452728–29. Mikoyan submitted a slightly more extensive written list the next day.
47. PA, *R* 106231, E041542.
48. *FRUS*, 1939, 1: 491.
49. BAMA, *RW* 19/172, 62–63.
50. BAMA, *RW* 19/243, 58.
51. BAMA, *RW* 19/243, 54.
52. *DGFP*, D, 8: 346, doc. 303.
53. BAMA, *RW* 19/243, 61.
54. *DGFP*, D, 8: 345, doc. 303.
55. *DGFP*, D, 8: 346, doc. 303, n. 2.

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Chapter 7

The Soviet Plan

Unfortunately for the Germans, the negotiating situation went from bad to worse in November. While the middle two weeks of October had seen the negotiators hustle through the details of the German plan for a new economic treaty, the next two months would find the two parties laboring over the Soviet proposals. This disparity in the amount of time devoted to each side's plan is yet another indication that it was still the Soviets who held the upper hand. Despite continuing German demands for speed, the Soviets maintained their languid pace. Despite the German rationale that industrial goods took longer to produce and should therefore follow Soviet shipments of raw materials, Stalin switched the order and required larger shipments of German machines and weapons during the first year. Finally, despite German claims that the USSR owed Germany for its easy territorial gains in Eastern Europe, the Soviets asserted that their economic and military aid had made the *Wehrmacht's* victories possible and that Germany was actually in debt to the USSR.¹ Now it was payback time.

MEN IN SUITS, NOVEMBER 7

An almost bizarre game of hide-and-seek developed from the very outset. The forty-five-member Soviet delegation arrived in Berlin on October 26, all newly outfitted in the same mid-quality dark brown coats, bright yellow shoes, drab hats, and empty suitcases. The suitcases were to bring back all those wonderful German consumer goods that the Soviet utopia had somehow failed to produce. One fellow had apparently started his shopping immediately upon arrival and now stood out from the other delegates because he was wearing a sailor's cap. Almost all the members of the mission could speak German relatively well, though few would

admit to their language abilities at first. The Germans, in turn, tried to gauge their opponents' level of understanding by providing only partial translations and observing who whispered the full version to his comrades.²

More important, five of the eight working groups in the Soviet mission dealt with armaments and the other three with high-technology manufacturing equipment.³ The initial Soviet wishlist revealed on October 27 made it even clearer that the Soviets were after German technology, and lots of it. In addition to the industrial goods that Mikoyan had mentioned, the Soviets added a huge list of potential military supplies. Naval equipment predominated, including four light cruisers and plans for all the latest German capital ships.⁴

Why all this emphasis on building a powerful battlefleet with German help? According to Admiral Kuznetsov, Stalin was acting on his own initiative without much input from his naval officers.⁵ In short, there was little military rationale for these acquisitions. The naval list, therefore, was probably "the result of Stalin's objective to learn as much as possible about his future enemy and, if possible, to hobble its expansion."⁶

Along these same lines, the Soviet delegates also produced inspection tour requests for up to four weeks.⁷ At each stop the distrustful delegates read off a series of questions while peering around corners and badgering their guides about not being shown the latest equipment.⁸ Alexander Yakovlev, Deputy Commissar for the Soviet Aircraft Industry, offers one account of the resulting clashes that occurred as the Soviets toured the country:

Everything was impeccably organized and made a rather good impression. Apparently, it was not the first time that such a display had been organized.

We returned to the "Adlon" strongly impressed by what we had seen. Our General Gusev, however, was beset by doubts: how could the Germans show us the true state of their air force equipment? "They probably think us fools and are displaying obsolete, rather than current, airplanes," he said.

. . . Our trip around the plants did much to disperse our doubts. The assembly line of aircraft and aircraft engines, the type of machinery in the shops, rather convincingly confirmed that what we had seen at Johannistal was indeed the backbone of the Luftwaffe. All our engineers clearly understood this, but our generals stubbornly held to the opposite.

When the Soviet generals voiced these suspicions to their liaison, General Udet, he exploded: "I give you my word as an officer. We've shown you everything; if you don't like what you saw, don't buy."⁹

Udet's reaction was typical for the Germans involved in these economic negotiations. They realized that "Russian aid is of decisive importance for us,"¹⁰ and that they therefore needed to cooperate fully. But they also felt that the current terms (and current Soviet attitudes) were somewhat extreme and needed modification. Even before the new Soviet proposals had been unveiled, for example, the Germans were already considering halting production on some of their own synthetic fuel plants in order to accommodate Soviet orders. But the

German economic officials were still reluctant to limit current plant construction, such as the project at Wesseling, unless they absolutely had to.¹¹

After the Soviet mission arrived and issued its initial demands, the Germans remained cordial but increasingly concerned. The *WiRüAmt* thought it could just barely supply the metals needed to produce the items the Soviets wanted, but was doubtful that the Soviet machinery demands could be met.¹² For his part, Hitler ordered that Soviet inspection wishes be fulfilled except when it came to top-secret information.¹³ Ritter believed he had convinced the German government to go along with the Soviet plans, but he also thought the Soviets would continue to drag their feet with their fact-finding and sight-seeing trips.¹⁴

As the days went by, the Germans became even more pessimistic. Weizsäcker's November 1 memorandum noted that "Field Marshal Göring, Grand Admiral Raeder and Colonel General Keitel, independently of each other, have told me that the Russian delegation in Berlin expected too much in the way of inspection and procurement of German materials of war."¹⁵ And a November 8 meeting in the *WiRüAmt* found German officials who only two weeks earlier had been fairly optimistic now concluding that the transportation system could not handle the envisioned trade totals and that the German war economy could not afford to give up the seventy thousand tons of iron a month required by the Soviets.¹⁶

Back in Moscow problems also continued to mount. On October 26, for example, the Germans complained that the Soviets had improperly taken 5 million RM worth of platinum netting in Poland.¹⁷ The delays in establishing transit connections had also eroded German trade with countries such as Iran.¹⁸ Rising German frustrations even boiled over into personal squabbling. A Lieutenant-Colonel Doerr, for instance, challenged Schnurre's handling of the Rumanian rail discussions. Schnurre retaliated by demanding Doerr's recall.¹⁹ At the same time, German businessmen continued to stream to Moscow determined to run their own negotiations. By the end of October, Schnurre was forced to suspend further business applications for a week while the Russia Committee sorted out the increasingly confusing situation.²⁰

Schnurre was obviously feeling the pressure. On October 26 he asked for full authority to negotiate and sign an economic agreement.²¹ When Berlin denied his request and the Soviets continued to delay the talks in Moscow, Schnurre asked to return to Berlin.²²

Despite these growing difficulties, there were still some positive developments in German-Soviet relations. The Soviets moved closer to the German position on third-party buying of various metals, though still under the conditions that the transactions be properly camouflaged and that the Soviets receive repayment from Germany mostly in hard currency.²³ The Soviets also agreed to reduce the freight costs for shipping soybeans from Manchuria by 50 percent for one year.²⁴ Molotov's October 31 speech in particular seemed to bode well when he asserted, "The recent economic negotiations carried on by the German delegation in Moscow and the present negotiations being carried on by the Soviet economic

delegation in Germany are preparing a broad basis for the development of trade between the Soviet Union and Germany.”²⁵ The two sides also hammered out an agreement on the exchange of populations in the newly divided territories.²⁶

But the increasing problems seemed to outweigh these limited advances. By November 3, Ritter was sending frantic messages that the Rumanian and Trans-Siberian rail agreements had to be signed immediately.²⁷ On November 7, Tevosyan and Göring met to smooth over some of these problems, but the encounter devolved into another round of Soviet accusations of deception and German assertions of openness.²⁸

While some historians have seen these high Soviet armaments and inspection demands and the resulting tension as part of a Soviet “blackmail” agenda and others have argued that this was primarily just a reaction to German “blackmail,” it seems more likely that the Soviets were using their superior bargaining position to get the best economic terms they could and to do a little economic espionage along the way. What transformed the otherwise merely difficult negotiations, as had been occurring in Moscow, into the intense confrontations described by Yakovlev were some fundamental misperceptions by both sides about their opponent’s level of technological sophistication. The Germans apparently assumed from their encounters with the poorly equipped Russians in Poland that they could intimidate the Soviets, as they had done with other countries, by a display of their military prowess. So they showed the Soviets almost everything and expected them to be impressed.²⁹ For their part, the Soviets assumed that the Germans would be much more technologically advanced than themselves and therefore complained bitterly when shown items inferior to what they already had in development. According to Guderian, the Germans noted this anomaly but did not fully understand its cause until 1941 when they ran into T-34s on the Russian steppes.³⁰ By then, it was too late.

THE SOVIET OFFER, NOVEMBER 30

The basic pattern of the first week of November continued during the rest of the month. The Soviets toured the country, delayed the negotiations, and increased their demands. The Germans pressed for speedy resolution and complained about Soviet tactics but did reach some limited agreements. In general, however, there was little the Germans could do to alter the Soviet tempo or terms.

What successes there were continued to come in Moscow where “trade negotiations with Russia have so far been more successful than anticipated by the German authorities.”³¹ Although still at the stage of vague promises, the Soviets did appear increasingly willing to make concessions on a series of secondary issues. By November 10, for example, Otto Wolff and *GHH* seemed on the verge of a compromise that would complete the synthetic fuel plant agreement.³² That same day, in a meeting with Schulenburg, Molotov offered to accept payment for transit costs through clearing accounts instead of in hard currency if the Germans would first agree to the Soviet mission’s demands. Molotov also stated that the

Soviets would send several million tons of 35 to 40 percent iron ore. Most enticingly, he promised to begin shipments of grain and oil immediately.³³ Furthermore, on November 17, the Soviets decided to return the platinum netting the Germans had earlier requested and desperately needed.³⁴ By November 20, the Soviets had agreed to ship 200,000 tons of liquid fuels before the end of January.³⁵ And by November 21, Ter-Nedden was reporting agreement on transit and delivery terms for almost all of the raw materials that Germany had wanted, including 1.2 million tons a year to and 300,000 tons a year from the Far East.³⁶

But the Moscow negotiations also saw their share of difficulties, particularly in regards to transportation. By November 9, the Soviets admitted what the Germans had already feared, that the USSR lacked the necessary train cars to handle the required connections at the Polish border. Consequently, Molotov informed a dismayed Schulenburg that all shipments would now have to reload at a series of special stations on the new borders.³⁷

Further problems arose concerning the Rumanian oil connection. According to the Ministry of Economics, the Germans needed at least 100,000 tons of oil a month from Rumania, but shipments had already declined to 60,000 tons in November.³⁸ The Allies certainly realized the crucial nature of Rumanian oil and even tried to repeat their World War I success of paying the Rumanians to destroy their own oil fields. The two sides could never agree on a price, however, and it would be left to Allied bombers to demolish the fields later in the war.³⁹

For its part, the USSR promised to restart train shipments along the Rumanian route by November 15.⁴⁰ But the Soviets decided instead to start renailing the tracks,⁴¹ slowing down the already contracting vital oil shipments.⁴² After official protests by Hitler himself,⁴³ the Soviets set December 1 as the new date for the now renailed and broadened line to reopen⁴⁴ under the condition that the Germans accept the Russian plan for reloading stations on the Polish border.⁴⁵

With oil becoming increasingly scarce, the German government redoubled its efforts to ensure exports from the USSR. It first decided to set up yet another agency, this one charged with supervising oil import agreements and deliveries. After an organizational meeting on November 10,⁴⁶ *Mineralöl-Einfuhr GmbH* was founded on November 15 as a consortium of the major businesses and government agencies involved in oil production and supplies.⁴⁷ In addition to the new agency, new studies on the Soviet oil system continued to appear, reinforcing the previous conclusions that the Soviets had vast reserves but limited potential to increase production or transport oil abroad (except, perhaps, via the Black Sea).⁴⁸

Although some progress had obviously been made in Moscow, these agreements and concessions were still contingent on the results of the talks in Berlin, that is, on the Germans first accepting Soviet delivery demands.⁴⁹ That, of course, was not going to occur until after the Soviet mission had finished its painstakingly slow work. As the Soviets continued their inspection tours, they repeated their complaints that the Germans were not showing them everything they had asked to see. In a November 14 meeting with Ritter, Tevossyan threatened that without full access the Soviets would not be able to place their

orders, and without these orders no raw materials would be sent to Germany.⁵⁰

There were some positive developments in Germany, however. Admiral Raeder, for one, seemed relatively satisfied with his negotiations with the Soviets,⁵¹ though Soviet support for various projects such as *Basis Nord* and the purchase of Soviet submarines⁵² probably influenced his attitude. Similarly, "the impressions of the Russian delegation in nonmilitary fields were altogether satisfactory."⁵³ Another treaty on exchange of populations was even signed on November 16.⁵⁴ And by November 18, the Soviets finally did offer a second set of economic proposals.⁵⁵ The demands still lacked specifics, but at least this was progress. After a formal dinner hosted by Ambassador Ritter at the Kaiserhof Hotel for all involved with the economic negotiations,⁵⁶ Tevossyan and Savtschenko flew back to Moscow on November 18 to consult on the final Soviet terms, ostensibly to return in a couple of days but actually not to reappear in Berlin until the end of the month.⁵⁷

In the meantime, the game continued. The Germans pressed again and again for more speed⁵⁸ but they now assumed that the final treaty might not be signed until the second half of December.⁵⁹ Even this assessment had to be revised when Tevossyan and Savtschenko finally returned and submitted a forty-eight-page, single-spaced list of detailed demands on November 30.⁶⁰ Instead of the 58 million RM in military goods and the up-front shipment of Russian raw materials called for in the September 28 treaty, the Soviets now wanted an impossible 1.5 billion RM in total deliveries by the end of 1940, 700 million RM worth from the navy alone, not counting extensive development costs.⁶¹ From ships to aircraft to synthetic fuel plants, the Soviets wanted the best Germany had to offer at rock-bottom prices, and they wanted it all right away!⁶² The Germans were stunned.

THE DELEGATES DEPART, DECEMBER 13

On the same day that the Soviets dropped this economic bombshell, however, they also set off a major political firestorm by invading Finland. A crisis had been simmering since the spring, but the treaties with Germany gave Stalin the opportunity to deal with the stubborn Finns, who had refused to accept his territorial arrangements. The Soviets expected an easy victory, with the Finnish working class rising up to support the invaders.⁶³ So confident of victory were the Red Army leaders that Soviet troops were even issued warnings not to violate Swedish neutrality!⁶⁴ What Stalin got instead was a bloodbath. As one Soviet general explained, "We have conquered just enough Finnish territory to allow us to bury our dead."⁶⁵

For the Germans, the Finnish crisis presented a major problem. With Italy⁶⁶ and other fascist countries wanting to aid tiny Finland against the Bolshevik menace, Hitler had to make an early and firm decision to remain benevolently neutral toward the Soviet cause if he was to avoid being sucked into the maelstrom.⁶⁷ Finland had been clearly relegated to the Soviet sphere in the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and the Germans still needed Soviet economic aid too much in order

to side against their “comrades” to the east. So the Germans played their role as neutral spectator and occasional supporter of the Soviet cause throughout the conflict.⁶⁸ As Weizsäcker directed all German missions, “In your conversations regarding the Finnish-Russian conflict please avoid any anti-Russian note.”⁶⁹

Although this political crisis would eventually alter the framework within which the economic relationship would operate, for the moment the economic negotiations continued their downward spiral. The Germans scrambled frantically for answers to the Soviet demands. The *WiRüAmt* held yet another round of meetings during the first two weeks of December to discuss the Soviet connection.⁷⁰ Schnurre noted on December 2 that turrets and other major items would take three to four years to construct and could not possibly be supplied by the end of 1940. Schnurre also pointed out that the Germans lacked the necessary raw materials to produce much of this equipment and that the Soviets would therefore have to supply these resources up front before construction could begin.⁷¹ Military leaders meeting on December 4 reiterated Schnurre’s arguments even more vociferously, pointing to earlier *Führer* statements that Soviet trade should not come at the expense of current military programs. The Germans also began calculating prices for what items they could send on the basis of world prices in August plus 20 percent plus licensing fees.⁷² Considering that the Soviets had been asking for world prices plus 50 percent at the start of their negotiations, this scheme was not unreasonable, but it was still a rebuff to the Russians.

In the meantime, there were a few positive signs. Soviet oil shipments previously agreed to were now scheduled to begin on December 14.⁷³ *Basis Nord* was also finally operational by December 9, though the still-suspicious Soviets “made Basis Nord very difficult to use—at least until they decided that the Germans were going to win the Norwegian campaign,” at which point the base became superfluous.⁷⁴ A number of delivery agreements were concluded, including one for 100,000 tons of cotton, the signing of which the German negotiator called “the most beautiful experience of his life.”⁷⁵ And the treaty governing general terms of trade and arbitration proceedings between the two countries was redone on December 12.⁷⁶

But these successes made only the smallest of cracks in the looming Soviet wall. On the grounds that it did not possess the necessary rolling stock, the USSR continued to push for reloading stations on the Polish border. When the Germans pressed about the 60,000 or more freight cars captured by the Soviets from the Poles, the USSR suddenly claimed that it had found only 6,000.⁷⁷ The Soviets also delayed yet again on reopening the Rumanian rail connection.⁷⁸ Then the Soviets tried to scale back their 50 percent reduction on Manchurian soybeans to 25 percent.⁷⁹ Repeated wrangles also developed on the new Polish border as both sides tried to expel their Jews into the other’s territory.⁸⁰ Finally, the Soviets handed over a revised set of military demands, which continued their earlier high requests and elicited this rebuke from Ribbentrop to Soviet Ambassador Skvartsev: “I wanted to say beforehand that I had given instructions to comply with the Russian requests in any conceivable way, within the limits of possibility. But it should not

be forgotten that Germany is at war and that certain things are simply not possible.”⁸¹

Some in the military decided the whole effort was futile. Keitel telephoned Weizsäcker on December 5, for example, to complain that “the Russian schedule of requests for deliveries of German products was growing more and more voluminous and unreasonable.”⁸² During a December 6 meeting, the military stubbornly refused Ritter’s request to release iron or other metals for Soviet export items.⁸³ An increasingly frustrated Ritter met with Göring on December 14 to get the seventy thousand tons a month of iron reinstated, again to no avail. In fact, a few generals now began to argue that Ritter and Schnurre were giving away too much in the negotiations and that the talks with the Soviets should be dropped.⁸⁴

Despite these various military and diplomatic discussions, the questions raised were obviously too important for “mere mortals,” and so first Hitler and then Stalin were brought in to resolve the growing crisis. By December 2, Ritter had already reserved a series of issues for the *Führer’s* decision: the 70,000 tons a month of iron needed to produce the Soviet goods, the cruiser *Seydlitz*, plans for the battleship *Bismarck*, torpedoes and mines with the most up-to-date fuses, and a demonstration of a 24-cm cannon. Ritter also noted that further negotiations with the Soviet trade delegation and with Mikoyan would probably not reach any decisive conclusion and that Molotov or maybe even Stalin might have to be brought into the process.⁸⁵ Schnurre added the questions of delivering the cruiser *Prinz Eugen* and models of Germany’s most advanced planes to the list of issues reserved for Hitler.⁸⁶

Over the next couple of weeks, Hitler apparently sorted out what additional deliveries he was willing to make to the Soviets. By December 8, for example, he ruled out completely the *Seydlitz* and the *Prinz Eugen*, temporarily the 20-cm guns for the *Lützow*, and perhaps also the plans for the *Bismarck*.⁸⁷ Hitler did finally acquiesce a week later to selling the *Bismarck* plans, but only reluctantly.⁸⁸ By December 9, the various lists of questions had been consolidated into the following still outstanding issues: *Bismarck* plans, *Lützow* hull, armor plating, turrets, electric torpedoes for subs, plane models, army material, machine tools, and industrial items.⁸⁹ The Germans did agree to increase their military deliveries to 660 million RM from the September 28 treaty figure of 58 million RM,⁹⁰ but Hitler still delayed making a final decision on some of these other questions.

Two weeks into December, German plans for an October agreement were now just a distant memory, lost in the constant Soviet haggling and delays. Nevertheless, with the negotiations heading back to Moscow, Ritter declared “that the signing of the agreement can still take place before Christmas.”⁹¹ Having completed “their six weeks of economic espionage,” having stuffed their suitcases with German goods, and having eaten their fill of German food one last time at the Kaiserhof Hotel,⁹² the returning Soviet delegates reported that they had been very satisfied with their visit, and Mikoyan told Schnurre that he was very optimistic about the upcoming talks.⁹³ Despite these mutual statements of good will, however, neither side would finish its Christmas shopping on time.

NOTES

1. BAMA, *RM 7/198*, 287.
2. PA/DR, "UdSSR 1939–1941," *R 27168*, 6: 25884–85.
3. See PA, *R 106231*, E041565, for a detailed list of the Soviet delegates and which German officials were responsible for handling each group in the delegation.
4. See PA, *R 106231*, 452734–37, for details of the new Soviet plan.
5. See Seweryn Bialer, ed., *Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II* (Boulder: Westview, 1984), 173–75.
6. Philbin, 69.
7. Birkenfeld, *Wirtschaftspartner*, 487–88.
8. PA, *R 27168*, 25885–90.
9. Bialer, 117–18.
10. BAMA, *RM 7/198*, 288.
11. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Ro, "Innerdeutsche Verwertung von bisher für Hydrierwerk Wesseling bestellten Apparaten," *RW 19/2862*, 560–62 & 567–69. In December, the project was still "on hold," and the Germans were becoming increasingly insistent on a final decision (BAMA, *RW 19/2862*, 576–79). It never came.
12. BAMA, *RW 19/335*, 136–37.
13. BAMA, *RW 19/243*, 70.
14. *DGFP*, D, 7: 361–62, doc. 316.
15. *NSR*, 127.
16. BAMA, *RW 19/172*, 39–40.
17. PA, *R 106231*, E041555.
18. *DGFP*, D, 8: 353–57, doc. 312.
19. PA, *R 106231*, E041553 & E041563.
20. PA, *R 106231*, 452740. See also N. Peresselenkow, "Die derzeitigen Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des Exportgeschäfts nach der UdSSR," *Die Ostwirtschaft*, Oct/Nov 1939, 127–29, and a notice from the Russia Committee on pages 130–31 in the same issue.
21. PA, *R 106231*, E041554.
22. PA, *R 106231*, E041568.
23. PA, *R 106231*, 452741 & 452745–47. See also *DGFP*, D, 8: 358, doc. 314, and 368–69, doc. 320.
24. PA, *R 106231*, E041566 & E041574. Earlier talks about establishing margarine factories in Manchuria to cut down on transport fees became mute as a result (*DGFP*, D, 8: 264, doc. 237, n. 3).
25. As quoted in Degras, *Soviet Documents*, 3: 388–400.
26. For more information, see Margaret Carlyle, ed., *Documents on International Affairs, 1939–1946* (London: Oxford University, 1954), 2: 59. The Germans later came to regret some unintended results of this nationalistic policy of gathering the Baltic *Volksdeutsche* into the Reich. These people had been the Germans' primary business contacts in the region, and their departure threatened to undermine much of the German trade in the area (BA, *R 9/1/635*, 2: 221–54).
27. PA, *R 106231*, E041578.
28. *DGFP*, D, 8: 386–87, doc. 335.
29. Olaf Groehler, *Selbstmörderische Allianz. Deutsch-russische Militärbeziehungen 1920–1941* (Berlin: Vision, 1992), 167.
30. As cited in Clark, 26.

31. *FRUS*, 1939, 1: 496. This report also noted, however, that “the Reich has no reliable indications or assurances that expansion of trade with Germany has been adopted by the Soviet Government as a permanent policy.”

32. RWW/Otto Wolff/Rußland, “Gasper Letter (10.11.39),” 72–41–5. A final settlement was delayed, however, because the Soviets demanded delivery within twenty-two months instead of the usual thirty, and the Germans decided they did not have sufficient cobalt to produce the vital contact components (BAMA, *RW 19/2862*, 570–74).

33. *DGFP*, D, 8: 394, doc. 342.

34. PA, *R 106231*, E041599. By December 6, the *WiRüAmt* was reporting that Germany would run out of platinum by March without supplies from the Soviets (BAMA, *RW 19/335*, 233). Although gold or silver could be substituted for platinum in various chemical processes, these items were also increasingly scarce and less efficient.

35. BAMA, *RW 19/335*, 207.

36. BAMA, *RW 19/243*, 92.

37. PA, *R 106231*, E041585.

38. *DGFP*, D, 8: 467, doc. 402.

39. Yergin, 370.

40. PA, *R 27804*, 356952–53.

41. PA, *R 106231*, E041601.

42. PA, *R 106231*, E041610.

43. *DGFP*, D, 8: 447–48, doc. 386.

44. PA, *R 106231*, E041612.

45. *DGFP*, D, 8: 447–48, doc. 386. Interestingly, the German oil agencies thought the renailing might actually facilitate Soviet oil shipments (even as it hindered transport from Rumania), because the transfer stations and freight cars would now be located on German soil instead of in Rumania.

46. BAMA, *RW 19/335*, 174.

47. For more information on the founding and structure of this organization, see BA/RFM, “Abschrift vom RWM (6.12.39),” *R 2/17315*, and BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Ro, “Mineralöl-Einfuhr aus Russland,” *RW 19/2814*, J005913 & J005918–19.

48. PA/HaPol/Schnurre/Forschungsstelle für Wehrwirtschaft/Dr. Berkenkopf, “Die Sowjetunion als deutschen Erdöllieferant,” *R 105314*, D527949–87.

49. PA, *R 106231*, E041607.

50. PA, *R 27804*, 356911–21.

51. *FCNA*, 56.

52. Although Hitler rejected buying Soviet submarines on October 10 because of quality concerns and because it would show German naval weakness, Raeder kept coming back to the idea, and Hitler had to deny the request again on November 10 (*NC&A*, 6: 980) and November 22 (*FCNA*, 58). Even then, Ribbentrop continued to investigate the possibility via Schulenburg on November 30 (*DGFP*, D, 8: 468–69, doc. 403).

53. *DGFP*, D, 8: 422, doc. 371.

54. PA, *R 106231*, 452749–69.

55. PA, *R 106231*, 452775–81.

56. PA, *R 27168*, 25892.

57. *DGFP*, D, 8: 422, doc. 371.

58. *DGFP*, D, 8: 422, doc. 371.

59. BAMA, *RW 19/243*, 92.

60. PA, *R 106231*, 452785.

61. *DGFP*, D, 8: 482, doc. 412.
62. For a complete list of the Soviet demands, see *DGFP*, D, 8: 472–75, doc. 407.
63. Pike, 280.
64. McSherry, 2: 39–40.
65. As quoted in Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin*, 660.
66. Galeazzo Ciano, *The Ciano Diaries, 1939–1943*, ed. Hugh Gibson (New York: Doubleday, 1946), 174.
67. Read and Fisher, 408–9.
68. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 88–91.
69. *NSR*, 127.
70. BAMA, *RW 19/243*, 112–13 & 119–22, and BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 3.
71. *DGFP*, D, 8: 482, doc. 412. A December 21 report listed the tons of material required each month to fulfill the naval contracts alone: iron—76,375, copper—2973, lead—3207, tin—413, nickel—917.5, aluminum—1674, chrome—1286, molybdenum—161, and rubber—548. See PA/Ritter, “Moskau Verhandlungen, Materiellen zum deutsch-sowjetischen Wirtschaftsabkommen 12.39–1.40,” *R 27805*, 1a: 324553–54.
72. BAMA, *RW 19/173*, 237–39.
73. BAMA, *RW 19/335*, 239.
74. Philbin, 113.
75. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 98.
76. N. Peresselenkow, “Zur Neufassung der Allgemeinen Lieferbedingungen und Schiedsgerichtsvereinbarung,” *Die Ostwirtschaft*, December 1939, 158–62. Although the Russia Committee tried to sell this new treaty as beneficial to Germany, Karl Helmer argues that the tougher punishment clauses wound up actually favoring the Soviets (Helmer, 24).
77. PA, *R 27803*, 357228.
78. PA, *R 106231*, E041666.
79. PA, *R 106231*, E041674.
80. *NSR*, 128.
81. *DGFP*, D, 8: 513, doc. 438.
82. *NSR*, 128.
83. BAMA, *RW 19/173*, 230–32.
84. PA, *R 27803*, 357199–200. Notice that Ritter’s pleading to a reluctant military is very different from his harsh assessment of the Soviet demands offered to Schulenburg (*DGFP*, D, 8: 516–18, doc. 442).
85. *DGFP*, D, 8: 483, doc. 413.
86. *DGFP*, D, 8: 481–82, doc. 412.
87. *FCNA*, 63.
88. PA, *R 27803*, 357202, and *DGFP*, D, 8: 537, doc. 457.
89. PA, *R 27803*, 3572218–20.
90. *DGFP*, D, 8: 517, doc. 442.
91. *DGFP*, D, 8: 518, doc. 442.
92. PA, *R 27168*, 25893.
93. PA, *R 27803*, 357203.

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Chapter 8

The Final Plan: Part I

With both sides having offered their own plans for an economic arrangement, the time had finally come to work out the differences. The Germans again hoped for a quick signing. Instead, the next two months saw yet another replay of the now-familiar pattern as the Soviets delayed and haggled their way through a series of high-level summit meetings. The resulting tension almost scuttled the already tortuous talks on several occasions. But both sides still had too much to gain from closer economic cooperation, and a settlement was finally reached on February 11, 1940, the terms of which bore little resemblance to the German interpretation of the vague Soviet promises in the September 28 treaty.

FIRST MOSCOW ECONOMIC SUMMIT, DECEMBER 31

The Germans had initially proposed 1.3 billion RM in raw material deliveries during 1940 in return for 810 million RM, only 330 million RM of which was in industrial and military goods. The Soviets had countered with roughly 500 million RM in raw materials in exchange for 1.5 billion RM, almost all of which was in industrial and military items. Having made their first offer primarily on the basis of “tactical considerations,”¹ the Germans were now willing to increase their military shipments from 58 million to 660 million RM in addition to over 300 million in industrial equipment, much of this 1 billion RM total being sent in 1940. But the Germans still would not, indeed could not, without endangering their war effort, move away from the September 28 framework of Soviet shipments preceding German counterdeliveries.

Having already made major concessions from their first offer and from the September 28 treaty, the Germans now hoped that the Soviets would meet them

halfway. What hopes the Germans still had for a quick signing in Moscow, however, were soon dashed on the hard rock of Anastas Mikoyan. During a December 15 discussion with Schulenburg, for example, the Trade Commissar rejected German complaints that Soviet demands were too high and leveled his own charges that German prices were exorbitant.²

The Americans, too, had caught the scent of trouble in the economic negotiations. According to Ambassador Kirk, "The impression prevails that a few weeks ago German authorities were sincerely convinced that Russia would furnish with reasonable promptness a fairly substantial volume of needed raw materials but that at the present moment these authorities are less sanguine as regards delivery dates and quantities of the commodities negotiated for."³

By December 19, the "less sanguine" Ritter had become downright pessimistic after his first encounter with Mikoyan. The Soviet Trade Commissar "insisted that the German compensatory deliveries had to consist almost entirely of military deliveries" and further demanded "delivery of the entire list [as] the only satisfactory equivalent for the deliveries of raw materials, which under present conditions are not otherwise obtainable for Germany on the world market."⁴ The Soviet threat was explicit. They realized that the Germans needed this economic arrangement much more than they did. Ritter, understandably, rejected Mikoyan's "all or nothing" approach, and with that the economic talks were temporarily suspended.

An anxious Ribbentrop, seeing his grand edifice collapsing around him, blamed Mikoyan for the difficulties and assumed that the Trade Commissar's position was not shared by Molotov or Stalin.⁵ Schnurre's encounter just a few days earlier illustrates how wrong Ribbentrop was:

When they reached an impasse, Mikoyan said he could not decide what should be done, it was a matter for Molotov—at which point Molotov himself suddenly emerged from a curtained-off archway in Mikoyan's office. After a short discussion, Molotov, in turn, said he could not decide, it was really a matter for Stalin—whereupon Stalin came out through the curtain and joined the discussion, pacing to and fro while considering the question, as was his habit, puffing on his pipe as he thought, then coming up with a decision which suited everybody.⁶

Despite its absurdity, Schulenburg did take Ribbentrop's case to Molotov late on the twenty-second of December. Schulenburg began by playing the political card, explaining that these talks held more than just economic significance for Germany and that Molotov should therefore use his influence to clear away the remaining hurdles. Molotov replied that the September 28 treaty had used the euphemism of "industrial deliveries" to include military items "because the correspondence was to be published." He did, however, allow that the Germans might not be able to supply everything the Soviets had asked for—one of the three cruisers requested would be sufficient, for example. After all, "he had the impression in the present case that both sides were guilty of exaggeration" in their initial proposals.⁷

In fact, Molotov complained, it was the German's "exorbitant" prices that were the real cause of the difficulties. Schulenburg argued in turn that since the Soviets wanted "models" of planes and other equipment for testing, they should pay the usual licensing fees, to which Molotov responded that the Germans should then pay licensing fees for Soviet oil and grain production because of the money invested in these enterprises.⁸

Despite these very sharp exchanges, this talk had at least reopened the possibility of an economic settlement. However, as Ritter pointed out, Molotov's contention that "industrial deliveries" also meant "military deliveries"⁹ and his bizarre rendering of standard price structures and licensing agreements indicated that "even though [the conversations] make it possible to resume negotiations, we can hardly expect the negotiations to make smooth and rapid progress."¹⁰

There were, on the other hand, some minor successes during these final two weeks of December. On the eighteenth, for example, the first Soviet grain shipments finally crossed the border at Przemysl (one of the main transfer points, especially for grain and oil),¹¹ and the Soviets were soon promising to ship 100,000 tons of oil by the end of January.¹² Even better, the two sides hammered out agreements by December 23 regulating air and rail traffic¹³ to replace the chaotic black hole into which entire carloads had occasionally disappeared during the past months.¹⁴ Finally, on the thirty-first the clearing and payment agreements were extended for another year.¹⁵

Although most in Germany wanted the Russo-Finnish War resolved quickly in order to open up Baltic trade and to avoid Western intervention in the region,¹⁶ some felt that they might be able to follow the course Schulenburg had already hinted at during his December 22 conversation with Molotov and use the conflict to pressure the USSR in the economic negotiations. The Naval High Command, for example, "advocated playing German military strength to its maximum diplomatic effect."¹⁷ Hitler himself seems to have hoped that the USSR had "bitten off more than she can chew in Finland."¹⁸

But the overall negotiations remained extremely difficult. The Soviets were apparently suspicious that Ribbentrop's effusive birthday wishes to Stalin were not shared by the *Führer* or the military.¹⁹ And as long as they felt that they held the upper hand, they were not going to give in quickly to the German requests. On December 25, for example, perhaps as some sort of Christmas present to themselves, the Soviets issued yet another revised list of demands, this one running 130 pages.²⁰ On December 27, Ritter concluded, "Negotiations here are not proceeding favorably. Both in general and in detail the other side is not showing the generosity that should result from the new political situation. Instead they are trying to get all they think they can."²¹

Of course, the Germans were also trying to get the best terms possible—hence the deadlock. By December 31 the situation could no longer be resolved by lower-level negotiations.²² As was typical for Stalin, he had waited until all sides had had their say, and now he formally entered the fray as the "good cop" trying to reach a compromise arrangement.

The first economic summit on December 31 included all the major players and lasted three hours but did not resolve the outstanding issues. Ritter recounted the meeting as follows:

On the whole M. Stalin appeared not to be in a very friendly mood. . . . Although on the individual points he showed more understanding of German needs than the Soviet negotiators had previously done, he steadfastly insisted on the Soviet wishes brought forward by him, which, to be sure, are quite limited compared to previous Soviet demands. . . . He [also] said that the Soviet Government did not consider the treaty as an ordinary trade agreement, but as one of mutual assistance.²³

Stalin agreed to deliver some scrap iron, but not the full 200,000 tons the Germans wanted. On the other hand, he did agree to ship 100,000 tons of chromium ore in 1940 and larger amounts in 1941. He also agreed to keep his machine-tool requests to a minimum and to allow the 50 percent freight reduction on soybean shipments from Manchuria, but he reiterated Molotov's complaint about German aircraft prices and reemphasized Soviet desire to receive German turrets within the year.

For their part, the Germans were disappointed by the proposed iron and nonferrous metals totals and also considered it impossible to deliver turrets and industrial plants in the short period requested by the Soviets. Ritter also restated the German argument for charging licensing fees on aircraft models.

But the real question was how quickly the two accounts should balance. The Germans, referring to the September 28 treaty, claimed that the German deliveries would lag behind the Soviets at least until the fifth quarter. Stalin responded that the delivery totals must balance by the end of the year. Ambassador Ritter noted, "The detailed discussion on this point did not lead to any understanding," and with that the meeting ended and the new year began.²⁴

SECOND MOSCOW ECONOMIC SUMMIT, JANUARY 29, 1940

The last day of the year had finally brought the Germans a major break in the economic negotiations, but the discussions had still followed Stalin's December 25, forty-point program, a plan that Molotov repeated for a third time during his January 7 talk with Schulenburg.²⁵ It seemed obvious to Schnurre, at any rate, that this new agenda was about as far as the Soviets were going to go. Now it was up to Hitler. In particular, would he provide the key items the Soviets wanted and lower the "utopian" 300 million RM for aircraft and 152 million RM for the *Lützow* stipulated by Göring and Raeder? To persuade Hitler and help him convince reluctant military and political officials, Ritter returned to Berlin on January 3.²⁶

Hitler, however, apparently needed no persuading, and the ensuing weeks saw the Germans debate substantial counterproposals in preparation for a second summit meeting with Stalin at the end of January. The *WiRüAmt* continued its usual conversations about various aspects of the relationship, particularly the

possible connection to the Far East.²⁷ More important, Hitler and major German figures, such as Keitel, Thomas, Ritter, and Raeder, held a series of conferences on January 8, 9, 12, and 13 in which the *Führer* pushed for a quick conclusion to the negotiations and “gave the general order that the reduced Soviet demands be handled with accommodating goodwill.”²⁸ Over the objections of some in the military and in the economic agencies, Hitler also reinforced the Foreign Office’s request to keep German prices at pre-war levels, agreed to the Soviet offer of 38 to 42 percent iron ore, and decided how many machine tools, turrets, and other crucial items could be shipped by what dates.²⁹

Although this response was generally favorable to the Soviet requests, there were still some clear signals that the Germans did not trust the Russians and that Hitler saw the economic arrangement as merely another “marriage of convenience.” Many businesses remained reluctant to deal with Russian tactics of “wait and let them starve”³⁰ when so many lucrative contracts were available at home. Military and economic officials also believed that their supplies were threatened by the new contracts with the Soviet Union. As a result, Schnurre and Schulenburg had to negotiate with disgruntled Soviet leaders who protested about the difficulty they were having placing orders in Germany.³¹

But these German subordinates were merely reflecting an ambivalence that went to the very top of the Nazi structure. According to Raeder, Hitler even ordered the navy “to delay as long as possible giving plans of the Bismarck class as well as the hull of the Luetzow to Russia, since he hopes to avoid this altogether if the war develops favourably.”³² The new trade treaty might be a necessity for the moment, but Hitler meant to break free from its constraints the first chance he had, preferably later that same year after a successful attack in the west.³³

In the meantime, however, the economic and political reasons for closer German-Soviet relations were again thrown into sharp relief by ongoing military operations. Although conservation and the phony war had kept the German raw-material situation from deteriorating as rapidly as first feared, the Germans were still counting on sixty thousand tons of Russian oil a month just to maintain their current stocks. If a major campaign began or if the Soviets failed to deliver their allotted totals, oil stocks would evaporate in a matter of months.³⁴ Grain reserves, previously considered fairly safe, also appeared increasingly tenuous, as the Germans faced a 1.6 million-ton shortfall for 1940 even under optimal conditions.³⁵ If there were a poor harvest and if the Soviets failed to deliver their roughly 1 million tons of foodstuffs, the German people might soon be facing a repeat of the winter of 1916–17.

The ongoing Finnish disaster hurt both parties, and their mutual problems in the region strengthened their need to cooperate and to end the fighting. The war drained Soviet resources, tarnished the already low reputation of the Soviet military, and invited intervention by the West.³⁶ It also reduced Soviet deliveries to Germany and imposed a de-facto partial blockade on German trade in the Baltic.³⁷ In fact, the Soviets were finally starting to overwhelm the Finns, but the impression remained that “the Russians are stuck quite fast in Finland.”³⁸

Realizing their common cause, the economic negotiators did make some progress during January.³⁹ On January 1, a tariff and toll treaty was added to the December 23 accords on air and rail traffic.⁴⁰ An agreement for a synthetic fuel plant from I. G. Farben seemed increasingly likely by mid-month.⁴¹ A contract for 208 kilograms of platinum was signed on January 20.⁴² And the first commercial air route from Berlin to Moscow opened on January 22, though it was delayed one day because the cold weather kept the plane stranded in Königsberg.⁴³

But without a clear commitment by the Germans to the Soviet terms, Stalin had little reason to support the Germans wholeheartedly. Consequently, Schnurre was soon complaining that "the Russians [were] showing extraordinary stubbornness,"⁴⁴ and the navy was expressing its concern about "difficulties in German-Soviet trade negotiations."⁴⁵ By January 2, for example, the grain treaty hit another snag over prices.⁴⁶ The Soviets also began complaining about delays in German coal shipments⁴⁷ and later even threatened sanctions under the terms of the August 19 treaty.⁴⁸

Soviet deliveries also lagged behind promised amounts. Oil shipments via Przemyśl, for instance, fell 34,000 tons short in January, according to one account.⁴⁹ Despite various assurances,⁵⁰ soybean shipments from the Far East never even began.⁵¹ The Germans had so few shipments to show for their efforts that they actually started marking some of their goods from Bohemia as "Made in Russia" in order "to show the German people how much 'help' is already coming from the Soviets."⁵² Although the terrible weather,⁵³ the exigencies of war, the Soviet bureaucracy, and the still-confused transportation situation all obviously limited the items the Soviets could send the Germans (and vice versa in the case of German coal shipments to the USSR), some of these delays were probably an intentional reminder to the Germans that substantial deliveries would begin only after the full economic agreement had been signed.

A few Germans, particularly those trying to reach a final settlement, seemed to have gotten the message. Ritter, for example, denounced the high prices (roughly 50 percent above pre-war) being put forth by a few German firms and threatened to cut the special government trade subsidy (*Zusatz-Ausgleichs-Verfahren*) to those firms that did not bring their rates into line with the general scheme of pre-war prices. He also petitioned German businesses to conclude their delivery contracts with the USSR as quickly as possible "in order to strengthen the German position and to clear away the great mistrust of the Russians."⁵⁴

German efforts to meet Stalin's demands culminated in a second economic summit late on the twenty-ninth. Ritter began by offering Hitler's new concessions on what items Germany could afford to send and when. Unsatisfied, Stalin proposed splitting the treaty into two parts, one for each of the next two years, with totals balancing at the end of each year. Ritter agreed in theory to the dual-treaty system, but again argued that the September 28 agreement had envisioned delayed transfers as the Germans were proposing. These were not, as Stalin had characterized them, "credits." Ritter also repeated the German request for more extensive nonferrous metal deliveries up front, because Germany lacked these raw

materials in sufficient quantities to handle the Soviet demands. Stalin again parried the German requests and refused to budge from his earlier position. Mikoyan then counterthrust by reiterating the Soviet threat to invoke sanctions against the Germans because of their lagging deliveries under the August 19 treaty.⁵⁵

On that discordant note, the meeting broke up at midnight. The Germans had come closer to Stalin's terms, but not close enough, and Stalin refused to give any more ground. The ball was still in the German court. As Schnurre had been warning since the first summit meeting, the Germans would have to be even more accommodating if they expected to reach a final settlement.

THIRD MOSCOW ECONOMIC SUMMIT, FEBRUARY 8

With two summits down, the German negotiators hoped that the third time would be the charm and began preparing yet another offer. Both sides, however, were coming close to the end of their respective ropes, and there were still major differences over pre-shipments of Soviet metals, access to German technology, and the overriding issue of when the two accounts should balance.

But the Germans were still the ones pursuing, trying to wrap up the deal in time to prepare adequately for the upcoming conflict in the West. As one Foreign Office report explained, since Soviet raw-material exports were "simply irreplaceable," "the breakdown of a German-Soviet agreement must be avoided at all costs."⁵⁶

The Soviets, on the other hand, still had less immediate economic incentive than the Germans and certainly did not want to encourage Allied intervention in Finland or the Caucasus by appearing too cozy with the Nazis. Regardless of the harsh winter and the resulting desperate German coal situation, therefore, the Russians continued to demand increased coal deliveries.⁵⁷ They also began raising problems on short-term credit arrangements.⁵⁸

Deciding it was now or never, Ribbentrop attempted to break the deadlock by sending a personal letter to Stalin on February 3 to plead the German case. The Foreign Minister rejected the idea of separate treaties, because this plan would decrease the raw materials sent to Germany in 1940. He then returned to the political principle on which the initial German proposals had been based, arguing that Soviet gains in Eastern Europe, as a result of the German victory in Poland, should "be considered . . . as a not inconsiderable advance payment by Germany and cited as an important reason justifying our desire to obtain support now, in continuing the war against England and France, by as rapid and as extensive deliveries of raw materials from the Soviet Government as possible."⁵⁹

As in the negotiations leading up to the Non-Aggression Pact, this direct approach seems to have tipped the balance and convinced Stalin that the time had come to seal the deal. The two sides, therefore, held a third and final economic summit in Moscow at one in the morning on the eighth. As usual, Stalin was well versed in the details of the negotiations and dominated the meeting.⁶⁰ He jumped

right into the discussion by exclaiming, "The letter from Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop altered the situation." He agreed that only one treaty should be signed in which the Soviets would send 420 to 430 million RM (in addition to the amounts agreed to in the August 19 treaty) within twelve months in return for an equivalent amount within fifteen months. An additional 220 to 230 million RM in goods would be sent during the ensuing six months in exchange for a like amount over one year. All these totals, however, must balance every six months in the first year and every three months thereafter. Finally, Stalin agreed to send some additional metals from months twelve to eighteen and to allow the Germans to station a mother ship in Murmansk waters for processing fish catches.⁶¹

Ritter thanked Stalin for "the accommodating spirit" and offered some of his own concessions on German deliveries: the plans for the *Bismarck*, drawings of 28-cm triple turrets, 20.3-cm guns for the cruiser *Lützow*, and technical assistance in constructing 28-cm and 38-cm turrets for Soviet ships initially designed for 30-cm turrets.⁶²

Having traded concessions for an hour, the parties adjourned and the long-awaited deal was now all but signed. Although the Germans remained hesitant about some of the arrangements to balance accounts, Ritter now believed that a treaty "can be ready for signature within the next few days."⁶³

SIGNING ON THE DOTTED LINE, FEBRUARY 11

Following Ribbentrop's letter and especially following the third economic summit, the negotiations that had previously been stuck in neutral suddenly kicked into high gear. On the eighth, the Americans noted that the Germans were "somewhat better satisfied with the general progress of their negotiations with the Soviets."⁶⁴ By the ninth, Ritter reported that in his talk that day with Mikoyan, "The previous pettifogging [*schikanöser*] methods have clearly been replaced by a certain ease of manner."⁶⁵ Finally, having already consumed more than their fair share of coffee, Crimean champagne, and vodka, the bedraggled negotiators "decided to alter the calendar and correspondingly lengthen February 11" in order to finish their work. And at six in the morning, an exhausted Mikoyan, Ritter, and Schnurre were finally able to sign their names to the much-anticipated economic treaty.⁶⁶

The terms of the treaty followed those laid down in the three summits, particularly that of February 8. In total, the Soviets would ship about 650 million RM in goods over eighteen months and receive an equivalent amount over twenty-seven months. Plenipotentiaries would make sure the accounts balanced every six months over the first year and every three months thereafter. The agreement also called for the 50 percent reduction in freight rates for Manchurian soybeans as well as 30 million RM in Soviet oil shipments from Drohobycz and Boryslav in return for 20 million RM in German coal and 10 million RM in steel tubing. The specific Soviet resources and German war materials and industrial goods were included in a series of lists attached to the main document. But the main items

were 1 million tons of grain, 900,000 tons of oil, and more than 500,000 tons of various metal ores (most of it iron ore) in exchange for synthetic material plants, ships, turrets, machine tools, and coal.⁶⁷

The “hard fight,” as Schnurre called it, was finally over. But who had won? Schnurre understandably played up his accomplishments and focused on the delayed German payments, the planned raw-material deliveries, and access to the Far East. Including the August 19 treaty and third-party buying, Soviet shipments and services would amount to 800 million RM in the first year alone and would in effect mean “a wide open door to the East for us.”⁶⁸ Hilger described the agreement in similar terms and explained that “British efforts at an economic blockade of Germany had been weakened considerably.”⁶⁹

On the other hand, Ribbentrop described the Russians as having been “very hard bargainers” in these economic negotiations.⁷⁰ In fact, as even Schnurre had to admit,⁷¹ the vague promises of the September 28 agreement had been dramatically reshaped to fit many of Stalin’s wishes. No quick agreement had been signed as the Germans had wanted, and consequently only a trickle of Soviet raw materials had flowed into Germany so far. Furthermore, despite the bottlenecks that already existed in the Germany economy, the “industrial deliveries” of the earlier accords had been transformed into massive military support in this new treaty, with the Soviets getting most of the technology and much of the equipment they had wanted. The Soviets had also avoided the German demand for nonferrous metal shipments up front. Even more important, Stalin had forced through the stipulation that the accounts must balance at specific intervals despite the obvious difficulty this would pose for the Germans.

Though largely a compromise that had stretched both sides to the limits of what their respective systems could comfortably handle, this treaty probably favored the Soviet Union—not surprising given Stalin’s close supervision of the negotiating process. Germany received enough raw materials to keep it in the war, but in limited amounts and at such a cost that they probably (and under Stalin’s watchful eye, definitely) would not provide a decisive edge against the Allies in the short term. The war, therefore, was likely to drag on into 1941 and beyond, making Germany ever more dependent on Soviet resources and allowing Stalin to twist the screws even tighter in future negotiations. In the meantime, the Soviet Union would receive the technology and equipment necessary to rearm.

But there was the catch. Who won in the new German-Soviet economic agreement as well as in the earlier political agreements depended largely on the course of the war. The World War I-style war of attrition that most expected would obviously suit Soviet interests the best. But a negotiated peace would still leave the Soviet Union with a solid economic and political foundation for world-power status. A quick victory by the Allies might be dangerous to the USSR. A quick Nazi success even more so. But the former was practically impossible, and the common wisdom of the day thought the latter also improbable. As usual, the cautious Stalin had taken the most logical option presented him, the one most likely to help the Soviet Union rearm and at the same time to keep the Germans

fighting but not winning against the West. Unfortunately for Stalin, history does not always follow the dictates of logic, especially with Adolf Hitler in the picture.

NOTES

1. BAMA, *RW 45/13b*, 22a.
2. PA, *R 106231*, 452797.
3. *FRUS*, 1939, 1: 498.
4. *DGFP*, D, 8: 558–59, doc. 474.
5. *DGFP*, D, 8: 560, doc. 476.
6. As quoted in Read and Fisher, 439.
7. *DGFP*, D, 8: 570–72, doc. 484.
8. *DGFP*, D, 8: 570–72, doc. 484.
9. According to Friedrich Gaus, Under State Secretary for Legal Affairs in the German Foreign Office, “It is certainly an error on Molotov’s part when he says that the expression ‘industrial deliveries’ was chosen in the Moscow negotiations only because the correspondence was to be published. The question whether and to what extent the German deliveries were to include deliveries of a military nature was never discussed at all, at the time” (*DGFP*, D, 8: 587–88, doc. 498).
10. *DGFP*, D, 8: 574–75, doc. 487.
11. BAMA/OKW/WfSt/Propaganda, “Industrie-, Wirtschafts, und Rohstoff-Fragen 1939–1942,” *RW 4/v.308*, 101.
12. BAMA, *RW 19/335*, 267. This new promise would again be delayed, and Soviet oil shipments would not reach the 100,000 ton mark until April. See Appendix A, Tables 3.1 and 3.2, for two sets of figures showing Soviet oil exports to Germany.
13. For the air treaty, see BAAP/BM, “Luftfahrtbeziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der UdSSR 1929–1941,” *09.02/336*, 58–88; for the train treaty, see the 200-plus pages scattered throughout BA, *R 15/V/43*; and for a general overview of both, see “Unmittelbarer Eisenbahngüterverkehr Deutschland-UdSSR,” *Die Ostwirtschaft*, December 1939, 145–46. Note that the main part of the train agreement included the transfer stations called for by the Soviets.
14. Dallin, *Foreign Policy*, 425.
15. IfW/RA, “Rundschreiben (3.1.40),” *YY2389*, 1.
16. Dallin, *Foreign Policy*, 158 & 182–83, and Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 89–90.
17. Philbin, 72.
18. Josef Goebbels, *The Goebbels Diaries, 1939–1941*, 1982, ed. Fred Taylor (New York: Penguin, 1984), 76.
19. Werth, 71.
20. PA, *R 27805*, 324667–797.
21. *DGFP*, D, 8: 575, doc. 487, n. 3.
22. See PA/Pol/West Europa, “Politische Angelegenheiten Russlands 1939–1940,” *R 101388*, 7: 334381, for a list of the 103 Soviet trade representatives then involved in the German-Soviet economic negotiations.
23. *DGFP*, D, 8: 589, doc. 499.
24. *DGFP*, D, 8: 589–96, doc. 499.
25. *DGFP*, D, 8: 641–42, doc. 520.
26. PA, *R 106231*, E041702–03.

27. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 6–7, 13–14, 20, 28, & 36–37.
28. PA, *R 27805*, 325580.
29. PA, *R 27805*, 325532–91. For a more detailed list of the items to be shipped and their dates, see *DGFP*, D, 8: 673, doc. 543.
30. MA/Technik, “Schauke/Jamm: Bericht über die Reise nach Moskau 8.1–8.2.1940,” *M 40.131*, 22.
31. *DGFP*, D, 8: 715–16, doc. 582.
32. *FCNA*, 79.
33. See Hitler’s January 30 strategy discussions with Göring as quoted in Carlyle, 28.
34. BAMA, *RW 19/205*, 92–93.
35. BAMA, *RW 4/v.308*, 92.
36. For the French plans to support the Finns and attack Baku, see Weinberg, *World at Arms*, 73.
37. *FRUS*, 1940, 1: 540–41.
38. Goebbels, *1939–41*, 98.
39. This was the conclusion of the Americans, at any rate (*FRUS*, 1940, 1: 540).
40. Reichsbahnrat Gährs, “Der deutsch-sowjetische Eisenbahngüter- und Tiertarif vom 1. Dezember 1940,” *Die Ostwirtschaft*, November 1940, 131.
41. PA, *R 106231*, E041715.
42. PA, *R 106231*, E041706.
43. For more information about this first flight, see BAAP, *09.02/336*, 31–50.
44. PA, *R 106231*, E041708.
45. *NC&A*, 6: 982.
46. PA, *R 106231*, E041694.
47. PA, *R 106231*, E041704.
48. PA, *R 106231*, 452838–39 & E041751–52.
49. BAMA, *RW 19/205*, 90.
50. *DGFP*, D, 8: 315, doc. 274, n. 2.
51. PA, *R 106231*, E041700 & 452835, and PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Moraht Telegram (22.1.40),” *R 106000*.
52. As quoted in Shirer, *Berlin Diary*, 206.
53. Shirer called it “the coldest winter in German history.” See William L. Shirer, *The Nightmare Years, 1930–1940* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 475.
54. MA, *M 40.131*, 4.
55. *DGFP*, D, 8: 718–22, doc. 584. See Appendix A, Tables 1.5 and 1.6, for more information on monthly deliveries. Although these figures do not show what amounts fell under the August 19 treaty, they do show that from November through January the Soviets shipped goods totalling 14.7 million RM in comparison to 8.1 million RM for the Germans.
56. PA, *R 106231*, 452847.
57. Goebbels, *1939–1941*, 111, and PA, *R 106231*, 452848–49.
58. IfW/RA, “Rundschreiben (2.2.40),” *YY2389*, 2.
59. *DGFP*, D, 8: 741, doc. 594.
60. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 97.
61. *DGFP*, D, 8: 752–53, doc. 600.
62. *DGFP*, D, 8: 752–53, doc. 600.
63. *DGFP*, D, 8: 756, doc. 602.
64. *FRUS*, 1940, 1: 543.

65. *DGFP*, D, 8: 757, doc. 602.
66. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 97.
67. For more details, see Appendix A, Table 5.1, and *DGFP*, D, 8: 763–69, doc.
607. The Soviet naval list, for example, ran to forty-two pages by itself.
68. *NSR*, 134.
69. Hilger and Meyer, 317.
70. *NC&A*, B, 1187.
71. *NSR*, 131–34.

Chapter 9

Gas and Grain for Coal and Cruisers

With the economic agreement finally signed, one might assume that the rest of the economic relationship would flow fairly smoothly. Fritz Tschunke's description of the new arrangement typified the expectations of many: "Because of [the treaty], the door and the path to and from the Soviet Union have been thrown wide open. Through this door and over this path a broad stream of raw materials and foodstuffs will flow into Germany."¹

The accord, however, only set up guidelines for specific delivery contracts. So it was now up to the individual businesses and agencies to negotiate on prices and terms of delivery. As with the general discussions just concluded, these new talks would again be long and difficult, the major issues not being resolved for another four months.

Both sides also had to muster the political will to ship the items assigned to them. What with the war, the weather, the poor transportation system, the bureaucratic haggling, and the continuing distrust between the two sides, such deliveries would prove easier said than done. Shirer argued that the agreement "looks good on paper, but I would bet a lot the Russians deliver no more than a fraction of what they have promised."² Ritter also "seemed somewhat doubtful as to Soviet compliance."³ The same could equally be said by the Soviets about Nazi Germany.

A SLOW START, MARCH 8

That contract negotiations and actual deliveries got off to a slow start in February and March should thus come as no surprise. The first trans-Siberian

shipment, for example, did finally arrive in Germany but it was only three tons of Japanese tea.⁴ This was hardly an auspicious beginning and one that was not followed up in any substantial way until June.⁵ The Soviets were also dragging out the new oil negotiations and their oil shipments, though the delays with the latter seemed mainly due to poor weather.⁶ By March 1, Ter-Nedden was reporting that some of the resources covered by the February treaty had begun flowing to Germany, but that many items were still being withheld.⁷

The worsening Finnish crisis and the resulting rumors of imminent Allied intervention also prompted the Soviets to keep some distance from the Germans. Border clashes in Poland increased sharply in late February and early March while exports to the Reich tailed off.⁸ Fortunately for the Russians, the Finns had had enough, rejecting the Allied offer of support on March 2, accepting the basic Soviet terms on March 6, and officially surrendering on March 12.⁹ The Soviet adventure in the frozen north had been at best a marginal victory. The threat of Allied intervention had already forced the Soviets into an early settlement with the Finns and would continue to make Stalin leery of working too closely with the Germans.¹⁰

The Germans were also delaying their negotiations and shipments. Among other problems, the Germans were busy organizing their own government trading monopoly to counter the Soviets' system. Although businesses would continue to bargain for individual items, they would now do so under the aegis of various Berlin agencies, including a new Ministry of Economics sub-group called the *Geschäftsstelle für den deutsch-sowjetischen Wirtschaftsverkehr* and designed to handle the continuing transportation problems.¹¹ In accordance with this basic philosophy, the Russia Committee's *Die Ostwirtschaft* and *Rundschreiben* initially published only sketchy details of the February agreement, but specifically requested that all businesses direct their questions to the Russia Committee first.¹² This way the Germans could keep internal competition down and strengthen their bargaining position with the USSR. Of course, as was the case with the Soviet bureaucracy, such a system would also result in even lengthier discussions, as each proposed step had to be shuttled up and down the administrative ladder first.¹³

On the other hand, because Soviet raw-material deliveries were dependent on German exports (thanks to Stalin's balancing procedures), the Russia Committee thought that it was "*absolutely necessary to execute German deliveries in the agreed upon amounts and within the planned timeframes.*"¹⁴ The Russia Committee repeatedly urged businesses to stick to pre-war prices in order to speed up the negotiating process.¹⁵ Other agencies also called for "the rapid completion of the equipment contracted for."¹⁶

Many in business and the government, however, still felt threatened by these new policies. Firms such as Otto Wolff were soon complaining that they were being forced into bad contracts.¹⁷ Other companies insisted that they were practically giving away their industrial secrets and thereby creating new competitors.¹⁸ Economic officials protested that the war economy could not afford to lose the steel required to produce goods for the Soviets.¹⁹

GÖRING THE GO-BETWEEN, MARCH 29

A month after the signing of the treaty, the two sides still seemed wary of the economic commitments they had made. But with warmer weather on the way and with the war in Finland coming to an end, the Germans at least seem to have expected that trade totals would finally take off.²⁰ Even Hitler appears to have been optimistic, writing to Mussolini on March 8, "The trade agreement which we have concluded with Russia, Duce, means a great deal in our situation!"²¹

After all they had been through in the economic negotiations so far, however, the Germans should have known better. Instead of dramatic increases in deliveries, March witnessed some of the most difficult bargaining yet, and trade figures actually declined. The Germans howled in protest, but to no avail. The Soviets refused to play their two aces (oil and grain) until they were safe from Western intervention and until contracts for the main items they wanted (coal and cruisers) were firmly in hand.

Problems began, as they had in the fall, with the arrival in Berlin on the eighth of a sixty-man Soviet commercial mission headed again by Tevossyan.²² The usual suspicion and bureaucratic wrangling prevailed as the Soviets again criticized their hosts for hiding their latest equipment and for postponing contract talks.²³

Negotiations for the various individual items were also becoming increasingly troublesome. By March 9, the licensing discussions with Otto Wolff for a Fischer-Tropsch synthetic fuel plant had reached a dead end,²⁴ and Soviet bargaining over an I. G. Farben hydrogenation plant was also proving "very difficult."²⁵ The Foreign Ministry described the Soviet demands for almost unlimited access to engineering and construction sites and processes as practically insurmountable.²⁶ Long-awaited contracts for platinum and iridium continued to languish, leaving Germany with only enough of these metals to last through April or May.²⁷ Finally, the Soviets launched a series of probing attacks on the by-now standard currency and payment procedures.²⁸ In general, the Reich Office for Foreign Trade complained that, despite strenuous efforts by German firms, talks had made no progress because of Soviet delays and excessive price demands.²⁹

The Germans, of course, realized that Stalin was twisting their arms on price questions by pressing for German costs to stay equal to or below pre-war levels and then charging 20 to 300 percent above pre-war prices for oil.³⁰ But there was little they could do in the short term except to hold tight on the pre-war pricing policy³¹ already agreed to and play along with the Soviet *quid pro quo*. The Germans hoped, therefore, that successful contracts on steel tubing³² and aircraft models³³ would expedite negotiations on oil and other raw materials.

Instead, Babarin complained to Ritter on March 15 that coal and ship talks had gone nowhere and that few German firms had begun serious discussions on deliveries to the Soviet Union. Ritter replied that constantly changing and excessive Soviet demands were the real cause of the problems. The German ambassador also noted that the progress of the coal and ship negotiations depended on Soviet willingness to send oil and grain.³⁴

Here again was the crux of the deadlock. The Soviet delays and demands were normal operating procedure. But the Germans would not make concessions on the key items of coal and cruisers until the Soviets showed themselves willing to send gas and grain. The Soviets were still too worried about the West, still distrusted Germany too much, and were still too confident in their negotiating position to give in quickly to German objections.

In short, the negotiations had reached yet another impasse. Soviet Ambassador Skvartsev returned to Moscow on March 21, ostensibly to consult with his superiors,³⁵ leaving Tevossyan, Krutikov, and Babarin to meet with Ritter and Schnurre on March 27. Schnurre began by complaining once again about Soviet grain and oil prices. Krutikov responded that the Germans had called off the grain talks themselves and now would have to agree to ship the requested planes within two months before grain negotiations could begin again. Even then, it would be too late to include 500,000 of the requested 850,000 tons. In the meantime, grain deliveries would be halted. So much for one of the two main German items. A furious Ritter explained that it was the Soviets who had ignored a March 12 German letter asking to restart the talks on the fifteenth. But Krutikov refused to budge on the grain issue and again protested that German coal prices were too high.³⁶ The next day Tevossyan repeated the Soviet aircraft demands to General Udet.³⁷

The negotiations having stalled on pricing questions, Schnurre chaired a meeting to investigate ways to reinvigorate the talks. Those present noted that most German firms appeared to be charging roughly pre-war prices, while the Soviets were demanding about 15 to 25 percent above the August rates and much more for oil and grain. Despite this inequity, Schnurre called for more German concessions on delivery contracts to ease his negotiating position and to entice the Soviets into stable pricing procedures.³⁸ Similarly, Ritter sought "to secure a swift commencement of German deliveries," even if that meant dipping into current stocks.³⁹

Realizing their still desperate need for Soviet resources and Soviet neutrality in the fast-approaching "capitalist conflict," Göring and Hitler quickly adopted this proposed strategy of concessions designed to assure a still-distrustful Stalin. On March 29, for example, Göring responded to Tevossyan's grievances by promising aircraft deliveries within the requested two months and increasing the earlier German offer of 250,000 tons of coal to 390,000 tons, and at pre-war prices. On the other hand, Göring reemphasized the coal-oil price connection and implied that German businesses were not to blame for the slow pace of the current talks. Nonetheless, the "Russians showed themselves extremely satisfied with the course of the conversation," as well they should have.⁴⁰

Soviet negotiators probably would have been ecstatic had they been privy to the discussions the next day at a Göring-led meeting "to consider the further handling of business transactions with Russia." In keeping with the new negotiating strategy, Göring declared that Russian raw materials were absolutely vital and that all contracts must therefore be fulfilled promptly. He then

highlighted Hitler's explicit decision that "where reciprocal deliveries to the Russians are endangered, even German *Wehrmacht* deliveries must be held back."⁴¹

OUR FRIEND MOLOTOV? APRIL 9

As usual, the Germans had finally buckled to Soviet pressure and offered a series of concessions. But in the coming ten days, Stalin made no counteroffer. Why? Schulenburg concluded "that the Soviet Government is determined to cling to neutrality in the present war and to avoid as much as possible anything that might involve it in a conflict with the Western powers."⁴² Allied economic and political threats were obviously having some effect.

The new German paradigm for negotiations with the Soviets was quickly put into effect. By the end of March, naval officials had already offered to sell the *Lützow* for 82.4 million RM plus 30 percent for ammunition.⁴³ On April 4 an inter-agency meeting investigated ways to increase German shipments from 140 million RM to 200 million RM during the first six months,⁴⁴ 90 million of which would come from the military.⁴⁵ The Germans also made plans to ship 300,000 tons of coal a month to the USSR and immediately began dispatching two trains a day to Przemyśl carrying 1,000 tons total.⁴⁶ Simultaneously, government agencies continued their pressure on hesitant German businesses to adhere strictly to the pre-war pricing policy in order to alleviate Soviet distrust and expedite Soviet counterdeliveries.⁴⁷

But the Soviets remained obstinate, having now added oil to their list of items not being shipped to Germany.⁴⁸ The Soviets also forced through changes in payment procedures and tried to triple the tariff rates they charged German customers.⁴⁹ Even more ominously, Schulenburg's April 6 encounter with Mikoyan was decidedly chilly. Mikoyan blamed the Japanese (with some justification) for the difficulties in transit trade to the Far East, and he opposed the resumption of oil and grain shipments until the Germans began sending coal.⁵⁰ In Berlin, Tevosyan also remained aloof, rejecting German proposals for the *Lützow* despite German protests that the Soviets had repeatedly altered their terms and thereby jeopardized the talks.⁵¹

A bewildered Ritter cabled Schulenburg on the ninth and requested that he

call on Mikoyan and Molotov once again and inform them as follows: . . . That the German deliveries would get under way more slowly was a foregone conclusion. . . . In view of the complicated nature of the deliveries and the manifold Soviet wishes it is natural that the German side will take rather longer to conclude the commercial contracts. The delays are largely occasioned by the Russians, who do not give the necessary technical data and specifications. Particularly troublesome is the fact that the Soviet representatives here keep making additional alterations in their wishes and demands, thus causing loss of time.⁵²

Ritter also pointed out that Germany's fulfillment of the August 19 terms easily outpaced that of the Soviet Union,⁵³ proving the Reich's willingness to cooperate.

Trudging off to yet another *tête-à-tête* with old “stone bottom” (as Churchill liked to call Molotov), Schulenburg was “completely amazed” to find the normally bland Foreign Commissar “affability itself.” Tracing the grain and oil suspensions to the “excessive zeal of subordinate agencies,” Molotov agreed to resume immediately delivery of these items. A stunned Schulenburg concluded that “there is only one explanation for this about-face: our Scandinavian operations must have relieved the Soviet Government enormously—removed a great burden of anxiety, so to speak.”⁵⁴

On April 9 the Germans had invaded Denmark and Norway, and the German and Allied forces were now engaged. This fighting ruled out the possibility of immediate Allied intervention in Finland or of “capitalist encirclement” of the Soviet Union and therefore succeeded in allaying Soviet concerns in a way that German economic concessions alone could not. The way finally, finally appeared open for full-scale trade to commence.

WAR IN THE WEST, MAY 10

Although Schulenburg described the Soviets as having made a complete “about face,” a “half turn” would be more accurate. Despite the increasingly bright future for German-Soviet economic relations, German concessions, better weather, and the battle in Norway had not yet eliminated all the remaining barriers. Elements in both countries remained hesitant, and tough bargaining continued on the key issues—grain, oil, coal, and cruisers.

On the positive side of the ledger, trade did pick up during April. Soviet exports to Germany almost doubled, from 9.7 million RM in March to 16.7 million RM, and German exports to the USSR more than tripled, from 2.6 to 8.1 million RM.⁵⁵ Grain shipments from the USSR also jumped from 16 million to 56 million tons.⁵⁶ And by the end of the month, the Germans had already delivered the two Dornier-115s, five Messerschmidt-110s, and two Junker-88s Göring had promised to send by the end of May.⁵⁷

Contract negotiations also made rapid progress, starting with another friendly meeting between Tevossyan and Göring on April 12.⁵⁸ Over the next three weeks, at least eight contracts for German machines were signed, as was another platinum agreement.⁵⁹ Negotiations for major timber shipments were also coming along well.⁶⁰ A consortium of German banks even set up a special 150 million RM fund to help promote short-term trade not covered by the August or February agreements.⁶¹

On the other hand, trade and negotiations on certain key items remained problematic. Soviet oil⁶² and items shipped via the USSR⁶³ still only trickled into the Reich, even though adequate transportation was no longer a major problem.⁶⁴ Tea sent from Vladivostok on December 16 arrived in Germany only on April 16, and some November shipments from Iran had yet to reach the Reich nine months later.⁶⁵ In addition, the Soviets had almost scuttled talks on manganese with their high price demands.⁶⁶ Delivery of German synthetic-material plants also looked

increasingly questionable as the Soviets continued to require extensive guarantees and technical access that the German firms found impossible to provide.⁶⁷

Technology transfers in particular continued to be a sore point with the Germans. On April 16 Molotov suddenly asked to buy German magnetic mines to protect Soviet ports such as Murmansk from British attacks.⁶⁸ Ribbentrop,⁶⁹ via Schulenburg,⁷⁰ politely but firmly denied the petition. Some Soviet requests were even sabotaged by high licensing fees from German firms reluctant to sell technologically advanced equipment to the USSR.⁷¹ The navy also began complaining that their ship construction, such as on the aircraft carrier *Graf Zeppelin*, was being "delayed by transactions with Russia."⁷²

But the major problem was again the coal-cruiser-gas-grain nexus. Not surprisingly, the Germans made the first major concession by offering, on April 19, to ship 400,000 tons of coal by the end of the year. That same day, Schnurre reported a tentative agreement for 4.7 million tons of coal to be shipped by May 11, 1941.⁷³ Negotiating prices and delivery terms for this major treaty, however, lasted another month. In other words, the Germans were still hedging their bets until the Soviets made some similar concessions.

One area of concern was grain. To handle these negotiations a German mission, led once again by Dassler, arrived in Moscow on April 18 for two weeks of intensive bargaining. *Exportkleb*, the Soviet agency in charge of grain exports, opened with an offer of 330,000 tons, claiming German delays had undermined the previous talks. Dassler, in turn, argued that "the guilt [for the delays] lies absolutely one-sidedly with *Exportkleb*" and demanded that the Soviets reinstate their earlier offer of 830,000 tons at the same price as the October 26 agreement. The Soviets countered that they had no instructions to offer any more than 330,000, in response to which an infuriated Dassler threatened to break off the talks and return to Berlin.⁷⁴

As in the fall negotiations, these lower-level discussions had quickly reached the limit of the Soviet agency's authority, and bigger guns had to be brought in. In this case Schulenburg intervened repeatedly, initially to no effect. The German Ambassador's April 22 meeting with Mikoyan to discuss grain and other issues, for example, proved "difficult and unpleasant." Soviet asbestos prices were "completely unacceptable," and the Soviet grain offer remained 500,000 tons below their earlier promise.⁷⁵ Eventually, the Soviets did relent on April 26 and reinstate their earlier 830,000 ton offer, but with major provisos: delivery terms for 430,000 tons still had to be negotiated, and the entire amount was still subject to talks on types and prices.⁷⁶

The negotiations concerning the cruiser *Lützow* and Soviet oil shipments showed similar difficult but steady progress. By May 6 the Soviets had responded to the earlier German proposal of 109 million RM for the cruiser and ammunition with a counteroffer of 90 million RM.⁷⁷ On the tenth, with war in the West already having begun, the increasingly desperate Germans offered to split the difference at 100 million RM, even though "this price is not acceptable from a strictly commercial point of view."⁷⁸ There was, of course, a string attached. The Soviets

had to resolve the coal and oil contracts on a similar “middle-way” basis.

So far the Soviets had refused to accept the Gulf price (the reigning standard for oil transactions) or even the Gulf price plus 20 percent for their oil and insisted on the price agreed to for the first oil contract the previous fall. That oil had cost the Germans two to three times the world average.⁷⁹ Instead of the earlier German offer of 36 million RM, Ritter was now willing to buy Soviet oil at 45 million RM, 50 percent above the world price. Under a worst-case scenario, the German negotiators were even authorized to pay 53.75 million RM for oil and to accept the low coal price tendered by the Soviets if a deal could be concluded quickly.⁸⁰

Desperation bred German concessions, but it also bred frustration with Soviet delaying tactics. In a lengthy report dated May 12, Ritter vented the pent-up German fury with the USSR’s dithering. Stalin, however, had heard this German griping before and apparently paid it little heed. As always with the Soviets, their deliberate and delicate negotiating dance required one step backward for every two steps forward, and no rapid agreement on these major items was forthcoming. The USSR even began tentative economic negotiations with the British during this period, though the Soviets vociferously denied that they had taken the initiative⁸¹ and the Germans do not appear to have been too concerned.⁸² Stalin probably intended merely to remind the Germans that the Soviets had other economic options, the Germans none.

They had none, that is, except plundering conquered territory. Having just won a close-run thing in Scandinavia, Hitler was about to embark on another “loot and pillage” operation, this time directly against the Allies. And, as usual, Hitler was playing for high stakes at long odds. Although better off than many had expected, the war economy was still tottering on the edge of ruin and possessed raw-material stockpiles for only a short war. The victories over Denmark and Norway had merely exacerbated Germany’s already troublesome oil situation,⁸³ and Germany’s rubber reserves were almost gone.⁸⁴

Of course, these were exactly the items that the Soviets had refused so far to ship in great quantities, which raises the question of how important Soviet economic aid was to the German war effort against the West. Soviet strategic and psychological aid was obviously vital, since the Germans had to station only four regular and nine territorial divisions on the eastern border⁸⁵ and since Comintern propaganda was slowly eroding French morale.⁸⁶ Some historians, however, have also claimed that Soviet economic aid was significant if not decisive to the German military victory in France, arguing that “Guderian’s tanks operated largely on Soviet petrol as they dashed for the sea at Abbeville, the bombs that leveled Rotterdam contained Soviet guncotton, and the bullets that strafed British Tommies wading to the boats at Dunkirk were sheathed in Soviet cupro-nickel.”⁸⁷

Dramatic, but wrong. By the end of May, the Soviets had shipped only 155,000 tons of oil to the Reich in comparison to German oil stocks of 1,115,000 tons,⁸⁸ 8,600 tons of manganese in comparison to reserves of 230,000 tons,⁸⁹ and 128,100 tons of grain in comparison to stockpiles of 4,693,000 tons.⁹⁰ And these were the most important categories. The rest of Soviet deliveries mattered even

less to Germany's raw-material situation during the decisive first few weeks of the conflict in France. In short, Soviet economic aid had relatively little direct impact on the initial fighting in the West.

Then why all the German concern about Soviet supplies? Even though Soviet deliveries had been relatively limited to this point, they were still projected to reach tremendous heights in the next few months. Since almost no one expected the war to end quickly, these Soviet shipments could still prove vital over the long haul, and the promise of their arrival allowed German military leaders to plan more confidently for an extended campaign. Much to everyone's surprise, even Hitler's, a lengthy struggle in France never materialized.

FINAL CONTRACTS, MAY 28

The war in the West and the German concessions that were offered as the conflict began finally appeared to give the Soviets what they wanted—security and an economic arrangement on their terms. Consequently, “from the beginning of May, negotiations which earlier had lasted months now required weeks and in many cases eight to ten days to be completed.”⁹¹ Contracts on cotton, rags, horns, platinum, bristles, iridium, intestines, wood tar, and various machines were all concluded during the second half of the month.⁹²

The two sides also moved toward resolution on the key questions of grain, oil, coal, and cruisers. By the fourteenth the Soviets had dropped their oil price from 71.5 million RM to 55.2 million RM,⁹³ although they still refused to increase their shipments of one thousand tons a day, which Schnurre condemned as “completely insufficient,” until everything had been signed.⁹⁴ A few days later, however, Molotov tentatively accepted Ritter's May 10 “middle-way” proposal.⁹⁵

That agreed to, the details fell into place over the next ten days. The Soviets did try to start another bidding war after the arrival in Moscow of the Cripps mission from England,⁹⁶ and the worn-out Germans almost played along when Ritter proposed on May 22 to travel to Moscow with Schnurre;⁹⁷ but the process was already too far along, and a deal was arranged in fairly short order. By the fifteenth the grain treaty had been completed,⁹⁸ and by the twenty-second an understanding had been reached on the *Lützow* that “very much impressed” the Russians.⁹⁹ On May 25 and 26 the oil contracts were signed at the world price plus 50 percent.¹⁰⁰ On the twenty-sixth the *Lützow* departed for Leningrad.¹⁰¹ Finally, on May 27 the Germans ratified the Soviet coal treaty, and the next day the Soviets ratified the German oil treaty.¹⁰² The major contracts had all been completed.

In the meantime Soviet motives for signing these final contracts had changed somewhat. When the fighting in France first began, the Soviets had had their eyes on the final prize of economic and political security. Just as they were reaching for the brass ring, however, the rapid German victory in France tilted the playing field. The Germans themselves had been very nervous about their Ardennes plan. They expected a much longer struggle and had planned for a “second wave” of troops and material.¹⁰³ Happily for Hitler, the French command's early errors

resulted in the rapid conquest of France and the Low Countries. No one was more surprised or more dismayed than Stalin.

NOTES

1. Fritz Tschunke, "Deutsch-russische Wirtschaftsabkommen vom 11. Februar 1940," *Ost-Europa-Markt*, Mar/Apr 1940, 53.
2. Shirer, *Berlin Diary*, 203.
3. *FRUS*, 1940, 1: 542.
4. Birkenfeld, *Wirtschaftspartner*, 506–7. The journey had taken fifty-five days, apparently the norm for this route (BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 71).
5. See Appendix A, Table 4.2, for figures on German imports via the Soviet Union. Although soya bean shipments appear to have begun by early March (BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 71), the total of all goods shipped to the Reich across the USSR amounted to only about five hundred tons by the end of May.
6. BAMA, *RW 19/2814*, J005970–71, and BAMA, *RW 4/v.308*, 37 & 42.
7. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 62–63.
8. McSherry, 2: 67–70, 78 & 84.
9. Read and Fisher, 414–17.
10. Reinforcing this concern, the Allies began a policy of economic pressure on the USSR with the internment of the Soviet transports *Selenga* and *Vladimir Mayakovsky* in the far east. See W. N. Medlicott. *The Economic Blockade*, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, 1952), 1: 324.
11. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 70. Ter-Nedden, who was already head of the Russia Committee's import section, became the head of this new agency.
12. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (15.2.40)," *YY2389*, 1, and Dr. W. Ter-Nedden, "Das deutsch-sowjetische Wirtschaftsabkommen vom 11. Februar 1940," *Die Ostwirtschaft*, Feb/Mar 1940, 17–18.
13. For a more detailed discussion of the changing status of the Russia Committee and similar government agencies, see Perrey, 304–8.
14. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (2.3.40)," *YY2389*, 2. Italics are in the original.
15. BA/RFM, "Ein- und Ausfuhrangelegenheiten Deutschland-Russland (28.2.40)," *R 17315*, 2–4.
16. BAMA, *RW 4/v.308*, 85.
17. RWW/Otto Wolff/Rußland, "Röhren (1.3.40)," 72–48–4.
18. Perrey, 319.
19. BAMA, *RW 19/173*, 57.
20. Shirer, *Nightmare Years*, 476.
21. As quoted in Noakes and Pridham, 2: 781.
22. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (14.3.40)," *YY2389*, 1.
23. For Tevossyan's inspection of German turret and armor-plating production procedures, see HA Krupp/FAH, "Betr.: Besuch des Volkskommissars Tevossyan (16.3.40)," *FAH IV C 168*. For general complaints, see PA/Ritter, "Deutsch-sowjetische Wirtschaftsabkommen (22.3.40)," *R 27806*, 324387.
24. RWW/Otto Wolff/Rußland, "Vermerk (9.3.40)," 72–41–5, 1–2.
25. RWW/Otto Wolff/Rußland, "Vermerk (17.3.40)," 72–41–5.
26. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Ringer Telegram (13.3.40)," *R 106000*.
27. BAMA, *RW 19/336*, 158.

28. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (23.3.40)," *YY2389*, 2–3.
29. BA, *R 9/I/635*, 2: 84.
30. PA, *R 106232*, E041765–67.
31. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (23.3.40)," *YY2389*, 2.
32. PA, *R 106232*, E041764.
33. The Soviets appeared particularly eager to acquire various German planes. Stalin even gave Yakovlev special authority to push through an aircraft deal over Tevossyan's objections (Bialer, 118–20).
34. *DGFP*, D, 8: 923–24, doc. 677.
35. PA, *Fach 65*, 3: 357709–11.
36. PA, *R 27806*, 324393–96.
37. PA, *R 27806*, 324391–92.
38. PA, *R 106232*, E041778–81.
39. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 85.
40. PA, *R 106232*, 453132–33, and *DGFP*, D, 9: 59, doc. 32, n. 1.
41. *DGFP*, D, 9: 60, doc. 32. For the slightly longer *WiRüAmt* version of the meeting and more information on the new sub-agency set up to supervise these plans, see BAMA, *RW 19/173*, 29–31.
42. *NSR*, 136.
43. PA, *R 27806*, 324387–88.
44. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 92.
45. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 99–100.
46. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 92 & 100.
47. BA/EfA/Prüfungstelle Maschinenbau, "Allgemeine Ausfuhrangelegenheiten (4.4.40)," *R 9/VIII/7*, 5–7.
48. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 90.
49. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (6.4.40)," *YY2389*.
50. *DGFP*, D, 9: 81–82, doc. 50–51.
51. PA, *R27806*, 324385–86.
52. *DGFP*, D, 9: 110–11, doc. 75.
53. See Appendix A, Tables 1.7 and 1.8, for German and Soviet fulfillment of the various treaty terms. Although by May the Soviets were outpacing the Germans under the February 11 accord, they had fallen significantly behind on the August 19 agreement. Of course, the Germans had failed to include in the August treaty the balancing clause that Stalin had introduced into the February settlement, so they lacked the legal recourse that the Soviets possessed.
54. *NSR*, 139–40, and *DGFP*, D, 9: 106, doc. 70.
55. Appendix A, Tables 1.5 and 1.6.
56. Appendix A, Table 3.5.
57. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schnurre Telegram (29.4.40)," *R 106000*. The Soviets appear to have been very satisfied with their purchase. According to M. I. Gallai, a member of the Soviet commercial mission to Germany, "the airplanes turned out to be really good. They contained what comes only from real combat experience and from no other source: simplicity, accessibility to the mass [-trained] pilot of average skill, and ease of operation. These were planes for *soldiers*" (Bialer, 129).
58. *DGFP*, D, 9: 157–58, doc. 109.

59. Eichler, 140, and BAAP/BM, "Vertretern der deutschen Wirtschaft in Moskau 1940-1941," 09.02/307-8, 16-17. See the rest of this 334-page report for an exhaustive description of the German firms negotiating in Moscow and the contracts they signed.

60. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schmitz Telegram (23.4.40)," R 106000.

61. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (29.4.40)," YY2389, 1-2, and "Kredithilfe bei Lieferungen nach der UdSSR," *Die Ostwirtschaft*, May/June 1940, 53-54.

62. Appendix A, Tables 3.1 and 3.2.

63. See Appendix A, Table 4.2, and BAMA, RW 19/244, 112-13. Schulenburg complained to Molotov on April 27, but the Foreign Commissar put the entire blame on the Japanese (DGFP, D, 9: 249, doc. 175).

64. For oil, see PA, R 106232, E041801-02; for transit trade to the far east, see Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 72-73; and for transit trade to Iran, see PA, R 106232, E041804.

65. BA, R 43/II/1490, 22b.

66. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Busch Telegram (19.4.40)," R 106000.

67. BAMA, RW 19/336, 197 & 210, and BA/RFM, "Ein- und Ausfuhrangelegenheiten Deutschland-Russland (10.4.40)," R 2/17315, 1-2.

68. DGFP, D, 9: 151-52, doc. 105.

69. DGFP, D, 9: 213-14, doc. 146.

70. PA, *Fach 65*, 3: 357727.

71. For one example, see MA/Generaldirektion, "Niederschrift #5 über die Vorstandssitzung vom 15. April 1940," M 12.017, 5: 2.

72. FCNA, 101.

73. Eichler, 139.

74. BA/RfEuL/RfG/Siburg, "Bericht über die Dienstreise nach Moskau (4.5.40)," R 15/VII/46, 1-4.

75. PA, R 106232, 453148-49.

76. BA/RfEuL/RfG/Siburg, "Bericht über die Dienstreise nach Moskau (4.5.40)," R 15/VII/46, 4. For the actual terms of the April 30 grain deal, see BA, R 15/V/43, 4/30/40.

77. PA, R 27806, 324383-84.

78. PA, R 106232, 453160.

79. PA, R 106232, 453156.

80. DGFP, D, 9: 317-18, doc. 229. The Soviet price for German coal was apparently low enough that they could later reexport some of it to the Baltic States at a profit (BAMA, RW 19/244, 139).

81. DGFP, D, 9: 248, doc. 174.

82. BAMA, RW 19/244, 119.

83. BAMA, RW 4/v.308, 117.

84. BAMA, RW 19/206, 73. According to the data in Appendix A, Table 3.3, Germany's two-month reserve of 28,200 tons at the beginning of the war had dropped to 15,800 tons by May. Even worse, natural rubber stocks had plummeted from 17,000 to 6,000 tons.

85. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 98.

86. Watt, *Setting the Scene*, 60.

87. This according to Nikolai Tolstoy as quoted in Andrew and Gordievsky, 251.

88. Appendix A, Table 3.2.

89. Appendix A, Table 3.4.

90. Appendix A, Table 3.5.

91. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (25.7.40)," *YY2389*, 2.
92. Appendix A, Table 5.3.
93. PA, *R 106232*, E041810.
94. PA, *R 106232*, E041809.
95. PA, *R 106232*, E041808, and BAMA/OKH, "Köstring Letter (16.5.40)," *RH 2/2932*, 125–26.
96. Medlicott, 1: 635–37.
97. *DGFP*, D, 9: 412, doc. 300, and PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Telegram to Clodius (31.5.40)," *R 106000*.
98. Appendix A, Table 5.3.
99. *DGFP*, D, 9: 318, doc. 229, n. 4. The negotiators had apparently agreed on the 100 million RM figure (Eichler, 139).
100. BAMA, *RW 19/2814*, 964–65.
101. PA, *R 106232*, E041817. The Germans were very concerned that bad weather or enemy planes would sink the ship and thereby void all the Soviet counterdeliveries. After the cruiser arrived safely in Leningrad, the Germans began to worry that the Soviets were using the outfitting of the ship for industrial espionage—to investigate and later duplicate German construction techniques (PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 97).
102. *DGFP*, D, 9: 454, doc. 332.
103. Förster, *Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft*, 204.

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Chapter 10

Delivering the Goods

With the European balance of power suddenly altered, Soviet interests changed dramatically. Whereas delay had previously allowed the Soviets to wring out the best terms possible, speed was now required to consolidate the economic position already achieved—hence the increasing pace of contract talks. Short-term security interests also became paramount—hence the quiet abandonment of vast construction projects that had already seemed questionable, given the difficulty of resolving issues of technology and timeframes,¹ but now appeared almost worthless.² Finally, the Soviets needed to encourage the Germans to continue their struggle with England—hence some of the upsurge in Soviet deliveries during the summer.³ No sense infuriating your supposed ally.

There was also no sense in appearing weak, however, especially once it became clear that England would stay in the war and that some of Stalin's plan, to play "third-rejoicing" while Germany and the West slugged it out, could be salvaged. Negotiations, therefore, remained difficult throughout the summer as the Soviets continued their often tough bargaining. If Stalin was trying to appease the Germans, as some historians have suggested, there is little evidence of such a policy in the economic relationship. In general, Köstring's reading of the Soviet situation seems accurate. Stalin would remain loyal to the strict terms of his agreements with Germany but would do so only as long as he could gain some advantage from the arrangement.⁴ For the moment, he felt he had the upper hand.

BIG IS BAD, JUNE 10

With complete victory apparently theirs, the Germans were euphoric, and they quickly began planning for their postwar world.⁵ One of the key questions was

what role the USSR would play in the new German *Großraumwirtschaft*. Clodius and Ritter both assumed that the Reich's improved economic situation would offer new leverage over the Soviets and push the USSR into even closer economic partnership as raw-material supplier to the rest of Europe.⁶

The next two weeks seemed to reinforce this German confidence. Having already captured huge stocks of petroleum products in France,⁷ the Germans further buttressed their oil position when on May 29 the Rumanian government chose what it saw as the lesser of two evils and threw in its lot with Hitler.⁸ By June 10 Italy had joined the war, and the Germans' final offensive in France had begun. Despite their still-low rubber stocks, *OKW* and the Ministry of Economics felt so secure that they cancelled the construction of a synthetic-rubber plant at Rattwitz because "cheaper and better natural rubber could be obtained from Singapore."⁹

Such enthusiastic statements, however, would prove wildly optimistic. Already during the first week of June, there were disturbing clouds looming on the horizon. Despite the ongoing Axis military success, the British were able to evacuate more than 300,000 men from Dunkirk. Led by Churchill, these men would continue to resist the German threat, leaving Hitler with no good options to end the war against England quickly.

Just as significant, the Soviets were obviously unwilling to perform the part allotted to them as Germany's raw-material supplier and junior partner. Instead of being passive, they rushed to consolidate their claims in Eastern Europe. By the end of May, the Soviet press had begun attacking Finland once more, this time as a prelude to a move on the Petsamo nickel mines.¹⁰ The Soviets also began tightening the screws on the Baltic states and Rumania.

German-Soviet economic relations similarly reflected the ambivalent Soviet attitude. Although the terms of payment¹¹ and prices largely favored the USSR, and although Schnurre believed that "German-Soviet deliveries were developing satisfactorily,"¹² the Soviets remained intransigent on a variety of issues. Captain von Baumbach, the German Naval Attaché in Moscow, for example, reported "*noticeable cooling off and technical difficulties* on the part of the Russians," which the navy interpreted as a possible attempt to undermine the economic relationship gradually.¹³

Transit deliveries, on the other hand, finally began creeping upwards,¹⁴ and the Soviets even seemed on the verge of shipping twenty tons of Chinese wolfram, a deal that had been in the works since the beginning of the war.¹⁵ But these totals were still far below earlier promises.

The Soviets also agreed to a series of minor contracts on such items as flax, sulphur, manganese, presses, and compressors,¹⁶ but they understandably continued to back away from almost all of the big, long-range projects. German firms increasingly complained about Soviet demands for low prices, quick construction, extended guarantees, and, most important, complete access to German technology. The German firm Krupp maintained that it would go along with such a project (in this case the selling of the Widia Process for hardening

steel) only if the government forced it to and only if the government backed up the contract.¹⁷

These concerns came to a head during an inter-agency meeting on June 7. Ter-Nedden opened the discussion, describing the Soviet attitude since May 10 as somewhat improved but still unacceptable and Soviet methods as difficult, bordering on "chicanery." Nonetheless, with the Soviets already rejecting a Buna (synthetic-rubber) plant, the *Bismarck* plans, and a hydrogenation facility, the German officials felt they might have to prop up some of the remaining negotiations for synthetic-material processes by covering 50 percent of the risk otherwise left to German firms. Surveying the wreckage of these major construction plans, Admiral Witzell concluded that the Soviets had been using these negotiations primarily for military and industrial espionage and had had no real intention of reaching a settlement.¹⁸

BESSARABIA AND BUKOVINA, JUNE 28

Whether they had intended to buy or not, Soviet rejection of these major items essentially torpedoed the entire February treaty arrangement even before it had really gotten under way. Soviet actions also seriously called into question the whole *Großraumwirtschaft* concept, in which the Russians would dutifully supply the Germans with the resources the Reich needed.

While Göring and others were following Ritter and Clodius in building theoretical castles in the fairy-tale land of total German domination,¹⁹ the Soviets continued to recast the economic relationship in a form of their own choosing. Problems with third-party trade,²⁰ Soviet transportation,²¹ terms of payment,²² and long-term German construction projects²³ persisted. At the same time, growing Soviet influence in the Baltics threatened another vital segment of German trade. Schnurre estimated the Baltic shipments in 1940 at 200 million RM in foodstuffs and petroleum products and warned, "The consolidation of Russian influence in these areas will seriously endanger these necessary imports."²⁴ The two sides did tentatively reach a special agreement on 110,000 tons of Soviet manganese in exchange for 55,000 tons of rolled steel,²⁵ but overall trade still lagged behind planned levels.²⁶ The continuing Soviet delays and the continuing distrust on both sides were having their inevitable effect.

In general, the new trade relationship reflected changes in the Soviet military and economy. Having earlier begun massive military reorganization in response to the Finnish disaster, the Politburo now placed the whole economy on a war footing.²⁷ This massive military-industrial effort, however, left even fewer raw materials available for export and less transportation equipment to ship them, a point the Germans were quick to realize.

While the sun still shone and the German armies were still occupied in France, Stalin was also busy making territorial hay. He started in the Baltic, quickly gobbling up already weakened Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. He then sliced off his share of the Rumanian pie. With the Iron Guard taking over

Rumania on the twenty-second, the Soviets apparently decided it was now or never to acquire Bessarabia, a piece of territory assigned to them in the Pact. But the Soviets went even further and demanded the province of Bukovina as well.²⁸ After some sharp words with the Germans,²⁹ Molotov compromised on taking only Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Berlin decided not to intervene and pressured Rumania to go along with the deal,³⁰ which it did on the twenty-eighth.

HITLER TURNS EAST, JULY 21

Having eaten his fill, the *Vozhd* cautiously eyed his German partner to gauge his response. As a result, economic relations in July remained correct but hardly cordial. Although oil, grain, and metal shipments did arrive in roughly the agreed-upon amounts,³¹ overall trade actually declined from June.³² Stalin now promised to buy roughly 6,000 tons of copper and 1,300 tons of rubber from third parties, but the Germans insisted that the USSR fulfill its more substantial earlier agreements.³³ When the Germans asked for the return of the territory in Lithuania assigned to the Reich in the September 28 agreement, Molotov responded that the Soviets now wanted to hold on to the strip of land.³⁴

The two sides did reach agreements on manganese deliveries³⁵ and on telephone and telegraph links.³⁶ But at the same time, German concerns about Soviet actions in the Baltics and Bessarabia/Bukovina and about the potential lost trade in wood and foodstuffs continued to grow.³⁷ Despite general Soviet promises to pay close attention to German economic interests in the newly conquered areas,³⁸ by the twenty-third Molotov had already reduced the planned yearly grain exports from Bessarabia to Germany from 290,000 to 100,000 tons.³⁹

The Germans also wanted the previously offered quick delivery of the remaining 430,000 tons of grain from the May treaty. As usual, the Soviets tried to delay on the details, proposing to ship the grain by November on account of transportation problems.⁴⁰ Because such late shipments would inevitably undermine German negotiations for grain deliveries in 1941, Schnurre swiftly rejected this offer,⁴¹ and no quick understanding was reached.

Of course, the Germans also contributed their share of problems to the economic relationship. Trade dropped off slightly in July,⁴² with the Germans remaining dangerously behind in their accounts under the February treaty.⁴³ The Russia Committee also warned that businesses producing goods for the Soviet Union were starting to lose skilled workers to the military and its efforts.⁴⁴ On the other hand, the Germans had overfulfilled their August 19 obligations, in contrast to the Soviets, who had met only half of their terms.⁴⁵ And the delays in fulfilling the February treaty were largely due to the arduous Soviet negotiating methods. Despite their failings, the Germans, as usual, seem to have had more to complain about in the economic partnership than the Russians.

While Stalin played his familiar waiting game, Hitler groped around, apparently unsure of what to do next. The problem was England and its inexplicable failure to see reason and surrender. That left Hitler with three options

to deal with the British: attack England directly (Operation Sea Lion), attack the empire, or attack its remaining potential allies (namely the Soviet Union).⁴⁶ Few in the German military seemed eager to take on the British navy in the Channel, so the services delayed while Göring chewed up his *Luftwaffe* in viscious fighting against the RAF.

Raeder and others were more eager to slash away at the flanks of the British lion, but this second option would take time, something the Germans might not have with the Soviet Union rearming, the United States leaning toward Great Britain, and the German economy struggling under the weight of increased industrial demand (particularly from France and the Low Countries) on an already shrinking raw-material base. As General Thomas and others had been warning all along, Germany could not survive a long war against major powers.

Far from solving Germany's raw-material problems, as many historians have assumed,⁴⁷ the booty from the new conquests provided only temporary relief and actually made the long-term situation much worse. The Reich was now cut off from much of its remaining overseas trade, a large part of which had come in via neutrals such as Italy and the Netherlands. As a result, German overseas exports plummeted from 222,100 tons in March to 7,600 tons in May.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, the conquered territories only added to the growing demand. Based on 1938 figures, Greater Germany and its sphere of influence lacked, among other items, 500,000 tons of manganese, 3.3 million tons of raw phosphate, 200,000 tons of rubber, and 9.5 million tons of oil!⁴⁹ Conservation and synthetics could make up only some of the difference.⁵⁰ The logical choice to take up the rest of this slack was the USSR, but it remained unwilling and increasingly unable (what with its own military buildup) to provide the enormous amounts required by the Germans.⁵¹

That left a third option, an attack on the Soviet Union, the strategy Hitler, for ideological reasons, preferred anyway. Hitler believed that demolishing the Bolshevik state "would be like a child's game in a sandbox"⁵² and would essentially solve his remaining strategic and economic problems. Germany would secure the raw materials it wanted so badly but was increasingly unlikely to get through trade. Japan would be encouraged to attack the United States. And England would be left completely isolated; it would be forced to surrender.

Even before Germany's increasing difficulties with England in July and August, Hitler and other German leaders appear to have seen this logic and begun moving toward a decision to attack the USSR. Although there is some question about the date, Hitler reportedly told Lt. General von Sodenstern on June 2 that the victories against the Allies "finally freed his hands for his important real task: the showdown with Bolshevism."⁵³ Within two weeks Hitler ordered the army to begin reorganizing, perhaps, as some have suggested, because a somewhat smaller but harder-hitting instrument would be better geared to fight a great mobile campaign in the east while the navy and air force handled the short-term English problem.⁵⁴ At approximately the same time, but on his own initiative, Chief of Staff Halder started planning and restructuring for "a vigorous defense" of the east.⁵⁵

Halder intensified his efforts in July after hearing from Weizsäcker that

Hitler, too, was looking eastward.⁵⁶ So far, however, the military was considering only a quick strike designed to intimidate and not a full-fledged campaign designed to conquer.⁵⁷ Halder himself would argue later in the month that “we should keep on friendly terms with Russia.”⁵⁸ Nonetheless, by the twenty-first planning had gone far enough that Army Commander-in-Chief Brauchitsch would propose a major action against the USSR in the fall. Hitler readily agreed.⁵⁹

Since some of these preparations for an eastern offensive were obviously a response to strategic concerns that the Soviets remained an unreliable source of vital raw materials and a major threat to other resources such as Rumania’s oil,⁶⁰ historians have asked whether a more conciliatory policy on trade relations could have delayed the German decision to invade. McSherry, for one, argues that Hitler’s decision to attack came rather late and as a result of Soviet intransigence. Therefore, a policy of economic and political appeasement “could probably have delayed the attack on the Soviet Union for at least a year.”⁶¹

This author is unconvinced. None of the earlier attempts to appease Hitler had diverted his blows—just the opposite. Especially in the case of the outwardly weak USSR, Hitler seemed bent on conquering his *Lebensraum* the first chance he got. Germany needed the resources to fight her war in the short term and the land to build her empire in the long term. And now was the time, or at least so the *Führer* apparently believed.

Many in the military appear to have reached similar conclusions. A few in the military may have been convinced to invade by the difficult economic negotiations, but such concerns were by no means decisive. During the preceding year, practically every major study on the subject had argued that Soviet economic aid could be significant, perhaps even vital, but not overwhelming. Even if Stalin had wanted to appease Germany, he could never have supplied enough raw materials to cover all the holes in the German war economy. Having already approached the limits of their “total war of improvisation,” even the most cautious military leaders had to look toward an invasion of the Soviet Union to help alleviate their resource demands. Besides, the Germans assumed they would have an easy time of it against a foe who could barely handle the Finns.

STALIN TURNS WEST, AUGUST 6

Given the thinking of Germany’s military leaders, it should come as no surprise that Hitler’s planned eastern campaign found only limited opposition, especially once the proposed 1940 invasion was pushed back to 1941. By the twenty-eighth the military had agreed to rebuild the German army to 180 divisions before next May;⁶² by the twenty-ninth Jodl had informed his staff of Hitler’s intention to attack;⁶³ and by the thirty-first Hitler had officially laid down his plan to crush the USSR in the spring of 1941.⁶⁴ Of course, this decision could still be overturned pending developments in the struggle with England, but Hitler’s preferred strategy was clear.⁶⁵

At the same time that Germany was secretly shifting its gaze eastward, Stalin

continued his very public moves westward. As July ended Molotov informed Schulenburg that Germany's future economic relations with the Baltics would be redirected to Moscow, though he again promised to safeguard German property interests.⁶⁶ During the next week the Baltics were officially incorporated into the USSR. After a few breathless moments in June and July, Stalin now appeared to have regained his confidence that Germany was still too enmeshed in the west and too dependent on Soviet resources and good will to wage war in the east.⁶⁷

While these political positions were hardening, the stream of goods from the Soviet Union to Germany continued to flow through the prescribed channels, jumping from 26.6 million RM in July to 67.6 million RM in August.⁶⁸ Schnurre in particular seemed pleased with these figures, arguing that "German-Soviet trade has developed altogether quite satisfactorily since conclusion of the new basic agreements." He further contended "that especially in the past two months the Soviet Government has made considerable efforts in transportation and production to accomplish deliveries of raw materials [grain, petroleum, cotton, mine timber, and metals] urgently needed by us."⁶⁹

Even Schnurre, however, admitted that there were still problems plaguing the economic relationship. Trade was already reaching the limits of what the transportation networks could carry, though some still hoped that inland waterways might be able to ease the load.⁷⁰ Even more troublesome was the growing trade imbalance in the February 11 clearing accounts, "primarily due to the very difficult negotiation procedure and the general slowness of the Russian agents."⁷¹

Recent examples of such Soviet methods included a series of demands levied on Krupp *after* contracts had already been signed to supply the Widia Process for steel-hardening. Only following considerable government pressure did Krupp agree to stay in the negotiations.⁷² Krupp officials explained to the Soviets that the firm's licensing fees were only 4 percent in contrast to the Americans at 30 percent, but the delays and price demands continued.⁷³ The Soviets also held tough on compensation for the assets of the Bessarabian *Volksdeutsche*. All property was confiscated, and these ethnic Germans were allowed to keep only those belongings they could physically carry with them out of the country.⁷⁴

Nonetheless, despite Soviet responsibility for most of the growing German deficit under the February treaty terms and a huge Soviet shortfall under the provisions of August 19, Schnurre feared that the current overall imbalance might jeopardize future negotiations and deliveries. He was right.

NOTES

1. For another example of the reluctance of German businesses to "give away" their technology to the Soviets, see HA Krupp/Werksarchiv/Dr. Janssen, "Besprechungen mit Regierungsrat Mussfeld (16.5.40)," *WA VII f 1404 I*, 1-2.

2. Although having already reached a 25 million RM agreement with Otto Wolff for the Wesseling synthetic fuel plant on May 14 and shown themselves interested in similar projects, the Soviets now began backing out of further discussions on synthetic-

material facilities. See RWW/Otto Wolff/Rußland, "Gasper Letters (14.5.40 & 30.5.40)," 72–41–5.

3. Soviet exports to Germany rose from 21.1 million RM to 67.6 million RM during this period (Appendix A, Table 1.5).

4. BAMA, *RW 2/2932*, 125.

5. Rolf-Dieter Müller, "Von der Wirtschaftsallianz zum kolonialen Ausbeutungskrieg," in *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion*, vol. 4 of *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), 107–8.

6. *DGFP*, D, 9: 476–77, doc. 354, and 496–501, doc. 367.

7. USSBS, *Oil, Final Report*, 25b, estimates that 745,000 tons were confiscated. Other figures put the total as high as 1.5 million tons.

8. Beloff, 2: 324.

9. USSBS, *Rubber*, 41.

10. Instead of allowing the Soviets free rein as they had done before, the Germans came to the aid of Finland. The Soviets were clearly unhappy about the changed German attitude in Scandinavia, but a compromise settlement was worked out whereby the Finns promised 60 percent of then Petsamo nickel to Germany and 40 percent to the USSR. For the whole issue of Soviet-German competition in Finland during the summer of 1940, see Gerd Ueberschär, "Die Einbeziehung Skandinaviens in die Planung 'Barbarossa,'" in *Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion*, vol. 4 of *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), 371–74.

11. While German firms had to pay in advance for Soviet goods, the Soviets did not have to pay until they received their shipments, in other words, about thirty to forty days later than their German counterparts. See BA/RFM, "Übersichten über den deutsch-russischen Waren- und Zahlungsverkehr," *R 2/17307*, 2.

12. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 156. Lt. Col. Drews and other German officials, however, described the Russian deliveries to Germany as "unsatisfactory," especially shipments of promised metals.

13. *NC&A*, 6: 984. Emphasis is in original.

14. See Appendix A, Table 4.2.

15. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 155–56.

16. Eichler, 141, and Appendix A, Table 5.3.

17. HA Krupp/Werksarchiv, "Betrifft: Steuerliche Behandlung des Erlöses aus dem Verkauf von Erfahrungen nach Rußland (3.6.40)," *WA VII f 1445*, 1–5.

18. BA/RFM, "Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Interministeriellen Ausschusses vom 7. Juni 1940," *R 2/17315*, 1–3. See also BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 165.

19. *DGFP*, D, 9: 115, doc. 103, and BAAP/RWM, "Aufbau der europäischen Wirtschaft nach dem Kriege: Rohstoffversorgung der Großbraumwirtschaft 1940–1942," *R 7/592*.

20. PA, *R 106232*, 453181.

21. See, for example, Schnurre's June 13 complaint about Soviet failure to unload German coal freighters waiting in Leningrad (PA, *R 106232*, E041822).

22. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (22.6.40)," *YY2389*, 1.

23. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 171.

24. *NSR*, 153. In addition to this annual trade, the *WiRuAmt* estimated that Germans held 200 million RM of investment capital in the Baltic states (BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 184–85).

25. PA, *R 106232*, E041825.

26. Appendix A, Tables 1.7 and 1.8.
27. Louis Rotundo, "Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941," *Journal of Contemporary History* 24 (1989): 280.
28. Dallin, *Foreign Policy*, 235–36.
29. *NSR*, 158.
30. *NSR*, 163.
31. BAMA, *RW 4/v.308*, 155.
32. Appendix A, Tables 1.5 and 1.6.
33. PA, *R 106232*, 453190–96.
34. *DGFP*, D, 10: 201, doc. 162. See also Bronis J. Kaslas, "The Lithuanian Strip in Soviet-German Secret Diplomacy, 1939–41," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 4, no. 3 (1973): 218.
35. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 190.
36. Eichler, 156.
37. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 190, and PA, *R 106232*, E041833.
38. PA, *R 106232*, E041837.
39. PA, *R 106232*, E041848.
40. PA, *R 106232*, E041840.
41. PA, *R 106232*, E041843–44.
42. Appendix A, Table 1.6.
43. Appendix A, Table 1.7. Molotov noted the discrepancy during his July 16 meeting with Schulenburg (PA, *R 106232*, E041840).
44. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (11.7.40)," *YY2389*, 1.
45. Appendix A, Tables 1.7 and 1.8.
46. Noakes and Pridham, 2: 791–93.
47. See Philbin, 115, for an example.
48. Appendix A, Table 4.2.
49. BA/SR/RfWP, "Die Mangelstoffe des mitteleuropäisch-großdeutschen Wirtschaftsraumes (Juni 1940)," *R 24/24*, 154–73. These conclusions were reinforced by a series of later reports. See, for instance, BA/SR/RfWP, "Rohstoffversorgung des mitteleuropäisch-großdeutschen Wirtschaftsraumes (Juli 1940)," *R 24/24*; and BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Ro/Dr. Friedensburg, "Die deutsche Roh- und Treibstofflage 1939–1940," *Wi/IF5.2199*.
50. They did, nonetheless, impose tight restrictions whenever possible. The oil allotment to the Benelux countries, for example, was slashed from 200,000 to 60,000 barrels a day, barely enough for industries to stay open (Goralski and Freeburg, 63).
51. For the Ministry of Economic Warfare evaluation supporting this argument, see Medlicott, 1: 419–21. For German military thinking on this question, see Müller, *Wirtschaftsallianz*, 111–13.
52. Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York: Avon, 1971), 238.
53. See Jürgen Förster's analysis in "Fünfzig Jahre danach: Ein historischer Rückblick auf das 'Unternehmen Barbarossa,'" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 7 June 1991, 13.
54. Thomas, 406–7, and Leach, *German Strategy*, 49–50.
55. Leach, *German Strategy*, 112.
56. Leach, *German Strategy*, 112.

57. See, for example, Robert Cecil, who downplays these early army preparations and emphasizes Hitler as the driving force behind the more extensive campaign plans (Cecil, 83–84).

58. Halder, 240–41.

59. Halder, 231–32.

60. See Norman Rich, *Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State and the Course of Expansion* (New York: Norton, 1973), 206–7, for a discussion of the Soviet threat to Germany's war economy.

61. McSherry, 2: 248.

62. Förster, *Fünfzig Jahre danach*, 15.

63. *NC&A*, 5: 741.

64. Halder, 244–45.

65. For the original version of this now widely accepted view, see Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 114–16. For a more recent rebuttal to this argument, see H.W. Koch, "Operation Barbarossa—The Current State of the Debate," *The Historical Journal*, 31, no. 2 (June 1988): 377–90.

66. *DGFP*, D, 10: 350, doc. 251.

67. This, at least, was the story high-level Soviets were circulating at the beginning of August. See BA, *NS 43/37*, 215–19.

68. Appendix A, Table 1.5.

69. *DGFP*, D, 10: 270, doc. 206.

70. Institut für Konjunkturforschung, "Die Bedeutung des Bug-Dnjepr-Kanals," *Die Wirtschaft der UdSSR* 3 (March 1941): 4.

71. *DGFP*, D, 10: 270, doc. 206. Schnurre later chided the military and business leaders for being partly to blame for the delays in German counterdeliveries (BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 198).

72. HA Krupp/Werksarchiv, "Letter to Oberregierungsrat Dr. Liptau, Finanzamt Essen-Nord (25.7.40)," *WA VII f 1445*, 1–2.

73. HA Krupp/Werksarchiv, "Memorandum der UdSSR über Preise für deutsche Kriegsgerät-Lieferungen (15.8.40)," *WA VII f 1445*, 1–2.

74. BAMA, *RH 2/2932*, 156.

Chapter 11

New Problems Addressed

With Stalin turning west and Hitler east and with both fairly confident that they held the better cards, a clash of interests was inevitable. Sure enough, the fall of 1940 would see a series of disputes between the two sides over territorial and economic questions. In the troubled trade relationship, the parties added a whole list of new issues to bicker over: trade balances, the Lithuanian strip, compensation for lost property, trade with conquered territories, and treaty terms for the second year of the February agreement. In all cases the traditional pattern continued. The Germans pushed for a quick settlement on their terms but had to relent when the Soviets turned up the pressure. Only this time, the Germans responded with more than just contracts and deliveries; they retaliated with war plans and military preparations.

THE DELICATE BALANCE, SEPTEMBER 12

Despite the relatively quiet summer of economic deliveries and mostly correct economic behavior and despite the continuing outward appearance of cooperation as exemplified by Soviet participation in the Königsberg and Leipzig trade shows¹ and the opening of new consulates in both countries,² the tension in German-Soviet trade negotiations began building once again. The first major issue on the table and the one that would almost destroy the economic relationship was, as Schnurre had feared, the growing German trade deficit under the February accord. The Germans examined the issue at an inter-agency meeting on August 8. For the same reasons presented earlier by Schnurre and Ritter, Ter-Nedden argued that “the German delivery deficit is due not to any fault on the German side, but goes back exclusively to the behavior of the Soviet side.”³ In particular, he explained

that Soviet delays and cancellations of long-term projects accounted already for roughly 100 million RM, much more than the current imbalance.

Further evidence of German good will could be found in the execution of the August 19 treaty. By the end of August, when the half-way point of the two-year arrangement had been reached, the Germans had already fulfilled 55 percent of the trade terms in contrast to the Soviets at only 31.2 percent of their trade requirements. Unsurprisingly, the Soviets were taking even greater advantage of the credit arrangements of the August 19 treaty. After one year the USSR had already used up 76.1 percent of its allotted total for which final repayment was not due for seven years.⁴ But Stalin ignored these statistics and started pressing the Germans on their February treaty deficit.

Trade balances, however, were far from the only issue plaguing the partnership. While the Soviets were incorporating the Baltics, the Germans brought up the still unresolved issue of the Lithuanian Strip and asked for a *quid pro quo*. By the twelfth the Soviets had offered \$3.86 million in gold or raw materials over two years.⁵ To show they were serious, they then strengthened their occupation forces in the Strip on the twentieth. In response, the Germans upped the ante and asked for 54 million RM (\$13 million) or 2.5 million tons of grain on the grounds that similar land in Prussia would cost 254 million RM.⁶ The Soviets, in turn, demanded greater access to the port of Memel,⁷ a move that the Germans forestalled by increasing their own military forces in the region. Trying to put an end to this escalating game of tit-for-tat, Ribbentrop met with Skvartsev on September 2. Despite the resulting German agreement on the tenth to sell the land, however, the two sides still remained far apart on prices.⁸

How to handle the occupied territories also proved perplexing, especially since the Germans had in the past been able to blackmail Eastern European states into economic terms favoring the Reich. Now these states were dominated by the USSR, and the Germans would have to pay Soviet prices for these same goods. In the case of the Baltics, Molotov proposed a bilateral commission to arbitrate property questions.⁹ But Schnurre was concerned that such an arrangement would lead to interminable delays and he requested to have this issue separated from the rest of his economic negotiations.¹⁰ Nonetheless, the Germans did press ahead with resettling many of the *Volksdeutsche* who still lived in the region.¹¹

In the case of Bessarabia, the Germans wanted at least 100,000 tons of the grain for which they had previously contracted, they wanted German property guaranteed, and they wanted the train tracks left alone to facilitate German oil shipments. Molotov stalled on the first,¹² proposed another bilateral commission to handle the second,¹³ and on the third promised not to broaden the rail line.¹⁴ By the twenty-third, however, Schnurre was already complaining about stoppages due to Soviet renailing.¹⁵ It was Poland all over again.

While the German negotiators talked, the Battle of Britain turned against the Reich. With the English option closed, the German military intensified its planning for an eastern campaign, despite some early warning signs that the invasion of Russia might not be the economic boon for which many were hoping.¹⁶

The Germans vetoed a proposed Soviet-Italian understanding,¹⁷ started building up their forces in Poland (*Aufbau Ost*), organized camouflage operations, sent troops to Finland, and funneled more forces into Rumania.¹⁸

Economic preparations were also under way as the Germans strove to build up a 180-division army. Of course, with more equipment going to the military, there would be even less to send to the USSR. Thus Göring informed Thomas on August 14 "that the Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands."¹⁹ The Germans were confident indeed. They were not confident enough, however, to let the Foreign Ministry officially in on the plan, though it does appear that Ribbentrop and company had a pretty good idea of what was in store.²⁰

Further economic measures included the reauthorization of construction on a third synthetic-rubber plant.²¹ Since the cancellation of the earlier plans had been justified at the time by the availability of rubber via the Soviet Union, new preparations for expanded domestic production meant that German officials no longer counted on Trans-Siberian shipments.

Of course, these measures and the increasingly inflexible policy behind them helped escalate tensions in Eastern Europe and undermine the Foreign Ministry and Russia Committee policy of closer relations with the USSR.²² The growing problems in the economic relationship came to a head when Schnurre, Ter-Nedden, and company left for Moscow on August 24 to start talks about trade deficits and economic arrangements in the occupied territories.²³

Negotiations on the latter issue made only limited progress. An agreement allowing the 125,000 *Volksdeutsche* in Bessarabia and Bukovina to resettle under terms similar to those in the earlier Baltic treaty was reached on September 5,²⁴ but the other issues remained unresolved. Ribbentrop even cabled Schnurre that he should bypass the issue of compensation for the Lithuanian Strip so that the subject could be handled separately and at a later time.²⁵

More important, Schnurre's conversations with Mikoyan on the trade deficit, despite some initial optimism and cordiality, were going nowhere.²⁶ The two sides could not even agree on the numbers, the Soviets claiming that the Germans owed 73 million RM under the terms of the February treaty and the Germans admitting at most to a 60 million RM debt. Schnurre blamed the Soviets for the deficit; Mikoyan blamed the Germans. Schnurre proposed that the Soviets reinstate their orders for major projects and other items; Mikoyan threatened to cut back Soviet shipments to Germany until the accounts balanced.²⁷ In fact, oil shipments had already dropped during the first two weeks of September.²⁸ When a second round of talks also resulted in deadlock,²⁹ the Soviets began turning off the spigot. Stalin obviously meant business.

RIDING THE RAILS, OCTOBER 1

While Schnurre returned to Berlin and the Germans examined the Soviet demands,³⁰ Stalin continued to use the trade imbalance as economic leverage.³¹

Overall trade began falling off, and oil shipments in particular slowed dramatically from 104,100 tons in August to 51,100 tons in September.³² Soon the Germans were complaining that the Soviets were holding up both rail and naval shipments. The USSR had closed down the Baltic route; previous orders had been delayed in Batum and Constanza; and no new shipments had been sent for almost two weeks.³³

The Soviets also tightened the screws in other parts of their trade relationship. They halted shipments from Manchuria, for example, claiming that the plague had broken out in that region, an assertion no other country seemed able to verify.³⁴ They also threatened to cancel German shale-oil contracts with Estonia because of the Reich's growing deficit with that state.³⁵

The economic balance of power in the trade partnership still clearly favored the Soviet Union. Despite its military successes, Germany's overall import situation had continued to deteriorate, leaving Hitler with the option of scaling back his military buildup to boost trade with the USSR or conquering the eastern *Lebensraum* to loot and pillage it.³⁶ He, in part for ideological reasons, and the German military, mainly for strategic reasons, chose the latter.

Growing doubts about Soviet ability or willingness to supply Germany with the raw materials necessary for a long war apparently strengthened the German resolve to attack come spring. Yet another *WiRuAmt* study on Soviet export capacity pointed to the USSR's limited potential to meet German needs. The study did imply that the government could squeeze out substantial quantities given the necessary political will, but that such action would require a more cooperative and efficient regime than currently in power.³⁷ Although there were some dissenters,³⁸ most German military leaders reached what appeared to be the obvious conclusion—conquer the country and establish a system that could extract the resources Germany needed.

In the meantime, however, German preparations for war only exacerbated the already growing economic tensions. Changes in the German priority system put armaments once again above Russian deliveries as plans for the 180-division army were launched.³⁹ As a result, labor started to run short for Soviet export production.⁴⁰

The Foreign Office tried to counter the trend toward armed conflict with the USSR by sharpening its argument in favor of a diplomatic settlement with the Soviet Union and renewed attacks against the British Empire. But these two halves of Ribbentrop's proposed policy were frequently at odds with each other. The September 27 signing of the Tripartite Pact with Italy and Japan, for instance, may have threatened Great Britain and the United States, but it also appeared decidedly unfriendly toward the Soviet Union.⁴¹

While Ribbentrop was off trying to organize an anti-capitalist alliance, Schnurre was spearheading the assault on the proposed invasion schemes. Having sometimes discounted the overall contribution that the USSR could or would make to the German war economy and having often put the blame on the Soviet Union for the various problems in the negotiations, Schnurre had by now caught wind of

the attack plans and was increasingly concerned that the growing anti-Soviet mood would jeopardize the laboriously constructed economic understanding. Schnurre therefore requested on September 26 that Hitler reinstate the top-level priority previously given to exports to the USSR. Without such a decision, Schnurre warned, "it will be impossible to balance the considerable deficit already existing in German deliveries. On the contrary, a further great lag in German deliveries must be expected."⁴²

Schnurre extended his analysis in an even longer memorandum on the twenty-eighth. After reviewing the recent history of the negotiations and explaining the problem posed by the new armaments priorities, Schnurre argued that "supplies from the Russians have heretofore been a very substantial prop to the German war economy" and that a cutoff would severely damage the Reich.⁴³

What signs of hope there were for the economic relationship remained limited and contradictory. The Soviets, for example, did continue to show some interest in small-scale synthetic-material plants,⁴⁴ but they also formally announced their already months-old policy of rejecting all long-term projects.⁴⁵ Work on the ex-*Lützow*, now renamed *Petropavlovsk*, progressed according to plan, but the Soviets still protested repeatedly about training schedules and other technical details.⁴⁶

More important, the two sides did sign a series of new transit treaties on October 1 to replace the temporary agreements from the previous December.⁴⁷ Even here, however, the road had not been smooth. The Soviet delegation dealing with rail negotiations had left for Berlin on August 20, bringing with them a two-hundred-page proposal! As always, the Germans were soon complaining that the Soviets were reserved and mistrustful and that the negotiations were moving slowly.⁴⁸ A whole host of problems came up: the route for the Berlin-Moscow rail link, reloading at border stations, the forming of a general transit commission, Soviet bureaucratic obstruction and incompetence, and the renailing of rail lines in Bessarabia.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, after the usual rounds of bickering, the Germans eventually agreed to most of the Soviet demands, and the deal was done.

ONCE MORE INTO THE BREECH, OCTOBER 28

Just as in the previous year's negotiations, however, the signing of a transit treaty was a prelude not to friendly discussions but to long and difficult bargaining. Also familiar was the gradual evolution of German economic policy to fit Soviet demands as the Germans realized that their still extensive reliance on Soviet shipments required that they compromise with the USSR.⁵⁰ But not everyone in Germany was so convinced. In fact, the leadership remained split between those pushing for an invasion and those arguing for closer relations with the USSR.

While the Germans waffled, the Soviets kept the economic pressure on. Overall Soviet exports to the Reich, for example, had dropped from a high of 94.6 million RM to 28 million RM in November,⁵¹ and German complaints about oil shipments⁵² and transit trade⁵³ continued unabated. The Soviets also delayed their

final approval of the train treaties for more than two weeks⁵⁴ and quickly lost interest in the initially promising talks about small synthetic-fuel plants.⁵⁵

At the same time, the Russians continued their nationalization of the occupied territories⁵⁶ and began digging in their heels on questions of compensation for *Volksdeutsche* property. Instead of allowing for the full indemnification that the Germans had expected, the USSR suddenly imposed greater restrictions on the amounts and kinds of wealth that could be taken out of the country⁵⁷ and drastically limited the totals that the USSR would apply toward the Reich's clearing accounts.⁵⁸

The Foreign Ministry and its allies in the Economics Ministry and the Navy used the continuing economic difficulties to press for closer relations with the Soviet Union. On October 4, while Hitler was off entertaining Mussolini at the Brenner Pass, Göring met with various high-ranking officials to sort out German policy. Stalin had effectively vetoed the August plan to raise the priority of military production above that of Soviet exports. But Thomas and Admiral Witzell continued to argue against Schnurre's scheme to reinstate the old priority system. Göring compromised between the two positions and included some but not all of the Soviet items in the highest (Ia) priority ranking.⁵⁹ After referring this decision to Hitler, Göring implemented his new strategy by mid-month.⁶⁰

Having achieved at least a change in German tactics if not yet a change in overall strategy, the opponents of a war against the Soviet Union continued to make their case against the proposed invasion. In his October 14 meeting with Hitler, for example, Raeder argued that the USSR "will not attempt to attack in the next few years, since she is at present building up her Navy with the assistance of Germany."⁶¹ Not only would the Soviet Union not attack, but members of the Moscow Embassy tried to convince Halder that a German-initiated war in the east could not be won quickly and that the resulting occupation of Western Russia would create "more of a drain than a relief for Germany's economic situation."⁶²

If the Soviet Union was not a short-term threat and if an invasion would only hurt Germany, why not work for closer relations? Thinking along these lines, Ribbentrop invited Molotov to visit Berlin with the prospect of forming a grand alliance against the Anglo-Saxon powers.⁶³ Although not necessarily agreeing to Ribbentrop's proposed agenda, Stalin did assent to Molotov's venture outside the confines of Mother Russia.⁶⁴

Now that Hitler had tentatively agreed to meet Soviet economic demands and Molotov had agreed to travel to Berlin, Schnurre was free to return to Moscow and continue the economic talks. Ritter had requested on October 5,⁶⁵ the Soviets had accepted on October 7,⁶⁶ and the Germans had reconfirmed on October 10⁶⁷ plans for Schnurre to fly to the Soviet capital in the next few days. But the Germans had apparently needed more time to resolve their differences, and only on the twenty-eighth did Schnurre, accompanied by fifteen other delegates,⁶⁸ depart for what the Germans feared would be a chilly reception in a snow-covered Moscow.⁶⁹

NOTES

1. See Hans Jonas, "Die Transit-Aufgaben der Deutschen Ostmesse, *Ost-Europa-Markt*, Jul/Aug 1940, 161–67; and "Die 28. Deutsche Ostmesse—Die UdSSR auf der Ostmesse und der Leipziger Herbstmesse," *Die Ostwirtschaft*, August 1940, 88–89.
2. Eichler, 156.
3. BA/RFM, "Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Interministeriellen Ausschusses vom 8.8.40," *R 2/17315*, 2.
4. BA/RFM, "Niederschrift (8.8.40)," *R 2/17315*, 2–5. For the specific figures, see Appendix A, Tables 1.7 and 1.8.
5. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Abtretung litauischen Gebietsstreifens (12.8.40)," *R 106001*. See also *NSR*, 176, where Schulenburg notes that the Soviets had apparently derived this figure by taking half of what the Russians had received from the United States for Alaska.
6. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Ribbentrop Telegram (31.8.40)," *R 106001*, 3.
7. PA, *Fach 65*, 3: 357796–97 & 357802–3.
8. For a more detailed discussion of these events, see Kaslas, 219–20.
9. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Deutsche Interessen in den Baltenstaaten (8.8.40)," *R 106001*.
10. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schnurre Letter (9.8.40)," *R 106001*.
11. *DGFP*, D, 10: 551–52, doc. 398.
12. PA, *R 106232*, E041856.
13. PA, *R 106232*, E041858.
14. PA, *R 106232*, E041872.
15. PA, *R 106232*, E041882.
16. Müller, *Wirtschaftsallianz*, 114.
17. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 96.
18. For these and other German moves in August, see Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 125–34.
19. *NC&A*, 4: 1082.
20. See, for example, Schnurre's meetings with Göring in September and October where the Field Marshall reassured Schnurre of his support for closer economic relations with the USSR but requested that Schnurre delay further negotiations because of the political climate. For a more detailed description of these events, see PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 103–5, and PA, *R 106232*, E041944.
21. USSBS, *Oil, Final Report*, 49.
22. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 172.
23. See the notice in *Ostwirtschaft*, August 1940, 87. The Germans had apparently asked for and received a postponement until August 28 but must have changed their minds (PA, *R 106232*, E041873).
24. PA/HaPol/Schnurre, "Vereinbarung . . . über die Umsiedlung der deutschstämmigen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten von Bessarabien und der Nördlichen Bukowina in das Deutsche Reich (5.9.40)," *R 105315*, 1–43. The remaining property was to be estimated by a German-Soviet commission and made good from Soviet clearing accounts over the next ten years (BAMA, *RW 45/14*, 3: 118–19).
25. PA, *R 106232*, E041883.
26. PA, *R 106232*, 453222.
27. PA, *R 106232*, E041886–87.
28. PA, *R 106232*, E041909, and BAMA, *RW 19/338*, 56 & 76.

29. PA, *R 106232*, 453227–41.
30. PA/DR, “UdSSR 1939–1941,” *R 27168*, 25908, and BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 260.
31. Ter-Nedden, Drews and most of the German leadership continued to blame the Soviets for most of the difficulties (BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 260, and BAMA, *RW 45/14*, 3: 107–8), but Köstring decided that some fault also lay with German officials for overestimating the Reich’s potential to supply the Soviet Union (BAMA, *RH 2/2932*, 169–70).
32. Appendix A, Table 3.1.
33. BAMA, *RW 19/2814*, J005945; BAMA, *RW 19/2715*, J015252–54; and BAAP/BM, “Wiehl Telegram (12.9.40),” *09.02/308*.
34. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 248–49.
35. PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Tippelskirch Telegram (23.9.40),” *R 106001*. The Germans responded that German-Estonian trade was based on 3 to 6 month credits and would automatically right itself (PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Behr Telegram [27.9.40],” *R 106001*).
36. Hans-Erich Volkmann, “N-S Aussenhandel im ‘geschlossenen’ Kriegswirtschaftsraum 1939–1941,” in *Wirtschaft und Rüstung 1939–1945*, eds. Friedrich Forstmeier and Hans-Erich Volkmann (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1977), 100.
37. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Geheim/Institut für Konjunkturforschung, “Ausfuhrmöglichkeiten für die Erzeugnisse des sowjetrussischen Bergbaus (Sept. 1940),” *RW 19/Anhang I/1135*, 33–35. As with earlier studies of this nature, the results were based on data from 1938, making these and future conclusions somewhat questionable. As the more optimistic members of the Russia Committee had been arguing, since the purges had artificially reduced Soviet economic performance from 1936 to 1938, there was a chance that the USSR’s economy could now handle more and not less trade. But this was pure speculation, and the growing Soviet military buildup had probably swallowed up the excess production and then some.
38. Müller, *Wirtschaftsallianz*, 115–17.
39. BAMA, *RW 19/205*, 24, and Zeidler, 103.
40. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 262 & 273.
41. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 135–36.
42. *NSR*, 197.
43. *NSR*, 201.
44. RWW/Otto Wolff/RuBland, “Aktenvermerk (18.9.40),” 72–41–5.
45. *NSR*, 201.
46. Philbin, 122–23.
47. For the 126-page text of the treaty, see BA/RfEuL/RfF, “Deutsch-Sowjetisches Eisenbahn- und Grenzabkommen,” *R 15/V/120*.
48. PA, *R 106232*, E041889–90 & E041918–19, and PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Hecking Telegram (20.8.40),” *R 106001*.
49. PA, *R 106232*, E041889–90, and BA/RfEuL/RfG, “Letter to AA (31.8.40),” *R 15/VII/46*, and BAMA, *RW 4/v.308*, 179–80.
50. As a result of growing demand from the military, Italy, and the occupied territories, and lower-than-expected production of synthetics, rubber was now added to the list of materials such as grain, oil, and manganese for which the Germans were increasingly reliant on Soviet deliveries (BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 80, and BAMA, *RW 19/205*, 18–19).
51. Appendix A, Table 1.5.
52. BAMA, *RW 19/2814*, J005949–51, and BAMA, *RW 19/338*, 88. Note that an earthquake in Rumania had added to the backlog in Constanza.

53. PA, *R 106232*, E041937 & E041940. An October 4 *WiRuAmt* meeting mentioned that Italy too now wanted access to this tenuous Trans-Siberian route to compensate for trade lost after its entry into the war (BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 289).
54. PA, *R 106232*, E041945.
55. RWW/Otto Wolff/Rußland, "Siedersleben Letter (12.10.40); Martin Letter (31.10.40); and Olpe Aktennotiz (1.12.40)," 72–41–5.
56. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (3.10.40)," *YY2389*.
57. PA, *R 106232*, 453268 & E041946–47.
58. *DGFP*, D, 11: 278, doc. 168, and 11: 336–37, doc. 202.
59. BAMA, *RW 19/176*, 109–11.
60. BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 80, and BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 306–9.
61. *FCNA*, 153.
62. PA/Etzdorf, "Walter Letter (10.10.40)," *R 27334*. For an analysis of this letter and its meaning for the internal German debates over Operation Barbarossa, see Robert J. Gibbons, "Opposition gegen 'Barbarossa' im Herbst 1940. Eine Denkschrift aus der Deutschen Botschaft in Moskau," *Vierteljahrsheft für Zeitgeschichte* 23 (1975): 332–40.
63. *NSR*, 213.
64. *NSR*, 216.
65. PA, *R 106232*, E041929.
66. PA, *R 106232*, 453264.
67. *DGFP*, D, 11: 279–80, doc. 170.
68. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Walter Telegram (28.10.40)," *R 106001*.
69. BAMA, *RW 45/14*, 3:58.

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Chapter 12

The Final Plan: Part II

With Schnurre's arrival in Russia, the elaborate negotiations to balance the 1940 economic treaty and sign the 1941 economic treaty began in earnest. Though less difficult because less novel, this year's bargaining process remained fairly arduous. The terms of the forthcoming treaty also remained more favorable to the Soviet Union. Even the delivery totals turned to the Soviet advantage as the naturally longer-term German contracts were completed and as Göring's compromise policy was implemented. In fact, German shipments roughly equaled or surpassed Soviet deliveries from now until almost the beginning of Barbarossa.¹ And Germany's fulfillment of the August 19 terms continued to outpace that of the Soviet Union.²

Despite these outward signs of German cooperation with Soviet plans and the Foreign Office's continuing efforts to maintain normal relations, Hitler's strategy remained decidedly anti-Soviet, and the German military continued its preparations for war. Far from enticing the *Führer* into closer ties, the ongoing economic and political discussions with the USSR seem to have convinced Hitler that he must attack.

MOLOTOV PAYS A VISIT, NOVEMBER 12–14

The visit of Vyacheslav Molotov was a dramatic case in point. Designed by Ribbentrop to bring the sides closer together, it merely reconfirmed Hitler in his belief that he must attack the USSR as soon as possible. Coming in the second week of November, Molotov's visit was preceded by two moderately successful weeks of economic negotiations in Moscow. Or, as Schnurre explained on the sixth, "things here are slow and difficult, but not unfavorable."³

In this first phase, both sides seemed tentatively willing to compromise.

Schnurre, Hilger, Schulenburg, and a few others were very eager to settle with the USSR, in part because this would strengthen their argument against Hitler's anti-Soviet policy. According to Köstring, they appeared hopeful that "the negotiations will end in peace and friendship since Göring has placed the Russian supplies on the same level as the military's supplies."⁴ With Molotov about to depart for Berlin, the Soviets too seemed to think an understanding was possible.

Schnurre and the other fifteen delegates arrived in Moscow on October 30, were received cordially by Mikoyan,⁵ and got right down to business. By the first of November, Schulenburg was already reporting that an economic arrangement concerning the nagging problem of Petsamo now seemed possible.⁶ A compromise also appeared within reach on German deliveries of 38-cm turrets at 85 million RM with a 20 percent downpayment.⁷ The Soviets even tentatively accepted a one-time German gold shipment to cover 20 million RM of the trade deficit.⁸

The two sides also moved closer to a settlement on Soviet grain shipments. The Germans hoped to receive 2.5 million tons, but Mikoyan would initially agree to only 1 million tons, though he did leave open the possibility of a further 1 million tons later.⁹ By the tenth the Soviets had also added an offer of 200,000 tons of Bessarabian grain and 120,000 tons of oil seeds from both Bessarabia and the USSR.¹⁰

Although many historians have seen the German request for 2.5 million tons of grain as a dramatic increase and the Soviet efforts to meet this figure as economic appeasement, nothing of the sort had actually occurred. Germany's arrangements for the past year had called for 1.1 million tons from the February treaty, 100,000 tons from the Baltic states, and 300,000 tons from Bessarabia—a total of 1.5 million tons. Whereas the first treaty had called for this 1.5 million tons to be shipped over twelve months, the new treaty would spread 2.5 million tons of grain deliveries over fifteen months. In short, the Germans were really asking for only some 40,000 tons extra a month, not a dramatic change given that earlier talks had already touched on the idea of larger grain shipments in Year Two (February 1941 through May 1942). And once the Year Two agreements were lengthened to eighteen months, German grain demands were now just 9 percent higher than the respective Year One (February 1940 through January 1941) totals. Nonetheless, the current Soviet offer of 1.2 million tons did represent some sort of progress.

There were, on the other hand, the usual continuing problems. The plague in Manchuria turned out to be more real than imagined, but the continuing Soviet delays based on transportation difficulties proved exaggerated and were probably something of an excuse for throttling back on Soviet transit deliveries.¹¹ More important, the two sides remained far apart on questions about *Volksdeutsche* property, with the Germans continuing to demand full compensation and the Soviets refusing to discuss anything but partial reimbursement.¹² The Soviets even reduced the planned shipments from the Baltics to 50 million RM for the Year Two treaty,¹³ down from the almost 150 million RM that had been shipped in the previous twelve months.¹⁴

The Soviets also had their fair share of German actions to criticize. In addition to the usual complaints about prices,¹⁵ Mikoyan protested against Germany's apparent willingness to sell military equipment to Finland but reluctance to sell similar items to the USSR.¹⁶ The Soviets also raised questions about still unresolved plane contracts.¹⁷

Nevertheless, the mood in the economic negotiations remained somewhat upbeat¹⁸ as many of the negotiators packed up and followed Molotov off to Berlin. Unfortunately for those hoping for closer ties between the two countries, the November 12–14 conference was a disaster. Hitler appeared interested only in hearing himself speak, Ribbentrop droned on endlessly about the virtues of a grand alliance, and Molotov ignored all of the fluffy German rhetoric in order to focus on an extensive Soviet list of complaints and demands.¹⁹ Although Molotov had probably intended only to set out initial terms for future negotiations and although Ribbentrop would still try to follow up on these potential talks, this unlikely attempt to divert Hitler from his invasion plans had backfired miserably.²⁰

What economic talks that did take place during Molotov's visit also resolved nothing. During his conversation with Göring, the Foreign Commissar expressed his amazement that Germany, with all the resources of Europe at its disposal, could not fulfill the Soviet orders. Göring gave the usual reply, blaming the Soviets for their extensive demands in critical areas such as high-technology equipment and weapons.²¹ The two countries' respective positions having been restated, the only meeting dealing with economic issues broke up.

Despite this lack of progress in the economic discussions, the Soviet delegates could report at least one success. They finally gained a clear picture of Germany's aviation industry. After the two previous trips to Reich aircraft factories, the Soviet leadership still believed that the Germans had shown and sold them inferior equipment. So Yakovlev was sent along with Molotov's mission to tour even more German plants. This third visit, which lasted two weeks, finally did the trick in convincing the Soviets that they really had been shown the true level of German technology.

But why, Yakovlev and others wondered, had the Germans revealed their secrets? The answer came during one of the inspection tours when the Soviets were shown a visitor's log containing the names of French, British, and American aviation experts. As Yakovlev explains, "It became clear that the French general had been shown this, the best of the German aircraft manufacturing plants, as proof that German air power was immeasurably superior to that of France. They tried to scare the French and the British, they tried to scare the Americans, and they hoped to scare us as well."²²

TARIFFS AND TOLLS, DECEMBER 1

If Hitler's policy all along had been to intimidate the USSR into favorable economic and political terms, his plan had fallen well short of its mark. But, of course, that was not Hitler's real agenda. The *Führer* insisted on invading the

Soviet Union come spring. Molotov's attitude in Berlin and the USSR's continuing unwillingness (actually inability) to provide the sort of economic aid Hitler deemed necessary only reconfirmed his earlier decision to attack as soon as possible.

Growing strategic and economic concerns also reinforced this scheme to cut the Gordian knot entangling Hitler's master plan. The *WiRüAmt*, for example, concluded that Germany's raw material supplies could last comfortably only through the summer of 1941. After that there would be severe cutbacks.²³

Rubber stocks in particular were already running critically short, having sunk to 1,500 tons of natural product in October 1940, the lowest point until late in the war. Without the 4,500 tons of natural rubber that had been shipped to Germany via the USSR in 1940, the Germans would already have completely exhausted their reserves.²⁴ Without at least some natural rubber, synthetic rubber was almost useless; without any rubber, boots and then tires could no longer be produced; and without boots and tires, Hitler's armies were immobile.

Realizing their reliance on the tenuous and soon-to-be-severed Trans-Siberian rail link, the Germans further tightened rubber consumption.²⁵ They also began planning for yet another Buna plant and even began preparing to smuggle rubber into Europe with blockade breakers.²⁶

Despite continuing concerns about the wisdom of the proposed attack,²⁷ other preparations for Operation Barbarossa were also under way. Göring initiated more serious economic planning,²⁸ and the military carried out a series of war games on the campaign in the East.

Although Hitler's real strategy called for an invasion, Germany's public position was that the Molotov visit had been a success²⁹ and that the economic negotiations were progressing satisfactorily. In fact, political relations continued to deteriorate, despite the appointment of Dekanosov as Soviet Ambassador in Berlin.³⁰ Hungary and much later Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact;³¹ but Stalin's November 25 letter offering to join the alliance was rejected and essentially ignored by Hitler because it stipulated that the Soviet Union would retain or even expand its dominant influence in countries such as Finland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The result was no junior partner status for the USSR and consequently no political settlement from the *Führer*.³²

While papering over these political disputes, the German media also presented the ongoing economic discussions in a positive light. This at least had the merit of being true, for the next few weeks at any rate. Hitler still wanted what resources he could get out of the Soviet Union before the attack, and he did not want to give away his real intentions by any dramatic economic break.

The German economic negotiators were obviously even more eager to reach a settlement than Hitler was, because they still believed a long-term arrangement could and should be reached. If presented in the right light, an economic settlement might even overturn the general anti-Soviet direction of German policy. For his part, Stalin seemed satisfied that Molotov had given a sufficiently high opening bid and that there was now some room to compromise, at least on a few

economic issues. Given these auspicious circumstances, the German negotiators expected that during the next few weeks, "in contrast to the talks in September, the atmosphere of the negotiations should be extraordinarily friendly."³³

Sure enough, Schnurre was soon describing the negotiations as "quite cordial," though he wondered whether the friendly atmosphere was the result of real Soviet desire for progress or of "the rather considerable entertainment program provided by the Russians."³⁴ Nevertheless, a series of agreements were reached, especially by the end of the month. Yakovlev submitted an order for additional German aircraft (ten Benz 601 engines, five Junker-52s, two Dornier-217s, and two Heinkel-111s)³⁵, which the Germans, after some hesitation and some changes to the list (now including ten Benz 601 engines, ten Junker-52s, two Heinkel-111s, three Messerschmidt-109s, three Messerschmidt-110s, and five Messerschmidt-108s), eventually accepted.³⁶ The turret and munitions accord was completed by the end of the month as well.³⁷ And the Germans tentatively agreed to early shipments of 13 million RM in used machines and later deliveries of 30,000 tons of aluminum to help balance the current trade deficit.³⁸

On their side, the Soviets first increased their grain offer from 1.2 million tons to 1.5 million tons³⁹ and then eventually, on November 28, acceded to the entire German request for 2.5 million tons.⁴⁰ Schnurre was ecstatic, describing this agreement and other Soviet concessions on the twenty-eighth "as a surprising indication of good will on the part of the Soviet Government."⁴¹ In contrast, Military Attaché Köstring, who was as favorable to closer relations with the USSR as any of the German representatives, pointed out that before the war Russia had exported 11 million tons a year.⁴² In other words, this was no major concession on the Soviet part.

But it was progress, progress that was furthered by the signing on December 1 of a major treaty governing tariffs and tolls between the two empires. This understanding built on earlier agreements from December 23, 1939, and October 1, 1940, and effectively completed the transportation arrangements, or so the Germans hoped.⁴³

Regardless of the relative success of the November 28 meeting with Molotov and the December 1 Tariff and Toll Treaty, however, this period can on no account be considered one of easy friendship, much less one of Soviet economic appeasement. Instead, we find the usual continuing problems in the trade negotiations. One such issue was transit trade, as the Germans protested the once again increasing restrictions imposed by the USSR.⁴⁴

Even more contentious were the talks concerning Petsamo nickel. The Germans concluded that the Soviets had no vital economic interest in the area and must therefore be using this issue as a political test.⁴⁵ Upon Molotov's return to Moscow, Schulenburg reasserted Germany's claim to 60 percent of Petsamo's nickel production,⁴⁶ but the Foreign Commissar remained obdurate, and by November 26 Schnurre cabled, "Further discussions between Molotov and me will not be able to change Molotov's position."⁴⁷

Although the Year Two discussions did get under way by the eighteenth when

Schnurre made his initial proposals, these talks also quickly ran into difficulty. Soviet exports to Germany were not really the main problem, because the Germans basically asked for the same goods in roughly the same amounts that they had requested in Year One. Schnurre, for example, had proposed a 610 million RM total by May 1, 1942, including 2.5 million tons of grain (when the Bessarabian shipments were included), 1 million tons of oil, 400,000 tons of manganese, and 2,400 kilograms of platinum,⁴⁸ all about the same amounts (figured over fifteen months instead of twelve) as received in the past year. The November 26 Soviet counteroffer differed in only a few areas, primarily grain and manganese.⁴⁹

Soviet import demands, however, were the main obstacle, having become even more concentrated in the precise areas that the German military needed for its own purposes: high-grade coal, machine tools for weapons production, aircraft. Schnurre protested to Mikoyan and then to Molotov that Soviet requests were too narrowly focused, but he received the same response that Göring had heard from Molotov in Berlin—Germany had control of almost all of Europe and should therefore have no trouble meeting Soviet demands.⁵⁰ Molotov did tentatively agree to broaden Soviet orders by the end of the month,⁵¹ but the dispute was far from over.

Despite their eventual general agreement on grain deliveries, the two sides remained far apart on the specifics of this deal as well. The Germans objected that the proposed Bessarabian grain was expensive, was of low quality, and would be shipped at very high cost. The Germans also complained that most of the Russian grain would be sent via the already overloaded Rumanian route instead of via Poland. Furthermore, the Soviets, as they had done in the spring, refused final resolution on grain and on property questions until the Germans met certain Soviet demands, this time for cobalt and aluminum.⁵²

Other general agreements also started to break down when it came time to discuss the details. For example, the Economics Ministry, normally a supporter of expanded Soviet trade, soon decided against deliveries of 13 million RM in used machines because the Soviets had asked for high-value armaments equipment.⁵³ In fact, German firms trying to fulfill Soviet orders increasingly lacked the labor force necessary to complete their tasks, largely because military items were more and more switched to the special “S” class and therefore still outranked the new “Ia” priority-level for Soviet production.⁵⁴

Another increasingly complicated issue was the question of compensation for *Volksdeutsche* property and the Lithuanian Strip. On the latter subject, Schnurre initially wanted to trade the Strip for extra grain shipments,⁵⁵ but Ribbentrop promptly vetoed the idea.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, the general question was so important that it was referred to Hitler by the twenty-ninth,⁵⁷ and the talks were temporarily suspended.

Similar confusion existed in the negotiations for property compensations in the other occupied territories. Since the Soviets refused to offer anything other than partial compensation, the Germans eventually decided to get as much as quickly as they could. On the twenty-fifth Schnurre and Schulenburg proposed a

one-time payoff of 315 million RM to resolve the whole question. While agreeing in principle to the idea, Molotov came back to the earlier Soviet plan for partial compensation over ten years.⁵⁸ The Germans remained unimpressed by the offer.⁵⁹ But by the twenty-eighth the Soviets had changed their minds and were now willing to settle the issue for 200 million RM over two years minus 50 million RM of their own property claims in German-occupied lands. Schnurre was excited, cabling that the proposal “considerably exceeds our expectations.”⁶⁰ Those eyeing the earlier Soviet promises, the growing obstacles to trade in the Baltics,⁶¹ and the impending onset of Barbarossa, on the other hand, did not share Schnurre’s enthusiasm.

Despite all these difficulties, however, the economic talks during the preceding few weeks had been relatively successful, and an increasingly optimistic Schnurre now hoped to have the final Year Two treaty finished in time for Christmas.⁶² The more pessimistic Ritter, however, doubted that the final accord could be completed before February.⁶³ The Soviets would eventually split the difference.

SOVIETS DEMAND SIMULTANEOUS SETTLEMENT, DECEMBER 22

As usual, the negotiations became a lot tougher before a final settlement could be reached. Having hooked the Germans with promises of grain and other items, the Soviets now stipulated that the Germans must settle the rest of the bargaining on Russian terms. Although still insistent on speedy resolution of the economic negotiations, Hitler and the German military were increasingly looking forward to Barbarossa⁶⁴ and were therefore unwilling to meet many of these demands. As a result, the negotiations sputtered.

For the moment, though, the German economic negotiators were literally drunk with success (after Molotov’s agreement to ship 2.5 million tons of grain to Germany, thirty-five of the German delegates having gone out to see how much of that total they could drink in its distilled form in one evening).⁶⁵ On December 2, an excited Schnurre listed the remaining obstacles as Petsamo, the Strip, and property compensation, but declared, “The sudden and surprising Russian compliance will presumably make it possible to bring the economic negotiations in Moscow to a close earlier than expected, and thereby to settle most points in a manner satisfactory to us.”⁶⁶

The next few weeks did, in fact, see continued progress on a variety of issues. Despite some haggling on both sides, the parties reached basic agreement on German shipments of war materials,⁶⁷ aluminum, cobalt,⁶⁸ gold,⁶⁹ 10.5-cm flak cannons,⁷⁰ and machines.⁷¹ The Germans even started diverting machine deliveries intended for other countries to the Soviet Union.⁷² Similarly, the parties agreed to terms for Soviet deliveries of most of the items the Germans had wanted,⁷³ especially grain.⁷⁴ And both sides agreed to reduce the overall Year One totals from 425 and 340 million RM respectively to 338 and 242 million RM so that accounts could be balanced more easily.⁷⁵

As always, however, the road became rough at times, particularly when dealing with new questions, and Schnurre was soon cabling Berlin about difficulties regarding several subjects.⁷⁶ For example, although Schnurre and Wiehl were initially enthusiastic about the Soviet offer of 150 million RM over two years for German property claims in the Baltics,⁷⁷ Ribbentrop continued to push for greater compensation for all the occupied territories,⁷⁸ but to no avail.⁷⁹ Hitler also kept the Strip question off the table indefinitely, though he still insisted that resettlement begin right away.⁸⁰ Similarly, the Petsamo⁸¹ and Baltic trade⁸² issues continued to be debated without any immediate resolution in sight.

More important, the Soviets still refused to ship any more rubber, even though the Germans had already purchased the goods in the Far East.⁸³ The Russians also refused a new and somewhat strange German request to ship airplanes to Japan via the USSR.⁸⁴ Despite continuing German concerns, Soviet wishlists for war materials and machines were still somewhat narrowly focused. The Germans had made the necessary sacrifices the year before. This time, however, and much to Schnurre's frustration and dismay,⁸⁵ reluctant German businessmen and government officials were able to deflect some of the Soviet demands because of the ongoing preparations for war in the East. Schnurre even proposed, and the Soviets eventually accepted, lengthening the time frame of the Year Two deliveries from fifteen to eighteen months to compensate for this growing resistance.⁸⁶

Suspicious of the German delays, particularly concerning the Strip,⁸⁷ the Russians retaliated on the twenty-second by demanding "simultaneous settlement of all questions pending between Germany and the USSR."⁸⁸ Although the economic and Baltic property questions were already essentially settled,⁸⁹ this move caused a temporary standoff and ultimately gave the USSR added bargaining leverage.

Even worse than this new economic impasse was the pitiful state of the political relationship. After Molotov's disastrous mission to Berlin and Stalin's ignored letter requesting to join the Tripartite Pact, political discussions ground almost to a halt. Although the two sides did tentatively agree on final borders,⁹⁰ their respective negotiators almost came to blows at the initial meeting of the Danube Commission (a committee set up at Soviet insistence to discuss control of and transport rights on this key waterway) and the organization was disbanded on the twentieth.⁹¹ By the eighteenth Hitler had even taken the final step of signing the official directives for Operation Barbarossa, the German battleplan for the invasion of the Soviet Union.⁹² From now on any further economic negotiations would be mainly for show.

SIGN HERE, AND HERE, AND SO ON, JANUARY 10, 1941

But the show did go on, because both parties still believed a deal was in their best interests. Consequently, the next few weeks saw the final resolution of the various remaining problems and the signing of a series of agreements fashioned ostensibly to solidify the economic relationship.

Hitler still desired an arrangement in part because the Germans still needed what resources they could get from the USSR as raw-material shortages became more acute. Among other problems,⁹³ food, oil, and nonferrous metals would probably last only through 1941, and rubber might run out even before then,⁹⁴ especially if the planned Trans-Siberian or blockade-breaker shipments failed to arrive.⁹⁵ Germany's allies, who were dependent on the Reich for many of their needs, were in even worse shape. Italy, for example, would exhaust almost all of her raw-material stockpiles within two to six months.⁹⁶

Hitler was also trying not to tip off the Soviets that an attack was coming. Therefore, in response to Russia Committee, Foreign Ministry, and business complaints that firms producing for export to the Soviet Union lacked sufficient skilled labor,⁹⁷ new priority directives were issued to insure short-term deliveries and rectify the current trade imbalance.⁹⁸ Such increases in German exports, however, also camouflaged continuing German war preparations.

For their part, the Soviets still seemed to think that Germany was too enmeshed in the air and naval war against Britain and too dependent on Russian raw materials to contemplate a major campaign in the east. After all, had not Hitler himself pointed out that Germany's cardinal error in World War I had been to wage war simultaneously on two fronts? Even if Hitler had wanted to attack, initial war games seemed to show that, with a few modifications to the current force structure, the Red Army could handle the *Wehrmacht's* blow and deliver a devastating counter-strike.⁹⁹ In other words, Soviet leaders felt that Germany was unlikely to attack in the next year or two, allowing the Soviets enough time to reap all the expected benefits of continuing close economic ties with the Reich.

With both sides still committed to an arrangement but still suspicious of their trading partner and the specific terms of the treaties, the negotiators ground away at the remaining obstacles. The most important and troublesome of these barriers was the problem of the Lithuanian Strip. Although the Soviets were essentially holding the economic, property, and boundary agreements hostage until this issue was settled, Berlin continued to delay, ostensibly waiting for final word from Hitler.¹⁰⁰ During the interim, Schnurre was told to stay in Moscow and resolve all other questions first.¹⁰¹ An exhausted Schulenburg welcomed the respite,¹⁰² but he still fretted that this delay might undermine the entire project.¹⁰³ An agitated Schnurre argued that the Soviets had committed themselves to extensive shipments that they would be hard-pressed to execute. Therefore, they would welcome this opportunity to delay and water down the Year Two settlement.¹⁰⁴ Postponement would also bring in the disruptive Petsamo question and mess up the specific delivery schedules, requiring the whole treaty to be reworked.¹⁰⁵ In the meantime Schnurre warned that "my opposites in the negotiations here will in their Armenian-Caucasian way connect every question that comes up . . . with the economic agreement in order to obtain every possible advantage from the present situation."¹⁰⁶

Despite Schnurre's urgings, Hitler and Ribbentrop took their time deciding exactly what they wanted in return for the Strip. Schnurre rejected payment in

gold, American dollars, or grain in favor of more raw materials or credits against Germany's trade deficit. Schnurre also thought that the most the Soviets would offer would be roughly \$8 to \$8.5 million (splitting the difference between the \$3.86 million Soviet proposal and the \$13 million German proposal).¹⁰⁷ While agreeing that Germany should seek repayment in raw materials, Ribbentrop still insisted on the \$13 million total, much of which should be in nonferrous metals.¹⁰⁸ As Weizsäcker explained to Schnurre in a letter apologizing for the short leash that the economic negotiators were being kept on, "those who had the power of decision were acting on the assumption that Germany, in the last analysis, 'held the longer arm of the lever.'"¹⁰⁹

Schnurre finally met with Molotov on December 30 to begin talks on the Strip; but, as Schnurre had expected, the Foreign Commissar quickly rejected the \$13 million figure.¹¹⁰ During the next week, the two sides did agree to include the Strip settlement in a secret protocol,¹¹¹ but they continued to debate the details of what would be included in this protocol. By the third, the Soviets had come up with an offer of 6,000 tons of copper, 2,000 to 2,500 tons of nickel, and 100,000 tons of manganese divided into eight quarterly shipments, a deal Schnurre thought the German government should accept.¹¹²

But two years was too long for Hitler, what with Barbarossa looming in five months. So while accepting the Soviets' \$7.5 million total (31.5 million RM), Ribbentrop still demanded immediate shipment with at least half in nonferrous metals and the other half in gold.¹¹³ Molotov initially rejected the idea¹¹⁴ and offered instead to shorten the time frame to one and a half years if some raw materials and gold could be substituted for the metals.¹¹⁵ When Ribbentrop persisted in his demands, despite Schulenburg's protest that this tactic might "thwart the realization of all other agreements,"¹¹⁶ Molotov responded with a new compromise—one-eighth of the total in metals (about 4 million RM) delivered over three months and the rest in gold (about 28 million RM) credited immediately against German gold shipments. Ribbentrop quickly agreed, and the final piece of the economic puzzle was put in place.¹¹⁷

Despite the fact that only a couple of substantially new elements had been added to the economic arrangement, the negotiations had still taken more than two months to reach their conclusion. The long and difficult bargaining required to resolve these relatively insignificant issues, for example with the Lithuanian Strip, "show clearly to what extent the relations between the two countries had deteriorated."¹¹⁸

Nonetheless, a deal had been reached. On January 10 a series of documents were signed in Moscow, completing the arrangements on the new borders, property compensation in the occupied territories, trade balances for Year One, trade with the Baltics and Bessarabia, control of the Lithuanian Strip, transit costs, and delivery schedules for Year Two.¹¹⁹ As the Soviets had wanted, the new treaty structure regulated almost all of the remaining economic questions and laid the foundation for a long-term relationship that would greatly benefit the Soviet

Union. Unfortunately for Stalin, Hitler had no intentions of developing such a long-lasting partnership.

NOTES

1. Appendix A, Tables 1.5 and 1.6.
2. Appendix A, Tables 1.7 and 1.8.
3. PA, *R106232*, E041957.
4. BAMA, *RH 2/2932*, 189.
5. BAMA, *RH 2/2932*, 187–88.
6. PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Schulenburg Telegram (1.11.40),” *R 106002*.
7. PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Ritter Telegram (4.11.40); Schottky and Schnurre Telegram (6.11.40); and Ritter Telegram (7.11.40),” *R 106002*. Problems, however, seem to have arisen on the tenth (PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Schlotterer Telegram [10.11.40],” *R 106002*). Note that the Economics Ministry was putting heavy pressure on Krupp to accommodate Soviet demands for these turrets as well as the Widia Process and other items still available to balance accounts with the USSR (HA Krupp/Werksarchiv, “Krupp und Rußland 1918–1941,” *WA VII f 1562*, 12).
8. PA, *R 106232*, E041953, and PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Ritter Telegram (7.11.40),” *R 106002*.
9. PA, *R 106232*, E041955, and *DGFP*, D, 11: 253, doc. 318.
10. PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Schefold Telegram (10.11.40),” *R 106002*.
11. PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Aufzeichnung Voss (3.11.40) and Voss Telegram (15.11.40),” *R 106002*.
12. PA, *R 106232*, 453292–94; *DGFP*, D, 11: 521–22, doc. 317; and BA/RWK, “Warensendungen nach Estland, Lettland und Litauen 1940,” *R 11/1338*, 10–18.
13. PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Schlotterer Telegram (13.11.40),” *R 106002*.
14. Appendix A, Table 1.5.
15. One new problem had arisen. Some German agencies had not yet adjusted to Göring’s change of priorities and were refusing to issue the usual export subsidies. German businesses wanted to pass along the added cost to the Soviets, much to the German negotiators’ alarm (PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Schlotterer Telegram [15.11.40],” *R 106002*).
16. *DGFP*, D, 11: 454–55, doc. 275.
17. PA, *R 106232*, E041956.
18. Weizsäcker described the economic negotiations to this point as “satisfactory” (*DGFP*, D, 11: 521, doc. 317).
19. For more details on the visit, see *NSR*, 217–54.
20. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 140–45.
21. Hilger and Meyer, 322–23.
22. As quoted in Bialer, 121.
23. BAMA, *RW 19/338*, 168.
24. Appendix A, Table 3.3.
25. BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 90–91.
26. Theo Michaux, “Rohstoffe aus Ostasien. Die Fahrten der Blockadebrecher,” *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* (1955): 486.
27. Halder, 286–87.
28. *NC&A*, 4: 1084–85.

29. See Weizsäcker's laudatory November 15 memorandum to all German diplomatic missions (*NSR*, 255), and the analysis of the general German reaction in Noakes and Pridham, 2: 808–9. Even the very well-informed Americans seem to have accepted the proposition that the Molotov meeting would lead to closer political and economic cooperation (*FRUS*, 1940, 1: 585–86).

30. For the American assumption that this move signaled closer relations between the two countries, see *FRUS*, 1940, 1: 587.

31. McSherry, 2: 164–73.

32. Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin*, 690–91.

33. BAMA, *RW 45/14*, 3: 40.

34. *DGFP*, D, 11: 650, doc. 377.

35. PA, *R 106233*, 455968–70.

36. PA, *R 106233*, E041970–71. The Air Ministry also agreed to provide teaching materials and various components in return for possible permission to transport some planes to Japan and to visit some aircraft factories in the USSR.

37. PA, *R 106233*, E041976.

38. PA, *R 106233*, E041963–67.

39. PA, *R 106233*, E041973.

40. PA, *R 106233*, E041975, and *DGFP*, D, 11: 723–24, doc. 412.

41. *DGFP*, D, 11: 724, doc. 412.

42. BAMA, *RH 2/2932*, 200–01.

43. Reichsbahnrat Gährs, "Der deutsch-sowjetische Eisenbahngüter- und Tiertarif vom 1. Dezember 1940," *Die Ostwirtschaft*, November 1940, 131–33.

44. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Ripken Telegram (20.11.40) and Marius Vermerk (22.11.40)," *R 106002*.

45. BAMA, *RW 19/244*, 336, and BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 89.

46. *DGFP*, D, 11: 590–91, doc. 344.

47. *DGFP*, D, 11: 716, doc. 405.

48. PA, *R 106233*, 455973–78.

49. *DGFP*, D, 11: 270–71, doc. 409.

50. *DGFP*, D, 11: 272, doc. 409.

51. *DGFP*, D, 11: 724, doc. 412.

52. For the grain negotiations, see BA/RfEuL/RfG/Siburg, "Bericht über Dienstreise nach Moskau von Präsident Dassler, Donner und Dr. Bender vom 20.11.1940 bis 14.12.1940," *R 15/VII/46*, 1–7. For the linking of these various negotiations, see PA, *R 106233*, 455995.

53. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schultze-Schlutius und Walter Telegram (26.11.40)," *R 106002*.

54. *DGFP*, D, 11: 747, doc. 425, and IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (5.12.40)," *YY2389*. For specific complaints from November 1940 to June 1941 about labor shortages for Soviet export production at various German businesses, see BA/EfA/Gießereiindustrie, "Lieferschwierigkeiten einzelner Firmen im Ausfuhrgeschäft mit der Sowjetunion 1940–1941," *R 9/XVI/5*.

55. PA, *R 106233*, E041961.

56. PA, *R 106233*, 455980.

57. PA, *R 106233*, 455992.

58. *DGFP*, D, 11: 717–18, doc. 406.

59. PA, *R 106233*, 455990.

60. *DGFP*, D, 11: 724, doc. 412.

61. For some of these problems, see BA/EfA/Außenhandel, "Hinze Report (29.11.40)," *R 9/I/637*.

62. *DGFP*, D, 11: 747, doc. 425. Schnurre did, however, admit that this would be possible only if he were given freer rein to pick different personnel and to promise greater German exports.

63. PA, *R 106233*, 455991.

64. The first integrated report on economic preparations for Operation Barbarossa was completed on December 10 (Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia*, 2nd ed. [London: Macmillan, 1981], 38).

65. BAMA, *RH 2/2932*, 204.

66. *DGFP*, D, 11: 765–66, doc. 437.

67. The Germans initially accepted most of the Soviet demands (PA, *R 106233*, 456002), and after the Soviets dropped their requests for new military items from 110 to 80 million RM, Schnurre pushed for a quick agreement (PA, *R 106233*, 456013). Including previous orders, Soviet demands now totaled 118.5 million RM (PA, *R 106233*, 456015).

68. Despite initial misgivings (PA, *R 106233*, 456003) and later attempts to tie these shipments to larger Soviet aluminum oxide shipments for refining into aluminum (PA, *R 106233*, E041985–86), the Germans eventually went along with Soviet demands.

69. PA, *R 106233*, 456016.

70. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Walter Telegram (9.12.40)," *R 106002*.

71. On the tenth the Soviets had requested 75 million RM worth of machines (PA, *R 106233*, 456018).

72. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Beschlagnahme von Werkzeugmaschinen für Russland aus dem Export nach anderen Ländern (6.12.40)," *R 106002*. This move caused increasing tension with the countries so deprived, especially with Italy.

73. The Soviets initially rejected some of the specific requests (PA, *R 106233*, 456019–20), but eventually gave in on most of the German demands (PA, *R 106233*, 456029, and *DGFP*, D, 11: 914, doc. 539).

74. Despite their continuing concerns (BA/RfEuL/RfG, "Vermerk [17.12.40]," *R 15/VII/46*), the Germans did relent somewhat to Soviet demands for the routing of grain deliveries mainly through the Black Sea and Rumania (PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Clodius Telegram [12.12.40]," *R 106002*). As a result, a contract was signed on December 12 for 250,000 tons (200,000 of which would come from Bessarabia) to be delivered over the next two months (PA, *R 106233*, E041999, and BA/RfEuL/RfF, "Getreide Vertrag [12.12.40]," *R 15/V/43*). The Germans considered requesting an additional 300,000 tons of Soviet grain when food shortages developed in Belgium (PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Clodius Telegram [13.12.40]," *R 106002*; PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Bargan Telegram [20.12.40]," *R 105849*; and PA, *R 106233*, E042003), had second thoughts by January when the Soviets requested payment in gold or hard currency (PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Sabath Vermerk [11.1.41]," *R 105849*), but eventually agreed to a settlement in late March (PA, *R 106233*, E042126).

75. BA/RFM, "Vermerk betr.: den deutsch-russischen Warenverkehr (20.12.40)," *R 2/17307*, Anlage 1b.

76. *DGFP*, D, 11: 748, doc. 425.

77. PA, *R 106233*, 456007–08.

78. The Foreign Minister thought more could be done, for example, in return for the German navy's interests in the Kivioli shale-oil concern, something Schnurre believed unattainable (PA, *R 27806*, 324817–19).

79. PA, *R 106233*, 456024–27, and *DGFP*, D, 11: 915, doc. 539.
80. PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Twardowski Letter (4.12.40),” *R 106002*, and *DGFP*, D, 11: 774, doc. 440.
81. BAMA, *RW 45/14*, 3: 27.
82. BAMA, *RW 45/14*, 3: 1.
83. PA, *R 106233*, 456020, and BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 98–99.
84. *DGFP*, D, 11: 903–4, doc. 533.
85. PA, *R 27806*, 324854.
86. PA, *R 106233*, 456021.
87. First Dekanosov and then Molotov requested more complete German answers to earlier Soviet proposals, but the Germans begged off, arguing that Hitler would have to decide the question and that he was indisposed during the Christmas holidays (PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Woermann Letter [24.12.40],” *R 106002*, and PA, *R 106233*, E042002).
88. *DGFP*, D, 11: 929, doc. 550. For earlier Soviet linkage of the economic and property questions, see PA, *R 106233*, 456034–35, and *DGFP*, D, 11: 914–15, doc. 539.
89. *DGFP*, D, 11: 930, doc. 550.
90. Eichler, 157.
91. See Dallin, *Foreign Policy*, 269, and PA, *R 106233*, 456047.
92. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 138–39, and *NSR*, 260–64.
93. BAMA, *RW 19/99*, 4a–5a.
94. Halder, 308, and BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Ro, “Aktennotiz Thomas (6.1.41),” *RW 19/2334*, 1.
95. For these general rubber plans and concerns, see Thomas, 302. The three blockade breakers were carrying 10,300 tons total, but only one loaded with 3,200 tons actually reached the Reich.
96. BAMA, *RW 19/338*, 252–53.
97. For more of these specific business complaints and some of the measures being implemented to resolve the problem, see this letter and those following it: RWW/Wuppertal/Lange, “Dringendster Kräftebedarf für die termingemäße Durchführung von Ausfuhraufträgen nach Rußland (23.12.40),” 22–28–14.
98. Thomas, 280.
99. Louis Rotundo, “War Plans and the 1941 Kremlin Wargame,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* (March 1987), 88–89.
100. PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Weizsäcker Telegram (23.12.40) and Woermann Telegram (25.12.40),” *R 106002*.
101. *DGFP*, D, 11: 943–44, doc. 558. In the meantime, the two parties did agree to a further extension of the basic clearing agreement to August 1, 1942 (PA, *R 106233*, 456150–53).
102. Fleischhauer, *Widerstand*, 277.
103. *DGFP*, D, 11: 946, doc. 560.
104. PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Schnurre Letter (25.12.40),” *R 106002*.
105. *DGFP*, D, 11: 960–61, doc. 568.
106. *DGFP*, D, 11: 960, doc. 568.
107. *DGFP*, D, 11: 945–46, doc. 560.
108. *DGFP*, D, 11: 971–72, doc. 575.
109. *DGFP*, D, 11: 961, doc. 568.
110. *DGFP*, D, 11: 979–80, doc. 580.

111. PA, *R 106233*, 456052 & 456062.
112. PA, *R 106233*, 456058.
113. *DGFP*, D, 11: 1010, doc. 598, and 1027, doc. 607.
114. *DGFP*, D, 11: 1028, doc. 608.
115. *DGFP*, D, 11: 1039, doc. 614.
116. *DGFP*, D, 11: 1040, doc. 615. For Schulenburg's pessimistic diary entry from the ninth, see Fleischhauer, *Widerstand*, 281.
117. *DGFP*, D, 11: 1052–53, doc. 625.
118. Hilger and Meyer, 319.
119. For more information, see Appendix B and PA, *R 106233*, 456107–94.

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Chapter 13

Grain for Guns

Although Hitler and the *Wehrmacht* continued to prepare for a May invasion, Stalin seems not to have realized that the blow might actually fall. He did, of course, take such precautions as building up the Red Army and gearing up the war economy, but he still appeared convinced that the USSR would be able to stay out of the war at least until 1942 and perhaps until 1943.¹ The Soviets, therefore, responded to the increasingly rigid German line in the spring of 1941 with firmness of their own and not yet with a dramatic policy of appeasement. As a result, economic relations between the two countries basically repeated the spring 1940 pattern of slow deliveries and wrangling over contracts despite some continuing high expectations.

ANOTHER SLOW START, FEBRUARY 11

The new economic arrangements quickly became a political football in the ongoing struggle over the direction of German policy. The fundamental problem was fairly clear—the Reich lacked raw materials, oil and rubber in particular, possessing only enough for a couple of months of heavy campaigning.² Germany's allies were also calling for more shipments just as German economic officials were considering cutting back deliveries to Italy and elsewhere.³

The answer to this looming raw-material crisis was less obvious. Schnurre and company had argued that closer economic relations with the USSR provided the only possibility for victory and prosperity. Having finally concluded the new economic arrangement, Schnurre was triumphant. The American and Japanese ambassadors, for example, congratulated him on securing the Reich's economic foundations and even implied that the new treaty might win the war for Germany.⁴

Believing mistakenly that only Hitler was really in favor of invasion⁵ and that perhaps even he could be persuaded by the conclusion of the new treaties to abandon this idea, Schnurre returned to Berlin preaching the gospel of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. For instance, after explaining to a still confused and somewhat irate Ribbentrop that Soviet gold shipments had been merely credited against German payments and that he did not have the actual gold bars with him, Schnurre went on to proclaim that the new treaty would greatly expand trade between the two countries and secure Germany's food and raw-material needs for the foreseeable future. The next day at Hitler's Berghof, Schnurre went even further and movingly declared that this treaty "is the solid foundation for an honorable and great peace for Germany."⁶ During meetings with Göring, Keitel, Jodl, and others, Schnurre repeated his sermon. Everyone nodded in agreement.⁷

Others added their voices to the chorus. Ritter, for example, contended, "The new agreement means the final collapse of the English blockade and the English attempt at an economic encirclement of Germany."⁸ During a January economic session chaired by Göring, "all of the men [with the exception of State Secretary Backe] expressed themselves very clearly and very energetically to the effect that, as seen from the economic point of view, it was impossible to wage war with Russia."⁹ The booty gained could never replace the lost Soviet deliveries and the Trans-Siberian shipments let alone the materiel used in the fighting. Thomas's initial study of the economic measures necessary for Operation Barbarossa also revealed that even a short-term cutoff of rubber and nonferrous metals could have crippling effects on the German war economy.¹⁰

Despite professions of support for Schnurre's ideas during their two meetings in early 1941,¹¹ Hitler remained unconvinced and war planning continued.¹² He even told Schnurre not to publish the terms of Germany's planned shipments to the USSR, probably because he feared future public concern when German troops started falling victim on the eastern front to weapons supplied by the Reich.¹³

Nonetheless, Hitler did agree that closer economic relations were necessary in the short term. Fortunately for Germany, the exigencies of trading resources for machines meant that more of the raw materials would be shipped up front. Schnurre noted that Germany would receive by August most of the deliveries owed it. Therefore, Germany should abide by the delivery schedule at least up until that time.¹⁴ Hitler, of course, concluded that after August, the economic relationship would prove more of a hindrance than a support for the Reich—just another reason why Germany should attack in 1941 and not later.

In the next few months, however, getting Soviet deliveries still required that Germany adhere strictly to the treaty schedule despite the expected difficulties.¹⁵ Although cold weather, Soviet renailing work on the rail lines,¹⁶ and delays due to the extended Year Two negotiations restricted trade from both sides in January and February,¹⁷ the Germans quickly renewed their efforts to meet the short-term Soviet demands,¹⁸ but only up to a point. Hitler still refused to place Soviet orders

on a par with military production.¹⁹ He had no intention of making any major course corrections now.

The crippled state of Nazi-Soviet political relations demonstrated Hitler's fundamental goals quite clearly. As the Germans prepared to make their move in the Balkans, Bulgaria, a country the Soviets thought of as being in their orbit, came under increasing Nazi pressure and eventually joined the Tripartite Pact.²⁰ The German hold over Rumania was also strengthened by a coup on January 20.²¹

With the overall situation tense and the Germans no longer giving in quite so easily on economic issues, the Soviets remained cautious. Grain negotiations, for example, were delayed,²² as was a 17.5 million RM payment for Baltic property.²³ Contract talks for oil deliveries quickly stalled because of differences over prices and quality,²⁴ and Soviet cotton shipments soon lagged far behind the planned schedule.²⁵ Despite repeated German protests, the Soviets also kept up the pressure on Germany to balance its 1940 accounts with the Baltics and the USSR at an early date.²⁶ The Soviets twisted the screws a bit tighter on the Petsamo question as well with their refusal to acknowledge the German interests in the nickel mines.²⁷

More important, the Soviets began taking hostage what for Germany was quickly becoming the most important element of the relationship—the transit trade. The Soviets still refused to ship any rubber,²⁸ and by mid-January they had also threatened to stop shipping Afghanistani cotton.²⁹ Furthermore, the Russians were holding up transit licenses³⁰ and were even planning to raise tariffs dramatically on Far Eastern trade, some by as much as 800 percent.³¹

THE EASTERN CONNECTION, MARCH 18

The wagon of German-Soviet relations lurched along essentially these same ruts and grooves over the next month. The political relationship remained at a standstill in the spring of 1941, and that left the increasingly tense but still mostly correct trade partnership as the last major link that the two sides, each for their own reasons, were holding on to.

For their part, the Germans tried hard, given the continuing priority for military production, to meet their short-term delivery dates.³² By March, the Germans had almost eliminated the earlier February 11 trade imbalance and were significantly ahead under the terms of the August 19 and January 10 treaties.³³

In fact, it was now the Germans who were criticizing the Soviets for falling behind on their scheduled shipments. The old contract having expired and the new contract talks having stalled,³⁴ supplies of Russian oil in particular dropped dramatically, from 47,300 tons in February to 19,600 tons in March.³⁵ Clodius complained on March 12 that "Soviet deliveries have fallen off to such an extent that it must be seriously doubted whether the Soviet side is prepared to make deliveries."³⁶ The Germans even considered repeating the Soviet trick from the previous fall of stopping shipments to the USSR until the accounts had balanced.³⁷

The Germans also lodged frequent complaints against Soviet delays and tariff

increases on the Trans-Siberian Railroad.³⁸ The Soviets asserted that they were being helpful, that most of the restrictions were due to illegal shipping,³⁹ and that the tariffs would not apply to German exports, only to German imports.⁴⁰ In fact, the Soviets were taking advantage of the German raw-material demands to squeeze out a few extra *Reichsmarks*. At the same time, Stalin could gain additional leverage in his upcoming economic negotiations with the Japanese.⁴¹

The Germans, understandably, rejected these Soviet assurances and instead sent a commercial mission to Moscow to resolve the impasse.⁴² This delegation, however, really had no choice in the matter if Germany wanted to get its precious rubber deliveries, a point the Russians highlighted by continuing to hold up any German rubber shipments.⁴³ Despite some intense bargaining, some heated exchanges, and some delays in exports to Germany, the Soviets still refused to budge.⁴⁴ Left with no options, the Germans ultimately caved in to Soviet demands on the fifth⁴⁵ and accepted the final Soviet terms for transit trade on the eighteenth.⁴⁶ A frustrated Hilger protested that "in his twenty-one years of service, German-Soviet relations had never experienced such an incomprehensible and pig-headed attitude from the Soviet side."⁴⁷ Appeasement this was not.

As in 1940, contract talks also made very slow progress as the Soviets effectively raised their prices 15 to 20 percent. Desperate for Russian resources and perhaps also calculating that they might never actually have to pay the Soviets back, the Germans agreed to Stalin's demands.⁴⁸

Negotiations for Soviet grain deliveries followed this same pattern of high Soviet demands and eventual German concessions. Grain discussions were first delayed,⁴⁹ then the promised amounts were reduced, and then the prices were raised.⁵⁰ Difficult negotiations followed, with the Soviets making only minor concessions and the Germans finally agreeing to most of the Soviet stipulations by March 13. The Germans did get 1.4 million tons, but they had to pay somewhat higher prices for somewhat inferior product, and they still received no assurances on the remaining 900,000 tons.⁵¹

While the political and economic relationship continued to deteriorate, Hitler reaffirmed his plans for the upcoming invasion, despite persisting concerns and occasional opposition. This internal German debate centered largely on General Thomas's evolving study on the economic consequences of Operation Barbarossa.⁵² Thomas's initial reports had been quite pessimistic. But Hitler had already grown tired of economic nay-sayers, such as Schnurre, and told Göring "that everyone on all sides was always raising economic misgivings against a threatening war with Russia. From now onwards he wasn't going to listen to any more of that kind of talk and from now on he was going to stop up his ears in order to get his peace of mind."⁵³ Göring apparently passed the word along to Thomas, who revised his work to fit the *Führer's* wishes.⁵⁴

The new report, therefore, included Thomas's earlier negative findings that the conquest of the USSR would be a net drain unless a series of impossible preconditions were met: the Soviet economy had to be captured intact, the people had to be won over to the German cause, the link to the Far East had to be rapidly

reestablished, and the Caucasus oil fields had to be captured in the first blow. Thomas, however, also now added that the German invasion would capture 75 percent of the Russian armaments industry and 100 percent of its precision-tool and optical manufacturing.⁵⁵ What chance then of the Soviets remaining in the war? The Red Army forces left after the first assault could be quickly destroyed.

As a reward for having contradicted his earlier arguments and for having essentially supported Hitler's belief that the Soviet Union could be easily crushed, Thomas was now given charge of economic preparations for the occupation.⁵⁶ Confident that he could accomplish what he had just implied might be an impossible task, Thomas set about his new assignment with enthusiasm.⁵⁷

YUGOSLAVIA, APRIL 6

These preparations for plundering Soviet resources, however, were still at the planning stage. In the meantime, the economic relationship continued to follow the previous year's pattern of gradual improvement as warmer weather approached, as the difficult contract talks reached their conclusion, and as the Soviets tried to influence German political decisions. Although far from perfect, this trade partnership was still operating within the established framework, more than could be said for Germany's trade relationship with an erstwhile ally such as Japan.⁵⁸

There were, of course, the usual setbacks and problems. The two sides continued to bicker over prices.⁵⁹ They also clashed on still unresolved questions such as Soviet oil-seed deliveries,⁶⁰ Soviet repayment of Czechoslovakian credits,⁶¹ and certain transit issues.⁶²

For the most part, however, the 1940 pattern of difficult bargaining giving way to a series of new contracts prevailed. An agreement on Soviet shipments of platinum and iridium was signed on March 13.⁶³ And on March 27 an oil contract following the prices and terms of previous treaties was concluded for 43,000 tons.⁶⁴

Other aspects of the economic relationship also saw some positive developments in the course of the next few weeks. During his March 17 meeting with Hilger, for instance, Krutikov assured the Germans that the USSR was doing everything possible to speed up its shipments, especially of the key items Germany wanted.⁶⁵ In particular, the Soviets agreed to put special trains at Germany's disposal to transport rubber from the Far East.⁶⁶ Krutikov later arrived in Berlin on March 27 to start talks on trade balances that would last until May 11.⁶⁷

The Soviets also fulfilled an earlier promise and allowed a team of twelve German aviation experts to tour a series of Soviet plants from March 28 to April 17. Interestingly, the Soviets had apparently learned from the German example of showing off the best facilities in order to impress and intimidate a potential opponent. The Germans, at least, were convinced they had been shown the best the Soviets had to offer.⁶⁸ Unfortunately for Stalin, these demonstrations of Soviet armed might had just the opposite effect on Hitler from the one intended and

actually reinforced his desire to attack before the growing Soviet economic and military buildup could derail his plans for the east.⁶⁹

For their part, the Germans strove to meet Soviet export demands despite increasing labor shortages.⁷⁰ On the other hand, there were indications that the Germans intended to meet Soviet demands only in the immediate future. The Skoda Works, for example, was told on March 22 to cease filling Soviet orders, a message that the vice president of the company passed on to Moscow.⁷¹

Because of information such as this, the Soviets were becoming increasingly concerned about the possibility of war with Germany, and this fear may also have contributed to the easing of tensions in late March. In an April 5 memorandum, Schnurre made exactly this case, concluding that the Soviets were committed to closer economic relations with Germany: "To sum up, it may be said that after an initial lag Russian deliveries at the moment are quite considerable, and the Commercial Agreement of January 10th of this year is being observed on the Russian side."⁷² Hitler was still unimpressed and retorted that Stalin would be willing to make even greater concessions if Germany had 150 divisions on the Soviet border.⁷³ Such statements did not, however, imply a desire for war, only for blackmail, and Hitler may have been trying to give the Soviets, via Schnurre and other German diplomats, the false impression that he could be bought off.

This argument, that Stalin felt he could appease Hitler, should not be exaggerated, however. Those like Schnurre who disagreed with the planned invasion obviously had a stake in presenting the Soviet Union as more friendly than it really was.⁷⁴ Schnurre's description of Soviet deliveries outpacing German shipments, for instance, is slightly distorted.⁷⁵ While Soviet exports to Germany (including the Baltic trade) did increase somewhat from 24.1 million RM in February to 32.9 million RM in March, they actually declined to 22.2 million RM in April. In contrast, German deliveries jumped from 21.3 million RM in February to 35.6 million RM in March to 51 million RM in April.⁷⁶ Stalin's response to the growing signs of danger was still cautious opposition and further defensive preparations, and thus his approach to the economic relationship did not reveal any short-term, aggressive intent, nor did it reveal any real appeasement—yet.

On April 6, however, Germany invaded not only Greece but Yugoslavia as well. Political relations between Germany and the USSR had been stalled since Molotov's visit in November, but neither side had openly opposed the other's actions. That all changed after the March 26–27 coup in Yugoslavia. Although the new government was still ostensibly neutral, Hitler quickly decided to invade in conjunction with his assault on Greece. The Soviets, on the other hand, sympathized with the new regime and signed a treaty of friendship on April 5. The next day's German onslaught and its rapid success, therefore, was a clear sign that Hitler cared little for Soviet interests in the Balkans and might be seriously considering an invasion of Russia after all. If true, a reorientation of Soviet policy would now be in order.⁷⁷

NOTES

1. Nekrich, *June 22, 1941*, 166–67.
2. For some examples of Germany's growing concern about rubber and oil supplies, see BAMA, *RW 19/339*, 11, 30, & 32, and BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 107–9 & 119.
3. BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 101, and BAMA, *RW 19/176*, 66.
4. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 111.
5. Gibbons, *Soviet Industry*, 90.
6. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 120.
7. For Schnurre's various encounters, see PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 109–26. See also *DGFP*, D, 12: 19–20, doc. 13.
8. *DGFP*, D, 11: 1071, doc. 640.
9. *Trials of War Criminals*, ed. Nuremburg Military Tribunal (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1952-53), 13: 1318.
10. BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 106.
11. For the first meeting, see *DGFP*, D, 12: 4, doc. 4. For the second, see BAMA, *RW 19/2334*, 366467.
12. Military studies were also showing serious flaws in the German strategy, but Halder apparently ignored the evidence and refused to pass along the bad news to Hitler (Barry Leach, "Halder," in *Hitler's Generals*, ed. Corelli Barnett [New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989], 115).
13. BAMA, *RW 19/2334*, 366467.
14. BA/RFM, "Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Interministeriellen Ausschusses vom 4. Februar 1941," *R 17315*.
15. BAMA, *RW 45/14*, 2: 170–71.
16. BAMA, *RW 19/99*, 3a–3b & 10a.
17. See Appendix A, Tables 1.5 and 1.6.
18. For some of these measures, see Philbin, 124–25; BA/EfA/Gießereiindustrie, "Lieferungen von Maschinen, Geräten und Waren nach der Sowjetunion 1940–1941," *R 9/XVI/4*, 10 & 12; and PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Syrup Schnellbrief (13.2.41)," *R 106003*.
19. BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 130.
20. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 151.
21. Read and Fisher, 554.
22. BA/RfEuL/RfG, "Donner Report (22.1.41)," *R 15/VII/46*.
23. PA, *R 106233*, E042029 & E042032.
24. BAMA, *RW 19/2814*, J005944.
25. BAMA, *RW 45/14*, 2: 171.
26. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (6.2.41)," *YY2389*, and BAMA, *RW 45/14*, 2: 150 & 154–55.
27. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Blücher Telegrams (20.1 & 21.1.41)," *R 106003*, and *DGFP*, D, 11: 1206–08, doc. 717.
28. PA, *R 106233*, 456093.
29. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Ripken Telegrams (14.1 & 17.1.41)," *R 106003*.
30. BAMA, *RW 19/245*, 39, and PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schnurre Telegram (1.2.41)," *R 106003*.
31. BA/RFM, "Vermerk (14.1.41)," *R 17315*, 1.
32. For some of these German efforts, see *RWW/Wuppertal*, "Niederschrift über die Sitzung der Leiter der Prüfungsstellen im Reichswirtschafts-ministerium am 19.2.1941," 22–168–2. Note, however, that the Germans still showed little interest in meeting Soviet

requirements after August (BA/EfA/Maschinenbau, "Allgemeine Ausfuhrangelegenheiten [11.3.41]," *R 9/VIII/7*).

33. Appendix A, Table 1.7.

34. PA, *R 106233*, 456211.

35. Appendix A, Table 3.1. Part of this decline was also due to a major train accident at the Rumanian border which held up some of the Soviet shipments in Constanza (BAMA, *RW 19/2715*, J015190). These delayed deliveries were rushed through in April after the rail link had been fixed, somewhat distorting this month's total as well.

36. *DGFP*, D, 12: 282, doc. 157.

37. PA, *R 106233*, 456211.

38. PA, *R 106233*, E042037-09, E042080, & E042110.

39. PA, *R 106233*, 456101.

40. PA, *R 106233*, 456196.

41. BAMA, *RW 19/245*, 54.

42. The main mission arrived on February 17. For a detailed report on some of its activities, see PA, *R 106233*, E042084-92. A second mission, this one led by Helmut Wohltat, was initially scheduled to begin negotiations with the Japanese on March 11 but was now told that it too should stop for a few days in Moscow to help settle the transit questions (PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Clodius Telegram [28.2.41]," *R 106003*).

43. BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 192-93. Even as late as March 15, the Soviets were still refusing to ship any rubber for the Germans (PA, *R 106233*, 456210).

44. PA, *R 106233*, E042063 & E042105-07; BAMA, *RW 19/339*, 91, 107, & 136; BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 164; and BAMA, *RW 19/245*, 63.

45. PA, *R 106233*, 456210.

46. BA/RFM, "Verfügung des Volkskommissars für den Auswärtigen Handel der UdSSR über den Transit ausländischer Waren durch das Gebiet der Sowjetunion (18.3.41)," *R 2/10009*.

47. PA, *R 106233*, E042089.

48. For phosphate negotiations, for example, see PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schiller Telegram (19.2.41)," *R 106003*. For general pricing problems, see PA, *R 106233*, E042097-98.

49. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schulenburg Telegram (25.2.41)," *R 106003*.

50. PA, *R 106233*, E042068-69.

51. BA/RfEuL/RfG, "Zwischenbericht (8.3.41), Vermerk (9.3.41), Zwischenbericht (11.3.41), Aufzeichnung (12.3.41), and Schlußbericht (14.3.41)," *R 15/VII/46*.

52. There were other, but significantly less influential, studies completed at the time. See, for example, BAMA/OKW/WiRuAmt/Wi, "Die Wehrwirtschaft der UdSSR, Stand: März 1941," *RWD 16/24-25*, and BAAP/IG/Vowi, "Die Lieferfähigkeit Sowjetrußlands und Südosteuropas für Deutschland (15.3.41)," *80 IG I/A 4137*.

53. *Trials of War Criminals*, 12: 1320.

54. For a more detailed description of the long evolution of this study, see Müller, *Wirtschaftsallianz*, 119-28, and Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegsführung 1940-1941* (Frankfurt: Bernard und Gräfe, 1965), 179-81.

55. *NC&A*, 4: 1087-88. For the actual report, see Thomas, 514-32.

56. Müller, *Wirtschaftsallianz*, 127-28, and BAMA, *RW 19/164*, 180.

57. For general questions about these early German economic preparations for the proposed occupation, see again Müller, *Wirtschaftsallianz*, 129-40.

58. *DGFP*, D, 12: 327-30, doc. 190.

59. PA, *R 106233*, E042121.
60. BA/RfEuL/RfF, "Schröter Abschriften (25.3, 2.4, & 8.4.41)," *R 15/V/43*.
61. PA, *R 106233*, E042114 & E042117.
62. PA, *R 106233*, E042134, and PA/DDfWiO/Wohltat, "Gähns Letter (9.4.41) and Vermerk über die Besprechung am 9.4.41," *R 27910*.
63. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schulenburg Telegram (14.3.41)," *R 106004*.
64. BAMA, *RW 19/2814*, J005940. The April 9 oil contract also followed the details of earlier treaties. Note, however, that during the 1940 contract discussions, the Germans had stipulated that they receive better conditions in 1941. Instead, nothing changed. On the other hand, the Soviets had been threatening to raise prices and had since recanted (Schustereit, 351). As with other contract talks, the Germans probably wanted to get as much as quickly as they could and decided not to delay the negotiations only to receive slightly better terms.
65. PA, *R 106233*, 456213–14.
66. PA, *R 106233*, E042115–16. These trains would take only twelve to fifteen days to make the journey across the USSR. The first 1300 tons were sent by two trains on April 6 and 8 (PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schulenburg Telegram [12.4.41]," *R 106004*).
67. *Die Ostwirtschaft*, Apr/May 1941, 49.
68. BAMA/RL, "Bericht über die Industrie-Besichtigungs-Reise vom 28.3.–17.4.41 in Rußland," *RL 3/2245*, 1–7.
69. *NC&A*, B, 1192–93.
70. For some of these measures, particularly a March 22 Economics Ministry directive and a March 29 *OKW* directive, see BA, *R 9/XVI/4*, 15, and a series of letters in *RWW/Wuppertal*, "Siegel (10.4.41), Siegel (3.6.41), and Rausch (7.7.41)," 22–28–14.
71. Barton Whaley, *Codeword Barbarossa* (Boston: MIT, 1974), 49–50.
72. *NSR*, 319.
73. PA/Schnurre, *Leben*, 126.
74. For a more detailed description of the Foreign Ministry campaign against Operation Barbarossa, see Gibbons, *Soviet Industry*, 94–100.
75. Eichler notes Schnurre's distortions but refuses to draw the obvious conclusion that Schnurre is overstating the case for Soviet appeasement in order to influence German policy decisions (Eichler, 187–88).
76. Appendix A, Table 1.5 and 1.6.
77. For a more extended discussion of these political events, see Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 148–58.

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Chapter 14

Germany Bites the Hand That Fed It

With Operation Barbarossa two and a half months away and with signs of the impending invasion increasing almost daily, Stalin apparently decided that his policy of cautious opposition toward the Reich had to be changed to one of cautious appeasement, at least until the threat of a summer invasion had ended. In the economic relationship, therefore, the USSR acquiesced to a series of German demands and seemed ready to go even further in meeting the Reich's resource requirements. Again, however, this argument for Soviet appeasement should not be overdone. Stalin also appeared confident that the Red Army could repulse a *Wehrmacht* attack, so he was not yet willing to move significantly beyond the delivery totals already stipulated.

While the Soviets were carrying out the terms of the economic treaties in order to signal their cooperative intentions and to delay a possible attack, Germany was fulfilling the conditions of the various economic agreements, at least for a couple of months, in order to camouflage its aggressive designs and to help prepare for the imminent invasion. That members of the Foreign Ministry and other German officials still believed closer economic relations were possible and were still working to persuade Hitler to abandon his plans for conquest only added to the confusion in Moscow. Why, after all, would Hitler risk losing a major supply of desperately needed raw materials and add a second front when military blackmail could accomplish many of the same goals at significantly less risk?

ANOTHER DELICATE BALANCE, APRIL 18

This, at any rate, was the case put forward by Schnurre, Schulenburg, Köstring, and others. In a series of reports and meetings, they continued to argue

that the USSR was willing to appease the Reich and provide even greater quantities of raw materials for years to come.

Despite some continuing problems with transit licenses and other issues,¹ Schnurre and company could point to a number of Soviet actions during the next two weeks as examples of a new eagerness to work with Germany. On April 9 the Soviets agreed to an oil contract for 982,500 tons;² a cotton contract was concluded on the tenth; and agreements for 6,000 tons of copper, 1,500 tons of nickel, 500 tons of zinc, 500 tons of wolfram, and 500 tons of molybdenum were signed by mid-month.³ The Soviets also finally settled the 1940 trade deficit issues with a special April 18 accord reducing the accounts from 425 to 310.3 million RM.⁴

In political matters the Soviets signed a neutrality pact with Japan on April 13, followed by Stalin's famous railroad-station greeting to Schulenburg and Acting Military Attaché Krebs: "We will remain friends with you—in any event."⁵ The Soviets also deferred to the Germans in regards to Finland, Rumania, and a new border settlement.⁶

CAUTIOUS APPEASEMENT, MAY 10

But Hitler remained uninterested, and preparations for the invasion continued.⁷ For example, although the Germans had initially been the ones pushing for closer Soviet-Japanese relations, the German press remained conspicuously silent about the signing of the neutrality pact. Reich Finance Minister Schwerin-Krosigk, for one, took this as a clear indication that war was imminent.⁸

Schwerin-Krosigk also added his voice to the small chorus of those German officials opposing the upcoming attack. He argued, among other things, that Germany would actually lose grain by invading because of Soviet scorched-earth tactics, lack of transport, and diminishing German production as the labor force was siphoned off to fight in the east.⁹ Even though optimistic about Germany's chances in the military engagements, Weizsäcker similarly concluded that we "would, on the other hand, lose in an economic sense."¹⁰

But why fight at all if the USSR was willing to provide substantial shipments right now and even greater amounts over the next couple years? Schnurre, for instance, echoed Krutikov's protest that German transportation already could not keep pace with the rising tide of Soviet deliveries.¹¹ And Schulenburg, in an April 28 meeting with Hitler, asserted that "Stalin was prepared to make even further concessions to us," including up to 5 million tons of grain next year alone.¹² Acting Military Attaché Krebs even claimed that the Russians "will do anything to avoid war and yield on every issue short of making territorial concessions."¹³

Although correct in general that an attack against the Soviet Union would not provide the economic windfall Hitler envisioned, some of these arguments were obviously exaggerated for effect. Schnurre had argued earlier that the USSR was incapable of finding, let alone transporting, a grain surplus of more than 2 million tons a year. Now he and others were suddenly talking about 5 million tons or

more! Germany could barely cover the immediate Soviet deliveries. How would she pay for the rest of the Year Two totals and an additional 400 million RM in grain without turning over a huge share of her armaments and machine industries to Soviet export production?¹⁴ Furthermore, at the same time that these German officials were portraying Stalin as willing to make dramatic concessions, Schnurre was complaining to the Soviets about their delays in shipping rubber,¹⁵ about their refusal to make even limited compromises on oil-seed contracts,¹⁶ and about their general pricing policy.¹⁷

Soviet deliveries were also not arriving at the torrid pace Schnurre had implied to his superiors. Supposedly, the delays in transporting Soviet goods were due to an overwhelming increase in Soviet shipments in April. Actually, the transportation delays were caused mainly by the confusion resulting from the Balkan campaign and by the Soviet insistence that the bulk of German oil and grain shipments travel via the already overtaxed Rumanian system instead of via Poland or the Baltic.¹⁸ The Soviets, in fact, had fallen 85 million RM behind in their accounts by April 20.¹⁹ The Americans even received word "that all Russian deliveries to Germany have apparently ceased."²⁰

Stalin, in other words, was by no means willing or even able to subjugate himself to the German cause or to hand over all the items that the German negotiators claimed he would. His policy remained one of cautious appeasement. In addition to the occasional difficulties over rubber deliveries and oil seed contracts,²¹ for example, the Soviets raised new obstacles to third-party shipping along the Trans-Siberian Railroad.²² More important, Stalin continued his military and economic buildup in case Hitler might be planning an actual invasion.²³

Nonetheless, Stalin was showing a much friendlier face than he had in the past. Soviet shipments of rubber and oil in particular had gone up sharply.²⁴ Political signs of renewed cooperativeness also abounded, in particular with Stalin's taking over the role of premier from Molotov.²⁵ Rudolf Hess's May 10 flight to England appears only to have reinforced Stalin's movement toward greater concessions to Germany. With England seemingly conniving with Germany, the dreaded "capitalist encirclement" might well be upon the Soviet Union.²⁶ Stalin would now have to redouble his efforts to avoid war in 1941. Defensive measures had to be stepped up and cautious appeasement might have to become real appeasement. It was, as usual with Stalin, the logical move.

THE LAST SHIPMENTS, JUNE 22

Unfortunately for Stalin, Hitler did not always follow the dictates of logic. Although he might pretend that economic blackmail was his preferred strategy and he might thereby deceive many prescient observers up until the very eve of the invasion,²⁷ he in fact remained firm in his plan to attack the USSR as soon as possible. Preparations for war, therefore, continued at an increasingly rapid pace.²⁸

Some of these preparations called for throttling back deliveries to the USSR, but only at the very last minute. In fact, German exports hovered around 50

million RM a month in April, May, and June;²⁹ and Hitler continued to give Soviet orders high priority.³⁰ German construction work on the *ex-Lützow*, for example, remained right on schedule until June 13 with seventy engineers and fitters working on the cruiser.³¹ The Russia Committee also continued to negotiate minor changes in the trade relationship up until almost the very date of the attack.³²

Some German firms, however, did begin delaying their projects, in part because of the increasingly obvious political instability,³³ in part because of tepid government support for delivery contracts extending beyond August,³⁴ and in part so that they could avoid shipping the items entirely if war broke out.³⁵ In May Krutikov was already complaining about delays in releasing German aircraft for delivery to the USSR.³⁶ But the protest was never followed up, and the planes apparently were never shipped.³⁷ The Germans also procrastinated on the next round of trade balance talks, again with only a mild Soviet complaint.³⁸ Shortly before the attack German ships began leaving Soviet harbors, some without having unloaded.³⁹ And on the night of the invasion, the Germans even ferried out their remaining workers from the *Lützow* project in Leningrad. The Soviets let them all go.⁴⁰

Stalin, too, was preparing for war, but he still believed he could avoid a short-term clash.⁴¹ Economic appeasement, for instance, might help persuade Hitler not to attack. Soviet exports to Germany, therefore, jumped to 50.8 million RM in May and 58 million RM in June.⁴² Even though the Germans had failed to negotiate contracts for the delivery of certain items, such as manganese and sulphur, and appeared unwilling to start talks now, the Soviets still continued to deliver these goods with only minimal protests.⁴³ By June 18 the Soviets had even promised the Japanese that they could ship much greater totals along the Trans-Siberian railway.⁴⁴

Based on these increasing Soviet export totals, Schnurre concluded on May 15 that "we could make economic demands on Moscow which would even go beyond the scope of the treaty of January 10, 1941."⁴⁵ The German navy argued similarly on May 2 that the "Russian government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict with Germany."⁴⁶

Of course, this policy of economic appeasement could go only so far. Stalin, in fact, still remained unwilling to go much further than the specific terms of the economic treaties. He might hint that greater concessions were possible, and he might ignore certain German actions, but this strategy could always be reversed when the summer's danger had passed. After his first round of talks with Krutikov, for instance, Schnurre had to admit, "Despite his constructive attitude, Krutikov's stand when defending Russian interests was firm. He showed no extreme willingness to give way which might have been construed as weakness."⁴⁷ From shale oil⁴⁸ to grain for Belgium⁴⁹ to transit licenses⁵⁰ to transport schedules,⁵¹ the Soviets still held their ground on a variety of issues over the coming month.

Transport licenses and schedules were relatively minor concerns, however. On the major questions of oil, rubber, and grain, the Soviets were doing just about everything they could to meet the German demands. Warehouses in Vladivostok

in the Far East⁵² and Varna and Constanza in Rumania⁵³ were filling up faster than the German and Soviet transportation systems, overloaded as they were with military preparations, could handle. The pace continued until the eve of battle with a Soviet express train, carrying 2,100 tons of desperately needed rubber, crossing the border only hours before the invasion began!⁵⁴

Stalin's attempts to buy off Hitler for the short term, however, had no effect. Having given every indication that he was ready to negotiate, especially with his June 13 TASS statement,⁵⁵ Stalin waited and waited for the German demands he was sure would precede any attack.⁵⁶ Even after he had received definitive proof of Hitler's aggressive intentions from the British Ultra intercepts, he still expected a German ultimatum.⁵⁷ It never came. Instead, on June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany turned to bite the hand that had fed it for the past twenty-two months.

COUNTING THE COSTS, 1941–44

Expecting a quick victory and an economic bonanza, Hitler was soon disappointed on both accounts. As Schnurre, Schulenburg, and others had warned him, the invasion of the east proved to be a long and exhausting affair from which Germany received very little of the economic benefit Hitler and some of his military advisors had anticipated.⁵⁸ The occupation itself was brutal, confused, and inefficient.⁵⁹ After almost four years of control and incalculable costs, the Germans had been able to squeeze out of the Soviet Union only about 4.5 billion RM. In contrast, tiny Belgium had contributed roughly 9.3 billion RM to the Reich.⁶⁰

Hitler did manage to avoid delivery of the nearly 750 million RM in still pending Soviet orders, roughly 230 million RM of which would have been needed just to cover the German deficit in the clearing accounts.⁶¹ On the other hand, he also forfeited substantial Soviet raw material shipments—520 million RM worth of counterdeliveries for the remainder of the 750 million RM in Soviet orders and roughly 400 million RM worth still owed Germany from the 1935 and 1939 credits and a few other accounts.⁶²

If the Germans had been so dependent on Soviet economic aid and if these vital supplies were now cut off, how did Germany's war economy survive? In particular, how did it handle the loss of the four key items it had imported from or via the USSR: oil, grain, manganese, and rubber? The short-term answer was that conservation, synthetic production, and Speer's efficiency drive helped bridge the gap. The long-term answer, however, was that the German war economy and Hitler's plans for world conquest were doomed to failure once the Russian campaign fell short of its ambitious goals. From 1942 until the end of the war, the Germans barely managed to scrape together enough reserves for a few more major offensives. But having failed with each increasingly desperate effort, the Germans were eventually forced over onto the defensive and then into complete surrender.

Oil was the main obstacle. The *Wehrmacht* already began experiencing local shortages in the summer of 1941,⁶³ and by November lack of fuel threatened to halt the whole operation in the east.⁶⁴ By 1942 the problem had become even more

critical, making the Caucasus the primary goal of the summer campaign. As Hitler himself declared during a June 1, 1942, conference, "If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grosny, then I must end this war."⁶⁵

Germany, however, no longer had the strength nor the oil reserves necessary to achieve such an ambitious objective. Hitler failed to get his oil, but he still refused to end the war; and the Reich was reduced to a hand-to-mouth existence for the duration. By 1942, for example, the Italian fleet had to remain in port because of lack of fuel.⁶⁶ Once the Allied bombers began concentrating on Germany's synthetic fuel plants in mid-1944, what little oil reserves the Germans had left completely disappeared. By late 1944 many German planes now sat idle, and in-air training for new pilots was cut to a mere one hour a week.⁶⁷

Food supplies were also dwindling,⁶⁸ but the envisioned 5 million tons a year from occupied areas in the USSR never materialized. In fact, over four years, the Germans managed to ship out only about 1.5 million tons of grain, less than one year's planned deliveries under the previous contracts.⁶⁹

With such meager amounts from Russia, the Germans resorted to cutbacks in Germany and starvation for much of the rest of occupied Europe. The food shortage in Germany never became quite as acute as it had been in World War I, except perhaps in fats and oils,⁷⁰ but it did drain morale at home and foster opposition in the occupied areas. The *Wehrmacht*, for example, consumed about 2 million tons of foodstuffs a year in the occupied territories of the USSR, but this was taken directly out of the mouths of the Russian people and helped to alienate them from the German invaders.⁷¹

In the case of manganese, the Germans still held sufficient stocks to survive until 1942, thanks to rationing and conservation.⁷² By then they controlled the key Ukrainian mines, from which they were able to extract enough ore to carry them through the next few years.⁷³ Although their supply of other metals now became more critical, the Germans were able to extend their stocks of these items as well by substitution and conservation.⁷⁴

Despite drastic usage cutbacks in 1941⁷⁵ and some continuing tire shortages until mid-1943,⁷⁶ the Germans also managed to replace much of the rubber lost when the umbilical cord to the East was severed, this time through substantial synthetic production that had started to come on-line in 1942. Synthetic rubber, however, was expensive and still required some natural product, roughly 10 to 15 percent, to function properly.⁷⁷ So the Germans also stepped up their blockade-breaking efforts.⁷⁸ They even tried to produce their own natural rubber using the Russian dandelion as the base material!⁷⁹

Although this third project failed miserably, the combination of Buna plants and blockade-breakers did succeed in bridging the gap from 1942 to 1944. After that, bombings of the synthetic materials plants⁸⁰ and sinkings of the blockade-breakers⁸¹ began taking their toll on the amount of rubber goods being produced.⁸²

If the war did not develop the way Hitler had envisioned, neither did it play out the way Stalin had planned. Although the attack had come in 1941 instead of 1942, as he had hoped, Stalin still apparently believed that he had sufficient forces

on the front to slow down the Germans and allow for a devastating counterstrike.⁸³ According to Volkogonov, the impact of the invasion took four or five days to hit Stalin, because he kept expecting that the Red Army would halt the German advance and push the *Wehrmacht* back across the border. Such news never came. It was then that Stalin “simply lost control of himself and went into deep psychological shock.”⁸⁴ In the end, however, space, weather, and, most important, German overconfidence, eventually saved the Red Army, and Stalin managed to survive Operation Barbarossa.

Fortunately for the *Vozhd* and unlike Hitler, Stalin still had alternative sources for the materials lost when the invasion began. Britain and particularly the United States were willing and able to supply the Red Army with trucks, electronic equipment, and other supplies that the Russians would need to win the war over the long haul. The difference showed. While Nazi power waned, the Red Army became a devastating fighting force that by 1944 had almost complete mastery over the Germans.⁸⁵

Although necessary from Hitler’s point of view,⁸⁶ the eastern invasion had nonetheless been a disaster for Germany. Far from building another economic support for the Reich, the invasion had led Germany into a quagmire of economic and military destruction.

NOTES

1. PA, *R 106233*, E042141.
2. BAMA, *RW 19/2814*, J005940.
3. BAMA, *RW 19/245*, 125–26.
4. *NSR*, 327.
5. *NSR*, 324.
6. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 162–63.
7. For example, see *NC&A*, 3: 811 for the beginnings of Thomas’s Economic Staff Oldenburg, the agency charged with planning much of economic exploitation of conquered areas in the USSR.
8. BA/RfM/Krosigk, “Innen- und außenpolitische Angelegenheiten der Reichsregierung während des Zweites Weltkrieges,” *R 2/24243*, 34.
9. BA, *R 2/24243*, 35–36.
10. *NSR*, 333.
11. *DGFP*, D, 12: 602, doc. 380.
12. *NSR*, 332.
13. Halder, 383.
14. For production and export problems already facing the Reich, see BAMA, *RW 45/14*, 2: 29, and Volkmann, *Kriegswirtschaftsraum*, 123–28. At the then current rates, the planned 2.5 million tons of grain would have cost about 400 million RM of the 630 million RM allotted under the Year Two treaty (BA/RfEuL/RfG, “Vertraulicher Vermerk für Herrn Ministerialrat Dr. Schefold [2.5.41],” *R 15/VII/46*).
15. PA/HaPol/Clodius, “Schnurre Telegram (22.4.41),” *R 106004*. The Soviets also warned that they might switch German rubber shipments back over to normal trains, which would require 20 to 25 days for each shipment instead of the 12 to 15 days for the special

trains (PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Tippelskirch Telegram [30.4.41]," *R 106004*).

16. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schnurre Telegram (23.4 & 29.4.41)," *R 106004*.

17. PA, *R 106233*, 456249–52.

18. For the general trade figures, see Appendix A, Table 1.5. For grain shipments via the Balkans, see BA/RfEuL/RfG, "Quassowski Schnellbrief (24.4.41) and Sommerlake Letters (2.5 & 12.5.41)," *R 15/VII/46*. Oil, on the other hand, did see dramatic increases, but also suffered the most from the war-related transportation problems (BAMA, *RW 19/2715*, J015158–62, and BAMA, *RW 19/2814*, J005938).

19. BAMA, *RW 19/245*, 125–26. For further German complaints about Soviet deliveries during this period, see BAMA, *RW 45/14*, 2: 14.

20. *FRUS*, 1941, 1: 141.

21. The two sides did, however, eventually reach a compromise by May 9 (PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schnurre Telegram [9.5.41]," *R 106004*). For the text of treaty, see BA/RfEuL/RfF, "Russland (17.5.41)," *R 15/V/120*.

22. PA, *R 106233*, E042161. Some of this tough stance was intended not for Germany, however, but for Japan.

23. Although the reports are contradictory, Stalin appeared to espouse a somewhat more defiant attitude toward Germany in his May 5 speech to Red Army leaders. At the very least, he pressed for heightened preparations for war. See Hilger and Meyer, 330, and Werth, 122–23.

24. Another 600 tons of rubber, for instance, was loaded in Mandschuli at the beginning of May (PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schnurre Telegram [2.5.41]," *R 106004*).

25. For details, see Read and Fisher, 573–77, and *NSR*, 335–36.

26. For Stalin's thinking about England and the effect of the Hess flight, see Andrew and Gordievsky, 294, and Gabriel Gorodetsky, "Stalin und Hitlers Angriff auf die Sowjetunion," in *Zwei Wege nach Moskau*, ed. Bernd Wegner (München: Piper, 1991), 351–53.

27. For some of this common wisdom that Hitler was really after greater economic concessions, see *FRUS*, 1941, 1: 142 & 150–51; Read and Fisher, 607–8; Andrew and Gordievsky, 264–66; and Churchill, 3: 300–301.

28. For some of the gruesome plans the Germans were now concocting for the occupation of the Soviet Union, see *NC&A*, 4: 264–65, and 7: 298–305.

29. Appendix A, Table 1.6.

30. *NC&A*, 4: 1088.

31. *NSR*, 340, and Birkenfeld, *Wirtschaftspartner*, 504.

32. IfW/RA, "Rundschreiben (9.6 & 20.6.41)," *YY2389*.

33. *NSR*, 340–41.

34. BA/EfA/Maschinenbau, "Allgemeine Ausfuhrangelegenheiten (23.5.41)," *R 9/VIII/12*.

35. Thomas, 229, and *NC&A*, 4: 1088.

36. *NSR*, 340.

37. Schustereit, 352.

38. PA, *R 106233*, E042175–76, and PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schulenburg Telegram (13.6.41)," *R 106004*.

39. Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, revised edn., ed. & trans. George Schriver (New York: Columbia University, 1989), 744.

40. PA, *R 106233*, E042170–71.

41. Werth, 120.

42. Appendix A, Table 1.5.
43. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schulenburg Telegram (5.6.41)," *R 106004*.
44. PA, *R 106233*, 45258.
45. *NSR*, 341.
46. *NC&A*, 6: 999.
47. *NSR*, 339–40.
48. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Schulenburg Telegram (16.5.41)," *R 106004*.
49. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Walter Telegram (28.5.41)," *R 106004*.
50. PA/HaPol/Clodius, "Behrend Telegram (27.5.41) and Davidsen Telegram (11.6.41)," *R 106004*, and PA/DDfWiO, "Wohltat Letter (17.6.41)," *R 27910*.
51. BA/RfEuL/RfG, "Donner Abschrift (29.5.41)," *R 15/VII/46*.
52. *FRUS*, 1941, 1: 145.
53. BAMA, *RW 19/2715*, J015138–39.
54. Goralski and Freeburg, 66. Unfortunately, these authors moved the decimal place over and came up with the unbelievable total of 21,000 tons arriving on this final express train. See Appendix A, Table 3.3, for more details on Soviet rubber shipments.
55. Degras, *Soviet Documents*, 3: 489, and Whaley, 207–8.
56. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union*, 166.
57. Gabriel Gorodetsky, "Was Stalin Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941?" *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies* (June 1986): 69.
58. Gibbon argues that most of the economic planners realized the enormity of the task facing them and attempted merely "to mitigate the economic consequences of the invasion" and not really to exploit the Soviet Union (Gibbon, *Soviet Industry*, preface). Hitler, however, had apparently hoped for much greater results.
59. Dallin, *German Rule*, 59–61, and Gibbons, *Soviet Industry*, 271.
60. *Trials of War Criminals*, 13: 919 & 924.
61. Figures on the trade balance that the Soviets still held on June 22, 1941, vary somewhat. Friedensburg places this figure at 239 million RM, Birkenfeld at 233 million RM, and Eichler at 220 million RM (Zeidler, 110, n. 58). Totals for Soviet orders are also somewhat vague. Zeidler estimates the figure at 750 million RM (Zeidler, 107), but other German figures show a 600 million RM total (BAMA, *RW 45/15*, 153). All but 5 to 10 percent of these orders were taken over by the German government.
62. BA/RFM, "Ein- und Ausfuhrangelegenheiten Deutschland-Russland (3.7.41)," *R 2/17315*, and Eichler, 199–200. Roughly 300 million RM of this debt was eventually covered by the government. For the drawn-out compensation procedures, see BA/RFM, "Tätigkeitsbericht des General-Verwalters, 1.11.41–31.1.42 (14.3.41)," *R 2/16467*.
63. BAMA, *RW 19/177*, 167a, and Goralski and Freeburg, 78–81.
64. Van Creveld, *Supplying War*, 171.
65. *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, 7: 260.
66. USSBS, *Oil, Final Report*, 36, and USSBS, *Oil, Ministerial Report*, 75–76.
67. Yergin, 347.
68. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Stb, "Kriegswirtschaftlicher Lagebericht," *RW 19/99*, 61a–61b.
69. Dallin, *German Rule*, 366–68.
70. USSBS, *Effects*, 132–33.
71. Dallin, *German Rule*, 368–71.
72. BAMA, *RW 19/177*, 166b, and BAMA, *RW 19/99*, 43a–43b.
73. Gibbons, *Soviet Industry*, 195.

74. USSBS, *Effects*, 111–12.
75. For some examples, see BAMA, *RW 19/99*, 39b & 50a, and Thomas, 462.
76. USSBS, *Rubber*, 16.
77. BAMA, *RW 19/177*, 165.
78. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/HWK, “Akten (26.7.41),” *RW 19/1548*, and Michaux, 487.
79. Alan Milward, *War, Economy, and Society, 1939–1945* (Berkeley: University of California, 1977), 264–65.
80. Speer, 445–46.
81. Michaux, 504–507.
82. USSBS, *Rubber*, 26.
83. Rotundo, *Stalin*, 295–96.
84. Volkogonov, 409.
85. For an analysis of the extent and impact of Lend-Lease for the Red Army, see Hubert P. Van Tuyl, *Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941–1945* (New York: Greenwood, 1989), 74 & 82.
86. Joachim Fest, *Hitler*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Vintage, 1975), 643.

Conclusion

Over and over on the eastern front, the same ironic scene was played out. German soldiers fed by Ukrainian grain, transported by Caucasus oil, and outfitted with boots made from rubber shipped via the Trans-Siberian railroad fired their Donetsk-manganese-hardened steel weapons at their former allies. The Red Army hit back with artillery pieces and planes designed according to German specifications and produced by Ruhr Valley machines in factories that burned coal from the Saar.

How did these two great powers come to this point? Despite their ideological differences, both Hitler and Stalin wanted to build up their military might and overturn the existing order. Since the two economies were naturally complementary, Germany and the Soviet Union had reached a series of economic agreements in the Twenties and early Thirties.

But by 1935 the respective military buildups and the growing ideological competition were driving the two powers apart. Hitler might increasingly need Soviet raw materials to fuel his rearmament efforts, but Stalin had other potential customers for his goods and other potential suppliers of machine tools and industrial equipment such as the United States or Great Britain. Although bartering with Germany had some very distinct advantages, the USSR did have other options. The *Vozhd*, therefore, kept his price for an economic arrangement fairly high.

The situation was reversed in political matters. Stalin needed to break the USSR out of its continuing isolation and to pit the capitalist powers against one another instead of against the Soviet Union. For that, he needed closer political relations with the Reich. Hitler, on the other hand, saw the USSR as a secondary military and political factor, perhaps more useful as a bogeyman with which to

scare the rest of the world than as an ally with which to conquer the world. Significantly closer economic relations would imply closer political relations, giving the Soviets much of what they wanted and taking this important card out of Hitler's hand. That he did not want. The years 1935 to 1939, therefore, saw the Soviets and occasionally some German officials extend tentative feelers, but no real movement occurred.

The new British attitude toward German expansion in the spring and summer of 1939 dramatically altered this political equation. Now Hitler needed the Red Army a lot more, if for no other reason than to bluff the West into submission while he grabbed Poland. Hitler also needed the promise of Soviet raw materials to stiffen the spines of his reluctant military leaders and to cover Germany's resource deficit in case of a long war. When the Allies refused to submit to Germany's threats and her display of power in Poland, Hitler's reliance on Soviet economic aid became even greater.

Holding the upper hand in economic and now also political terms, Stalin was repeatedly able to wait the Germans out and drive up the price. The Germans might protest and complain at the delays and the Soviet bargaining method, but in the end they would go along with most of Stalin's demands. The August 19 and February 11 treaties, therefore, might offer Germany some short-term comfort, but the raw materials the Reich received would quickly be used up. In the long run, therefore, the terms of these agreements were more beneficial to the USSR, which would now be able to build up its war economy and its armed might with German technology and machines.

But here was the catch. Stalin's strategy required peaceful relations between Germany and the Soviet Union for at least the next few years—even better if the “capitalist” war dragged on and on. Since almost everyone at the time expected a long war, Stalin's policy seemed eminently logical. He would get territory, security, weakened enemies, and the means to build up his own military and economy. For this, all he had to do was remain neutral, his preferred option anyway, and provide Germany with a few raw materials that the *Wehrmacht* would rapidly chew up fighting in the west.

But what if Hitler rapidly defeated the Western powers and then turned on the Soviet Union? Soviet raw materials, being easier to produce and deliver than gun turrets and synthetic-fuel plants, were supposed to be shipped in greater quantities during the first year and a half. German counterdeliveries would lag behind. Stalin might then be facing a much stronger enemy than he would have in 1939 without the support of allies such as Great Britain.

Even after the defeat of France, however, this possibility seemed unlikely. England was staying in the war, and Germany, according to the common wisdom of the day, still appeared too dependent on Soviet resources to consider an invasion in the east. That the German economic negotiators so obviously believed in the value of continued cooperation helped to convince Stalin that Hitler would not actually attack.

But the *Führer* had other ideas. *Lebensraum* in the east beckoned, and the

Soviet state seemed ripe for the plucking. The *Wehrmacht* that had just annihilated the Allied armies could easily destroy a Soviet force barely capable of defeating the Finns. Leaving the USSR in peace while Germany fought the Anglo-Saxon powers seemed by far the more dangerous option. The Red Army would be a growing threat, and the Soviet Union would not, indeed could not, supply Germany with the raw materials she needed for a major war. Why then not just take the resources and eliminate the Soviet menace with one quick campaign?

Having decided for war, Hitler's attitude concerning Finland, Rumania, and trade relations with the USSR became somewhat more rigid. In response, Stalin resorted to a policy of cautious opposition. The Soviets made few if any major compromises during the fall's trade-balance discussions, during Molotov's visit, during the negotiations surrounding the January 10 treaties, and during the ensuing contract talks. The Soviets already had the economic arrangement they wanted, so these various negotiations added little that was significantly new and focused instead on sorting out the details of the previous agreements.

Economic relations, therefore, remained tense but correct. The Germans, as always, tried to extract as many resources as quickly as they could. Having already delivered more of their items up front, the Soviets concentrated on making sure the Germans kept their side of the bargain. Threats of cutoffs, delays over transit licenses, and so forth seemed to do the trick, and German deliveries now matched and sometimes even outpaced those of the USSR.

While goods continued to flow through the normal channels, the political situation deteriorated. Hitler appeared increasingly intent on pressuring the Soviet Union into greater concessions, or so most thought at the time. Wanting to avoid a war in 1941, Stalin responded with increased deliveries and hints of even larger shipments to come. Ever cautious, Stalin also built up his military defenses in the west just in case Hitler would try to attack. But that seemed unlikely. Again, Stalin had made the logical move.

Unfortunately for Stalin, it was also the wrong move. Hitler's armies poured over the recently agreed-to border and very nearly wiped out the Soviet state. Ironically, that Hitler could come so close to destroying the USSR was due largely to Stalin's own efforts. Stalin's neutrality had allowed the Axis armies to sweep over the rest of Europe. While not decisive to the Battle for France, the promise of Soviet economic aid, though not yet the actual deliveries, had helped convince the German generals to go along with Hitler's plans and had allowed the Germans to take risks they might not otherwise have been willing to consider.

Having aided Hitler in eliminating the other major armies in Europe, Stalin now faced the full fury of an even more powerful *Wehrmacht*. The economic reserves required for this grand venture had also come in great measure from the Soviet Union itself. Of the various items that the USSR had sent to Germany from 1939 to 1941, oil, manganese, grain, and rubber stand out. Platinum, chrome, phosphates, textiles, wood, and other foodstuffs (particularly soybeans) were also shipped in significant amounts, but the loss of these items could usually be handled by substitution or by increased imports from other countries.¹

Without Soviet deliveries of these four major items (oil, grain, manganese, and rubber), however, Germany barely could have attacked the Soviet Union, let alone come close to victory. Germany's stockpiles of oil, manganese, and grain would have been completely exhausted by the late summer of 1941. And Germany's rubber supply would have run out half a year earlier. Even with more intense rationing and synthetic production, the Reich surely would have lacked the reserves necessary for a major campaign in the East along the lines of Operation Barbarossa.² In other words, Hitler had been almost completely dependent on Stalin to provide him the resources he needed to attack the Soviet Union. It was no wonder that Hitler repeatedly insisted Germany fulfill the terms of the economic treaties. He could not conquer any Soviet territory until he first received enough Soviet raw materials.

But what did Stalin receive in return? Although this is really the subject for a separate study, some tentative conclusions can be reached. Under the clearing accounts, the Soviets had shipped roughly 230 million RM worth of raw materials in advance. On the other hand, the Soviets avoided repaying the roughly 400 million RM they owed from the various credits and other accounts. In terms of the numbers, therefore, they had come out about even.

The effect of these imports of largely finished products is more difficult to estimate. The Soviets had concentrated heavily on naval equipment, the cruiser *Lützow* being one example. But the Baltic fleet lost much of its strength when it attempted to flee from its base in Tallinn in late August and spent almost the entire war bottled up in Leningrad. The *Lützow* itself was never completed, but it did have four 20.3-cm guns already installed and served as a floating battery in the siege of Leningrad until it was sunk on September 17, 1941. It was later refloated and saw some further action under the name *Tallinn*.³ But taken as a whole, German naval aid proved of relatively little value.

The rest of Germany's shipments seem to have been of somewhat greater utility. Soviet aviation experts were quite satisfied with their admittedly modest purchases. The Soviets also put great emphasis on German coal deliveries, the quality of which apparently exceeded what the Soviets could get elsewhere. Although many of the machine tools and much of the other equipment sent to the USSR were destroyed or captured in the Nazi invasion, the overall totals received from the Reich were great enough that the remainder probably still played an important role in reequipping the Red Army.⁴

Nonetheless, these German exports were certainly less vital for the Soviet Union than the Russian exports were for the Reich. And in comparison to the amounts the Soviets would later receive from the Allied Lend-Lease program, this trade with the Germans was insignificant. For the entire period of the Nazi-Soviet collaboration, Germany had shipped less than 500 million RM worth of goods. In 1942 alone, the Allies sent the Russians \$1.36 billion of various materials, or more than 5 billion RM worth! By 1944, the number had risen to \$3.44 billion.⁵ If any outside power helped the Soviet Union to victory in World War II, it was the United States.

On the other hand, if any country helped the Germans to near triumph in the war, it was the USSR. Despite the relatively small delivery totals when compared to the later Lend-Lease figures, Stalin had nonetheless unwittingly provided Hitler with that extra dose of strength the *Führer* needed to launch his drive for *Lebensraum*. A little more help, and the German eagle's bite might well have been fatal.

NOTES

1. See Appendix A, Tables 2.1–2.7, for more details. Of the secondary products listed, only in platinum did Soviet deliveries account for more than fifty percent of German imports in both 1940 and the first six months of 1941. Gold, however, could often be substituted for platinum in various chemical processes.
2. For the likely effects of a cutoff of Soviet supplies on Germany's raw material position, see Appendix A, Tables 3.2–3.5.
3. Philbin, 126–28.
4. For more information on the specific totals exported by Germany to the USSR, see Appendix A, Tables 2.8–2.10.
5. Van Tuyll, 165.

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Table 1.1
German Imports from the USSR in Millions of RM, 1912–41¹

	Total Imports	Imports from the USSR	Gold from the USSR	Percentage of Total Trade
1912	10691	1528	—	14.3
1913	10770	1425	—	13.2
1923	6161	147	—	2.4
1924	9317	141	—	1.5
1925	12362	230	—	1.9
1926	10001	323	43	3.2
1927	14228	433	44	3.0
1928	14051	379	1345	2.7
1929	13447	426	1	3.2
1930	10393	436	0	4.2
1931	6727	304	247	4.5
1932	4667	271	204	5.8
1933	4204	194	202	4.6
1934	4451	210	227	4.7
1935	4159	215	16	5.2
1936	4218	93	0	2.2
1937	5468	65	0	1.2
1938	5449	47	0	0.9
1938 (Austria)	6052	53	0	0.9
1939	4797	30	0	0.6
1940	5012	391	0	7.8
1941 (6 months)	3293	216	27	6.6
1941	6925	327	27	4.7

Source: Statistisches Reichsamt, *Statistische Jahrbücher für das Deutsche Reich, 1913–1942* (Berlin: Reimar-Hobbing, 1913–1942); and *Der Außenhandel Deutschlands* (Berlin, 1939–1941).

Table 1.2
German Exports to the USSR in Millions of RM, 1912–41

	Total Exports	Exports to the USSR	Percentage of Total Trade
1912	8957	680	7.6
1913	10097	880	8.7
1923	6116	76	1.2
1924	6568	91	1.4
1925	9319	251	2.7
1926	10415	266	2.6
1927	10801	330	3.1
1928	12030	403	3.4
1929	13483	354	2.6
1930	12036	431	3.6
1931	9599	763	8.0
1932	5739	626	10.9
1933	4871	282	5.8
1934	4167	63	1.5
1935	4270	39	0.9
1936	4768	126	2.6
1937	5911	117	2.0
1938	5257	32	0.6
1938 (Austria)	5619	34	0.6
1939	5222	31	0.6
1940	4868	216	4.4
1941 (6 months)	3332	240	7.2
1941	6840	269	3.9

Source: Statistische Jahrbücher and Der Außenhandel Deutschlands.

Table 1.3**Soviet Imports from the United States, Great Britain, and Germany in Millions of Rubles, 1913–40**

	Total Imports	Imports from the USA	Imports from Great Britain	Imports from Germany	German Imports as Percentage of Total
1913	4792	276	603	2276	47.5
1922–23	518	15	130	214	41.3
1923–24	814	178	171	157	19.3
1924–25	2521	703	386	357	14.2
1925–26	2636	426	452	613	23.2
1926–27	2487	508	352	563	22.6
1927–28	3295	654	166	866	26.3
1929	3069	618	191	678	22.1
1930	3690	921	279	874	23.7
1931	3851	801	256	1431	37.2
1932	2454	110	320	1142	46.5
1933	1214	58	107	515	42.4
1934	810	62	109	100	12.4
1935	841	103	79	75	8.9
1936	1077	166	77	245	22.8
1937	1016	186	48	151	14.9
1938	1090	308	132	50	4.6
1939	745	229	85	42	5.6
1940	1091	338	10	316	29.0

Source: Roger A. Clarke, *Soviet Economic Facts, 1917–1970* (London: Macmillan, 1972), 37–41; and *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR Za 1918–1940* (Moscow 1960), as cited in Eichler, 276–81.

Table 1.4**Soviets Exports to the United States, Great Britain, and Germany in Millions of Rubles, 1913–40**

	Total Exports	Exports to the USA	Exports to Great Britain	Exports to Germany	German Exports as Percentage of Total
1913	5298	49	933	1580	29.8
1922–23	467	2	101	150	32.1
1923–24	1300	25	291	231	17.8
1924–25	2014	99	674	304	15.1
1925–26	2451	107	769	389	15.9
1926–27	2812	82	769	611	21.8
1927–28	2759	98	543	674	24.4
1929	3219	149	706	749	23.3
1930	3612	143	976	716	19.8
1931	2827	79	927	450	15.9
1932	2004	60	483	350	17.5
1933	1727	49	303	298	17.3
1934	1458	50	341	343	23.2
1935	1281	93	301	230	18.0
1936	1082	104	288	92	8.5
1937	1312	101	421	80	6.1
1938	1021	67	283	64	6.3
1939	462	65	101	46	10.0
1940	1066	86	0	555	52.1

Source: Clarke, 37–41, and *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya*.

Table 1.5
German Imports from the USSR and the Baltics in Millions of RM, 1939–41²

	Total Imports	Imports from USSR	Imports from Baltics	Soviet Imports as a Percentage of Total
Sep. 1939	349.7	1.8	9.0	0.5
Oct. 1939	271.4	2.2	8.8	0.8
Nov. 1939	270.1	5.5	13.4	2.0
Dec. 1939	299.6	4.5	10.5	1.5
Jan. 1940	185.6	4.7	9.2	2.5
Feb. 1940	217.6	10.2	5.6	4.7
Mar. 1940	230.6	9.7	5.5	4.2
Apr. 1940	294.0	16.7	6.7	5.7
May 1940	285.6	21.1	10.4	7.4
Jun. 1940	331.1	34.2	23.2	10.3
Jul. 1940	372.6	26.6	17.3	7.1
Aug. 1940	490.6	67.6	19.9	13.8
Sep. 1940	541.7	94.6	18.7	17.5
Oct. 1940	562.7	42.4	11.8	7.5
Nov. 1940	560.0	28.0	7.9	5.0
Dec. 1940	542.8	27.0	7.0	5.0
Jan. 1941	440.9	24.0	3.8	5.4
Feb. 1941	473.9	19.9	4.2	4.2
Mar. 1941	553.9	31.4	1.5	5.7
Apr. 1941	528.2	22.2	0.0	4.2
May 1941	641.8	50.8	0.0	7.9
Jun. 1941	654.0	58.0	0.0	8.9
Jul. 1941	632.1	34.8	0.0	5.5
Aug. 1941	583.3	29.8	0.0	5.1
Sep. 1941	582.5	10.1	0.0	1.7

Source: *Der Außenhandel Deutschlands.*

Table 1.6
German Exports to the USSR and the Baltics in Millions of RM, 1939–41

	Total Exports	Exports to USSR	Exports to Baltics	Soviet Exports as a Percentage of Total
Sep. 1939	318.7	0.1	6.1	0.0
Oct. 1939	364.0	2.4	9.1	0.7
Nov. 1939	373.8	2.2	10.2	0.6
Dec. 1939	392.0	2.9	12.9	0.7
Jan. 1940	255.8	3.0	9.1	1.2
Feb. 1940	251.6	1.8	6.9	0.7
Mar. 1940	321.7	2.6	8.7	0.8
Apr. 1940	419.9	8.1	20.4	1.9
May 1940	375.1	15.1	23.7	4.0
Jun. 1940	353.1	30.8	20.7	8.9
Jul. 1940	354.0	25.8	15.4	7.3
Aug. 1940	360.8	24.8	6.6	6.9
Sep. 1940	388.2	19.9	9.4	5.1
Oct. 1940	422.4	14.2	4.0	3.4
Nov. 1940	499.0	25.0	3.6	5.0
Dec. 1940	521.7	37.7	3.4	7.2
Jan. 1941	451.8	29.6	2.3	6.6
Feb. 1941	514.1	19.4	1.9	3.8
Mar. 1941	591.6	20.6	15.0	3.5
Apr. 1941	593.1	51.0	0.0	8.6
May 1941	591.9	47.1	0.0	8.0
Jun. 1941	581.8	53.2	0.0	9.1
Jul. 1941	550.7	21.6	0.0	3.9
Aug. 1941	584.2	3.9	0.0	0.7
Sep. 1941	579.1	2.3	0.0	0.4

Source: Der Außenhandel Deutschlands.

Table 1.7
Percentage of Economic Treaty Terms Fulfilled by Germany, 1940–41³

	August 19, 1939, Trade Treaty	August 19, 1939, Credit Treaty	February 11, 1940, Clearing Treaty	January 10, 1941, Clearing Treaty
May 1940	99.8	90.3	25.5	—
Jun. 1940	97.6	93.0	32.2	—
Jul. 1940	111.0	105.3	50.4	—
Aug. 1940	55.0	76.1	29.7	—
Sep. 1940	58.5	80.0	33.5	—
Oct. 1940	61.8	79.3	37.1	—
Nov. 1940	58.5	83.5	42.8	—
Dec. 1940	58.9	98.5	48.7	—
Dec. 1940 (Revised)	58.9	98.5	61.3	—
Jan. 1941	61.2	99.4	67.7	—
Feb. 1941	60.9	95.6	81.5	101.3
Mar. 1941	61.7	96.5	90.0	115.7
Apr. 1941	61.6	99.0	98.0	121.7
May 1941	63.2	99.2	106.6	175.2

Source: BA/RFM, "Übersicht über den deutsch-russischen Waren- und Zahlungsverkehr," R 2/17307.

Table 1.8
Percentage of Economic Treaty Terms Fulfilled by the USSR, 1940-41⁴

	August 19, 1939, Trade Treaty	February 11, 1940, Clearing Treaty	January 10, 1941, Clearing Treaty
May 1940	44.1	28.2	—
Jun. 1940	45.9	51.7	—
Jul. 1940	51.0	77.1	—
Aug. 1940	32.1	51.3	—
Sep. 1940	39.2	55.3	—
Oct. 1940	44.5	59.2	—
Nov. 1940	49.2	62.7	—
Dec. 1940	51.4	66.9	—
Dec. 1940 (Revised)	51.4	84.1	—
Jan. 1941	55.5	87.6	—
Feb. 1941	62.0	90.3	8.7
Mar. 1941	64.8	94.3	21.3
Apr. 1941	68.7	94.7	45.8
May 1941	67.4	98.1	112.4

Source: BA/RFM, "Übersicht über den deutsch-russischen Waren- und Zahlungsverkehr," R 2/17307.

Table 2.1**Soviet Mineral and Chemical Exports to Germany in Thousands of Tons, 1938–41⁵**

	1938	1939	1940	1941 (6 months)
Oil Products	78.6	5.1	617.0	254.1
Copper	0.0	0.0	7.1	7.2
Nickel	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.7
Tin	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0
Platinum (in tons)	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.3
Manganese	60.9	6.2	64.8	75.2
Chromium	0.0	0.0	26.3	0.0
Chemicals: Finished	0.0	0.9	2.9	0.2
Chemicals: Unfinished	0.0	0.9	2.6	1.0
Chemicals: Phosphates	151.6	32.4	131.5	56.3
Technical Fats & Oils	4.7	4.4	11.0	8.9

*Source: Statistische Jahrbücher and Der Außenhandel Deutschlands.***Table 2.2****Soviet Mineral and Chemical Exports to Germany in Millions of RM, 1938–41⁶**

	1938	1939	1940	1941 (6 months)
Oil Products	4.8	0.3	75.1	24.8
Copper	0.0	0.0	7.8	5.4
Nickel	0.0	0.0	6.7	3.4
Tin	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.0
Platinum	0.0	0.0	7.3	6.5
Manganese	2.9	0.7	5.5	6.2
Chromium	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.0
Chemicals: Finished	0.0	0.5	1.3	0.1
Chemicals: Unfinished	0.0	1.2	2.7	1.1
Chemicals: Phosphates	3.2	1.2	5.5	3.1
Technical Fats & Oils	1.5	1.1	6.3	4.7

Source: Statistische Jahrbücher and Der Außenhandel Deutschlands.

Table 2.3
Soviet Mineral and Chemical Exports to Germany as Percentage of Type, 1938–41⁷

	1938	1939	1940	1941 (6 months)
Oil Products	2.2	0.1	34.2	25.0
Copper	0.0	0.0	6.8	9.2
Nickel	0.0	0.0	30.0	33.3
Tin	0.0	0.0	11.4	0.0
Platinum	0.0	0.0	75.9	88.1
Manganese	14.3	2.6	54.5	64.6
Chromium	0.0	0.0	65.8	0.0
Chemicals: Finished	0.0	2.4	5.6	1.2
Chemicals: Unfinished	0.0	2.3	5.2	3.9
Chemicals: Phosphates	5.1	1.9	11.9	7.9
Technical Fats & Oils	2.2	2.2	12.7	14.0

Source: Statistische Jahrbücher and Der Außenhandel Deutschlands.

Table 2.4
Soviet Agricultural Exports to Germany in Thousands of Tons, 1938–41⁸

	1938	1939	1940	1941 (6 months)
Raw Textiles	5.1	9.0	99.1	41.1
Wood Products	271.9	171.9	846.7	393.7
Grains	0.0	0.2	820.8	547.1
Meats	0.0	0.1	3.8	1.9
Raw Tobacco	0.0	1.9	0.4	0.0
Animal Skins	0.1	0.2	2.5	0.1
Woven Fabrics	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Legumes	0.0	10.9	47.2	34.8
Oil Cake	0.0	0.0	29.0	8.6
Bed Feathers	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3

Source: Statistische Jahrbücher and Der Außenhandel Deutschlands.

Table 2.5
Soviet Agricultural Exports to Germany in Millions of RM, 1938–41⁹

	1938	1939	1940	1941 (6 months)
Raw Textiles	2.3	3.0	77.6	32.9
Wood Products	19.8	8.6	42.3	25.3
Grains	0.0	0.0	98.5	74.0
Meats	0.0	0.9	6.8	2.9
Raw Tobacco	0.0	1.9	0.7	0.0
Animal Skins	2.8	1.8	9.2	3.4
Woven Fabrics	1.2	1.3	0.0	0.0
Legumes	0.0	3.4	16.3	14.7
Oil Cake	0.0	0.0	4.3	1.9
Bed Feathers	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.1

Source: Statistische Jahrbücher and Der Außenhandel Deutschlands.

Table 2.6
Soviet Agricultural Exports to Germany as Percentage of Type, 1938–41¹⁰

	1938	1939	1940	1941 (6 months)
Raw Textiles	0.3	0.5	20.0	13.9
Wood Products	6.4	3.1	11.2	10.9
Grains	0.0	0.0	30.1	58.3
Meats	0.0	0.6	2.9	1.4
Raw Tobacco	0.0	1.0	0.3	0.0
Animal Skins	1.2	1.0	8.7	7.0
Woven Fabrics	1.4	1.6	0.0	0.0
Legumes	0.0	8.8	30.3	23.9
Oil Cake	0.0	0.0	9.3	20.0
Bed Feathers	4.3	4.4	3.5	0.7

Source: Statistische Jahrbücher and Der Außenhandel Deutschlands.

Table 2.7
Major Soviet Exports to Germany in Thousands of Tons, 1939–41 (Soviet Figures)¹¹

	1939 (Sep.-Dec.)	1940	1941 (Jan.-Jun.)
Grains	5.7	897.7	707.7
Timber	90.1	975.8	161.7
Textiles	8.1	98.2	65.1
Rags	2.1	6.0	1.9
Meats	0.3	3.8	1.4
Animal Skins	0.6	1.1	0.1
Pulses	8.4	35.9	36.5
Oil Seed Cake	0.0	26.2	15.6
Fat Vegetable Oils	0.0	8.9	0.5
Oil	1.4	657.4	282.9
Manganese	3.4	107.1	54.7
Chromium	0.0	23.4	0.0
Asbestos	1.8	13.6	3.2
Phosphates	10.3	163.6	28.4
Glycerine	0.0	3.7	0.2
Other	13.9	10.4	2.4
Total	146.1	3032.8	1362.3

Source: W. N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade* (London: Longmans, 1952), I: 667–68.

Table 2.8
Major German Exports to the USSR in Thousands of Tons, 1938–41¹²

	1938	1939	1940	1941 (6 months)
Coal	0.0	0.0	3845.9	1273.6
Machines	4.6	9.1	19.4	40.2
Finished Iron: Tools	2.5	0.8	14.3	8.4
Unfinished Iron: Tubing	15.9	15.7	98.7	61.4
Motor Vehicles & Planes	0.0	0.0	0.4	3.0
Chemicals: Unfinished	2.6	0.5	1.7	2.1
Electrical Goods	0.1	0.6	3.3	3.5
Optical Equipment	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3
Metals	0.5	0.1	3.7	3.1
Naval Equipment	0	0	6	5

Source: Statistische Jahrbücher and Der Außenhandel Deutschlands.

Table 2.9
Major German Exports to the USSR in Millions of RM, 1938–41¹³

	1938	1939	1940	1941 (6 months)
Coal	0.0	0.0	32.5	1273.6
Machines	11.1	18.6	50.5	102.9
Finished Iron: Tools	1.7	0.7	41.9	42.9
Unfinished Iron: Tubing	4.4	4.3	36.5	31.4
Motor Vehicles & Planes	0.0	0.2	11.1	4.9
Chemicals: Unfinished	2.1	1.4	5.5	5.4
Electrical Goods	1.3	1.3	9.4	14.9
Optical Equipment	4.9	2.5	5.8	8.7
Metals	2.1	0.4	9.1	9.2
Naval Equipment	0.0	0.0	9.0	5.0

Source: Statistische Jahrbücher and Der Außenhandel Deutschlands.

Table 2.10
Major German Exports to the USSR as Percentage of Type, 1938–41¹⁴

	1938	1939	1940	1941 (6 months)
Coal	0.0	0.0	4.6	3.1
Machines	1.4	2.5	9.8	30.2
Finished Iron: Tools	0.3	0.1	9.1	10.3
Unfinished Iron: Tubing	1.1	0.3	7.3	11.7
Motor Vehicles & Planes	0.0	0.1	3.4	3.6
Chemicals: Unfinished	0.5	0.3	1.9	3.1
Electrical Goods	0.4	0.4	4.2	10.1
Optical Equipment	3.9	2.3	6.8	19.2
Metals	0.8	0.2	3.3	10.1
Naval Equipment	0.0	0.0	37.0	90.9

Source: Statistische Jahrbücher and Der Außenhandel Deutschlands.

Table 3.1
Soviet Oil Exports to Germany by Route in Thousands of Tons, 1940–41¹⁵

	Overland	Black Sea	Baltic Sea	Total
Feb. 1940	25.7	18.0	0.0	43.7
Mar. 1940	27.0	0.0	0.0	27.0
Apr. 1940	19.5	5.2	0.0	24.7
May 1940	31.5	33.5	0.0	65.0
Jun. 1940	60.1	23.5	6.9	90.5
Jul. 1940	60.9	23.0	23.2	107.1
Aug. 1940	43.3	33.4	27.3	104.1
Sep. 1940	20.7	21.9	8.6	51.1
Oct. 1940	24.5	21.2	2.2	47.9
Nov. 1940	19.1	23.9	0.0	43.1
Dec. 1940	21.4	38.2	0.0	59.6
Total 1940	353.8	241.9	68.2	663.9
Jan. 1941	22.3	28.9	0.0	51.2
Feb. 1941	17.3	30.0	0.0	47.3
Mar. 1941	19.6	0.0	0.0	19.6
Apr. 1941	68.7	14.8	0.0	83.6
May 1941	28.5	36.1	0.0	64.6
Total 1941	156.4	109.8	0.0	266.2
Total 1940-1941	510.2	351.7	68.2	930.2

Source: BAMA/WiRüAmt/Ro, "Mineralöl-Einfuhr-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Berichte 2–17," *RW 19/2814*, 5935–71.

Table 3.2
Germany's Monthly Oil Stocks in Thousands of Tons, 1939–41¹⁶

	Estimated Total Stocks	Aviation, Motor, & Diesel	Total Soviet Exports	Estimated Minus Soviet	A.M.&D. Minus Soviet
Aug. 1939	2176	1366	0	2176	1365
Jan. 1940	1135	930	19	1116	911
Feb. 1940	1115	915	48	1067	867
Mar. 1940	1110	910	70	1040	840
Apr. 1940	1150	945	105	1045	840
May 1940	1115	915	155	960	750
Jun. 1940	1250	1025	235	1015	750
Jul. 1940	1490	1220	331	1155	889
Aug. 1940	1720	1410	426	1294	984
Sep. 1940	2010	1650	495	1515	1155
Oct. 1940	1900	1560	543	1357	1019
Nov. 1940	1880	1540	581	1299	959
Dec. 1940	1810	1485	622	1188	863
Jan. 1941	1840	1510	678	1162	832
Feb. 1941	1825	1495	713	1112	782
Mar. 1941	1815	1490	746	1069	744
Apr. 1941	1745	1430	795	950	635
May 1941	1665	1365	839	826	496
Jun. 1941	1645	1350	877	768	473
Jul. 1941	1370	1125	910	460	215
Aug. 1941	1290	1060	912	378	148
Sep. 1941	1225	1005	912	313	93
Oct. 1941	1105	905	912	193	-7

Source: BAMA/WiRüAmt/Ro, "Mineralölbestände, -Erzeugung und -Einfuhr insb. aus Rumänien und UdSSR 1940–1943," *RW 19/2715*, 15070; "The German Oil Industry: Ministerial Report," in *USSBS*, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), Fig. 21; and "Oil Division, Final Report," in *USSBS*, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), Fig. 25.

Table 3.3
Germany's Monthly Rubber Stocks in Thousands of Tons, 1939-41¹⁷

	Natural	Synthetic	Reclaim	Total	Natural via USSR	Natural minus USSR	Total minus USSR
Sep. 1939	17.0	5.5	5.8	28.2	—	—	—
Jan. 1940	12.0	7.5	5.8	25.3	—	—	—
Feb. 1940	10.5	7.3	5.3	23.1	—	—	—
Mar. 1940	9.3	6.7	5.0	20.9	—	—	—
Apr. 1940	7.9	5.9	4.9	18.7	—	—	—
May 1940	6.0	5.1	4.8	15.8	—	—	—
Jun. 1940	4.8	4.4	4.7	13.9	—	—	—
Jul. 1940	6.3	2.9	4.8	14.0	—	—	—
Aug. 1940	4.6	2.7	4.9	12.2	—	—	—
Sep. 1940	3.2	2.6	4.7	10.5	—	—	—
Oct. 1940	1.5	2.2	4.8	8.6	—	—	—
Nov. 1940	2.2	1.9	4.3	8.4	—	—	—
Dec. 1940	1.9	3.4	4.5	9.8	4.5	-2.6	5.3
Jan. 1941	3.3	3.8	4.2	11.4	—	—	—
Feb. 1941	2.9	2.8	4.2	9.9	—	—	—
Mar. 1941	2.3	2.6	4.0	9.1	—	—	—
Apr. 1941	2.6	3.6	4.4	10.6	—	—	—
May 1941	5.7	3.1	4.2	12.9	18.8	-15.1	-5.9
Jun. 1941	6.3	3.4	4.1	13.8	18.8	-12.3	-5.0
Jul. 1941	6.8	3.2	3.8	13.9	18.8	-12.0	-4.9
Aug. 1941	4.7	3.2	3.8	11.7	18.8	-14.1	-7.1
Sep. 1941	5.6	3.9	3.6	13.1	18.8	-13.2	-5.7
Oct. 1941	4.9	3.9	3.3	12.1	18.8	-13.9	-6.7

Source: "Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix," in *USSBS, 1945* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), Table C-5; and *Medlicott*, 1: 669-70.

Table 3.4
Germany's Monthly Manganese Stocks in Thousands of Tons, 1939–41

	Manganese Stocks	Total Soviet Shipments	Stocks minus Soviet
Sep. 1939	365	0.3	364.7
Jan. 1940	290	1.7	288.3
Feb. 1940	260	2.8	257.2
Mar. 1940	255	3.6	251.4
Apr. 1940	230	5.3	224.7
May 1940	205	8.6	196.4
Jun. 1940	200	9.7	190.3
Jul. 1940	190	9.7	180.3
Aug. 1940	185	11.1	173.9
Sep. 1940	200	13.0	187.0
Oct. 1940	245	18.4	226.6
Nov. 1940	240	41.6	198.4
Dec. 1940	235	66.4	168.6
Jan. 1941	290	83.8	206.2
Feb. 1941	260	87.7	172.3
Mar. 1941	240	94.1	145.9
Apr. 1941	235	109.1	125.9
May 1941	210	129.6	80.4
Jun. 1941	205	141.6	63.4
Jul. 1941	210	155.5	54.5
Aug. 1941	200	177.9	22.1
Sep. 1941	185	183.4	1.6
Oct. 1941	170	189.5	-19.5
Nov. 1941	160	195.6	-35.6
Dec. 1941	140	208.5	-68.5

Source: *Der Außenhandel Deutschlands* and BA/SR/RfwP, "Monatliche Übersichten über die Rohstoffversorgung. Graphische Darstellung 1939–1943," R 24/26.

Table 3.5
Germany's Monthly Grain Stocks in Thousands of Tons, 1939–41¹⁸

	Grain Stocks	Total Soviet Shipments	Stocks minus Soviet
Sep. 1939	5613	0.0	5613.0
Jan. 1940	5373	1.7	5371.3
Feb. 1940	5216	12.1	5203.9
Mar. 1940	5029	28.1	5000.9
Apr. 1940	4982	84.0	4899.0
May 1940	4693	128.1	4564.9
Jun. 1940	4425	186.5	4238.5
Jul. 1940	4281	244.0	4037.0
Aug. 1940	4563	412.9	4150.1
Sep. 1940	4517	752.7	3764.3
Oct. 1940	4157	841.9	3315.1
Nov. 1940	3063	881.1	2721.9
Dec. 1940	3123	925.0	2198.0
Jan. 1941	2848	964.2	1833.8
Feb. 1941	2524	1012.2	1511.8
Mar. 1941	2446	1097.4	1348.6
Apr. 1941	2159	1154.3	1004.7
May 1941	1763	1337.0	426.0
Jun. 1941	1381	1472.3	-91.3
Jul. 1941	865	1540.0	-675.0
Aug. 1941	588	1601.3	-1013.3
Sep. 1941	666	1625.4	-959.4
Oct. 1941	761	1637.1	-876.1
Nov. 1941	643	1637.4	-994.4
Dec. 1941	435	1640.2	-1203.2

Source: *Der Außenhandel Deutschlands* and BA/RfE&L/RfG, "Bestände, 1939–1944," R 15/VII/41.

Table 3.6
Percentage of Military Consumption of Liquid Fuels and Rubber Compared to
Percentage of Overall German Economy Converted to War Purposes, 1939–41¹⁹

	Gasolines & Diesel Fuels	Rubber Products	Overall GNP
Aug. 1939	19	52	25
Jan. 1940	41	—	—
Feb. 1940	42	—	—
Mar. 1940	37	—	—
Apr. 1940	41	—	—
May 1940	68	—	—
Jun. 1940	64	—	—
Jul. 1940	55	60	44
Aug. 1940	57	—	—
Sep. 1940	58	—	—
Oct. 1940	57	—	—
Nov. 1940	58	—	—
Dec. 1940	59	—	—
Jan. 1941	60	—	—
Feb. 1941	52	—	—
Mar. 1941	64	—	—
Apr. 1941	64	—	—
May 1941	65	—	—
Jun. 1941	80	—	—
Jul. 1941	70	65	56
Aug. 1941	74	—	—
Sep. 1941	72	—	—
Oct. 1941	68	—	—
Nov. 1941	67	—	—

Source: "Oil, Ministerial Report," *USSBS*, Fig. 17; "Oil, Final Report," *USSBS*, 54; and Mark Harrison, "Resource Mobilization for World War II: The U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938–1945," *Economic History Review*, 41, no. 2 (May 1988): 84.

Table 4.1**German Total Overseas Exports Versus Exports via the USSR in Thousands of Tons, 1940–41²⁰**

	Total Overseas Exports	Exports via the USSR	USSR as Percentage
Feb. 1940	151.8	0.7	0.5
Mar. 1940	222.1	1.5	0.7
Apr. 1940	15.5	3.5	22.6
May 1940	16.3	2.6	15.8
Jun. 1940	7.6	2.2	29.4
Jul. 1940	7.1	5.0	71.2
Aug. 1940	4.4	3.1	69.7
Sep. 1940	6.6	5.0	76.0
Oct. 1940	5.6	4.2	74.5
Nov. 1940	11.6	6.1	53.1
Dec. 1940	11.0	6.8	61.5
Jan. 1941	7.4	4.2	56.8
Feb. 1941	9.6	6.7	69.9
Mar. 1941	9.1	5.5	59.1
Apr. 1941	5.1	3.0	58.4
May 1941	4.9	2.8	58.2
Jun. 1941	11.1	3.0	27.3
Jul. 1941	2.4	1.1	47.4
Aug. 1941	3.2	0.8	24.8
Sep. 1941	4.3	0.0	0.3
Oct. 1941	4.2	0.0	0.0

Source: BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/VO, "Berichte des Verb. Offz. (Oberst Drews) zum RWM 1940–1941," *RW 45/14–15*.

Table 4.2**German Total Overseas Imports Versus Imports via the USSR in Thousands of Tons, 1940–41**

	Total Overseas Imports	Imports via the USSR	USSR as Percentage
Feb. 1940	21.1	0.0	0.0
Mar. 1940	24.5	0.0	0.2
Apr. 1940	25.0	0.2	0.8
May 1940	19.9	0.3	1.6
Jun. 1940	20.5	7.6	37.2
Jul. 1940	17.4	13.2	76.1
Aug. 1940	20.4	11.1	54.2
Sep. 1940	50.2	43.0	85.7
Oct. 1940	37.1	31.7	85.3
Nov. 1940	41.1	23.6	57.4
Dec. 1940	48.5	33.4	68.9
Jan. 1941	43.8	33.1	75.5
Feb. 1941	48.0	31.4	65.3
Mar. 1941	53.5	33.4	62.4
Apr. 1941	65.3	41.0	62.8
May 1941	69.0	52.9	76.7
Jun. 1941	53.2	35.2	66.2
Jul. 1941	103.8	34.6	33.3
Aug. 1941	77.7	7.1	9.2
Sep. 1941	58.5	5.8	9.9
Oct. 1941	56.5	1.0	1.7

Source: BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/VO, "Berichte des Verb. Offz. (Oberst Drews) zum RWM 1940–1941," *RW 45/14–15*.

Table 4.3**German Trade via the Trans-Siberian Railroad in Thousands of Tons, 1940–41 (Soviet Figures)**

	1940	1941 (5 months)
Soya Beans	58.5	109.4
Whale and Fish Oil	56.7	46.2
Rubber	4.5	14.3
Fats	2.1	2.9
Nuts	9.3	12.2
Tea	3.3	4.8
Tinned Food	5.0	3.8
Copper	2.0	2.8
Oil Seeds	0.5	1.9
Japanese Peas	5.1	0.0
Others	19.2	14.1
Total	166.2	212.4

Source: Medlicott, 1: 669–70.**Table 4.4****German Trade via the USSR with Afghanistan and Iran in Thousands of Tons, 1939–41 (Soviet Figures)**

	1939	1940	1941 (5 months)
Textiles	0	19	17
Dried Fruits	8	42	8
Legumes	0	7	2
Other Items	0	2	0

Source: Medlicott, 1: 670–71.

Table 5.1
Planned Soviet Exports to Germany for August 19, 1939, to August 18, 1941²¹

	August 19, 1939, Treaty	February 11, 1940, Treaty	Other Agreements
Albumin	—	150,000 RM	—
Animal Hair	2,000,000 RM	—	?
Arsenic	—	2,250,000 RM	—
Asbestos	3,000 tons	15,000 tons	—
Bed Feathers	2,480,000 RM	—	—
Bladders	120,000 RM	—	—
Bristles	3,600,000 RM	—	—
Carpets	—	—	366,900 RM
Castor Oil	—	—	10,000 tons
Chrome Ore	—	150,000 tons	—
Cobalt	—	3,000 kilograms	—
Copper	—	11,000 tons	59,000 tons
Cotton	14,000 tons	137,300 tons	—
Cotton: Waste	8,100 tons	5,300 tons	—
Ether	—	1,050,000 RM	—
Flax	5,600 tons	14,400 tons	—
Flax: Waste	2,700 tons	—	—
Glands	—	975,000 RM	—
Glimmer	—	300,000 RM	—
Glue	—	300 tons	—
Glycerine	—	300 tons	—
Grains & Legumes	117,100 tons	1,401,800 tons	—
Herbs	1,600,000 RM	750,000 RM	—
Horn Materials	—	375,000 RM	—
Intestines	—	9,000,000 RM	—

(Table 5.1 cont.)

	August 19, 1939, Treaty	February 11, 1940, Treaty	Other Agreements
Iodine	—	975,000 RM	500,000 RM
Iridium	—	72 kilograms	—
Iron: Ore	—	750,000 tons	—
Iron: Raw	—	150,000 tons	—
Iron: Scrap	—	300,000 tons	—
Linseed Oil	600,000 RM	—	—
Liquorice	—	375,000 RM	—
Manganese	83,500 tons	37,500 tons	110,000 tons
Molybdenum	—	500 tons	—
Morphine, etc.	—	1,500,000 RM	—
Nickel	—	3,000 tons	100 tons
Oil Seed Cake	5,400 tons	—	—
Oil Products	63,800 tons	1,308,000 tons	300,000 tons
Phosphates	475,000 tons	450,000 tons	—
Pine Oil	—	330,000 RM	—
Platinum	413 kilograms	3,288 kilograms	—
Rags	700,000 RM	1,500,000 RM	—
Resins	700,000 RM	—	—
Rubber	—	—	1,300 tons
Seeds	—	225,000 RM	—
Shale Oil	23,000 tons	6,700 tons	—
Sheep Skins	—	—	1,900 tons
Sulphur	14,000 tons	21,000 tons	—
Terpentine	—	1,750,000 RM	—
Tin	—	1,000 tons	300 tons
Tobacco & Furs	9,600,000 RM	4,800,000 RM	—

(Table 5.1 cont.)

	August 19, 1939, Treaty	February 11, 1940, Treaty	Other Agreements
Tobacco Powder	—	—	1,000 tons
Wolfram	—	500 tons	—
Wood	75,500,000 RM	27,000,000 RM	—
Wood Tar	—	15,000 RM	—

Source: BA/RK/RA, “Kaufabschlüsse ab 19. August 1939 bis 10. Juli 1940,” *R43/II/1940*, 21ff.

Table 5.2
Negotiators and Transfer Points for Soviet Exports to Germany, 1939–40

	German Buyer	Soviet Seller	Transfer Points
Albumin	E&C Kreuzberger	Rasnoexport	—
Animal Hair	Kiwus & Mogk	Rasnoexport	Stettin, Leningrad, Bremen
Arsenic	Igerussko	—	—
Asbestos	Becker & Haag	Soyuspromexport	Leningrad
Bed Feathers	Künsemüller & Co.	Rasnoexport	Hamburg, Stettin, Przemysl
Bladders	Igerussko, O. Brückner	Exportles	Leningrad
Bristles	J. L. Graubner, P. Schneider	Rasnoexport	Stettin
Carpets	Persische A. G.	Rasnoexport	Leningrad
Castor Oil	Otto Aldag	Rasnoexport	Novosserk
Chrome Ore	Elektrometal.	Soyuspromexport	—
Cobalt	—	—	—
Copper	—	—	—
Cotton	Albrecht, M.-P., & Co.	Exportlyon	Leningrad, Border
Cotton: Waste	Degen. & Otto, Bunzl & Biach	Exportlyon	Leningrad, Border
Ether	O. Brückner	Rasnoexport	Stettin
Flax	Ernst Schulz	Exportlyon	Leningrad, Border
Flax: Waste	Ernst Schulz	Exportlyon	Stettin, Border
Glands	Igerussko	Rasnoexport	Leningrad, Border
Glimmer	Röhrs & Co.	Soyuspromexport	—
Glue	Deutsche Handels	Rasnoexport	—
Glycerine	Otto Aldag	Soyuspromexport	Leningrad
Grains	Reichstelle für Getreide	Exportkleb	Przemysl, Povstken, Terespol
Herbs	Brenntag	—	Border
Horn Materials	Hornimport K.-G.	Rasnoexport	Stettin

(Table 5.2 cont.)

	German Buyer	Soviet Seller	Transfer Points
Intestines	Berthold Rolff, Haberecht & Würz	Rasnoexport	Stettin, Leningrad
Iodine	Igerussko	Soyuspromexport	Stettin, Hamburg
Iron Ore	Stahlwerke	Soyuspromexport	—
Iron: Raw	Krupp, Johst	—	—
Iron: Scrap	Stahlwerke	Soyuspromexport	—
Linseed Oil	Otto Aldag	Exportkleb	—
Liquorice	Brückner, A. G. Chem.	Rasnoexport	Stettin, Hamburg
Manganese	Stahlverein	Soyuspromexport	—
Molybdenum	—	—	—
Morphine, etc.	Six Companies	Rasnoexport	Stettin, Border
Nickel	—	—	—
Oil Seed Cake	Reichstelle für Getreide	Exportkleb	Przemysl, Povstken, Terespol
Oil Products	A. G. Chem., Brenntag, M-E GmbH	Soyuspromexport	Przemysl, Batum, Baltic Ports
Phosphates	Igerussko, Stahlverein	Soyuspromexport	Trangsund, Leningrad
Pine Oil	Brenntag	Rasnoexport	Leningrad
Platinum	Heraeus	Soyuspromexport	Moscow ²²
Rags	Bunzl & Biach	Exportlyon	Stettin, Border
Resins	Igerussko	Soyuspromexport	—
Rubber	—	—	—
Seeds	A. G. Chem.	—	Border
Shale Oil	Igerussko, Jenquel & Hayn, E. Diemar	Soyuspromexport	Poti
Sheep Skins	Four Companies	Rasnoexport	Leningrad
Sulphur	Igerussko	Soyuspromexport	—
Terpentine	Brenntag, Igerussko	Rasnoexport	Leningrad
Tin	—	—	—

(Table 5.2 cont.)

	German Buyer	Soviet Seller	Transfer Points
Tobacco & Furs	Theodor Thorer	Soyuspuschnina	Leipzig
Tobacco Powder	Bigot & Co.	Rasnoexport	Leningrad
Wolfram	—	—	—
Wood	Ten Companies	Exportles	Leningrad, Border
Wood Tar	Brenntag	Soyuspromexport	Leningrad

Source: BA/RK/RA, "Kaufabschlüsse ab 19. August 1939 bis 10. Juli 1940," *R43/II/1940*, 21ff.

Table 5.3
Terms of Trade Agreements for Soviet Items Exported to Germany, 1939–40²³

	Dates	Tons	Avg. RM/Ton	Relative to Market	Total in RM
Albumin ²⁴	—	—	—	—	—
Animal Hair ²⁵	10/25/39– 4/?/40	1,575	Varies	0–16% >	3,769,500
Arsenic ²⁶	—	—	—	—	—
Asbestos ²⁷	12/22/39	3,000	360	40%>	128,000
	7/2, 7/8, 7/9/40	14,003	300	20%>	4,000,000
Bed Feathers ²⁸	11/14/39	100	3,500	0%>	350,000
	3/31/40	150	3,500	0%>	630,000
	6/24/40	50–60	3,900	12%>	250,000
Bladders	10/26/39	1.1	12–21	0%>	18,000
	6/14/40	2.9	15	0%>	43,400
Bristles ²⁹	10/17/39	100	Varies	0%>	998,000
	5/25/40	110		17.5%>	1,332,000
Carpets	10/14, 10/19/39	—	—	—	366,900
Castor Oil ³⁰	3/20, 6/16/40	10,000	\$220	30%<	—
Chrome Ore ³¹	8/?/40	20,000	—	—	—
Cobalt	—	—	—	—	—
Copper	4/28, 8/20/40	—	—	—	—
Cotton ³²	12/11/39	97,500	824–992	0%>	85,204,000
	10/?/40	1,220	—	—	—
Cotton: Waste	8/25/39– 5/16/40	10,000	Varies	30%<	2,750,000
Ether	up to 1/5/40	139.3	Varies	0–20%>	1,345,000
Flax ³³	12/1/39	1,000	1,442	25%>	1,356,000
	6/5/40	9,113	1,442	25%>	5,000,000
Flax: Waste ³⁴	8/?/39– 12/1/39	10,392	3–500	12.5%>	5,000,000
Glands	6/2/40	112	Varies	65%>	141,000

(Table 5.3 cont.)

	Dates	Tons	Avg. RM/Ton	Relative to Market	Total in RM
Glimmer ³⁵	—	—	—	700+%>	—
Glue ³⁶	—	—	—	—	—
Glycerine ³⁷	4/12/40	250	1,000	20%>	250,000
Grains & Legumes ³⁸	10/26/39	171,232	115-30	0%>	23,620,000
	4/30, 5/15/40	810,000	115-30	8%>	98,800,000
	7/24/40	4,400	—	—	—
Herbs	3/12/40	397.7	Varies	0-20%>	405,000
Horn Materials	12/?/39, 5/24/40	680	110-18	0-?%>	76,100
Intestines	9/11/39-5/29/40	7,400 bls	Varies	0%>	2,283,000
	9/29/39-6/20/40	21,000 bls		3.25%>	6,000,000
Iodine ³⁹	11/10/39	50-60	13,000	175%>	650,000
Iridium	5/28/40	24 kgs	19,000,000	25%>	463,000
Iron: Ore ⁴⁰	—	—	—	—	—
Iron: Raw ⁴¹	—	—	—	—	—
Iron: Scrap ⁴²	—	—	—	—	—
Linseed Oil ⁴³	—	—	—	—	—
Liquorice ⁴⁴	8/19/39-2/14/40	1,150	Varies	Varies	300,000 +/-
Manganese ⁴⁵	7/11/40	80,000	45 +/-	—	3,600
	8/14/40	55,000	45 +/-	—	2,400
Molybdenum	—	—	—	—	—
Morphine, etc.	10/9/39-7/4/40	59.3	Varies	Varies	709,700
Nickel	4/28, 8/20/40	1,531.5	—	—	—
Oil Seed Cake	1/17/40	25,000	150-55	0%>	3,700,000

(Table 5.3 cont.)

	Dates	Tons	Avg. RM/Ton	Relative to Market	Total in RM
Oil Products ⁴⁶	11/39 12/18/39 5/25, 5/26/40	1,800 108,200 801,200	260 260 Varies	200%> 200%> 50%>	540,000 13,000,000 85,000,000
Phosphates ⁴⁷	12/1/39 12/2/39	500,000 130,000	27 17	0-2%< 0-2%<	12- 15,000,000 2,190,000
Pine Oil	8/23/39- 2/3/40	60	4,000-4,500	0-13%>	245,000
Platinum	1/20- 5/22/40	2,400 kgs	5,000,000	33.3%>	11,522,000
Rags ⁴⁸	9/20/39- 5/21/40	6,750	Varies	0%>	1,284,000
Resins ⁴⁹	—	—	—	—	—
Rubber	8/22/40	1,309	—	—	—
Seeds	6/17/40	20.7	Varies	0-20%>	40,000
Shale Oil ⁵⁰	12/39 3/26/40 5/22, 7/2/40	500 6,000 15,000	112 112 112	12%> 12%> 12%>	56,000 672,000 1,680,000
Sheep Skins	9/10, 11/21/39	1,911	Varies	0-14%>	2,898,000
Sulphur ⁵¹	6/23/40	28,000	142.5	6%>	4,000,000
Terpentine ⁵²	12/31/39 6/?/40	500 3,000	400 455	30%> 70%>	200,000 1,365,000
Tin	4/28, 8/20/40	785	—	—	—
Tobacco & Furs ⁵³	up to 7/10/40	—	Varies	15%>	4,200,000
Tobacco Powder	10/20/39	1,000	\$19	0%>	69,000
Wolfram	—	—	—	—	—
Wood ⁵⁴	up to 8/30/40	—	Varies	0-10%>	39,378,000
Wood Tar ⁵⁵	5/30/40	10	600	0%>	6,000

Source: BA/RK/RA, "Kaufabschlüsse ab 19. August 1939 bis 10. Juli 1940," R43/II/1940, 21ff.

Table 5.4
Planned Versus Actual Soviet Exports to Germany, 1939–41⁵⁶

	Planned by Aug. 1941	Contracted by Oct. 1940	Delivered by Aug. 1941
Albumin	150,000 RM	—	—
Animal Hair	2,000,000 RM —	3,769,500 RM 1,575 tons	— 2,200 tons
Arsenic	2,250,000 RM	—	—
Asbestos	18,000 tons	14,300 tons	18,600 tons
Bed Feathers	2,480,000 RM —	1,280,000 RM 300 tons	— 400 tons
Bladders	120,000 RM	61,400 RM	—
Bristles	3,600,000 RM —	2,330,000 RM 210 tons	— 100 tons
Carpets	— —	366,900 RM —	— 100 tons
Castor Oil	—	1,000,000 tons	—
Chrome Ore	150,000 tons	20,000 tons	23,400 tons
Cobalt	3,000 kilograms	—	—
Copper	16,900 tons	11,000 tons	—
Cotton	151,300 tons	98,700 tons	139,500 tons
Cotton: Waste	13,400 tons	10,000 tons	—
Ether	1,050,000 RM —	1,345,000 RM 139.3 tons	— 200 tons
Flax	20,000 tons	10,100 tons	27,300 tons
Flax: Waste	2,700 tons	10,400 tons	1,000 tons
Glands	975,000 RM	141,000 RM	—
Glimmer	300,000 RM —	— —	— 900 tons
Glue	300 tons	—	—
Glycerine	300 tons	300 tons	3,900 tons
Grains & Legumes	1,518,800 tons	985,600 tons	1,691,900 tons

(Table 5.4 cont.)

	Planned by Aug. 1941	Contracted by Oct. 1940	Delivered by Aug. 1941
Herbs	2,350,000 RM —	405,000 RM 398 tons	— 3,000 tons
Horn Materials	375,000 RM —	76,100 RM 680 tons	— 1,900 tons
Intestines	9,000,000 RM —	8,283,000 RM —	— 5,400 tons
Iodine	1,475,000 RM	650,000 RM	—
Iridium	72 kilograms	24 kilograms	—
Iron: Ore	750,000 tons	—	—
Iron: Raw	150,000 tons	—	—
Iron: Scrap	300,000 tons	—	—
Linseed Oil	600,000 RM	—	—
Liquorice	375,000 RM	300,000 RM	—
Manganese	231,000 tons	135,000 tons	165,200 tons
Molybdenum	500 tons	—	—
Morphine, etc.	1,500,000 RM	709,700 RM	—
Nickel	3,000 tons	1,500 tons	—
Oil Seed Cake	54,200 tons	25,000 tons	51,200 tons
Oil Products	1,371,800 tons	911,200 tons	941,700 tons
Phosphates	925,000 tons	630,000 tons	202,300 tons
Pine Oil	330,000 RM	245,000 RM	—
Platinum	3,701 kilograms	2,400 kilograms	—
Rags	1,700,000 RM —	1,284,000 RM 6,750 tons	— 10,000 tons
Resins	700,000 RM	—	—
Rubber	1,300 tons	1,300 tons	—
Seeds	225,000 RM	40,000 RM	—
Shale Oil	29,700 tons	21,500 tons	—
Sheep Skins	—	2,898,000 RM	—

(Table 5.4 cont.)

	Planned by Aug. 1941	Contracted by Oct. 1940	Delivered by Aug. 1941
Sulphur	3,500,000 tons	2,800,000 tons	—
Terpentine	1,750,000 RM —	1,565,000 RM 3,500 tons	— 2,900 tons
Tine	1,300 tons	800 tons	—
Tobacco & Furs	14,400,000 RM —	4,200,000 RM —	— 1,900 tons
Tobacco Powder	—	1,000 tons	1,500 tons
Wolfram	500 tons	—	—
Wood	102,500,000 RM —	39,378,000 RM —	— 1,227,600 tons
Wood Tar	15,000 RM	600 RM	—

Source: Medicott, 1: 667–68.

NOTES

1. Note that the 1934 and 1935 figures for imports from the USSR were later revised by the *Rußlandausschuß* to 223 and 202 million RM, respectively. Though other authors also cite these same reports, there remain differences over exact totals for Soviet trade during the first six months of 1941. Ferdinand Friedensburg, "Die sowjetischen Kriegslieferungen an das Hitlerreich," *Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung* (1962): 333, mistakenly cites the year-end figures as the six-month totals! Furthermore, the six-month German export total of 276 million RM one finds by adding the individual categories he lists on page 337 is already 7 million RM over the year-end figure of 269 million RM. Gerhard Eichler, *Die deutsch-sowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen* (Ph.D. diss., Halle, 1965), 284, on the other hand, estimates imports at 205.9 million RM and exports at 234.5 million RM by adding individual categories instead of using the overall figures. Finally Heinrich Schwendemann, *Die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Sowjetunion von 1939 bis 1941* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), 367, uses these reports second-hand through the notices sent to Oberst Drews in the *WiRuAmt* and lists imports at 251 million RM and exports at 265 million RM (which includes a gold payment of 45 million RM).

2. BA/RFM, "Übersicht über den deutsch-russischen Waren- und Zahlungsverkehr," R 2/17307, contains similar import and export information in two additional forms: "Reports of Government Agencies" and "Payments to Banks." These lists show higher numbers at earlier dates than the *Der Außenhandel* reports because they reflect when shipments either left Soviet hands (and were reported to German agencies) or when the Germans ordered their goods (and had to pay up front, unlike the USSR which paid upon receipt) instead of when shipments crossed German tariff borders. However, these figures are less complete, result in wildly fluctuating month-to-month totals, and are ultimately less meaningful because both sides could always delay or renege on earlier deals reflected in these alternate statistics. See Schwendemann, 368, for the opposing argument.

Note also that all these import statistics continued for months, and actually for years, after the invasion began. Apparently, the Germans counted as imports items that were confiscated during the occupation as long as these goods fell under the provisions of earlier treaties or of agreements signed with the new puppet governments.

3. As explained in more detail in Appendix B, the "Trade" provisions of the August 19, 1939, treaty required the Germans to provide the Soviets with 90 million RM of orders by August 19, 1940, and 180 million RM of orders by August 19, 1941. The "Credit" provisions required the Germans to provide 120 million RM of orders by August 19, 1940, and 200 million RM of orders by August 19, 1941. The February 11, 1940, treaty required the Germans to send 170 million RM of goods to the USSR by August 11, 1940, 340 million RM by February 11, 1941, and 425 million RM by May 11, 1941. In December 1940, this 425 million RM total was revised to 338 million RM. The January 10, 1941, treaty did not oblige the Germans to send any shipments in addition to those under the February 11, 1940, agreement until after May 11, 1941. The Germans, however, did have a special agreement from December 1940 to pay 23 million RM in gold for Bessarabian agricultural products. I have calculated percentages for the January 10, 1941, treaty against this 23 million RM figure.

4. The August 19, 1939, treaty required the Soviets to send 90 million RM of goods by August 19, 1940, and 180 million RM by August 19, 1941. The February 11, 1940, treaty required the Soviets to provide 212.5 million RM by August 11, 1940, and 425 million RM by February 11, 1941. In December 1940, this last figure was revised to 338

million RM. Finally, the January 10, 1941, treaty called for the Soviets to send 115 million RM by May 11, 1941.

5. Note that platinum is given in tons and includes iridium shipments. BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Stb, "Kriegswirtschaftlicher Lagebericht," *RW 19/99*, 28a, gives somewhat different figures for February through May of 1941: oil—93.8 thousand tons, copper—1.4, nickel—0.3, tin—0.1, and manganese—5.9.

6. By way of comparison, *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya* gives the following totals in millions of rubles for the years 1938–1940: oil—2.9, 2.6, 102.9; manganese—3.7, 1.3, 9.2; chemicals—2.0, 0.7, 11.4.

7. Percentages are calculated on the basis of thousands of tons, except for platinum, chemical goods, dyes and colors, and phosphates, which are calculated on the basis of millions of RM because of the variety of items included under these categories (such as the very expensive iridium included in the platinum totals).

8. BAMA, *RW 19/99*, 28a, gives somewhat different figures for the months from February to May of 1941: grains and legumes at 587,400 tons and oil cake at 10,400 tons.

9. *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya* estimates as follows for the years 1938–1940 in millions of rubles: grains—0.2, 1.0, 168.1; legumes—0.7, 6.3, 16.0; oil cake—0.0, 0.0, 7.7.

10. Percentages calculated on the basis of millions of RM.

11. These Soviet totals do not always compare exactly with those given in *Statistische Jahrbücher*. In this and in most other cases where there are both German and Soviet trade figures, the Soviet numbers are slightly higher, usually because of more liberal bookkeeping procedures. Medicott also notes that a comparison of these Soviet figures with Britain's Ministry of Economic Warfare estimates shows the general accuracy of the Ministry's estimates. Unfortunately, Medicott's own accuracy in adding these Soviet figures is somewhat off on page 658, though the numbers in "Economic Warfare," in *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The War and the Neutrals*, eds. Arnold Toynbee and Veronica Toynbee (London: Oxford University, 1956), 38, have been corrected.

12. Naval equipment is counted in individual pieces instead of in thousands of tons. Eichler's figures for coal (page 291) have the decimal point moved over one place, so his numbers are too low.

13. *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya* gives the following numbers in millions of rubles for the years 1938–1940: coal—0.0, 0.0, 64.0; machine tools—31.5, 334.5, 149.7; chemicals—5.8, 1.2, 9.9; electrical goods—1.8, 1.3, 28.9; naval equipment—0.0, 0.0, 27.1.

14. All percentages calculated on the basis of millions of RM a year.

15. These reports calculate their figures based on when oil shipments left Soviet hands—by land at Przemyśl and Terespol, by the Black Sea at Batumi, and by the Baltic at Leningrad, Tallinn, Reval, and Riga. Hartmut Schustereit, "Die Mineralöllieferungen der Sowjetunion an das Deutsch Reich 1940/41," *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 67 (1980): 347, double counts some 1941 Black Sea shipments that had been temporarily delayed in Constanța. Consequently, his "Black Sea" numbers for February to May of 1941 are slightly higher than those listed above: 34.2, 6.7, 24.5, and 47.7 thousand tons, respectively.

16. Soviet imports are taken from the *WiRüAmt* report that counts shipments that crossed the German border and therefore overlooks some of the stocks that were captured or used in foreign countries. Other estimates, therefore, while less complete, offer higher totals, ranging up to a total of 1 million tons higher than the Soviet Union provided to the Axis cause.

Fuel stocks are adapted from the two USSBS reports. Unfortunately, these charts only

include stocks of aviation, motor, and diesel fuels and ignore stocks of fuel and lubricating oils. The USSBS gives the following estimates in tons for these items: fuel oil—810,00 (August 1939), 300,000 (August 1940); lubricating oil—138,000 (August 1939), 228,000 (January 1940), 196,000 (January 1941), and 162,000 (January 1942). Stocks of other petroleum products appear to have been minimal. In general, these figures show aviation, motor, and diesel fuels to have been about 80 to 85 percent of total stocks (I have used 82 percent throughout). The estimated levels given for all stocks, therefore, are only a guide to the overall German oil situation, but the end result without Soviet oil exports would probably have fallen somewhere in between the two sets of data shown in the table.

17. There is some confusion about the amount of rubber that transited the Soviet Union. Medlicott estimates 18,800 based on Soviet figures. The “Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry,” in *USSBS*, 1945 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1947), 16, puts the total via the USSR at 16,000 tons. On the other hand, Robert Goralski and Russell Freeburg, *Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat* (New York: William Morrow, 1987), 66, state that the famous express train that crossed the German border at midnight on June 22, 1941, contained 21,000 tons of raw rubber by itself, instead of the 2,100 tons it actually carried!

18. Imports from the USSR include shipments from the Baltics after these countries were occupied by the USSR in July 1940. As usual, the statistics from *Der Außenhandel Deutschlands* are conservative compared to Soviet and other internal German figures, which estimate Soviet grain shipments at a few hundred thousand tons higher.

19. These oil and especially rubber figures are probably too low because German exports of these materials were counted under civilian consumption. “Much of this exported rubber, however, was subsequently reimported or supplied to the *Wehrmacht* outside Germany,” according to “Effects,” *USSBS*, 84. Finally, much of the remaining export went to the armed forces of Axis allies. For further figures on rubber consumption, see BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Dr. Hedler, “Kautschuk und die Versorgungslage im Kriege, 1941,” *RW 19/1467*, Anlage 10.

20. The various monthly reports list total exports and the amounts that crossed the Lithuanian-Soviet-Polish border until July 1940, and the newly formed Soviet-Polish border thereafter.

21. None of the figures from Tables 5.1 to 5.4 include transit shipments or other services rendered by the Soviets. Note also that BAMA/OKW/WiRüAmt/Ro, “Vortragsnotiz: Das deutsch-sowjetische Wirtschaftsabkommen 11.2.40,” *Wi/D.21*, 61, offers somewhat higher figures for the amounts due under the August 19 credit agreement: cotton at 30,800 tons, grain at 352,700 tons, and platinum at 860 kilograms.

22. Platinum and iridium were flown to Germany from Moscow.

23. The report from which most of these tables are constructed does not include information for contracts reached after July 10, 1940.

24. A November 28, 1939, Soviet offer was later raised, and no agreement was reached.

25. The two reached a special agreement for the extra amount above two million RM.

26. Packing questions kept any treaty from being concluded.

27. The July 2, 1940, treaty for 12,000 tons was apparently never ratified, though the totals shipped would seem to include tonnage from this agreement.

28. The Russia Committee reported that the Soviets had exhausted their export potential at 300 to 350 tons a year.

29. For the May 25, 1940, treaty, the Soviets had demanded a 50 percent price increase.
30. This low price was intended to balance the high price for glycerine. Note that the price is in American dollars.
31. Transportation costs delayed the negotiations.
32. The *WiRüAmt* dates the main treaty on February 12, 1940. Note that these delivery totals apparently included some waste cotton as well.
33. The *WiRüAmt* lists the December 1, 1939, agreement as 915 tons.
34. The Germans requested and received an additional 8,000 tons because of the good prices for this item.
35. The Germans complained of high prices and low quality.
36. An offer had been expected by July 1, 1940, but apparently never materialized.
37. Low resin oil and castor oil prices were intended to balance this high cost.
38. Transportation costs are listed as 7 to 9 RM per ton. The Russia Committee complained repeatedly about lagging Soviet deliveries.
39. The Soviets had originally asked for 21,000 RM per ton.
40. High Soviet prices and the German capture of the iron ore mines in Lothringen, France, scuttled these talks.
41. See note 19 for Appendix A.
42. The Russia Committee was apparently on the verge of completing a treaty for 200,000 tons, but the agreement was never concluded.
43. High Soviet prices resulted in no treaty being reached by July 10, 1940.
44. The main treaty was signed on February 14, 1940.
45. The Russia Committee had initially been hoping for agreements totaling 200,000 tons instead of the 135,000 tons in the two main treaties. There was a special accord signed later, however, that added another 110,000 tons.
46. The Germans also initially paid the Rumanians 200 percent over pre-war market prices. Note that the *WiRüAmt* lists the November 1939 oil treaty on February 7 and February 15, 1940.
47. The Russia Committee was concerned about planned steamer transportation costs of 27.5 to 43 *pfennig* per ton.
48. The main treaty was signed on November 22, 1939.
49. There was still no Soviet offer as of July 10, 1940.
50. The *WiRüAmt* dates the July 2, 1940, treaty from June 25; counts 5,305 tons for the May 22, 1940, agreement; and ignores the December 1939 arrangement.
51. This treaty had yet to be officially signed as of November 1, 1940.
52. The June 1940 agreement had yet to be officially signed as of July 10, 1940.
53. Freight and insurance costs added 2 percent to the final price.
54. The Russia Committee noted occasional problems with transportation costs.
55. Packing costs added 15 percent to the final price.
56. Since the figures for shipments planned and contracted for are from German sources and the figures for shipments actually delivered are from Soviet sources, the comparisons are not always exact or complete.

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Appendix B: German-Soviet Economic Treaties

CREDIT AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 19, 1939

Representatives of the Government of the German Reich and representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have conducted negotiations with each other on placing additional Soviet orders in Germany, and have come to the following agreement:

Article 1

(1) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will cause the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany, or the importing organizations of the U.S.S.R., to place additional orders to the amount of 200 million Reichsmark with German firms.

(2) The additional orders shall be placed exclusively for supplies for capital investment purposes, that is in particular for: Equipment of factories, Installations, Fittings of various kinds, Machinery and machine tools of all kinds, Construction of apparatus, Equipment for the naphtha industry, Equipment for the chemical industry, Products of the electro-technical industry, Ships, Vehicles, Means of transport, Measuring instruments, Laboratory equipment.

(3) The usual spare parts for such supplies are also included. There are further included contracts for technical assistance and bringing installations into operation, where these are stipulated in connection with orders placed under this Credit Agreement.

(4) The value of individual orders shall not be less than 50,000 Reichsmark.

(5) Not included in the additional orders, are orders for so-called current business. Such are, in particular: Raw materials, Semi-finished products, Spare parts (other than those mentioned in paragraph 3), Chemical products, Consumer goods, Articles of daily use.

(6) The Trade Delegation and the importing organizations shall be free in the choice of firms when placing orders. German firms shall likewise be free to decide whether, and to what extent, they wish to accept orders under this Agreement.

(7) Orders from List A will be placed within a period of two years from the date of the conclusion of this Agreement. By the end of the first year from the conclusion of this Agreement, the value of the orders shall not exceed 120 million Reichsmark.

(8) Orders will be placed by the Trade Delegation, or, with joint liability of the Trade Delegation, by the importing organizations of the U.S.S.R.

(9) The German Government undertake to give the Trade Delegation and the importing organizations of the U.S.S.R. the necessary assistance in placing orders, in each individual case where required, particularly in respect of delivery dates and the quality of the goods.

(10) The delivery terms for orders placed under this Agreement shall be the normal ones and the prices for such supplies shall be reasonable.

(11) Article VII of the German-Soviet Agreement on Trade and Payments, of December 19, 1938, shall also apply to orders placed under this Agreement.

Article 2

The German Government declare that the German Gold Discount Bank ("Dego") has given them an undertaking to finance the additional orders to the amount of 200 million Reichsmark on the following terms:

(1) The Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany shall deposit bills of exchange with "Dego." These bills shall have an average term of seven years and shall be drawn for each individual transaction in such a way that

30 percent of the amount of the order shall run for 6 1/2 years,

40 percent of the amount of the order shall run for 7 years,

30 percent of the amount of the order shall run for 7 1/2 years.

The bills of exchange shall be drawn by the importing organizations of the U.S.S.R. and endorsed for acceptance by the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. The bills shall be drawn in Reichsmark and shall be payable in Berlin.

(2) On the basis of the bills of exchange, "Dego" shall make a credit available to the Trade Delegation and the importing organizations of the U.S.S.R., which shall be used to pay the German firms cash in Reichsmark. "Dego" will not require endorsement of this credit by the German suppliers.

(3) The bills of exchange shall bear 5 percent interest per annum. This shall be paid by the Trade Delegation to "Dego" at the end of each quarter through the Trade Delegation's current account with "Dego." The interest shall be covered by bills of exchange if "Dego" so requires.

(4) The Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany shall have the right to redeem before maturity the bills of exchange deposited with "Dego," in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (3) of this article, in which case interest will be paid only for the period that has elapsed.

Article 3

The agreement on the technical method of payment, in accordance with Article II of this agreement, will be concluded between "Dego" and the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R.

Article 4

Orders shall be placed in accordance with the provisions laid down in the General Delivery Conditions, the Arbitration Agreement, and the Final Protocol, signed on March 20, 1935, by the Russian Committee of German Industry, on the one side, and by the Trade Delegation, on the other side, with amendments which may be agreed on in an exchange of letters between the appropriate agencies of both sides.

Article 5

(1) The Government of the U.S.S.R. give an undertaking to take measures for the delivery to Germany of the goods set out in List C, to the minimum values indicated therein, within two years from the conclusion of this agreement. The prices of these goods shall be reasonable.

(2) Delivery of, and payment for, the Soviet goods shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the German-Soviet Agreement on Trade and Payments, of December 19, 1938.

(3) Should the Agreement of December 19, 1938, not be extended during the term of this Agreement or, in the event of extension, be amended, it shall continue to apply unless otherwise agreed upon, until such time as all bills of exchange and interest on the credit have been paid up and the amounts paid in for Soviet deliveries of goods have been used for the redemption of all bills of exchange, including the previous ones.

(4) This applies also to Articles VII and VIII of the above-mentioned Agreement of December 19, 1938.

(5) The German Government undertakes to issue permits promptly for the import of Soviet goods into Germany, to an amount sufficient to cover at due date the credit provided for in this Agreement, and the payment of interest thereon, as well as to meet all other liabilities of U.S.S.R. bills of exchange in Germany. With this object in view, the two Governments shall, in due time, enter into negotiations for drawing up annual lists of such goods the import of which into Germany meets the requirements of German economy on the one hand and Soviet possibilities and interests on the other.

(6) The German Government further undertakes to render assistance to the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany and to the Soviet importing organizations in placing orders and obtaining supplies of other goods set out in List B, against the free amounts resulting from the sale of Soviet goods in Germany.

Article 6

At least 60 percent of the German supplies shall be carried by German ships, if available, at rates which are usual and normal in view of the freight situation on the Germany-U.S.S.R. run. The remainder of the German supplies shall be carried by Soviet ships, using German seaports.

Article 7

(1) Should difficulties arise in placing and duly executing the orders provided for in this Agreement, or in the delivery of other goods—against the credit as well as against the current proceeds resulting from Soviet exports—the two Governments shall immediately enter into negotiations for the purpose of removing such difficulties. If no settlement is reached the further obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under Article V of this Agreement, regarding the execution of measures for the delivery of Soviet goods to Germany, as set out in List C, shall be suspended until the ratio provided for in paragraph (3) of this Article is reached.

(2) The same shall apply in the event of difficulties arising in the delivery of Soviet goods to the extent provided for in Article 5 of this Agreement: the two Governments shall immediately enter into negotiations for the purpose of removing such difficulties. If no settlement is reached the further obligations of the German Government under Article I of this Agreement, in connection with facilitating the placing and due execution of orders against the credit, shall be suspended until the ratio provided for in the following paragraph of this article is reached.

(3) In the cases referred to in this article, the Government concerned shall not be released from their obligations to take all measures to reach, in the shortest time, a ratio between the orders in accordance with Lists A and B on the one hand and the contracts for the supply of Soviet goods, in accordance with List C, on the other hand, corresponding to the totals of these Lists. In this connection the two Governments shall take the necessary measures for the execution of the orders and contracts in accordance with the terms contained therein.

Article 8

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.

Done in duplicate in the German and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

BERLIN, August 19, 1939.

For the German Government:

DR. K. SCHNURRE

For the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

E. BABARIN

Confidential Protocol

In connection with the Credit Agreement between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed today, the undersigned have agreed as follows:

The German Government will refund 1/2 percent per annum of the interest agreed upon and paid, so that an actual interest rate of 4 1/2 percent per annum on the credit will remain. This refund will be made at fixed repayment dates, to be agreed upon between "Dego" and the Trade Delegation, in such a manner that 10 percent of the interest paid by the Trade Delegation for each accounting period will be refunded at the payment dates. Payment of such amounts shall be made in Reichsmark into one of the special accounts opened under the Agreement on Trade and Payments of December 19, 1938, of the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany, or of the National Bank of the U.S.S.R.

The amounts payable may be used in accordance with Article 4 of the said Agreement on Trade and Payments.

It is understood that the right, specified in paragraph 17 of Article 4 of the above-mentioned agreement of December 19, 1938, of using the balances in the special accounts for payments of interest, extends also to the interest on the credit which is the subject of the Credit Agreement signed today between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

BERLIN, August 19, 1939.

For the German Government: For the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

DR. K. SCHNURRE

E. BABARIN

Final Protocol On the German-Soviet Negotiations on Trade and Credit of August 19, 1939

I. After examination of their full powers, which were found to be in due form, the Contracting Parties signed the Credit Agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and exchanged copies of this document.

II. The documents set out below, being integral parts of the Credit Agreement above referred to, were signed and delivered:

1. List A of German deliveries;
2. List B of German deliveries;
3. List C of Soviet deliveries;
4. Confidential Protocol regarding refund.

BERLIN, August 19, 1939.

For the German Government: For the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

DR. K. SCHNURRE

E. BABARIN

Enclosure 1

MY DEAR HERR SCHNURRE: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of today, which reads as follows:

"In connection with the Credit Agreement signed today, you expressed the desire that the German Government should lend their assistance so that the proposed U.S.S.R. orders in Germany may be successfully placed and executed.

"To this I have the honor to declare that the German Government will, as heretofore in individual cases, give assistance to the Trade Delegation and the Soviet importing organizations in the placing and execution of orders.

"The German Government will further see to it that representatives of the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and of the Soviet importing organizations may visit such firms as are prepared to undertake deliveries, in order to ascertain the quality of the articles to be ordered. The German Government will also see to it that representatives of the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and of the Soviet Importing Organizations are given the opportunity, after placing an order, of visiting, upon previous notice, the factories of the suppliers, for the purpose of ascertaining the position on, and progress of, the order, to undertake the requisite inspections in the case of special orders and to effect the expert passing of the goods."

The Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Berlin will in such cases immediately inform the Reich Ministry of Economics of the opening of negotiations on orders with firms, so that the Reich Ministry of Economics may exert its influence in the sense of this letter.

I declare myself in accord with the contents of this letter.

With the assurance of my highest consideration,

E. BABARIN

Enclosure 2

MY DEAR HERR SCHNURRE: I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of today, which reads as follows:

"During the negotiations on the Credit Agreement, it was pointed out most emphatically on the German side that the prerequisite for the now newly regulated German-Soviet foreign trade is a good and smooth functioning of the arbitration procedure of March 20, 1935, agreed upon between the Russia Committee of German Industry and the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany. On the Soviet side, readiness was expressed to ensure, jointly with the German side, the functioning of the arbitration procedure and to take up this question immediately upon the conclusion of the Credit Agreement. The German side took note of this.

"Immediately the Credit Agreement has been concluded, both sides will do their best towards having this question settled between the Russia Committee of German Industry and the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Germany."

I declare myself in accord with the contents of this letter.

With the assurance of my highest consideration,

E. BABARIN

ECONOMIC AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 11, 1940

In the exchange of letters of September 28, 1939, between the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it was established that the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the basis of and in the sense of the general political understanding achieved, desired by all possible means to develop the commercial relations and the exchange of commodities between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For this purpose an economic program was to be drawn up by both sides, according to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should make deliveries of raw materials to Germany, which should be compensated for by Germany with industrial deliveries over a more extended period of time.

As a result of the negotiations for the establishment and execution of the contemplated economic program, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have made the following Agreement:

Article 1

In the period February 11, 1940, to February 11, 1941, in addition to the deliveries provided for in the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939, the commodities enumerated in List 1 to the value of 420 to 430 million Reichsmarks shall be delivered from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Germany.

Article 2

In the period February 11, 1941, to August 11, 1941, there shall be delivered, likewise in addition to the deliveries provided for in the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939, commodities to the value of 220 to 230 million Reichsmarks from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Germany, namely, in each case, half of the values or amounts specified for the various commodities in List 1.

Article 3

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pledges itself to take all measures necessary to insure the performance of the deliveries named in Articles 1 and 2. The deliveries shall begin immediately.

Article 4

In payment for the Soviet deliveries provided for in Article 1, German products of the kind designated in List 2 (war material) and List 3 (industrial equipment and other industrial products) to the value of 420 to 430 million Reichsmarks shall be delivered from Germany to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period of February 11, 1940 to May 11, 1941.

Article 5

In payment of the Soviet deliveries provided for in Article 2, German products of the kind designated in List 4 (war material) and List 5 (industrial equipment and other industrial products) to the value of 220 to 230 million Reichsmarks shall be delivered from Germany to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period of May 11, 1941 to May 11, 1942.

Article 6

The Government of the German Reich pledges itself to take all steps necessary to insure the performance of the deliveries named in Articles 4 and 5. The German deliveries shall begin immediately.

Article 7

In List 6 appended to this Agreement are specified the machinery, equipment, and processes of production which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is interested in acquiring or receiving. Both parties shall take all steps that may be necessary in order that commercial contracts for machinery, equipment, and processes of production of the kind enumerated in the list may be concluded as soon as possible.

The payments that become due on the basis of these contracts during the validity of this Agreement shall be made from special accounts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Germany by way of the German-Soviet clearing system. If they become due during the first fifteen months of the Treaty they shall be used in settlement of the Soviet deliveries provided for in Article 1, and insofar as they become due in the succeeding twelve months, in settlement of the Soviet deliveries provided for in Article 2.

For this settlement other payments which are credited to the special accounts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for example for transit traffic, shall also be used.

Article 8

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has declared by the exchange of letters of September 28, 1939, that it is prepared to deliver, in addition to the quantities of petroleum otherwise agreed upon or still to be agreed upon, a supplementary quantity of petroleum equivalent to the annual production of the Drohobycz and Boryslaw oil region, in such proportions that half of this amount shall be delivered to Germany from the oil fields of the said oil region and the other half from the other oil regions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As compensation for these petroleum deliveries the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall receive deliveries of coal and steel tubing.

It is agreed that the quantities of petroleum and petroleum products to be delivered in accordance herewith during the period September 28, 1939, to September 28, 1940, shall be included in the amount named in List 1. In calculating the value of the compensatory deliveries of coal and steel tubing, it

shall be assumed that this first annual amount is equal to the value of 30 million Reichsmarks. These petroleum deliveries shall be compensated by German deliveries of coal to the value of 20 million Reichsmarks and steel tubing to the value of 10 million Reichsmarks. These deliveries shall be made by September 28, 1940.

Article 9

Both parties take it for granted that the mutual deliveries based on this Agreement are to balance.

The Soviet deliveries made during the first twelve months of the duration of this Agreement shall be compensated by German deliveries by May 11, 1941; that is, after the first six months 50 percent of the Soviet deliveries provided for in the first period of the treaty shall be balanced by 40 percent of the German deliveries provided for in the same period of time; after twelve months 100 percent of the Soviet deliveries shall be balanced by 80 percent of the German deliveries. The rest of the German deliveries shall be made within the following three months.

The Soviet deliveries made during the period from the thirteenth to the end of the eighteenth month of the duration of this Agreement shall be compensated by German deliveries to be made during the period from the sixteenth to the end of the twenty-seventh month, computed from the date this Agreement goes into effect, in equal quarterly amounts. It is provided that during this second period of the Agreement a balance sheet of the mutual deliveries shall be drawn up every three months.

Article 10

Each of the two Governments shall appoint plenipotentiaries who shall meet on the date specified in the previous Article. The task of these plenipotentiaries shall be to study currently the total commercial intercourse between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the observance of the percentage relationship between the German and Soviet deliveries mentioned in Article 9, and to take all measures necessary to carry out the economic program agreed upon between the Governments, especially to balance the above-mentioned percentage relationship.

The Plenipotentiaries of both Governments shall be empowered within the scope of their duties to communicate with each other directly, either in writing or orally. They may from time to time draw the experts needed in their work into their consultations.

If the percentage relationship fixed by Article 9 for the mutual deliveries is disturbed in one of the periods of time, both parties shall take measures in the shortest possible time for the removal of the disproportion, in which connecting supplementary deliveries, especially of coal, shall be used by Germany as a means of settlement. In case this cannot be arranged, the interested party shall have the right to discontinue temporarily its deliveries until the stipulated relationship is attained.

Article 11

In the execution of this Agreement the following shall be applied:

(a) the Agreement regarding exchange of goods and payments of December 31, 1939;

(b) the provisions of Article IV and of section 3 of Article V of the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939. Besides, in connection with the payment of Soviet obligations arising from orders made on the basis of this Agreement, the provisions of section 5 of Article V of the above-mentioned Credit Agreement shall be correspondingly applicable;

(c) the Confidential Protocol of August 26, 1939.

Article 12

Both Parties have agreed that the accommodations granted for transit traffic on the basis of the exchange of letters of September 28, 1939 (freight reductions of 50 percent on soybeans and the payment of all railway freight charges in the transit traffic through the German-Soviet clearing system) shall remain in force during the entire period of validity of this Agreement. In order to facilitate use of the sums paid in Reichsmarks by Germany for freight charges, Germany shall lend her cooperation to the Soviets in placing orders in Germany and in acquiring goods and techniques of production there.

Article 13

The Agreement shall not affect the Credit Agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of August 19, 1939, which shall remain completely in force.

Article 14

This Agreement shall become effective upon signature.

Done in two original copies in the German and the Russian languages respectively, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in Moscow, February 11, 1940.

For the Government of the German Reich: Representing the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

K. RITTER
K. SCHNURRE

A. MIKOYAN
BABARIN

Confidential Protocol

In connection with the Economic Agreement signed today between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of both Parties have agreed concerning the following:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall instruct the

proper Soviet commercial organizations to enter into negotiations with the German organizations and firms designated by the Government of the German Reich in regard to the purchase by the Soviet Union of metals and other goods in third countries and in regard to the sale of these metals and goods to Germany. Such sales shall be made by the Soviet organizations on the following basis:

Payment for the goods by the German purchasers up to 70 percent in transferable foreign currency to be designated by the Soviet commercial organization making the delivery and 30 percent in Reichsmarks in accordance with the German-Soviet Agreement regarding exchange of goods and payments of December 31, 1939. If the German purchaser is not in a position to make payment in the currency suggested by the Soviet commercial organization, he may offer to make payment in another transferable currency. If the Soviet commercial organization refuses this currency, payment shall be made in gold on conditions to be agreed upon between the purchaser and the Soviet commercial organization making delivery.

In this connection the Germans shall, for the purpose of utilization of the sums in Reichsmarks paid by the Germans to the Soviet commercial organizations, lend their cooperation in placing orders in Germany and in acquisition of goods and production techniques in Germany.

Moscow, February 11, 1940.

For the Government of the German Reich: Representing the Government of the
U.S.S.R.:

K. RITTER
K. SCHNURRE

A. MIKOYAN
BABARIN

AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 10, 1941

As the result of negotiations concerning reciprocal deliveries on the basis of the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940, in the second treaty period the German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached agreement on the following:

Article 1

In the period February 11, 1941, to August 1, 1942, commodities specified in List 1A to the value of 620 to 640 million Reichsmarks will be delivered from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Germany. The obligations for deliveries stipulated in articles 2 to 8 of the Economic Agreement are hereby superseded.

Article 2

In compensation for the Soviet deliveries in article 1, German commodities as stipulated in List 1B to the value of 620 to 640 million Reichsmarks will be delivered from Germany to the U.S.S.R.

It is agreed that the Soviet Government can furthermore during the period of validity of this agreement tender orders with times of delivery going beyond August 1, 1942.

The obligations for deliveries stipulated in articles 5 and 8 of the Economic Agreement are hereby superseded.

Article 3

The apportionment of the German and Soviet deliveries in the particular periods will be done on the basis of equality between the German and Soviet deliveries in each quarter of a year.

As an exception to paragraph 1 of this article, that part of the deliveries specified in articles 1 and 2 which had been stipulated in the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940—i.e., German and Soviet deliveries each to the value of 225 million Reichsmarks—is to be carried out in accordance with the schedule laid down in the aforesaid agreement.

Article 4

In conformity with article 3, the German and Soviet deliveries stipulated in articles 1 and 2 of this agreement are to be completed in quarterly installments according to the following schedule:

<i>Quarterly installment</i>	<i>Soviet deliveries</i>	<i>German deliveries</i>
From Feb. 11 to May 11, 1941	115	
From May 11 to Aug. 11, 1941	170	117
From Aug. 11, to Nov. 1, 1941	87	143

From Nov. 1, 1941 to Feb. 1, 1942	86	142
From Feb. 1 to May 1, 1942	86	142
From May 1 to Aug. 1, 1942	86	86

The period from August 11, 1941, to November 1, 1941, is reckoned as quarterly installment.

Article 5

If the ratio of quarterly German and Soviet deliveries stipulated in article 4 of this agreement is not attained, both parties will take measures to eliminate this faulty ratio at the earliest possible date. The Plenipotentiaries of both Governments named in article 10 of the Economic Agreement will meet at the latest within fifteen days after the end of the corresponding quarterly period.

Article 6

Otherwise, the terms of the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940, as well as the Confidential Protocol and the exchange of letters which go along with it, remain in force in their full extent until August 1, 1942, so far as they are not changed by the above terms.

The terms of the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940, and of this agreement are also to be applied to orders and deliveries on the basis of this agreement whose fulfillment will possibly not have been completed by August 1, 1942.

Article 7

This agreement shall become effective upon signature. Done in two original copies in the German and Russian languages respectively, both texts being equally authentic.

Executed in Moscow, January 10, 1941.

For the Government of the German Reich: With Full Power of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

K. SCHNURRE

A.I. MIKOYAN

German-Soviet Russian Secret Protocol

The German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, Plenipotentiary of the Government of the German Reich, on the one hand, and the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR, V.M. Molotov, Plenipotentiary of the Government of the USSR, on the other hand, have agreed upon the following:

(1) The Government of the German Reich renounces its claim to the strip of Lithuanian territory which is mentioned in the Secret Additional Protocol of

September 28, 1939, and which has been marked on the map attached to this Protocol;

(2) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is prepared to compensate the Government of the German Reich for the territory mentioned in Point 1 of this Protocol by paying 7,500,000 gold dollars or 31,500,000 Reichsmarks to Germany.

The amount of 31.5 million Reichsmarks will be paid by the Government of the USSR in the following manner: one-eighth, that is 3,937,500 Reichsmarks, in nonferrous metal deliveries within three months after the signing of this Protocol, the remaining seven-eighths, or 27,562,500 Reichsmarks, in gold by deduction from the German gold payments which Germany is to make by February 11, 1941, in accordance with the correspondence exchanged between the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation, Dr. Schnurre, and the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR, M.A.I. Mikoyan, in connection with the "Agreement of January 10, 1941, concerning reciprocal deliveries in the second treaty period on the basis of the Economic Agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of February 11, 1940."

(3) This Protocol has been executed in two originals in the German language and two originals in the Russian language and shall become effective immediately upon signature.

Moscow, January 10, 1941.

For the Government of the German Reich: With the Full Power of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.:

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V. MOLOTOV (Seal)

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